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
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THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1845.

EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

ART. I.—*A Treatise on Justification.* By GEORGE JUNKIN, D. D., President of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa. Pp. 328. 12mo. Philadelphia: J. Whetham. 1839.

IT is a consolatory truth, that our faith stands not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. So foolish are the wise of this world, so dark the most enlightened, that none could confidently trust eternal interests to such unworthy keeping. In approaching the fountains of heavenly wisdom, we cannot use too much simplicity; here only implicit faith is called for. Nor should this faith end when it has brought us to the Bible for instruction; we should still look to the inspired word, alone and self-interpreting, to reveal its own philosophy, and to guide us in all matters of faith and morals. A failure thus to esteem the word of revelation has ever been an evil of no inconsiderable magnitude among Christians. We are deeply sensible that too much refinement has been attempted in the elucidation of the gospel, and that an overdoing marks almost every system of theology. It is not enough to know the truths necessary to salvation, men also require the philosophy of the system of grace; not satisfied to know that the sinner may be raised from his fallen estate, they would also know every part of the machinery by which he is elevated and delivered. Doubtless there is a philosophical principle pervading the plan of recovering mercy, but it is equally certain that we but faintly and imperfectly perceive it. It rises too high and sinks too deep, it is altogether too vast for human comprehension. "These things the angels desire to look into," and no doubt find them more than their seraphic intellects can fully understand. Still, the subject is above all others worthy of our attention, not so much, however, as a subject of scrutiny, as of wonder and admiration.

It were well could we always decide what is cognizable and what is inscrutable, that we might neither rest in idle ignorance

of what should be known, nor rush with heedless steps "where angels dread to gaze." To us the gospel seems to have lost much of its efficiency by appearing in the borrowed trappings of the schools. The philosophy of Plato first palsied its arm, when in youthful vigor it was subduing thrones and dominions; that of Aristotle held it in dizzy trance for a thousand years. The Reformation, by abjuring philosophy and evoking the word of life, broke the spell and restored liberty to the gospel. Such plain truths as the fall of man, redemption by Christ, justification by faith and salvation by grace, are readily apprehended. But when we pass beyond these, and attempt a philosophical explanation of the whole economy of grace, we are in danger of "darkening counsel by words without knowledge."

This excess of philosophy is the more to be deprecated, since by reason of it the theory of the gospel is frequently learned before the gospel itself. Then what is afterward learned is interpreted by a preconceived theory, which, acting as a false lens, distorts and deranges the symmetry of the system of saving grace. Nor does the matter end in speculative errors. Man is naturally a logician, and therefore the simplest states of mind afford the purest logic. Persons of speculative habits may so torture their minds as to leave but little sympathy between their opinions and actions; but most men will act as they think. Simplicity may indeed expose to impositions from sophistry; but whatever premises may have been adopted, the unsophisticated mind hastens to the legitimate conclusion. Hence, though the evil tendency of any tenet may lie a little under the surface, it is not therefore the less dangerous; the proper inferences will generally be made.

The chief glory of Protestantism is, that it rejects human traditions, and adheres to the word of God—that it replaces the subtilties of the schools by the plain statements of the Bible. But as the Reformation, though the work of the Holy Spirit, was effected through human means, it were not to be expected that a work absolutely perfect would be accomplished through such instrumentalities. Some part of Reformed Christendom never escaped from the shackles of the past; others, breaking wholly away from prescriptive authority, leaned too much to their own understanding. It is acknowledged by his admirers that Calvin never fully lost the influence of the schoolmen, and that his "danger is, pushing his statements beyond the Scriptures." His theological system has been greatly enlarged and refined upon since his time, so that it would not be difficult to show that he was not more than half a Calvinist, according to the present acceptation of that term. The

doctrine set forth by the author under review is among these extra-Calvinian parts of systematic Calvinism.

The history of doctrinal theology for the past half century indicates that this system, having had its day, was about to share the fate of all things human, and take its place among the things that were. But as the strongest currents produce the greatest eddies, so the progress of truth not unfrequently gives occasion to the most violent efforts to re-establish some falling error. The preaching of the whole gospel, by casting into the shade the doctrine of partial atonement and discriminating grace, has awakened the advocates of those superannuated dogmas to endeavors to revive "Old School divinity." This movement is manifested not only in the rupture of ecclesiastical bodies, but still more in attempts to renew the antiquated works of old divines, and to revive doctrinal discussions for some time not much agitated. The work named at the head of this article is a specimen of this latter class of productions. In his preface the author complains of the laxness of the age as to attention to doctrinal opinions, and the general indifference to *definite* religious knowledge; and declares these to be the occasion of this publication. Supposing that the works of Boston, Owen, Witherspoon, and Edwards have fallen into desuetude, he would express their quintessence into his little volume; for though ostensibly a treatise on justification, it is not confined to that particular point, but considers it in connection with its cognate doctrines. In our notice of the book we shall attend less to its literary than to its doctrinal character. Differing with the author in his whole theory, we shall endeavor to give him a fair hearing before the reader, and in each case to show cause for our dissent.

The theology here sought to be revived may be distinguished as the system of the "covenants." A learned divine of former times, when he had composed "a complete body of divinity," entitled his work "The Economy of the Covenants," designating by that name all of the divine dispensations. The word "covenant" seems to have misled many to suppose that in these dispensations are to be found all the elements of a complete covenant between contracting parties—a position wholly untenable. "The word usually translated *covenant*, in the New Testament more properly signifies a *dispensation* or *appointment*, which is indeed suited to the majesty of law, and even to the authoritative establishment of a sole method of pardon. But in both there are parties, *not to the original institution*, but to their beneficent accomplishment, and *in this view* may be termed a covenant."—*Watson*. Thus guarded, (and it is only such a guard as is required to keep it to its Scriptural

sense,) we make no objection to the use of the word; but then it would fail to answer the end proposed by those who most delight in its use. There are usually reckoned two principal covenants,—the first called "the covenant of works," made by God with Adam immediately after his creation; the second called "the covenant of grace," made by the Father and Son from eternity. In the elucidation of the system, however, they are shown to be virtually and substantially the same,—being identical in the essential particulars of parties, tenure, and assent. In the first God treats with the human race through their representative, Adam; in the second, with the same party through the second Adam, Jesus Christ. In both the terms are, that the representative shall render obedience, by which those represented shall be justified. But in the second, as, by the failure of the first representative, the represented party were under the curse, penalty for the first transgression is required, as well as obedience, in order to justification. The representative character is here the fullest possible, wholly absorbing individual responsibility, and leaving only the susceptibility of pleasure or pain. So perfect is the oneness of the head and the members of the covenanting party, man, that the act of the head is really and truly the act of the members, and therefore the legal results of his acts are properly consequent to them. Had Adam kept the law during the period of his probation, his whole race, then federally in him, would have been saved beyond possible failure; and when he broke it, it was equally right that God should for that cause doom all his race to perdition. But God, in his own sovereign mercy, was pleased to appoint a second representative for a *portion* of Adam's fallen race; who, by suffering in their stead the penalty due for Adam's sin, redeemed them from death; and, by keeping the law in their stead, procured for them the rewards of everlasting life.

This theory of the "covenants," it will be seen, carries along with it the whole of old-fashioned Antinomian Calvinism,—decrees, unconditional election and reprobation, final perseverance, and finished salvation. The whole is a self-consistent theory, and only wants a foundation of evidence; of which, by the way, it is singularly deficient.

It is an abuse of language to apply an accommodated term in a sense widely different from that to which it was accommodated. The Bible does not teach that the divine dispensations are of the nature of contracts or treaties among sovereign states. By examining the first "covenant," it will be found that two of three particulars which constitute a covenant are wanting. It was not

made by the parties, for Adam had no existence when it was made,—the "covenant" being the same with the divine law, which is eternal; and if Adam, when he came into conscious being, found the law in full force upon him, though he no doubt approved it, still his approbation had nothing to do with the establishment of the "covenant." It was appointed by divine authority; its nature was essentially in being from eternity, and the creation of man could in no wise change it, nor was his approval necessary to give it authority. So thought the great Witsius: "The law," says he, "is deduced, by infallible consequence, from the nature of God and man. I presuppose that the great God has a sovereign and uncontrollable power and dominion over all his creatures. This authority is founded primarily and radically, not on creation, *nor on any contract entered into with the creature*, as some less solidly maintain; but on the majesty, supremacy, sovereignty, and eminence of God, which are his essential attributes, and would have been in God, though no creature had actually existed."* This is, beyond dispute, a more rational and Scriptural statement of the case than that of Dr. Junkin, who supposes that man's assent was an essential ingredient of the "covenant" of works. After stating that a covenant "includes three leading items, viz., the parties, the terms, and the voluntary assent or agreement," he proceeds as follows:—

"Now is there any moral transaction between God and man wherein the principles above recited are involved? Is there any proposition made by God to man, of the something to be done by the latter? any restipulation of something to be done by the former? any agreement of both? any penal sanctions? To all such interrogatories every superficial reader of the Bible, much more every accurate observer of its contents, must answer affirmatively."

"God leaves Adam to choose his course,—he does exercise volition, and that under no constraining perils calculated to interfere with his choice. This is perfectly plain and indisputable.... Yet it is true, in one sense, that he could not object. He could not without sin."

"There is not a hint at anything like a refusal on the part of Adam before the act of violation. The whole history is perfectly consistent with the supposition that he did cheerfully agree.... Adam was after his sin abundantly disposed to excuse himself.... Now, most assuredly, if Adam could in truth have said, I never *consented* to abstain,—I never *agreed* to the terms proposed,—I have broken no *pledge*,—he would have presented this apology or justification. But he was dumb: he offered no apology. Can any reasonable man want further evidence of his consent?"—Pp. 46, 47, 49.

We pass in silence over the self-confident assumptions of what

* Economy of the Covenants, chap. iii, sec. 8.

must be done by "every superficial reader of the Bible," and "any reasonable man," and come to examine our author's positions. It is evident that he holds Adam's assent to have been necessary to render the covenant valid; and had he withheld his assent, and committed the act for which he was condemned, he would have had an "apology or justification." All this is quite explicit in statement, though not so well supported by evidence. But we are greatly at a loss how to reconcile the learned doctor with himself, when he also says, that "he could not object without sin." The two propositions, side by side, stand thus: 1. Had not Adam consented to the tenure of the covenant of works, it would have been a cause of justification when he ate of the forbidden fruit: 2. Had not Adam consented to the terms of the covenant of works, in the day that God created him, it would have been sin. Now there appears to us not only a plain contradiction in these two expressions, but the latter seems also to contradict the part with which it is immediately connected; for if to refuse assent was to sin, surely there were some "constraining perils calculated to interfere with his choice," should that be to dissent. "This is" (to us) "perfectly indisputable." We are equally at a loss as to the character of that sin of which Adam would have been guilty, had he refused his consent to the terms of the covenant. We had supposed that the advocates of the covenant theology hold sin, and non-compliance with the terms of the covenant, to be equivalent expressions. But here, while we are listening to instruction which teaches that the covenant became obligatory by Adam's consent to its terms, we are gravely told, that he would have sinned in objecting! We have heard of "uncovenanted mercies" from another source, but the penalty of such a sin must be something hitherto unheard of—"uncovenanted wrath." The whole affair is a miserable attempt to patch up an excuse for the condemnation of the "non-elect," for Adam's sin; as though he having assented to the terms of the proposed covenant, and then broke them, all were justly condemned to eternal death for it. Still, all must be conscious that it is man's duty to obey God even without having *agreed* to do so; our author felt this, and therefore inserted one true expression in the midst of his sophisms, which, like Aaron's rod among those of the magicians, swallows them all. There is no doubt sufficient occasion for this change of ground among the school of theologians who hold these peculiarities, since the times of Witsius. The apparent injustice and cruelty of the horrible decree of unconditional reprobation have been so closely pressed, that they would escape it by this fiction of consent. But the web is too thin to bear its own

weight. *No reasonable man believes that man's consent is necessary to render him wholly subject to his Maker;* and therefore every conclusion drawn from such premises is without proper foundation, and an insult to the common sense of mankind.

In all his dispensations God acts as an absolute sovereign. He does right, for it is not in his nature to do wrong. His eternal essence is the original pattern of all moral excellence; the notions of right and wrong found in the human heart are but transcripts of it, perverted at times, but generally correcting their own obliquities. Whether this power is of natural discernment, or the effect of "that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," we stop not now to determine. Of this moral perception in man God takes cognizance when he commends his dispensations to human scrutiny, and challenges the approbation of his rational creatures. A conviction of the rectitude of the divine economy is necessary to the maintenance of moral government. Hence it is requisite, not only that "the Judge of all the earth should do right," but also that the righteousness of his judgments should be manifest. To meet this necessity, God has made a declaration of the righteousness of his ways, in such clearness, and so suited to the sense of right found in every heart, that in our sinful world "every mouth is stopped." The notions of moral right with which we have now to do, relate to the nature of human responsibility. It is a universal sentiment, that no one should be responsible for that which he cannot control; and also that pain should not be penally inflicted, unless guilt has been incurred by voluntary transgression. The force of these sentiments appears to have been felt by our author; he therefore labors hard to accommodate his system to them. The former stands opposed to his sweeping overthrow in hopeless ruin of an unborn race, for the sins of one whom they could nowise control. To escape this difficulty, he resorts to the absurdity of pretending an absolute moral unity of the human race; as if all the individuals of the race of Adam were so present with him in Paradise as to be responsible participants of his volitions and actions, and therefore that they are justly condemned with him. It is indeed wonderful that such absurdity should find a moment's favor in any rational mind. We pity the blind credulity of the Papist, who can do such violence to his *senses* as to believe that matter, having all the sensible properties of bread, is really flesh and blood; how much more should we commiserate that perversity of intellect which can lead one to believe, against the more authoritative demonstrations of *consciousness*, that he held a responsible relation long before he had a personal existence! And who is not con-

scious of no participation in Adam's sin? If, then, none of Adam's posterity was so present in his first transgression as to be cognizant of it and to have control over it, we see not how they can be held responsible for it. That all were present in some sense we allow, though not in such a one as to render them liable to eternal death for anything that could occur there. All were there seminally; but this is almost no presence at all, for it is an exceedingly strong figure that can find an oak in an acorn, or millions of individuals in the loins of one man. We also admit that all Adam's family were present by representation. For he, as the head of our race, was the depositary of certain good things which belonged to him less in his individual character than as head of the race. When by sin he lost the public property in his care, he lost it for all as well as for himself. But among the things of which he was the depositary as the head of the family of man, was *not* the eternal *personal* welfare of any one. "As we sinned *seminally* in Adam, if God had not intended our redemption, his goodness would have engaged him to destroy us *seminally*, by crushing the capital offender who contained us all: so there would have been a just proportion between the sin and punishment; for as we sinned in Adam without the least consciousness of guilt, so in him we should have been punished without the least consciousness of pain."—*Fletcher.*

That there are social and relative responsibilities among men we do not deny; indeed, they are matters of daily experience. We also admit that legal guilt (liability to pain occasioned by sin) is by God imputed to others than those whose actions were the occasions of such guilt. On what principle of divine jurisprudence this is done does not particularly concern us; the truth we consider ultimate, and in theology, as elsewhere, ultimate truths limit investigation. But while we admit so plain a truth, we may not so extend and apply it as to infract truths equally clearly proved, and to dishonor the name of God. There are, unquestionably, both social and individual responsibilities resting upon all. The two may coexist in perfect harmony. To our dim sight there may seem to be danger of collisions, but we are assured that a powerful and skillful hand is governing the whole machinery. He is too strong to be thwarted in his purposes, "too wise to err, and too good to be unkind." We are not at liberty to suppose that the evils entailed by the sins of the fathers upon the children are strictly and purely penal. Only in a greatly modified sense may such pains be called penalties, and their occasions in the sufferers, guilt. Indeed, we may not suppose that any of the ills that befall

those who are within the reach of recovering mercy are strictly punitive in their purposes; and we hesitate not to believe, that in the strong sense which inevitably exposes to eternal death, no person is rendered guilty by another's act.

The great fault of that school of divinity which Dr. Junkin would revive, consists in so extending Adam's federal character as to swallow up the individual rights and responsibilities of his posterity. Speaking of the extent of the first "covenant," he says:—

"There is nothing to limit and bound the covenant with Adam... but the will of the parties. If God so willed it, and Adam so agreed to it, that he should act for all human persons—should represent the race—then so it was, and so the effects must be. The moral body is one. The head and the members go together; their destinies are the same."—P. 56.

As to the will of the party of the second part, (Adam,) we have shown (what was well known before) that it had nothing to do in establishing the "covenant;" for when he became a living soul he found the covenant or law in full force upon him. That the divine will is the measure and limit of his own decrees is not disputed; but it should be remembered that the will of God is no mere caprice, but the eternal law of righteousness. He can ordain only what is right. As to the oneness of the moral body, and the consequent identity of the head and members, we dissent from the premise till proved, and therefore cannot be expected to assent to the conclusion. Here, then, is the proof:—

"All the race of Adam suffer. This is a moral effect, and must have a moral cause. For in the government of a perfectly holy being, the sufferings of holy beings unconnected with sin is an impossibility. The human mind is so constructed that it cannot believe God would impose pain and anguish where there is no sin.... The moral sense of all men would revolt at such an idea. What! shall men suffer who have never sinned?"—Pp. 57, 58.

The existence of suffering and death may indeed be viewed as lasting mementoes of the truth that sin is in the world; not, however, that the latter is necessarily implied by the former, but because the Bible tells us that death entered into the world by sin. But we cannot agree with our author, that it is impossible to suppose there should be suffering unconnected with sin. Man knows too little of the inscrutable nature of the Almighty to determine, in every case, what is and what is not impossible with him. And if our own individual understanding is a specimen of the human mind, it is not constitutionally impossible "to suppose that God would impose pain where there is no sin." We are not sure

that this is not perfectly consistent with the divine perfections, and in full course of operation among other orders of creatures, preparing them by temporary suffering for the enjoyment of eternal felicity. Indeed, the state of Adam in the garden seems to have partaken somewhat of that character, since he *suffered* temptation and had a *trial* of his virtue. But the human mind does strongly revolt at the idea of infinite and endless pain, inflicted for sins over which the sufferer had not the least control, and in which he had no personal participation. It would be much better to take the truth that the Bible gives us, without additions of our own, and especially without attempting to determine what God can do and what he cannot, further than he has expressly declared. This whole labor to show that "Adam's sin is justly imputed to his posterity" is a work of supererogation. The divine administration needs no such apology. God has not only done all things well, but has also manifested the righteousness of his dispensations. He permitted our fallen first parents to propagate a fallen progeny. The sins of the parents thus became the occasion of sufferings in their descendants; but to assume that such sufferings are properly and finally punitive, or such as it would have been impossible for God to inflict irrespective of such relations, is worse than gratuitous. The doctrine of original sin is an integral portion of revealed truth; but when seen as it is exhibited in some systems of theology, it will always be liable to the objection of seeming to impugn the divine goodness; such is the impression it always makes on unprejudiced minds. "This objection, however, springs from regarding the legal part of the whole transaction, which affected our first parents and their posterity, separately from the evangelical provisions of mercy which were concurrent with it, and which included, in like manner, both them and their whole race." "The redemption of man by Christ was not certainly an after thought, brought in upon man's apostasy; it was a provision, and when man fell he found justice hand in hand with mercy."—*Watson.* By thus contemplating the fall in view of the atonement, and remembering that the same glorious sovereign appointed both the former and latter dispensations, the ways of God are justified, and his throne established in righteousness.

Thus far we have examined only the fundamental part of the system of our author; but we have dwelt the longer here, because of the importance of first principles. Our purpose has been to show that no such "covenant" ever existed as is set forth as the basis of the system of theology we are opposing,—that the eternal destiny of no one of the family of man was ever absolutely intrusted

to any other, and therefore that the sentence of eternal death cannot be justly pronounced against any one except for sins voluntarily committed, by persons having power to do otherwise. If in this we have succeeded—have shaken the foundation of the hypothesis of justification by the active obedience of Christ imputed to us for righteousness—we shall now find it comparatively easy to disprove the details of the system.

The atonement is the most wonderful of the divine dispensations. All its features display the ineffable glory of its Author. Passing by any contemplations of the love therein manifested, and the attributes of God thereby revealed, we will only consider the rule of righteousness upon which this great work proceeds. Its purpose is to redeem mankind from the curse of sin, viewed in its provisions as already committed. Redemption necessarily implies substitution and vicarious merit, without which it must have been true, without exception or qualification, that the soul that sins must die. The law by which man was condemned, and from whose curse he was to be redeemed, was no other than the holy and immutable decree of the Almighty, which could neither be evaded nor successfully resisted. That law was broken by Adam and by the millions of his race; a greater than Adam was therefore required to bring salvation to a fallen world. To meet this requisition, the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us—a divine Redeemer was given to the world. There also appears to be a fitness in the Redeemer's holding such natural relations to the subjects of his redemption, as to place the parties within the sphere of each other's legal influence. We may therefore suppose that it was not consistent with the economy of divine grace, that any other than one of the human family should fill the office occupied by the humanity of our blessed Redeemer. He was made of a woman—made under [the curse of] the law; he took not on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham. Divinity in an angelic impersonation would not have presented that evident fitness for the work intended that is seen in God manifested in the flesh. Still, it does not appear that his official relations to mankind were the necessary result of the assumption of our nature. The Father anointed him for the office of Redeemer, for which our nature was a part of the necessary furniture. So far we may trace the principles of action in the divine administration; all beyond is clouds and darkness.

As Adam sustained a twofold relation to the law of God—an official and an individual one—so also did Christ. Hence his proper humanity is prominently and expressly set forth; for if he was really man, he was liable to all the necessary accidents of humanity

—its relations and obligations. As a creature, he was individually subject to the divine law; unless a portion of the creation is beyond the dominion of the Creator. To us this position appears unquestionable; but if true it is fatal to the doctrine now under review, and accordingly it is strongly opposed by our author. We will give his statements at length.

"1. Christ never existed, in his mediatorial character, except as a federal head. His moral headship existed by covenant from eternity, and the susception of our nature was the result, and constituted part and parcel of the covenant itself. Now if the God-man—the Messiah—never existed in any other character, he could never be bound by any other."—P. 195.

The fallacy of this argument consists in assuming that an individual obligation may not coexist with an official one. This may be made plain by an illustration. Suppose the case of a child, the posthumous heir to a kingdom; from the moment of his birth he is a king—he never existed except as a sovereign. But he is not therefore freed from the private obligations of justice and benevolence. So our Lord was at once a man and the Redeemer of men; it therefore became him to fulfil the duties of both relations. Accordingly, we find him submitting to all the ordinances of society, both civil and religious, commending himself to the approval of men and growing in favor with God. And as he was always well beloved of God, this increased favor must have been the effect of his obedience, whereby he was justified before God.

"2. Another phase of the same thought is, that the human nature of Christ never had a separate existence—it never was a human person; and therefore a righteousness for its sake could not be necessary."—*Ibid.*

All this is only a play upon the word *person*. Doubtless he will acknowledge the perfect humanity of our Lord, and that the union of natures in him was their proper concurrence in his person, and not their coalescence or confusion. If so, both natures must have moral properties, and of necessity our Lord's humanity had the property of human righteousness.

"3. The Messiah is a divine person, and to talk of a divine person being bound to procure righteousness as a title for himself to eternal life, is, at the very least, to approximate blasphemy."—*Ibid.*

This objection, when compared with the preceding, appears very much like an attempt at evasion by an ambiguous use of terms. We are now contemplating the Messiah only in his incarnation. That he had a personal pre-existence we are not disposed to doubt; but that does not affect this case. In his incarnation, by which he

became our Redeemer, he is not exclusively a divine being—nor is he less really a human than divine person. We hold, as the ancient church decided against opposing heresies, the *hypostatical union* of the human and divine natures, really and properly, in the person of the Messiah, and therefore that all the properties of each were essential to the perfection of his character. As God, he was holy with divine holiness: as man, he was wholly righteous. This whole objection, being founded in error, falls with the baseless hypothesis on which it is built. While, however, we contend that our Lord's personal righteousness was not vicarious, we are far from supposing that it was not concerned in his mediatorial office. His personal justification by obedience was necessary, that the law should have no further demands on him when he came to offer himself "a Lamb without spot unto God," for the sins of the world. It was requisite that he should be pure and holy when officiating as high priest for us, "for such a high priest became us who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners." We are then deeply interested in the personal righteousness of our Redeemer, though not by any direct transfer of its merits to us; and so it is not altogether improper to associate his obedience and death when speaking of the work of atonement, though we should be careful not so to connect them as to make them appear to hold the same relation to the work of redemption.

It appears, therefore, that Christ's active obedience was properly his own and for himself, and therefore cannot constitute a fund of merits for others: we might extend this argument, by showing that Scripture gives no direct or indirect intimations that the divine economy anywhere admits of vicarious *active* obedience; but we must proceed to other particulars.

The great purpose for which Christ came into the world was to redeem man by suffering in his stead. In becoming man he became subject to all the natural effects of the fall. The relation which he assumed to our race was such as, under the divine appointment, to permit to meet on him the iniquity of us all. He was made under the law, which was not simply demanding of him obedience as its subject, but also death as man's representative. The original covenant had failed by reason of man's noncompliance with its terms, and therefore justification by that dispensation was impossible. The law had required obedience, which had not been rendered; it now required vengeance, and in this demand would not be turned away. In all moral governments, one of two alternatives is required of every subject—obedience or penalty—one of which must be rendered. In either case the provisions of the law are

secured—the law fulfilled; not, however, in the latter case, in its specific precepts, but in its authority and final demands. Our Lord's purpose was not to undo what man had done, (for that was in the nature of things impossible,) but to save him from the proper consequences of his disobedience,—to redeem him from the *curse* of the law, the only alternative that now remained to him. The law did not then require obedience of man as to the sins he had committed; vengeance alone was called for. In becoming man's Redeemer, therefore, Christ came *to die*. On this point the Scriptures are very full and explicit, so much so as to render any particular quotations unnecessary to prove this position. The purpose of his death is shown with equal clearness to be "*for* us," "in our stead," "the just for the unjust, to bring us to God." Here we might rest the cause, having shown that the word of God does not teach a redemption by obedience, but does one effected by suffering; but we will make room for Dr. Junkin's own statement of the hypothesis of double redemption. After showing that man is under obligation to render universal obedience to God, and that the first act of transgression both rendered him guilty and unfitted him for future obedience, his obligation continuing unchanged, he proceeds:—

"Consequently the penal obligation is additional to Adam. And if he could have been justified by the covenant before its violation only by its positive fulfilment—by working righteousness—he can afterward be justified only by working righteousness and exhausting the whole curse of the law—satisfying its penal claims. These two things are indispensable to Adam's obtaining life by the covenant—he must exhibit a righteousness as long and as broad as the law, and he must endure the wrath of God."—P. 93.

This presents the theory as to the occasion or necessity of redemption by Christ's keeping the law for us—the theory of imputation. We will next give his views on the contested point whether justification is identical with remission of sin. Having set forth the death of Christ as the procuring cause of pardon, he adds:—

"Now we ought to distinguish between this [viz., pardon] and justification. I know indeed great efforts have been made to confound them, and great success has attended these efforts. But I know that just in the same proportion have indistinct and often erroneous views been entertained—views which, if run out to their legitimate results, land in ruin. Therefore I the more insist that *pardon is not justification*. It is an accompaniment of it in man's condition, but it is not the thing itself. To declare a man innocent, as we have seen, is a different thing from declaring him righteous. A mere negative virtue is no virtue at all."—P. 310.

Reserving for the present any criticisms on this strange language, we will immediately subjoin the counterpart of the above-stated doctrine, that the parts may appear in due juxtaposition:—

"The setting down or reckoning of Christ's righteousness, all his acts of obedience to the law, to the account of the believer, is the precise matter of justification. The righteousness of Christ is the believer's in the book of God. *He is righteous in the law's eye.* The judge perceives the fact, and declares it so to be. This declaration is the precise thing meant by justification. It is the judicial and declarative act which results by an inevitable necessity existing in the nature of law and of justice, and in the facts of the case."—P. 310.

Here then we have the whole system. The law requires righteousness, both negative and positive, of which man has neither. To atone for the want of the former, which is properly guilt, Christ suffered on the cross; to supply his deficiency of the latter, Christ kept the law for him; so that by transferring the merits of his sufferings and obedience to us, we are justified "*in the eye of the law.*" The hypothesis is an ingenious one, but it "savors not of the things that are of God, but of men." Its completeness as a theory would commend it to favor, were it not repugnant to the teachings of the Bible. That it is unscriptural, we will now briefly show.

In the first place, there is no Scripture with which to prove the above-assumed doctrine. "The sacred writers do not once state that the active obedience of Christ is imputed to a sinner for justification. A man may assume this doctrine of imputation, and use it as a key to unlock the Scriptures, while to those who grant his assumption he may seem to confirm his favorite hypothesis by a peculiar interpretation of many passages of holy writ, the meaning of which is first rendered doubtful by the hypothesis; but this is to suppose at the outset that the truth of the doctrine is incontrovertible. It is to model the Scriptures by our own fancy, and to make the sacred writers into awkward commentators on the erroneous opinions of fallible men. Let a passage first be found in which an inspired writer declares in plain terms that the active obedience of Christ, as distinct from his sufferings and death, is imputed for justification, and that passage may be used as a legitimate key to open the Scriptures generally. But such a key must be forged in the human imagination, for it cannot be found in the sacred cabinet."—*Hare on Justification.*

The entire silence of the Scriptures as to this notion of imputation contrasts strongly with their fullness and explicitness in stating the doctrine of justification through the merits of Christ's passive

obedience, and affords a strong inference in favor of the exclusive claim of the latter to a place as the meritorious cause of our acceptance with God. Space would fail us even to refer to all the places where the sufferings and death of Christ are plainly recognized as the ground of hope to fallen man. Our redemption is in his *blood*—we are *healed* by his *stripes;* his *life* is our ransom; he bare *our sins* on the *tree;* our glory is in his *cross.* When faith is to be excited, the same idea is presented and urged upon us; we are pointed to Christ as the *Lamb* of God—assured that he is set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his *blood*—that we come to the *blood of sprinkling.* Death is everywhere presented as the price of redemption. We are also assured that Christ's death is accepted of God as a perfect satisfaction for sin; such is the proper import of such terms as "atonement," "propitiation," and others of equivalent meaning; expressing a state of reconciliation and *positive* favor, flowing from the death and mediation of Christ. But the whole subject in controversy turns upon the correctness or incorrectness of one short sentence contained in the foregoing extracts from the work under review, to wit: "pardon is not justification." He has good cause to say that strong and successful efforts have been made, not to "confound," but to identify the sense of these terms; and this has been done nowhere else so strongly and successfully as in the Bible. There we hear of one who, when he prayed, "Be *merciful* to me, a sinner!" "went down to his house justified,"—the prayer for *pardon* being answered by the gift of *justification.* When the apostles preached forgiveness of sins through Christ, they did so assuring their hearers that "by him all that believe are justified," still keeping up their Master's confusion of ideas. But the masterpiece of confusion is the joint product of two of the greatest names in Scripture. David, in attempting to set forth the blessedness of the true believer, "confounds" in one chaos *pardon, the covering of sin,* and the *non-imputation of sin;* and St. Paul, in taking up his expression, adds the *imputation of righteousness* to the heap. Now if this is confusion at all, it is certainly successful confusion. But if we grant, as is plainly implied, that all these expressions are substantially identical, order at once rises out of the chaos. This is the key that unlocks the sacred oracles—the thread that guides us through the otherwise traceless labyrinth of the Scriptures. But the positive assertion that "to declare a man innocent is a different thing from declaring him righteous," is most palpably erroneous. It should be remembered that the language here used is wholly forensic, and all the imagery that of a legal tribunal. Now law

recognizes but two conditions, guilty and not guilty. All who "in the eye of the law" are not guilty, are righteous; whom the judge pronounces innocent, he by the same act justifies. No truth can be plainer than this, and yet this plain truth is directly opposed to the notion of the distinction of pardon and justification.

It is no valid objection to our view of this subject to say that Christ's death redeemed us only from the curse of sin, and therefore we have no pledge or provision for the positive blessings of salvation except in his active obedience; for we do not hesitate to commit our souls to our heavenly Father, now reconciled by the blood of the cross, being assured that "he that spared not his own Son, but gave him for us all, will with him *freely* give us all things." We are satisfied to receive heaven as a gratuity, not claiming it as a debt even from the Father. We have no taste for glorifying the Son at the expense of the Father; nor dare we, in order to magnify the free grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, consent to dim the benignant glories of the eternal Godhead, causing him to appear toward some penurious of the grace he bestows, and toward others an inexorable and an implacable tyrant. His grace is always free. When his own law opposed his gracious purposes, he provided an offering commensurate with its claims, which being satisfied, there is nothing to hinder the free ingress of the divine grace, which flows spontaneously from the throne of the Father. "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God," which peace is of the very essence of the kingdom of heaven within us.

But we have a still more formidable objection to this theory of justification. It is not only built upon an unsound basis, but the thing itself is not genuine. It is not the justification of the gospel. According to it, the only difference between the first and second covenant consisted in a transfer of the representative office from Adam to Christ, the terms and conditions in both being otherwise identical.

Our author openly assumes this position, and insists that man must be justified by the terms of the covenant—that "the original institute must be preserved inviolate." These terms are, "Do this and live"—keep the commandment, and receive the benedictions of the judge. But if vicarious obedience were among the duties of our representative, whether that were rendered by the first or the second Adam, in either case, justification is secured "by the deeds of the law." The first requirement of the law being rendered, the subject is justified *as righteous*. But this very righteousness of the law is by St. Paul opposed to the righteousness of faith, and that apostle expressly declares that by it shall no flesh

be justified in God's sight. The justification of the gospel does not suppose the law fulfilled by any one, as to its precepts, but the justified person is always contemplated as having failed to keep the law. It is not the acquittal and approval of the guiltless, but pardon to the guilty and gracious acceptance to the ungodly. "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith, *without the deeds of the law.*"

It is remarkable, that by departing from the truth in opposite directions, the doctors of the Council of Trent and those of the Synod of Dort meet at the same point in the regions of error. A Papist could not desire more appropriate language to express his notions of justification than is afforded in this work. A recent writer is greatly censured, and his orthodoxy called in question, for alledging that "obedience in deed and word alone can constitute our justification;" but Dr. Junkin declares the same in substance in repeated instances. The same writer declares, "Our justification is a reality;" Dr. J. replies, "Before God can justify a man, he must be just indeed." The point of difference between the two systems rather gives the advantage to the Papal scheme; for that teaches, that by the power of the Holy Ghost a man is first constituted righteous, and then accepted as such; while the other holds that he is accounted just indeed, though in fact he is unjust, by the transfer to him of the merits of the righteousness of another. The one supposes, as the ground of acceptance with God, a state never known except as a consequence of acceptance; the other bases justification upon the incommunicable qualities of a second person, the justified being reckoned righteous when really unrighteous. We repeat it, this is not the justification of the New Testament. St. Paul knew nothing of it, and St. James only knew it to condemn it. If Christ fulfilled the law for us, and presents his righteousness to its demands as the basis of our justification, then are we justified by the deeds of the law, no less than if it were our own personal obedience and righteousness by which we are justified. We shall therefore continue to believe that the gospel is a new covenant, and that it is properly called the covenant of grace, from its peculiarly gracious provisions. It originated in the spontaneous benevolence of the Father of mercies; its fundamental provision is the death of Christ, whose expiatory offering is therefore styled the blood of the new covenant. Its direct and immediate fruit, when embraced in faith, is pardon of sin, and consequently acceptance with God. The sin canceled by this pardon is not this or that, or any number of specific transgressions, but all inward and outward unholiness. And as pardon wholly removes

the guilt of sin, its moral defilement is brought under the dominion of that God who loves purity; to the exercise of whose sin-destroying power there is no longer any barrier, when the divine law is satisfied and the rebellion of the heart destroyed. To efface the stains of sin when its legal guilt is removed is the proper office of the Holy Ghost dwelling in the believer; and the soul thus sanctified, the temple of God on earth, is prepared for the glory of God above.

Having briefly reviewed our author's theory of justification, and attempted to show cause for disallowing its claims to divine authority, we will now notice some of its consequences and implied doctrines. Among these may be mentioned its necessary implication of the doctrine of irresistible decrees. If the members of the federative body were so subjected to the head that his acts determined their destinies, then their fate for eternity is unchangeably fixed while they are yet unborn, and have done neither good nor evil. If Christ not only, by his death, made it possible that God should justify the unrighteous persons who should believe in him, but also by his active righteousness wrought out a justification for his elect, then they have an infallible assurance of salvation; and we must suppose, either that God will bind their volitions by irresistible influences, so that they cannot sin, or else, although he permits them to sin, their sins shall not endanger their salvation. That is fixed by an immutable decree, and they must approach it with the certainty of fate. Take either horn of the dilemma, and unbridled license is the result. Fatalism was at the foundation of Epicurean licentiousness, and everywhere its fruits must be the same. The notion of finished salvation, and the *harmlessness* of sin in believers, is the source of criminal carelessness among professed Christians. The tendency of such notions is necessarily to diminish our abhorrence of sin and our dread of its consequences; if God makes no account of it, why should we? doubtless it is a matter of small account. When we cease to dread sin, our depraved hearts will soon be found contemplating it with complacency, until we are drawn into its allurements and engaged in its commission, the mean time fondly thinking all is well. Some find in the sins of believers the greatest honors for Christ, since they illustrate the greatness of his saving power; others, jealous of their Lord's glory, will not presume to patch up the glorious garment of his perfect righteousness with their own filthy rags, and therefore take no pains to be righteous at all. Some find sin an excellent means of grace, since it shows them their utter need of a Saviour; while multitudes, without any definite theory of the matter, having learned

that sin would not endanger their eternal welfare, impelled by depraved appetites, rush heedlessly into all manner of abominations. This is no fancy sketch—would to God it were only the deductions of a theological hypothesis! The history of the church is a gloomy demonstration of the truth of these positions. Nor have we to go to past ages or to distant countries for illustrations of the evils we deprecate; even here, where we now write, we are in the midst of the ravages of the demon of Antinomianism. The unlearned and unsophisticated, having been taught the elements of the system of justification by imputation of Christ's active righteousness, have run out the premises to their legitimate conclusions, and find no occasion to *strive* for righteousness when they are righteous in Christ, or to *work* for a salvation which was finished before they were born. So they argue, and so they act; we admire their logic, though we deprecate its influence; but we detest a system pretending to be the gospel of the Son of God, which leads to such consequences. Many, we rejoice to know, who hold the premises, by a happy inconsistency, hesitate at the conclusion. Such are consistent Christians, though inconsistent theologians.

Another inference from this doctrine, coupled as it must be with the notion of partial atonement, is, that a portion of those who die in infancy are damned for Adam's sin. This inference is very obvious, though many have tried to avoid it. But if the idea of unconditional reprobation is admitted, (and it seems a necessary counterpart of that of unconditional election,) it does not appear why it should not include infants as well as adults. If God creates to damn, why should he not send some of the doomed spirits from cradled infancy, as well as preserve others, as for the day of slaughter, until they have become susceptible of more intense sufferings, and then plunge them into fires kindled for them before they had a being, and to which they were born, as to a certain inheritance? Our author mystifies greatly upon this point; evidently he finds it a hard case. He perceives the necessary tendency of his system, but fears to allow it, and so goes around and about the subject rather oddly. His remarks on this subject deserve a place among the curiosities of literature rather than in a grave theological treatise. He treats his readers to a whole chapter entitled "Original Sin—proved by the Salvation of those who die in Infancy." Here he assumes the fact of the salvation of infants as so far conceded as to be proper matter for proof of the less obvious doctrine of original sin. Accordingly the first section of this chapter is headed, "Infants go to Heaven." But let no one suppose that he devotes a section to state, prove, and illustrate that position:

he only labors to show that though this *may be true*, because Scripture does not expressly deny it, still it is not taught in the Bible. His succeeding propositions are, that "only sinners are saved;" and "infants are sinners;" and therefore, if saved, they are saved "through Jesus Christ." This leaves the salvation of dying infants to rest on the simple fact that they are sinners; but we have been assured very plainly that there is not salvation for all sinners, and therefore probably some of those who die in infancy may be among the non-elect. The drift of his argument, so far as it has any fixed course, is about this: those who die in infancy *may be saved*, probably *some are*, but the balance of evidence is that *most are not*. But believing parents may console themselves with the hope, founded, however, rather on paternal fondness than any well-grounded evidence, that their departed little ones are among the favored few. O what a foundation for the hopes of eternity! Even the tender mercies of this system of faith are cruel.

There are many other things in the book that present prominent points for criticism and animadversion; but as they must stand or fall with the system of which they are part, we pass them in silence, and hasten to close this article. We have evidently had to deal with an inveterate predestinarian; his theory of justification implies it; and though he winces a little at some of its details, he generally appears to relish it. We trust he is a better Christian than either theologian or logician. He is unquestionably the victim of his own prejudices—otherwise he must be esteemed guilty of wilful misrepresentation. Not content to couple Arminianism with semi-Pelagianism, as though identical, he specifically charges upon the former tenets which, had his gangrened vision permitted him to see the truth, he would have known to be no part of that system. But for his blinding prejudices, he would not have had the hardihood to traduce Arminianism, by setting forth as a tenet of it, that "they who convert themselves by free will are saved, the rest perish." But it would not have done to set forth that system of doctrine in a true light, since the fitness of its parts and the excellence of the whole would have commended it to universal favor. A caricature was needed; and in preparing one he copied the distorted image found in his own imagination. But it is a small matter for the friends of that doctrine to hear it spoken against. It was so from the first; and amidst all it has spread itself until it fills the land, while the opposite error flees before it, as shadows at the rising of the sun. Calvinism proper has seen its day; the recent efforts to revive it prove it dead beyond recovery; a fitful and spasmodic action is all that can be effected by the united efforts

of a host of Old School divines; while the course of truth is steadily and triumphantly onward. Only let the ministers of the whole gospel be faithful to their high responsibilities—avoiding subtilties and vain philosophy, let them preach the Lamb of God, and glory only in the cross—and no weapon formed against them shall prosper. Let them seek no other philosophical theory of the gospel than that given by the apostle, to wit: "that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their transgressions, but forgiving their iniquities." Let the gospel appear in its native simplicity, and it will always prove itself to be the power of God unto salvation to every one that believes.

Columbus, Ga., April 10, 1844.

ART. II.—*Elements of Algebra, embracing also the Theory and Application of Logarithms, together with an Appendix, containing Infinite Series, the General Theory of Equations, and several of the most approved Methods of solving the higher Equations.* By Rev. DAVIS W. CLARK, A. M. Harper & Brothers. 1843.

So many elementary books of instruction, especially on mathematics, have of late made their appearance, that the announcement of a new work has ceased to excite much interest, nor is it considered as an object of sufficient importance to demand much care in examining its merits. But as our attention was called to the work before us, we were led to consider it as deservedly an exception to the general rule. Although we have a multiplicity of books on every branch of science, and certainly a sufficient number of algebras, yet it seems to be the general opinion of experienced teachers, that a text-book in this science, properly prepared and well adapted to the wants of students, is still needed; and we know of no work that appears so well calculated to supply this desideratum as this book. With a brief notice of this work we have thought it might be well to connect a short account of the history and object of the science.

The early history of mathematical science, perhaps more than most others, is involved in doubt and obscurity, through which no diligence of research can penetrate. It is perhaps impossible at the present time to determine at what period the more important branches of it, such as arithmetic and algebra, were first introduced, or to whom the world is indebted for so useful an invention.

The abstract nature of such sciences must for a long time have retarded their progress. Some method for denoting quantity must have been originated with the first ideas of property; but it is only in the more advanced state of society, when the intercourse of man with man is frequent, when commercial transactions are multiplied and extended, that the necessity of simplifying and improving the methods of calculation is felt. In the earlier ages of its history it is not probable that the science of calculation was extended beyond the immediate wants of society. It has been affirmed that many tribes of savages are not only ignorant of the operations of arithmetic, but almost totally unacquainted with the first principles of numeration. Some of them cannot reckon further than three, and have no denomination for any number above this. Several can proceed as far as ten, others to twenty: when they would convey an idea of a number beyond these, they point to the hairs of their heads, intimating that it is equal to them, or with wonder declare it to be so great that it cannot be numbered. In short, the state of mathematical science among a people offers a kind of standard for estimating the degree of their intellectual improvement.*

Josephus maintains that Abraham was the inventor of arithmetic, and that his descendants communicated the knowledge of numbers to the Egyptians. But little credit will perhaps be given to this assertion, prompted doubtless by national partiality. There is strong evidence that the Greeks, at least, copied both their alphabet and method of notation from the Hebrews. The first knowledge of mathematical science was of course embraced in some of the simpler principles of arithmetic. When these were understood, other and higher principles of computation were discovered and applied, and thus by slow, perhaps imperceptible steps, men were led to the discovery and use of those more intricate principles and methods of analysis and calculation now embraced in algebra. Algebra is very closely connected with arithmetic in its history and in its design. Both are employed in reasoning concerning the relations which subsist among different quantities in respect to their magnitudes. In both sciences the quantities treated of are expressed by symbols. In arithmetic there are the ten numeral characters, while in algebra they may be any characters whatever: the letters of the alphabet are, however, at present always used, denoting not only the known quantities, to which alone numerical notation will apply, but also the unknown quantities, or such as are required to be found. The two sciences thus agreeing in the objects of which

* Robertson's History of America, vol. i, p. 150. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 136.

they treat, and to a certain extent in their reasonings, of course depend on the same first principles. Algebra has indeed been denominated *universal arithmetic;* a name in many respects proper enough, but which does not fully express its character. The essential character of algebra may be considered as consisting in this—"That when all the quantities concerned in any inquiry to which it is applied are denoted by general symbols, the results of its operations do not, like those of arithmetic and geometry, give the individual values of the quantities sought, but only show what are the arithmetical or geometrical operations which ought to be performed on the original given quantities in order to determine their values."

The early history of algebra, like that of arithmetic, is involved in much obscurity. The question relative to its origin has been the cause of much speculation among the learned. The Greeks were undoubtedly the first nation among whom the science attained any degree of perfection. Diophantus has been considered as the earliest known writer on algebra. His work was a collection of problems, for which he gave many ingenious solutions; but it contained no general principles, no methods of analysis, that might be applied to problems generally. There are, however, so many principles contained in his work, as to render it altogether improbable that they had their origin entirely with him. The science of algebra was not at first in Europe derived from Diophantus, but from the Arabians and Moors. They, by unanimous avowal, derived the first principles of their knowledge from India. There is good reason to believe that the Indians were in possession of it at the time of Pythagoras, and that through him the Greeks obtained their first ideas in relation to it. The earliest Indian writer on algebra of whom there remains any certain or traditional knowledge is the astronomer Aryabhatta, who was in possession of a general artifice for the resolution of all indeterminate problems of the first degree, and also of a method of resolving equations containing several unknown quantities. Of both these last methods Diophantus seems to have been ignorant. The Brahma-sidd'hanta, the work of Brahmegupta, an Indian astronomer at the beginning of the seventh century, contains a general method for the resolution of indeterminate problems of the second degree; an investigation that baffled the skill of every modern analyst previous to the time of La Grange. The Greeks cannot be considered as the authors of this discovery; and years of patient thought and many successive efforts of invention must have prepared the way for it in the country where it did originate. All that we now pos-

sess of Indian science is but a part, perhaps, of a great system, that existed at a very remote period, perhaps previous to the first dawn of science among the Greeks.

Many have considered the Arabs as the authors of algebra; but more recent investigations, and the facts to which we have referred, show that this idea is entirely without foundation. From them, however, it was introduced into Europe, early in the fifteenth century, by Camellus Leonard of Pisa. The first printed work on algebra appeared in 1494. This exhibited the science in a rude state, consisting merely of rules for raising numbers to powers and the resolution of simple and quadratic equations. The Indian algebra had quite an extensive symbolic notation, while algebra as introduced into Europe was almost entirely destitute of it. Our present system of notation has arisen by almost insensible degrees, as convenience suggested different marks of abbreviation to different authors; and that perfect system of symbolic language, addressing itself solely to the eye, and enabling us to take in at a glance the most complicated relations of quantity, is the result of a series of small improvements made from time to time; while in no case, at least till within a very short time from the present period, has any general and systematic view of the nature of symbols directed the choice of new ones.

Many important discoveries were made in algebra by the Italians, several of which are owing to singular circumstances. The endless disputes relative to the claims of different inventors seem to be in a great measure owing to the custom in those days for mathematicians to conceal their discoveries, to secure an advantage over their rivals in proposing problems beyond their reach. But when an author failed in this way to humble his opponent, on account of some unexpected invention on his part, the charge of plagiarism was ever ready to soothe wounded vanity and chagrin at disappointment.

If the more distinguished authors were governed by sufficiently noble motives to enable them to acquiesce in the well-earned fame of their rivals, there were always inferior writers who, masking their malignity under the specious semblance of national partiality, were ever ready to continue the dispute, advancing the charge of plagiarism in the most aggravated and disgusting manner. From these disputes, and the trials of skill that often resulted from them, the science of algebra was greatly advanced. One illustration of this we will mention. Ferrea having proposed in defiance some problems to Tartalea, he applied himself to discover the solution, and succeeded. This he revealed in confidence to Cardan, bind-

ing him to secrecy by the most solemn oaths. This fact will give us some idea of the care used in that age by scientific men to prevent their discoveries from being generally known. Cardan, however, made no scruple of immediately violating his oath; not only this, but having made himself master of the solution, and extended it somewhat, he most ungenerously set up a claim to it as his own. This unlooked-for result aroused, as might be expected, the anger of Tartalea; a violent dispute and a kind of mathematical duel were the consequences. Innumerable were the problems proposed and resolved on both sides. This dispute, while it brought little else than chagrin to the parties, ended in the permanent improvement of science. Louis Ferrari, a friend and pupil of Cardan, coming to his assistance, as his first exploit, discovered the general resolution of the biquadratic equation by a very elegant process. Several improvements, such as the use of the letters of the alphabet to denote general or indefinite quantities, and a better understanding of the nature of surds, may be dated from this dispute.

But it is not our purpose to trace minutely the history of this branch of science, nor to specify the various circumstances that may have advanced or retarded its progress. To the admirers of any science it is interesting to trace the successive steps and the slow progress by which the various improvements and inventions have succeeded each other. In point of interest, in this respect, mathematical science is hardly second to any other. But, omitting the further consideration of this part of the subject, we proceed to speak more particularly of our own times, and of the work at the head of this article.

Judging from the number of elementary and other mathematical books issued yearly from the press, we should infer that the people of the Northern States merit their common appellation of a *calculating* people, though perhaps in a better sense than it is usually applied to them. It is indeed almost frightful to the tyro in mathematics to contemplate the number of such books presented constantly to his attention. One thing, however, may cheer him,—there are not probably as many different principles as there are books presented. It is indeed amusing to examine many of these works, and observe how little is the difference that distinguishes them. They all contain nearly the same principles, in each somewhat differently arranged, the phraseology being likewise somewhat changed. Few new principles have lately been discovered. Mathematicians have chiefly employed themselves in simplifying and arranging the materials already furnished. Of the numerous

books on elementary mathematics, few receive much attention; the greater part are briefly noticed and then laid aside. It is often the case that a successful teacher introduces some little variation in the usual course of instruction, and is more than usually successful in teaching. In most cases this is owing to his being more interested in the subject himself, and consequently making greater efforts for the advancement of his pupils. Almost every able and experienced teacher could undoubtedly make a text-book that would answer his purpose better than any other in use. Such persons do not, however, always consider whether their plan of instruction, in the hands of another, would succeed better than many other plans already known. Under the impression that he has made a valuable discovery, an individual often hurriedly prepares a text-book, which is duly published and advertised. But as the book possesses no particular intrinsic merit, it is but by few noticed, and soon falling into disuse, in a few months nobody excepting those more immediately interested knows that such a book is in existence, while the author receives little else than vexation and disappointment for his trouble. So many books, especially on various branches of mathematics, have in this way been published, that the public have learned to regard with distrust any announcement of new works, or of any improvements in the sciences. This seriously retards the progress into public favor of books that would bear a critical examination, and which are in reality improvements on those that have preceded them. Notwithstanding numerous text-books have been issued that can hardly be considered as improvements, no one can deny but that in the science of algebra there has been a regular advance. The methods of instruction have become more thorough and accurate, the course of study more extensive, and far better text-books have been introduced, than the course of mathematics that, not many years ago, was so extensively used in the colleges and higher seminaries in New-England. Several of the books in most general use owe their success, we think, more to circumstances, to the reputation and high standing of the author, and the influence of his friends or interested patrons, than to their superior merit or adaptation to the wants of the public. No text-book on algebra has been received with more favor than the work of President Day. This has run through a great number of editions, and has been used (if we may judge from its use in the state of New-York) in most of the schools in the country. The ease and familiarity with which the subject is treated are undoubtedly strong recommendations for this work; but then it is sadly deficient as a *system* of algebra. There is, in fact, but little sys-

tem in it. For instance, the chapter on quadratics exhibits a most curious jumbling of matters distinct in their nature, and, in order to be thoroughly understood, requiring to be considered separately. Elimination is treated of in connection with equations of the second instead of the first degree. The work throughout is characterized by far too much diffuseness, and contains much unnecessary repetition. Several eminent professors of our higher institutions have within a few years published series of mathematical books. Whatever merit the higher parts of their series, with which in practice and in teaching they are more familiar, may possess, in the elementary parts, especially in algebra, they have very generally failed. Some of these works exhibit evidences of haste and carelessness little creditable to their authors. There are others that may perhaps be considered models of mathematical skill and neatness, general precision and accuracy, yet they are far too sententious and abstract for the purpose for which they were designed, being better adapted to *scholars* than to those that are to be made such. Many of the works now in use were translated from the French, or founded on translations already made. However well they may be calculated for the class of students for whom they were prepared in the country where they originated, they seem ill calculated for beginners in algebra, having only the amount of arithmetical knowledge usually considered in this country as a prerequisite for this study. Moreover, the reasoning used is often imperfect, and there is an obscurity in the statement of principles, and wide chasms, impassable to a beginner, at least, in the processes of reasoning. Such works, instead of being suited to train an undisciplined mind, require a mind to be under no ordinary degree of discipline at the outset. But it has well been said, that to require steady thought from a person who has not been trained to it, is one of the most unprofitable and dangerous requisitions that can be made in education.

> "Full in the midst of Euclid dip at once,
> And petrify a genius to a dunce."

Those who have undertaken to simplify the principles of algebra seem in a great measure to have failed. They either introduce their principles in an improper connection, not having prepared the student sufficiently by previous exercises, or they state them so obscurely as not to be comprehended. Their simplification consists merely in solving some few easy examples, explaining all the needless minutiæ of the work. The student sees that the operations are as stated, but all the simplification does not reach the main point; the principle is not perceived in its general applica-

tion, nor is it understood; hence he is no better prepared to solve the next example, especially when, as is often the case, the examples solved do not embrace half the difficulties in the principle to be illustrated. Nothing tends more to discourage a student than the perpetual recurrence of obstacles he cannot surmount. One great difficulty is to comprehend what is required by the principle that is to be applied. Great care should therefore be used in stating general principles clearly, and in illustrating one before proceeding to another. Were these principles carefully attended to, mathematical studies would possess far more interest for the majority of students than they now do. The only adequate incentive to laborious and profound study, the only source of interest that can safely be relied on to secure the attention of the young, is the clear perception of truth. After all possible difficulties resulting from the mode of treating the subject are removed, there will remain difficulties enough to task the mind of the most persevering student, in its varied general principles, in their application to particular cases, and in the abstract demonstrations of the more difficult parts of the science.

Considering the treatise of Mr. Clark with reference to the principles we have stated, and others that might be named, we have no hesitation in saying that in an uncommon degree it possesses all the requisites of a good text-book. We think it, indeed, superior to any other with which we are acquainted. The author, in his preface, informs us that the work was prepared while he was engaged in hearing daily recitations in the same science. It is in this way alone, we believe, that a book can be successfully prepared to meet the wants of the young. The author has evidently been a close observer, and appears to be well acquainted with the difficulties of young students. He exhibits not only an intimate and accurate knowledge of his subject, but sound judgment and great skill in the selection of his materials, and in their arrangement and adaptation to the wants and capacities of the class of students for which they are designed. Aware that most persons who commence the study of algebra have very little knowledge of mathematics, he has made the transition from arithmetic to algebra easy and natural. As the language and many of the signs of algebra are new to the beginner in the science, he has introduced the subject by giving a general outline of the nature and objects of the science, the leading definitions, &c. These are afterward repeated where the subject called for particular attention to them.

The work is modeled in the main after the system of M. Bourdon, now generally admitted to be the best large work extant. The

author has, however, studiously avoided the prolix theories of the French mathematician, and followed the more practical methods of the English mathematicians.

The scientific arrangement of the topics in this work is excellent. The illustrations and rules are stated with singular simplicity, clearness, and precision. This we consider as constituting one of the chief excellences of the work. General principles are fully stated and clearly illustrated. In some parts of his work the author has, perhaps, given more illustrations than are necessary, and too many hard problems. But all who have had experience in teaching this science are aware, doubtless, of the importance of the pupil's understanding thoroughly one general principle before proceeding to the next; and while a want of a sufficient number of problems would be a serious difficulty, if too many are given, a judicious teacher can select from the number such as will answer his purpose.

We cannot now speak of the several parts of the work particularly, but the clear and satisfactory manner in which the subject of equations, both simple and quadratic, is disposed of, cannot but be gratifying to the teacher who may use this book, and profitable to the student.

In running over the pages of this work, we were struck with what we do not recollect having seen elsewhere, namely, the law with regard to the exponent in division—*That the exponent of the divisor is to be subtracted.* A notice of this simple principle would have prevented Davies, as well as some others, from falling into the absurdity of reducing fractions to their lowest terms before the subject of fractions had been introduced.

Generalization is treated to better advantage in this work than in any other with which we are acquainted. The general use and application of algebraic symbols is illustrated by the demonstration or reduction of several "general problems," giving rise to certain formulas or rules by which all other examples, differing only in the particular numbers, may be solved. The application of these formulas is illustrated by examples. Section V. likewise contains several general theorems, and a very neat algebraic demonstration of certain properties of numbers. Many teachers and students who use algebra only as a kind of higher arithmetic, may consider this section as not suited to their purpose. Such can omit it and pass on without difficulty to the other parts of the work. But there is no section in the book that we consider of more importance, or which we would more earnestly commend to the attention of both teacher and scholar. It is only when the student can substitute

letters for numerals, and can frame formulas with facility, that he begins to see the beauty, the power, and certainty of algebra. The most luminous and satisfactory processes in algebra are those which are least encumbered with arithmetical numerals. We think the author has not devoted too much space to this subject even in an elementary treatise on algebra. Generalization appears to most beginners in the science as useless, but a little acquaintance with it, and a moment's reflection, we think, cannot fail to show them its great utility. A letter may be used to represent a large as well as a small number; and every one certainly can see, that if it were required in any demonstration to multiply such numbers as 13789468, 312567893, and 9678374567 together, it would be much easier to represent them by letters, and write $a\ b\ c$, than to find the numeral product. In the solution of many problems, a great number of multiplications, divisions, powers, and roots may be required in order to obtain the result, while the final equation may not contain but two or three such operations, and those, perhaps, of the simplest character. A great deal of time in such cases can be gained by substituting letters for numbers throughout the work of solution, and then in the result, when the most of the operations have been performed, again substituting numbers for letters. The work will likewise be less cumbrous. Moreover, when we once have obtained a solution in this manner, without again going through with the work necessary to obtain it, by means of the last formula we can in a few moments solve very many questions of the same kind. We would again commend this section to particular attention.

We might notice likewise the demonstration of certain properties of numbers. This may not be very practical, in the sense in which the term is often used; yet the study of it will familiarize the student with the use of algebraic symbols, and it has likewise the advantage of affording him the pleasure arising from the discovery of new and unexpected truths. The abstract properties of numbers received great attention from the ancient mathematicians, and it is said that for a long time the Pythagoreans devoted their attention exclusively to their discovery. There are two kinds of properties of numbers; one essential to their very nature, and the other accidental, being derived entirely from the manner of representing them. It is an essential property of numbers that the successive sums of the odd numbers should be squares;—1, $1+3=4$, $1+3+5=9$, $1+3+5+7=16$, &c.; but it is an accidental property of 9, that the sum of the digits which represent its products is always either 9 itself or a multiple of 9, thus:—

1×9= 9		5×9=45	4+5=9
2×9=18	1+8=9	6×9=54	5+4=9
3×9=27	2+7=9	7×9=63	6+3=9
4×9=36	3+6=9	8×9=72	7+2=9
		9×9=81	8+1=9

The number 9 has the remarkable property, likewise, of resolving other numbers, when joined with itself, into themselves also; thus:—

9+1=10	1
9+2=11	1+1=2
9+3=12	1+2=3
9+8=17	1+7=8, &c.

Mathematicians anciently confined their attention chiefly to the accidental properties of numbers, dividing them into classes of *perfect* and *imperfect*, *abundant* and *defective*. They ascribed to them qualities entirely distinct from notation. They even pretended to believe that the world was created with reference to their abstract properties. The first four odd numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, represented the pure and celestial parts of the universe, while the first four even numbers represented these elements in combination with terrestrial matter. The sum of these numbers, 36, was considered as possessing high and wonderful virtues, and was held, according to Plutarch, in such veneration by the Pythagoreans, that to swear by it was to contract the most solemn obligations.

The Magi at Athens, at the time of Plato's death, sacrificed to him, because he died at the age of eighty-one—figures which consummate a perfect number, namely, nine times nine. Plato considered the number twelve as an image of all-perfect progression, because it is composed of a multiplication of three by four, both of which numbers the Pythagoreans considered as emblems of perfection. The number twelve has been a great favorite with poets and philosophers. Plato's laws are in twelve books, Virgil's Æneid and Milton's Paradise Lost, and also Spenser's Faërie Queene.* The number three has been considered as a remarkable number, and was anciently considered as illustrative of many things which we cannot here mention. For further illustration of properties of numbers we would refer to Mr. Clark's Algebra.

The article on Logarithms in this work deserves a passing notice. Instead of giving a synopsis, altogether useless in an elementary work, of the different systems of logarithms, the author has wisely confined himself to a clear exhibition of the nature of common logarithms. While the utility of logarithms is understood,

* Bucke's Beauties and Sublimities of Nature, p. 269.

to many their formation appears mysterious. But the author has given so simple a method of calculating them, that the student well versed in arithmetic and geometrical progression can readily understand the whole process. This method of computation gives the common student a far better understanding of the nature of logarithms than any other we have seen.

The general theory of equations, and several other subjects treated with singular ability, are put in the form of an Appendix to the work. We think this a good arrangement. Although these subjects are indispensable as introductory to the higher mathematics, yet they are but of little importance to the beginner in the science, or the merely practical algebraist; they are seldom studied in schools and academies. We would suggest to the author or his publishers the propriety of having an edition published without the Appendix, to accommodate this class of learners. Published in this form, the work will come cheaper, and yet contain all that is generally studied.

Of the other sections in this work we cannot now speak particularly: we consider the work as a decided improvement on the treatises in general use. Throughout the whole the reasoning is adapted to the progress of the student. The examples are so arranged as to form a series of progressive exercises, rendering the transition from the more simple to the most complicated algebraic operations as easy as possible. We consider it unusually well adapted to render the study of the science attractive, and to introduce the student to the more abstruse analytical reasoning of the higher branches of mathematics. Difficulties will be found in this work, but they are difficulties inherent in the subject, and not dependent on the manner of treating it. The work is eminently practical, and still that which we consider to be more important in the study of this science is not lost sight of, namely, the discipline of the mind—the increase of intellectual power. Three things are to be considered in an education—the increase of mental power, the acquisition of knowledge, and the acquisition of skill in its use. These three things are distinct from each other, and there are studies particularly suited to each branch. For the acquisition of mental power, the study of mathematics, especially analysis and other branches of pure mathematics, is acknowledged to be unrivaled. The question is often asked relative to the more intricate parts of analysis, What good will they ever do in the affairs of life? It is evident that the benefit must be chiefly sought in the effect they have on the thinking powers. Every one who has pursued the more intricate parts of mathematics, probably, is well aware

that they have produced an effect in enlarging and disciplining the intellectual powers which the whole of life will not obliterate. It should ever be remembered, that the first great object of education is not to acquire knowledge, but to learn and to be able *to do something*. Then we discover the use of mathematics, to expand the mind and strengthen the power of continuous thought. It has been said that no one can exalt his capacity for all good more than by adopting that course of education which will enable him to derive the best advantage from the works of Newton, D'Alembert, and La Place.

But in the first great object of studying mathematics other considerations should not be lost. The study is far more practical than is by many admitted. It would be well to present this consideration more fully to the pupil than often is done. "Does the student weary over the theorems of his Euclid or the formulæ of his algebra? Let him be taught how these theorems and formulæ are employed by the engineer, in his nice adjustments and calculations; by the mariner, as he shapes his unerring course across the trackless sea; by the astronomer, as he passes the limits of this little earth, seems to set his foot on the most distant planet, and takes the measure of its size, its density, and the span of its orbit. Instruct him in the uses of these theorems and formulæ as well as in their theory, and they will no longer seem but a tissue of hard names and dreary abstractions. They will be seen to shed their concentrated light over the humblest processes of the artisan, and to open before him prospects of improvement as interminable in extent as they are animating in their influence."*

There are few subjects in physical science or in the arts that are not greatly dependent on mathematics. The truths of pure mathematics are necessary truths, the reverse of which involves a contradiction. The laws of nature on which physical reasonings are founded in some instances are necessary truths, but in many cases depend in a great degree on the testimony of our senses. These derive the highest confirmation from the aid of pure mathematics, by which innumerable consequences, previously unobserved, are proved to result from them. "The laws of nature are for the most part simple in themselves, but the circumstances under which they act induce a complication in their agencies, which calls at once for the most powerful exertions of natural reason and the most refined artifices of practiced ingenuity to develop. Combinations are perpetually presenting themselves where the principles

* Science and the Arts of Industry.

are satisfactorily known, the general laws placed beyond a doubt, the mode of applying mathematical investigation thoroughly understood, yet which, by the mere complication of the pure mathematical inquiries they involve, defy the utmost power of calculation. The restless activity of nature surrounds us with minute phenomena of this kind. The motions and equilibrium of fluids, their capillary attraction, the vibrations of the atmosphere and of solid bodies, every breath of wind that blows, and every moth that sparkles in the sunbeam, supplies us with an instance in point. On a wider scale the simple law of gravitation, modified by the consideration of three gravitating bodies in motion, produces a problem which has resisted every effort of ingenuity and industry, stimulated by the strongest motives which can rouse man to exertion. This consideration will afford an ample answer to those who look on abstract inquiries which have no immediate practical object in view as useless or contemptible. The luxuriance of modern analytical speculation has arrived at such a point as to startle the most industrious, and to render an equally perfect knowledge of all its parts no longer attainable by one individual; yet of all the ingenuity which has been lavished upon the system, of all the lives drawn out in abstract speculation, no portion can, with a shadow of reason, be looked upon as waste labor, so long as we remain uncertain whether the very next physical problem which presents itself for examination may not plunge us at once in the most remote and obscure of its recesses."*

While it is now generally admitted that the study of most of the sciences is not inimical to the appreciation of the evidences of either natural or revealed religion, unfortunately, this seems not to be true of mathematics. It is indeed to be regretted that one† of the able authors of a series of works designed to illustrate the "Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in Creation," should have expressly maintained that long application to the abstract sciences disqualifies the mind for duly appreciating the force of that kind of evidence which alone can be adduced in favor of natural theology. The article is calculated to discourage close attention to these most useful pursuits. Such influence, coming from one of the authors of the above-mentioned series of works, seems very ungenerous to their fellow-laborers, and as coming with a very ill grace, when they are indebted for many of the most sublime truths on which their arguments are founded to

* Ed. Ency., Art. Mathematics.

† Bridgewater Treatise, by Rev. Wm. Whewell.

the untiring perseverance and laborious investigations of mathematicians.

The following quotations will perhaps exhibit the author's views fairly:—

"We may thus with the greatest propriety deny to the mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times any authority with regard to their views of the administration of the universe; we have no reason whatever to expect from their speculations any help, when we ascend to the first Cause and supreme Ruler of the universe. But we might perhaps go further, and assert that they are in some respects less likely than men employed in other pursuits to make any clear advance toward such a subject of speculation."

And again:—"If the mathematician set out on religious reasoning, thinking that his mathematical knowledge alone must bring him into nearer proximity to his Maker and Master, he will, I fear, find that the road is interrupted by a wide chasm, and he may perhaps turn back prostrated and hopeless. It is only by rising above his mathematics and his physics—by recognizing the utter dissimilarity of moral and religious grounds of belief from mathematical and physical reasonings upon established laws of nature—that he can make his way to the conviction of a moral constitution and providential government of the world; and if the mathematical or physical philosopher so habituate his mind that it is difficult for him thus to elevate himself into a higher region than that of mathematical proof and physical consequence, I cannot but think he does damage to his power of judging on those other subjects."

The chapter from which the above quotations are selected induced Professor Babbage, as he states, to publish his work styled Ninth Bridgewater Treatise. In this, we think, the study of mathematics is most triumphantly defended. The work exhibits a power of generalization rarely witnessed. It was not, perhaps, to be expected that the next addition to the numerous and irresistible arguments in favor of the subjects in natural and revealed religion would be derived from the pure mathematics, yet no one, we think, can carefully peruse this work and not admit that many of its principles and conclusions may fairly claim to be admitted among those fundamental truths that are considered as the pillars of our faith. No one, perhaps, has given a more irresistible answer to Hume's famous argument against miracles—an answer founded on mathematical principles. There is, moreover, something sublime and well worthy of attention in the idea, that the most extensive laws to which we have hitherto attained converge to some few simple

and general principles, by which the whole of the material universe is sustained, and from which its infinitely varied phenomena emerge as the necessary consequences. Instead of representing the Deity as destitute of foresight, as perpetually interfering to alter the laws he had previously ordained, in order to accomplish some present good, he represents him as having from the first foreseen all these necessary changes and apparent exceptions, and as having established one general law, which in its various modifications shall include them all. So that God, in his superintending providence, instead of perpetually interfering with his laws for individual good, has provided for these changes, so that they constitute a part of the original universal law. These views are enforced by an illustration derived from the calculating engine of which Prof. Babbage is the inventor, an illustration so beautiful and striking that we can hardly refrain from introducing it here; yet its length forbids.* It refutes most conclusively the assertion, that "we have no reason whatever to expect from their [that is, mathematicians'] speculations any help when we ascend to the first Cause and supreme Ruler of the universe."

To refer particularly to the many interesting and valuable illustrations and arguments in this work would lead us too far from our present purpose. Sufficient are given to show that the abstract sciences may supply some of the strongest arguments in favor of religion. We doubt not but that all who attentively read the work of Professor Babbage will agree with him when, speaking of his speculations, he says:—"If the reader agrees with me in opinion, that these speculations lead to a more exalted view of the great Author of the universe than any we have hitherto possessed, he must also have arrived at the conclusion, that the study of the most abstract branch of practical mechanics, combined with that of the most abstruse portions of mathematical science, has no tendency to incapacitate the human mind from the perception of the evidences of natural religion; and that even those very sources themselves may furnish arguments which open views of the grandeur of creation perhaps more extensive than any which the sciences of observation or of physics have as yet supplied."†

There has been for a long time an unreasonable prejudice against the study of mathematics. Gibbon went so far as to assert that the mathematics so harden the mind, by the habit of rigid demonstration, as to destroy those finer feelings of moral evidence which must determine the actions and principles of life. The objection

* For this illustration see Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, p. 42.

† Ibid., p. 100.

has been often and variously repeated. But it might be sufficient to remark in relation to this, that Euclid, Archimedes, Galileo, Napier, Newton, and Euler were not only in the first class as mathematicians, but also in the first rank as excellent men. It has justly been remarked, that "it requires but little insight into man's heart to perceive that profession and professional advancement, that power and wealth, have a far more frequent and more effective influence on his judgment than any mental habits he may be supposed to have cultivated." We may then, without hesitation, recommend the study of mathematics as best calculated to strengthen and discipline the mental powers, and as in no way calculated to injure the moral faculties, but as affording even valuable illustrations of the truths of religion.

Algebra is the introduction to all those more important branches of mathematics that depend on analysis. If this is not mastered to the satisfaction of the student, if it is not in some degree rendered interesting and attractive, few will think of pursuing mathematics further. Hence the importance of having a text-book properly prepared. So many text-books are yearly issued, that most teachers think it not worth while to be at the expense of procuring and examining them. In recommending the work of Mr. Clark to the public, we say without hesitation that we think it has stronger claims on the attention of teachers and all others interested in the subject than any work of a similar character with which we are acquainted. The work will bear examination; and no one who is disinterested, we think, can carefully study it with reference to the selection and arrangement of its materials, the simplicity and precision with which the principles and rules are expressed, the unity of the work, the natural manner in which the topics succeed each other, each preparing the way for that which is to follow, and not be convinced that this work is not only better calculated for an elementary text-book, but also for an introduction to the higher branches of mathematics, than any work now in use.

Art. III.—*Kant, and Kantism.*

KANT.

The reforms attempted by Bacon and Descartes, in the methods of philosophizing, produced in their own countries phenomena most interesting. The inductive system, as developed by the former, was fully carried out in the Principia of Newton and the Treatise on the Understanding by Locke. The latter work, on account of the sifting discernment of the writer, met with a highly flattering reception, which did not, as is often the case, suddenly die away, but which has continued even unto our own times. The influence of this philosophy was, however, in many cases most hurtful, because of the premise upon which all its investigations were founded; which affirmed that there were but two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection. Proposing as it did to take nothing for granted which had not passed the ordeal of rigid investigation, it assumed an error in the very first step, which, entering into the remaining portions, distorted the whole. With such a fundamental error, its influence was necessarily injurious, as all may perceive by following the path marked out by its development.

In the hands of Hume it produced infidelity; with Berkeley, through reaction, perfect idealism; in the system of Condillac of France, gross sensualism. Systems most pernicious sprang out of it; systems, too, which could not be overthrown while the Treatise on the Understanding was received. On the continent at this time philosophy was assuming a not less distorted, though less hurtful state. The imaginings of Descartes were followed by the system of Leibnitz, with the ideas so prominently advanced of the sufficient reason, and pre-established harmony. Like the system of Locke, it was well received and taught in the universities. Wolf, its succeeding champion, added much, changed its form, and called it by his own name. Throughout all Germany was the philosophy of Wolf received when the books of Mr. Hume appeared, and in Germany as in England produced trembling and dismay. He made his most formidable attack on the idea of cause, asserting that from sensation or reflection no ideas of cause can be obtained, and therefore all ideas of this kind are mere chimera. Of course in this attack all religion was in danger, as well as the system of Wolf, which rested upon the principle of sufficient reason. In England and Scotland the Church fell back immediately upon faith as her basis, while in Germany religion was uprooted and destroyed.

In such crises master minds usually arise; nor could the great interests of man, the independency and freedom of his will, the immortality of his thinking part, be resigned without a desperate conflict. Of the great champion who arose we proceed to speak.

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724, at Konigsberg in Prussia. His father, George Kant, was a saddler by trade, originally from Scotland. To Immanuel first instructions in reading and writing were given at the charity school of his own parish, but on account of the ability and inclination to learn which he manifested, he was soon removed to the college of Fredericianum. Here mathematics and natural philosophy became his favorite studies. Having quitted the institution at the close of his course, he acted in the capacity of tutor in various situations for nine years.

In 1755 the degree of Master of Arts was conferred upon him, when he immediately commenced lecturing with great success to crowded audiences. During the space of fifteen years which now passed peacefully over him, he published many works both upon physical and metaphysical subjects. In 1770 the metaphysical department at Konigsberg having become vacant, the professorial chair was offered to him.

Here metaphysics occupied all his time, and in this new relation we find the great powers of his mind suddenly developing to an unexpected greatness. His celebrated work, the "Critique of Pure Reason," ("Critik der Reinen Vernunft,") appeared in 1781, attended by circumstances of distinguishing peculiarity. For six years did it remain in the hands of the bookseller, uncalled for and unknown, and it was when he had concluded to destroy the copies for waste paper that a sudden demand required and exhausted three editions. After this appeared several important works containing the system which he upheld, applied to practical and theoretical ethics.

In 1786 he was appointed rector of the university, in 1788 senior of the philosophical faculty, in 1798 he took his leave of the public as an author, and early in 1804 death removed him to a happier clime.

Before speaking of his philosophy, we will consider his character as we find it delineated in the notices which have been furnished by various writers. In philosophy, say they, he was celebrated for his depth of intellect, and powers of generalization. In the world he was a bright example of benevolence and love. "His mind, polished like the diamond, was the philosopher's stone of his age." There was no subject which he could not investigate, and the accuracy and minuteness of his investigations were without a parallel.

He has created for himself an undying reputation, and posterity will look upon him as having brought us nearer than ever to that Socratic wisdom, of acknowledging our ignorance and the limits of our possible acquirements.

It was his intention to strip philosophy of everything that did not belong to her as a science, and we may infer from this that he aspired with unwonted vigor after the truth. But he did not alone devote himself to abstruse and dry reasoning. His eyes and ears were ever open to the actions and opinions of the moving world, and he studied his fellow-men that he might please and instruct. The students of the university in which he taught, acquired a quickness and depth in metaphysical reasoning which is but rarely known.

He made everything tributary to himself, and history, philosophy, mathematics, and experience, alternately and in unison, ministered to his pleasure, and became his instruments in imparting knowledge. As we have remarked, he fixed his eye upon immortal truth, and he acquainted himself with her offspring, beauty and goodness, that he might aspire to her own lofty throne. No cabal, no sect, no advantage, no ambition of a name, had the smallest charm for him when compared with the extension and development of truth. Man was to him a creature far above the beasts that perish, one who aspires to higher and holier scenes. Gentle benevolence and goodness were ever seen lighting up his countenance, and his noble forehead, while it revealed the depth and power of his understanding, ever wore the aspect of imperturbable serenity and joy. It was necessary but to know him, to love him; for joined to his giant intellect there was a tenderness of heart, and strictness in morality, which made him a bright example to the youth of his age. No one could say that he was selfish, for the happiness of others was ever his great desire. He viewed the world through the medium of his own happy temper, and found everything agreeable and alluring. No breeze of passion ever ruffled the mirror surface of his calm mind, and in him the acuteness of reasoning was joined with the polish of a gentleman.

He was a most decided enemy to falsehood of every kind. The world ever saw him as he was, unvarnished by any false art, and making no attempts to conceal his own merits. In his youth he paid his attention to the physical sciences, and arrived at a good degree of proficiency in demonstrative reasoning. It was not, however, until he entered into metaphysics that the great powers of his intellect became fully developed. Here we see him, not rushing to new and untried conclusions, which peradventure could not

stand the test of experience, but moving slowly and surely, clipping off here and there those things that do not belong to true reasoning, casting aside mysticism and prejudice, until he arrived at the fountains of all knowledge. Then he noted their number, limits, and peculiarities, and starting from these *a priori* truths, he followed down the many streams that flowed from them, until they all united and formed the beautiful river of science. This system speaks for iself, and is but a representation of the excellent arrangement of his own mind.

But there is yet another peculiar characteristic of this great man, and it may be found in his love for his native place. We are told that he spent eighty years in Konigsberg, contented and happy. Many offers were made to him to remove to other and more flourishing universities, with promises of many honors, but they had no effect. His love for his home was far greater than his love for riches and fame. Having received from his mother a spirit of reverence and devotion, he aspired after true religion, and made the great principle of right his guide in morals, as was truth in science.

How much he was esteemed may be inferred from the fact that in the universities of Jena, Halle, Gottingen, Erlangen, &c., lectures were delivered on his system; and books were written by his advocates to illustrate and defend his doctrines. "Professors were even sent at the request and expense of princes and crowned heads, to learn more minutely, by a personal conference, what had not been sufficiently elucidated in his books. His lecture rooms were crowded, and many from afar came as disciples to sit at the feet of the German Gamaliel."

Such was the character of this philosopher. His intellect was deep and discriminating, his affections were bound up in universal benevolence, his religion was that of the heart. Few have known and appreciated his merits, because they have looked for faults instead of virtues, and read his works rather to criticise than imitate. His failings were few, and resulted from viewing all nature as happy as himself. His virtues were many, and will not be forgotten, when the philosophy which he taught shall be swallowed up in universal knowledge; and error, and falsehood shall be known no more.

KANTISM.

We have already remarked that Locke ascribed the origin of all our ideas to sensation and reflection, which was the fruitful source of numerous glaring errors. This Kant perceived, and finding that the phenomena of mind could not be established upon the in-

ductive method as used by the former philosopher, he advanced, after much reflection, a new postulate, which runs through his system, and gives coherence to the whole. It is as follows:—

"Whatsoever truth is *necessary*, and of *universal extent*, comes to the mind from *its own operation*, and does *not* rest on *observation* and *experience;* and conversely, whatsoever truth or perception is present to the mind, with a consciousness *not* of its *necessity*, but of its *contingency*, is ascribable not to the original agency of the mind *itself*, but derives its *origin* from *observation* and *experience*."

Having established the foregoing, he proceeded to an examination of man's cognitive faculty, to discover the laws and extent of its operation. Like some of his predecessors, he considered that we possess three distinct faculties, sensation, understanding, and reason. The reason he held to be the higher faculty of the soul, capable of criticising not only itself but also the subordinate faculties of understanding and sense. He, therefore, interrogates the pure reason in his great work, called the "Critique of the Pure Reason," concerning the mind of man, and the results to which he arrives we will attempt to set before our readers.

The matter to be explained is the origin and constitution of knowledge *a priori;* just that evidently which Locke failed to explain. According to our postulate, whatever is of universal extent, and comes from the mind itself and not from experience, is *a priori;* that which is contingent and from experience is *a posteriori*. Every *truth* expressed in a proposition is *necessary* or *contingent*, and every *proposition* is *analytic* or *synthetic*. Thus, wherever we find the relation of subject and predicate, we find it in one of two ways. Either the predicate belongs to the subject as already contained, or it lies utterly without the idea of the subject. The first relation whenever it exists in a proposition is analytic, because it adds nothing to our knowledge of the subject; but merely resolves and dissects the knowledge we already have. The synthetic, on the contrary, increases our knowledge of the subject, because in it we find a predicate referred which is not contained in our conceptions of the object, and therefore not before known to belong to it. For example, to say that gold is yellow is analytic, while to say that it does not rust is synthetic.

All knowledge founded on experience is synthetical; for that which is analytical comes from intuition. The great question is therefore how we form synthetic propositions *a priori*. That knowledge is *a priori* which is attained independently of experience; as when we assert that the square of the hypothenuse in a right trian-

gle is equal to the sum of the squares of the sides, the proposition is not only seen to be of *necessity* true, but also of universal extent, although all triangles have not been examined. This, therefore, did not come from experience. It is the result of some operation of the mind, which we seek to investigate.

Many, if not all, of the elementary ideas are *a priori*, and the manner in which they are combined so as to form a compound conception is interesting. Upon the sensory impressions are made by surrounding objects, but manifestly the impressions want a unity until brought together under some *form* of the mind. This however is evident. They must be co-existent, or successive. If co-existent, they exist in space; if successive, in time. Space and time are of the *a priori* class by which we behold and view. They are the ground forms of the sensation, and being produced by the mind are subjective realities. To prove that space is a subjective reality not derived from the senses, we will suppose we have in the mind the conception of an apple. An inductive philosopher would aver that this conception is wholly made up of elementary ideas derivable from the senses. Let us see; and if anything remain after we have thrown off the elements received by the senses, that remaining portion must be subjective wholly. We abstract, therefore, the color, taste, smell, weight, &c., in short we abolish it in thought, but we find that the space which it occupied still remains, the vacant form of the annihilated body still presents itself. We thence conclude that the idea of space is to us necessary, and has its origin, not in the action of the senses, but from the *a priori* action of the mind itself. The same may be proved of time, so that we find in the sensory two *a priori forms*, in, and according to which, all objects are viewed. Whether other beings see objects in space or time we know not. We can very well conceive, however, that they might have been created otherwise. All things, therefore, which do not present themselves to us through the sensation, but immediately by means of the reason, cannot be viewed as existing in space. We refer to the spiritual and ideal world. All the notions which we form of objects—all the qualities which we attribute to them—are derived either from the impression of external nature on the senses, or from the innate forms which dwell in human perception. We perceive then the *phenomena*, alone, of external things, not the *noumena*, or essence. The phenomena are known as existing in space and time, which are ideal realities developed in the internal. They possess the quality of magnitude, which confers upon them the capability of being depicted by diagrams and numbers, which gives rise to the pure science of reason called

mathematics. The difference between this and the moral sciences is now apparent. All pure ideas of the understanding and reason, not being known in space or represented by number, do not admit of demonstration.

The *understanding* is in possession of the universals, which it uses to hold fast the singulars which flit across the sensory. "The whole operation of the understanding consists in judging, that is, for the most part, in referring singulars under their universals; the consolidating and binding together of which with one another gives birth to knowledge." We will exemplify. When we see a star for the first time, we are conscious at first only of a thing. The understanding takes occasion, however, to form a conception and to acquaint itself (kennen) with that conception. This conception is the universal at this time for the mind. When a star is again perceived, its impression is referred to the universal already established, pronounced to agree, and we recognize it, (erkennen,) this is knowledge.

The universals of the understanding are thus notions of a *potential* object, or one which may be. A *category*, or pure intellectual notion, is the notion of a potential object to which particular intuitions may be referred. The sensory we have discovered to possess two unalterable intuitions, which are both necessary and universal; and in like manner we become aware that the understanding possesses a necessary *a priori* representation, that of *myself* or "I." This is called consciousness or self-consciousness. "It is the general form of all singulars and universals whatever. In short, it is the intellect itself, being neither more nor less than the understanding's self-consciousness of its own spontaneity."

We speak of *our* perceptions, from which it is plain that we must have combined them in some how or other with the "I"; this synthesis is what consolidates the variety of sensitive perceptions in one whole, and is a combination which must necessarily obtain. It is the "I," that by force of its standing identity, introduces unity into the midst of all the checkered sensations of my receptivity. The question is now clearly before us: in what way does the understanding effect a union between the variety in the sensory, and the unchanging perception of *itself the cogitant?* The laws by which this combination is effected are the logical laws of the intellect. They are the *ground forms* of thought, and taken abstractly are categories.

The categories of Kant we give below.

1. *Quantity* or *extension.*	
One (the measure.)	Many (the quantum.)
	All (the whole.)

2. *Gradation* or *intensity*.
   Something (that is, Affirmation of a certain grade of intensity.)
   Nothing.
   Anything.

3. *Relation*.
   Inherence.
   Causality.
   Reaction.

4. *Modality*.
   Possibility.
   Entity, or existence.
   Necessity.

The ground forms are independent of particular intuitions, but are notions for cogitating any object of intuition whatever, even though it were supersensible. Thus is the main problem of the Critique solved. We see clearly how mathematical and physical science are founded. Space and time are intuitious *a priori*. "To convert a representation into knowledge demands a notion and an intuition welded together into one perception; but from the *a priori* singulars are derived all the notions of the configurations of space, and of the combinations of numbers discoursed of in geometry and arithmetic. Mathematical science consists then in the subsumtion of *a priori* intuitions under *a priori* notions of the understanding. Natural philosophy, however, is different; for in it the intuitions are *a posteriori*, because from experience. How such subsumtion of singulars *a posteriori* under universals *a priori* is effected, requires some explanation.

To effect a subsumtion there must be some resemblance between the representations unified. Between the two already mentioned there is, however, nothing homogeneous, which warns us to look for some middle term or connecting link. This we find in time, which is a formal law of the mind regulating the representations of sense and the categories. In other words, to the understanding's categories the fancy endeavors to supply a sensible image, which it does by certain configurations and determinatons of time. This Kant calls "schematism" or the "effigiation of the category." Of the schemes, properly so called, there are eight, not twelve; because the categories of quantity and quality differ only in degree, not in kind. The effigiation confers unity upon time and its contents, enabling all the perceptions to combine in the "I," into which focus of self-consciousness all intuitions converge by the instrumentality of the categories.

Whenever impressions are made on the sensory they converge immediately to the "I," and it is this convergence which stamps both upon them and the scheme time, that incomplexity whereby they are singular perceptions. "The scheme of the category quantity is time itself, that is, number. In the genesis of time

the mind adds successive units, that is, generates number." The scheme of the category intensity is time, not in its genesis, but considered, when generated as a vacuum, or plenum. "The synthesis of quantity goes from the parts to the whole, whereas that of intensity, or quality, begins with the whole, and thence descends to the parts. For the category of quality or intensity, time is effigiated thus:—

> Reality=Time figured as a plenum.
> Negation=Non-implement of time.
> Limitation=Transit from the former to the latter."

The category substance or relation, is effigiated upon the modes of time, which are three,—duration, succession, and simultaneousness. Hence for *inherence* we have not only a self-subsisting thing, but one that persists throughout all time in space; and thus is the permanent ground-work of certain changes. So *causality* is effigiated by representing such an actuating thing as antecedes in time, and upon which somewhat else invariably follows. "The category *reaction* is effigiated by representing as co-existent the modification of the accidents of substance. The scheme of the categories of modality is the representing of the relation, not of phenomena to one another, but of the relation which a phenomena bears to time itself.

"Possibility is effigiated by representing an object as at any time. Entity or existence is effigiated by representing an object as at some fixed given time. Necessity is effigiated by representing an object as at all times."

The two categories, quantity and intensity, warrant the application of the calculus to phenomena, and from the two categories, substance or relation, and modality, are derived the *a priori* propositions upon which natural philosophy depends.

We can give now a general idea of the operations of the mind. The intuitions of the sensory, the understanding reduces to unity under the *a priori* conditions of time and space expressed by the categories. These unities thus produced we may call ideas. They are in turn reduced to a unity by the reason, and as there are three general forms of reasoning, the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, there are three ideas, which establish for each form of reasoning the absolute condition of unity. "Reasoning is categorical when the understanding furnishes to the reason judgments in which the attribute is considered as residing in the subject. Reason should, then, seek for the idea of a subject which does not itself reside in any other: this is the idea of substance. Reasoning is

hypothetical when the attribute of judgments is united to a subject only in virtue of a particular supposition. Reason should then seek for an absolute hypothesis, and as no particular can give it, this absolute hypothesis is perhaps only the absolute totality of all phenomena, that is, the idea of the whole series of facts which compose the universe. Finally, disjunctive reasoning ascends from a part to the whole, and from the whole to a larger whole until it reaches the Supreme Being." The above quotation we have taken from the History of Dr. Henry, as being much more pertinent than anything which we could produce.

Now it being very evident that experience cannot furnish either the ideas of substance, of the totality of phenomena, or of the Being containing all existences, it follows that the notions by which reason constitutes the unity of judgments are *a priori*.

The speculative reason, as we have seen, asks the question, What can I know? The practical reason asks, What ought I to do? Putting all sensible motives aside, we have manifestly the following answer: "Act according to a maxim which would admit of being regarded as a general law for all acting beings." This is the moral law. It naturally presupposes man's freedom to act, and further by commanding him to establish a perfect harmony between his intentions and the moral law, it points him to *holiness* as his ideal. This Kant calls virtue, so that we may infer that virtue and not happiness is the supreme end. All of these lead us to the belief of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.

The philosophy of Kant was termed transcendental by himself because the *a priori* notions of the mind transcend experience. We should be careful, however, lest we infer that it is the same as modern transcendentalism, which is in truth far removed from it. Many objections have been raised against his system, most of which grew out of an inability to understand his language, but some were valid. That he did not make enough of the sensibility in man is evident, but that his theory lead to idealism or sensualism is not true.

Fichte is referred to by writers as having carried out the views of Kant to their legitimate end. This, however, we are disposed to deny, for the system of Fichte was one of complete idealism, founded upon the idea of the all universality of the "me." According to him the "me" first posits itself in an absolute and unlimited manner; then, by the limitation of its own activity, it acquires the idea of the not-me. Thus according to him all the realities in the world are expressed by the word, I. The opinion that the system of Kant leads to this result is obtained from a mistaken view

of his considerations of the objective. He expressly states that we confer objectivity upon the impressions of the sensory, although we indeed know the phenomena and not the noumena. Yet we have the idea of the noumena, or essence, as he also declares. This certainly is not the view taken by Fichte. The other reaction against Kantism, which asserted that its tendency was to skepticism, arose from the spirit of skepticism itself, which finds such tendencies in every system.

That there are errors in Kantism we readily admit, and some quite formidable, one of which we mentioned above, and we would add the tendency which his system has to cramp the workings of the pure reason. He has confined the mental operations in such a manner that limits are set, where there are indeed no such limits. Still he admitted revelation upon subjects not cognizable by the reason.

The great merit of this man consists not in the perfectness of his *system*, but in its *general* accuracy, and above all in its *originality*. He was, like Socrates, the destroyer of old and rotten theories, the promulgator of a new and sound one in a general form. Socrates needed a Plato to make known his conversations: Kant was his own Plato, in intention, if not in result. It cannot be denied that his writings are obscure on account of the technical phrases which he uses; some of them of his own construction, others bearing new meanings. It is for this reason, as much perhaps as any other, that many have neglected to study him, and adopting the common opinion, have lived in error. The beautiful views of Cousin, as advanced in his review of Locke, may be found in Kant in another form, as are many of our own well-received theories. The truth is, the "I" is conscious of the truth and necessity of certain things, and, notwithstanding all arguments, however ably used to the contrary, it will ever believe as it now does. This is a point too little remembered by thinkers, who adopt fanciful systems even against the declaration of the mind that they are false. Hume knew that he was fighting against the truth. Berkeley believed in an outward world, and so do we all give internal assent to the true, even when we vociferate loudly for the false. Let us then give to Kant his due, as an accurate original thinker, and if we wish to benefit our fellow-men, let us disseminate the good things of him far and wide. Truth never contradicts herself, however much she may seem to at times. If Kant's system was the true system, or a part of it, or containing some of the fundamentals of it, (which latter we believe,) it will finally meet with its due attention. The error, then, of philosophers seems to consist in their declaring what the mind

is to receive, rather than asking what it already believes. Closely allied to this we find also another failing in human nature, that of playing around some one point of view and explaining all things from that centre. If we should make out a list of those who have done this, how great indeed it would be, numbering most of the giant intellects of our world. When the philosophers of France declared themselves eclectics, they did nobly, but were they always found true to their name? We fear not. Let all notice, and reflect upon this.

Wesleyan University, Sept. 16th, 1844.

ART. IV.—*The History of the Puritans, or Protestant Non-conformists; from the Reformation in* 1517 *to the Revolution in* 1688. By DANIEL NEAL, M. A. Reprinted from the text of Dr. Toulmin's edition, with his Life of the Author, revised, corrected, and enlarged with Additional Notes, by JOHN O. CHOULES, M. A. New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1844. 2 vols. 8vo., pp. 534, 580.

THE present times are distinguished from all that have gone before them. The whole world is in motion; events of every kind are fermenting together, and all are ready to express anxiety as to the result to which the whole is tending. Principles which were once supposed to be entirely settled, are now not merely disputed, but by some in our own country, and by very many elsewhere, utterly exploded. The half-reformed Church of England, which has long boasted of its pure Protestant principles, and which bade fair a few years since to adopt holier and more Scriptural principles than formerly, now cherishes in her bosom thousands who hate the Reformation, and reject the name of Protestant. Thoughtful Christians of every denomination have been roused, and though they cannot be alarmed as to the ultimate result of the contest, they strongly feel the importance of vigorous efforts to repel error, and to accelerate the progress of truth.

In a period of great excitement, when every one is disposed to be active, and but few know how to direct their labors in the wisest direction, the advantages of history are beyond all calculation. Some one has said that "by the help of history a young man may acquire the experience of old age:" if this be true, never did the inhabitants of any country manifest more need, or were more capable of profiting by such a study, than our own countrymen. We, as well as our brethren in Britain, have Popery presented to us, both

in its honest character, as it appears at Rome, and in its cloak, as it is seen at Oxford. It is well worth while to ask the historian what has been done by our forefathers, under similar circumstances, in past ages. The diversity of the forms of error is by no means infinite; what is now rife among men was known to our fathers: let us ask in what manner they opposed error, for "with the ancient is wisdom." And if we shall find that they employed the best weapons in the wisest manner, and with the most delightful results, we shall surely be induced to act as they did, and to cherish hope of the same ultimate triumph. It is somewhat trying to have the battle of the Reformation to fight over again in the middle of the nineteenth century, and that too against those who have professed heretofore to fight by our side, as well as against Popery proper. Mr. Choules has well remarked in his preface to these volumes :—

"Afflictions and religious persecutions have for a long period been unknown to the happy citizens of these United States, and we have strangely forgotten the times that tried the souls of our fathers.

"There is a resurrection in the land at the present time of feelings and principles which were once generally prevalent, and which once so eminently distinguished our English ancestry. Now, after a long period of carelessness and inattention to the history of Protestant Nonconformity, the descendants of the Pilgrims have been compelled to fall back upon the history and faith of their fathers, in consequence of the pressing impertinence with which the claims of Popery, prelacy, and priestcraft have been urged upon them and their children. God has been building up Zion in all our borders for two hundred years, making our land the praise of the nations. He has granted the quickening influence of his Spirit to the ministrations of thousands of all religious names, who have published the deathless love of his adorable Son; and yet a comparative *handful* of our fellow-Christians gravely deny that our solemn gatherings make Christian churches; that our pastors and teachers have any authority to speak in His name who has so unequivocally blessed them in their labor; and as for Zion's chief and holiest feast, that they stigmatize as 'the blasphemous mockery of a lay sacrament.' We have again to fight the battle for all that we hold dear; but we enter the contest cheered by the undying renown of the names which illustrate the early history of the struggles for religious freedom. It is as fitting and proper for an American to forget or scorn the names of Lexington or Bunker-Hill, Trenton and Princeton, Hancock and Adams, Washington and Jefferson, as for a New-Englander to be unaffected by the utterance of Smithfield, Lambeth Palace, and the ever honored names of Rogers, and Ridley, Hooper, Lawrence, Latimer, and their fellow-martyrs. We should never forget that the prison, the scaffold, and the stake were stages in the march of civil and religious liberty which our forefathers had to travel, in order that we might attain our present liberty."—Vol. i, p. 6.

Cordially sympathizing with these views, we were glad to see the work before us announced from the American press, and shall feel still more happy to find that it is thoroughly digested till its readers are *steeped* in the spirit of the noble army of whom it treats. The importance of studying the History of the Puritans is forcibly shown by Dr. Vaughan, in his "History of England under the House of Stuart;" which, as it also happily illustrates several traits of their character, we will transcribe:—

"A distinct acquaintance with them is strictly necessary to an accurate knowledge of English history under the house of Stuart. It is the confession of their enemies that to this people we 'owe the whole freedom of our constitution;' and the character of that religious struggle, which has given this secular importance to their history, is but very partially and imperfectly exhibited in our most popular histories. The principles which made them Protestants made them Puritans, teaching them to regard oppression as an evil to be resisted, whether practiced by popes, princes, or by a Protestant clergy. Animated by these principles, and persecuted by the crown and the court clergy, the Puritans not only became connected with every popular movement, but gave to every such movement the peculiar energy of religious motives. The interests of religion and of civil freedom were seen to be everywhere interwoven, so that to forsake either would be to give an ascendency to the enemies of both; and, what affected the Puritans greatly more was, that by such conduct they would expose themselves to those penalties in a future world, which they feared much beyond any which could be inflicted by man. It is confessed that their views of freedom, especially in regard to religion, were not in all respects equally enlightened; but they were views sufficiently just to render these persons the great conservators of English liberty as then secured by law, and the means of transmitting it to future generations in a form still more safe and ample. At this time, the alternative placed before them was to forego the public worship of their Maker, or to conform to usages which they believed to be contrary to his will. Had their persecutors allowed them to form separate assemblies, much of their just ground of complaint would have been removed; but from any separation they were prohibited by the sternest interdicts. These interdicts show it to have been well understood, that not a few were ready to avail themselves of such a liberty had it been conceded."—Pp. 45, 46.

We may remark in addition to what Dr. Vaughan has so well said, that the whole history of the Puritans goes to show that all establishments of a religious character, Protestant as well as Catholic, are essentially of a persecuting character. This is a part of their very nature; they tend alike to deprive men of civil and religious freedom; and where they are unchecked by popular opinion, they reduce the countries in which they exist to mental and almost physical slavery. The Greek, the Catholic, and the Epis-

copal Churches are proving this in the old world at the present hour. Nor ought we to forget the remark that this History will tend to show how much injury has been done to the cause of Christianity by too much government. An excess of regulation has been one of the greatest curses of the world, and nowhere has this remark been so clearly shown as by the mischiefs produced by human laws when they have interfered with religion. It is the duty of legislators to let it alone. Its professors, in this their distinctive character, do not even ask for *protection;* they want no more protection while worshiping the Supreme Being in "the house of prayer," than they have a right to require as they sit at their own firesides.

A second reason may be assigned for a careful study of the history of the Puritans, arising out of the fact that they have been almost always misrepresented. We scarcely remember an historian of their own day, or long afterward, who has been disposed to do them justice. Nearly all the accounts which have been handed down from their contemporaries were given by their enemies, whose interests and prejudices directly opposed them. Every year is disproving statements which were almost universally believed; and raising the names of men to honor, who, while they lived, were reckoned "the offscouring of the world." Mr. Neal himself, cordially as he sympathized with these moral heroes in feeling and principles, makes statements which more modern writers have gone very far to disprove. Time is bringing their righteousness fully to light; and their character, like their cause, gains much by rigid investigation. Men now are ceasing to look at the sayings and doings even of monarchs as inspired, and believing that kings and bishops *may* do wrong, it is not long before they find that they *have* done so; and hence men are becoming more than willing to do without kings, and to discover that those who have practically opposed their usurpations, of whatever character, may be greater friends to human happiness than they were once supposed to be. Let these principles be acted out in reference to the Puritans, and assuredly they will lose nothing by the course pursued.

But as Americans, we have yet another and powerful reason for studying the history of this noble race of men. They were the fathers of our country. Their blood flows in our veins; their influence is seen alike in our governments and our laws; our constitution is but their principles wrought out. Whatever is noble in our country may be traced to the character and the influence of the pilgrim fathers. As the work of Dr. Vaughan is less accessible to our readers than the History of Neal, and as he has given us the fact in a few lines, we quote from him:—

"In consequence of these and similar severities, many thousands of the most upright and industrious of the people emigrated to America; most of them taking sufficient property with them to become planters. Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New-Haven were the settlements in which they sought an asylum. The historian of the Puritans possessed the names of nearly eighty clergymen, who during this period accompanied various bands of exiles to the new world. Among these was Eliot, whose zeal procured him the honorable name of the apostle of the Indians, and whose perseverance supplied that people with the sacred Scriptures in their own tongue."—P. 275.

If we have not wearied our readers by dwelling too long on facts which must be very obvious to them, we would urge the study of this History because it presents us with many lessons which are always important, both to individuals and to bodies of men, and never more so than at the present hour. Now, when the most influential rulers in every state of Europe are seeking with more determination than ever to have but one church, and when in our own favored land wise and good men have lamented efforts, in more than one quarter, to denounce the right of private judgment in matters of religion, and to bring the minds of their fellow-citizens under the fetters of human opinion, it is well to ask old Time what we may learn from his records of the past.

Nor is it difficult to obtain an answer to such an inquiry. We have already observed that all Establishments must of necessity persecute, and this has been proved in England by Catholics, Protestants, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians; and if in this country Baptists and Quakers have held political power without persecuting their fellow-Christians, it was because they wisely separated religion from everything else, and declared that human laws had nothing to do with it. They never permitted Christianity to be established, and therefore never were persecutors. The absurdity of the king directing the religion of his subjects, so strongly insisted on not only in darker ages, but within the last year or two, by Mr. Gladstone, in his talented volume, is strongly put by Dr. Price, in his "History of Non-conformity," which Mr. Choules has very properly introduced as a note in the first volume of Neal:—

"When the religion of a people is made to depend on the pleasure of their rulers, it is necessarily subjected to a thousand infusions foreign from its nature. The kingly or magisterial office is essentially political. Its power may be wielded by an irreligious, immoral, or profane man; a despiser of Christianity, or a blasphemer of God. What, therefore, can be more monstrous than to attach to such an office a controlling power over the faith and worship of the church; to constitute its occupant the supreme head of that body which is represented as a

congregation of faithful men? The Christian faith addresses men individually, soliciting an examination of its character, and demanding an intelligent and hearty obedience. But where the pleasure of a king is permitted to regulate the faith of a nation, authority is substituted for reason, and the promptings of fear supplant the perceptions of evidence, and the confiding attachment of an enlightened piety. This is the radical defect of the English Reformation. The people were prohibited from proceeding further than the king authorized. They were to believe as he taught, and to worship as he enjoined. Suspending their own reason, extinguishing the light divine within them, they were to follow their monarch, licentious and blood-thirsty as he was, in all matters pertaining to the moral government and eternal welfare of their souls."—Vol. i, pp. 42, 43.

Nor have parliaments or assemblies of divines been more tolerant, or less disposed to punish those who differed from them. Prynne taught in the House of Commons, that "if the parliament and synod establish presbytery, [Presbyterianism,] the Independents and all others are bound to submit under pain of obstinacy." Calamy, preaching before the same house, in 1664, says, "If you do not labor, according to your duty and power, to suppress the errors thereby that are spread in the kingdom, all those errors are your errors, and those heresies are your heresies; they are sins, and God calls for a parliamentary repentance from you for them this day. You are the Anabaptists, you are the Antinomians, and 'tis you that hold that all religions are to be tolerated." Baillie found fault with the Independents, that "they plead for an accommodation to other sects, as well as to themselves." The ministers of Lancashire published a paper in 1648, in which they "remonstrated against toleration, as putting a cup of poison into the hand of a child, and a sword into that of a madman; as letting loose madmen with firebrands in their hands, and appointing a city of refuge in men's consciences, for the devil to fly to; and, instead of providing for tender consciences, taking away all conscience." The ministers and elders of London met together in 1749, and published "A Vindication of the Presbyterial Government and Ministry," in which they represent "the doctrine of universal toleration as contrary to godliness, opening the door of libertinism and profaneness, and a tenet to be rejected as soul-poison." The synod meeting weekly at Sion College, and the assembly at Westminster, were equally opposed to allowing any difference of opinion among Christians, and equally prove to us that no class of men can safely be trusted with power over the consciences, the persons, or the rights of others, where religion is the subject of debate. On this subject Neal writes in his preface to the fourth volume of the original edition:—

"It is unsafe and dangerous to intrust any sort of clergy with the powers of the sword: for our Saviour's kingdom is not of this world; 'If it were,' says he, 'then would my servants fight, but now is my kingdom from hence.' The church and state should stand on a distinct basis, and their jurisdiction be agreeable to the nature of their claims; those of the church purely spiritual; and those of the state purely civil; as the king is supreme in the state, he is also head or guardian of the church in those spiritual rights that Christ has intrusted it with. When the church in former ages first assumed the secular power, it not only rivaled the state, but in a little time lifted up its head above emperors and kings, and all the potentates of the earth: the thunder of its anathemas was heard in all nations, and in her skirts was found the blood of the prophets and saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth. * * * It is therefore the interest of all sovereign princes to keep their clergy within the limits that Christ has prescribed for them in the New Testament, and not to trust them with the power of inflicting corporeal pains or penalties on their subjects, which have no relation to the Christian methods of conversion."—Vol. ii, p. 103.

The only exception we take to this statement is, that it does not go far enough. The ruler has to protect the person and the property of his subjects, and neither himself meddle with their religion nor allow others to do so. On this subject we regret that our author is not so clear as we could have wished him to be.

It must not, however, be inferred from this expression of opinion that we undervalue Neal as an historian. On the other hand, his sound judgment, his patient research, and his Christian feeling, eminently qualified him for the task he was induced to undertake. His History is a statement of facts; he draws from records, and not from imagination. We are aware that Maddox and Grey disputed the correctness of some of his statements, and we remember too the triumphant defense he made against the former, and the equally unanswerable reply, after his death, given by his first editor to the ungentlemanly attack of the latter. The books of his opponents are never seen now, and their very names would have been long since forgotten, had not life been given to them by placing their names in these volumes, while the praise of correctness is now voluntarily conceded to him by almost all parties.

Would our limits allow, we should be glad to give a hasty sketch of the Puritans as they stand before our mental vision, adorned with the innocence and majesty attendant on them as moral heroes, in whose holy cause heaven itself took a deep interest, and the results of whose character and conduct will stamp their impress on the world through all time.

We confess that we have little sympathy with Macauley in his eloquent delineation of the character of these extraordinary men,

as contained in his well-known essay on Milton. He viewed them almost entirely through the representations of their enemies. It is true, he had judgment enough to know that much misrepresentation hovered round the subject, and he, therefore, willingly concedes to them talent, learning, and an ardent devotion to freedom; but then he describes them as "half-maddened by glorious or terrible illusions," speaks of "their groans and their whining hymns," laments "the absurdity of their manners," and "dislikes the sullen gloom of their domestic habits." To say nothing of this somewhat strange combination of contrarieties, we venture to dispute the correctness of the portrait altogether. They may have been somewhat rigid, but they were not gloomy; they were severe, and not enthusiastic. They lived in the fear of God, and "endured as seeing him who is invisible." They always acted with a view to the whole of their existence, and as remembering that what they did, bore, in its results, on millions yet unborn. Could they have foreseen their influence on posterity, and especially on this country, they could have done few things better than they did. The rejection of the reforms they proposed was the worst deed of an evil time, and their expulsion from the inclosures of the Establishment was an event which even yet will prove suicidal. We venerate their names, and admire their conduct, while we would wish to breathe their spirit, and, as far as circumstances may call for it, to imitate their example. Let our children be taught to trace the conduct of the pilgrim fathers to the principles which induced them first to labor for the freedom of the consciences of their countrymen from oppressive tyranny; and when they failed in this, the same high and holy principles induced them to brave difficulties of every kind, and even to meet death with serenity in founding a state which should secure freedom to their children, and furnish a model for the world. It is true that their views did not all exactly harmonize, and that they sometimes indulged in disputes which appeared to an indifferent spectator, both as to their objects and their results, of small moment; but in all this they showed their mental freedom, and proved to us the value and importance of free discussion.

On these, and on other accounts, we welcome these volumes to our own library, and cordially recommend them to our friends. We have indeed greatly mistaken the matter, if they will not prove more than acceptable to the whole Christian church. We should greatly rejoice if the acceptance with which these volumes shall meet should induce Mr. Choules to give us an edition of "Brook's Lives of the Puritans," and "Palmer's Non-conformist's Memorial."

Few authors have been more favored in having suitable editors for the successive issues of their works than has Neal. It has been our happiness personally to know them all, and we have not unfrequently remarked on the somewhat singular fact that all have been Baptists, belonging, however, to different sections of that body In 1793, when Dr. Toulmin published his edition of Neal, and added his invaluable notes and supplementary matter, he was the minister of the General Baptist Church at Taunton, in Somersetshire. This was a situation admirably adapted to the study and research for which his task called. He removed not long after to succeed Dr. Priestley at Birmingham, a position he occupied with high reputation till his death. Few things connected with our boyish days are more indelibly impressed on our memory than seeing the worthy doctor, tall and portly, as doctors should be, with his dress made court fashion, a large white bush wig, a three-cornered hat, and a gold-headed cane. He was the object of great reverence, ay, and of love too, even on the part of children; for whether he met them in the streets or saw them in the houses of their fathers, he would have a kind word to say to them, and kindly stroking down their hair, would utter some pious petition or some fervent wish that would be sure to attach veneration to his name as long as his affectionate little friends should live. His patience, learning, and candor produced additions to Neal for which every reader will be grateful.

Very different, in many respects, was the editor of the next edition, published, we think, about twenty years since in London. This was William Jones, the well-known historian of the Waldenses. Connected with the Scotch Baptists, he has always breathed too much of their party spirit, and cherished a lamentable degree of bitterness toward those who have differed from him. His contributions were very small, and consisted rather in correcting a few names and dates than in anything else. Mr. Jones, however, on other accounts, deserves high esteem for his general labors in the department of ecclesiastical history; and it is alike creditable to him and to the British sovereign that he enjoys at eighty-four, almost blind and friendless, a small annuity for life. We cannot but add in this connection that it is digraceful to the religious, and especially to the dissenting community of England, that such a man should need the paltry sum of twenty-five pounds a year from such a quarter. But so, alas, have they treated their best writers in the great controversy from the days of the martyred De Laune till now.

We trust that it may be very long before we are called to say all that we might wish to say of the gentleman who has prepared the

edition of Neal now on our table. He is known to belong to what are called the regular Baptists of this country, and his extensive reading, liberal spirit, and good taste have well qualified him to correct the text of his author, and to add, from the many excellent general and ecclesiastical works recently published in London, important and valuable information. This he, like Dr. Toulmin, has done in the shape of notes, and gives full evidence that he has neither spared labor nor expense to make the work all that it ought to be. As the volumes proceed from the press of the Harpers, it is quite unnecessary to say that the printing is done with great accuracy, that considerable pains have been taken to secure correct portraits of some of the leading persons introduced in the work, or that it is brought out at the lowest possible price. The public is brought under a heavy debt of gratitude to this enterprising house for so many standard English works, published in cheap form; especially, as persons of small means are hereby enabled to avail themselves of the advantages of important and useful works, which would otherwise only be found in the libraries of the wealthy.

Art. V.—1. *Observations in Europe, principally in France and Great Britain.* By John P. Durbin, D. D.,President of Carlisle College. In two volumes 8vo. Harper & Brothers. 1844.

2. *Quinet L'Ultramontanisme.* Paris, 1844.

3. *Romanism not Republicanism.* By Civis.

4. *Catholicism compatible with Republican Government and in full Accordance with popular Institutions.* By Fenelon. New-York, 1844.

5. *Constitution and Address of the Christian Alliance.* New-York, 1843.

6. *Letter of Pope Gregory XVI.*, May 8th, 1844, *on the same.*

Among the publications of the closing year, the discerning public has already assigned a conspicuous place to Dr. Durbin's late work, the title of which appears at the head of this article. All classes of readers may here meet with something entertaining or instructive; and the impartiality and kindness of the writer will make, no doubt with them all, an ample atonement for his few mistakes in point of fact, and for the unsoundness of some of his conclusions. On our part we acknowledge that we felt particularly interested in the graphic account which he has given us of the pre-

sent condition and prospects of the Romish Church, of the disastrous issue of the contest which steeped all Europe for twenty-five years in blood, and more than all, of the *true* nature of that contest, and its calamitous consequences. These subjects, which Dr. Durbin handles with skill and precision in the last chapter of the first, and the twenty-second of the second volume, occupy the most prominent place in the history of our times, and absorb the larger share of the meditations and feelings of the present generation: for they refer to the greatest and most ancient question of all human societies, the question of conviction or authority, of liberty or despotism, of self-government or slavery for the body and soul of mankind.

Therefore, if we can in this article throw some additional light on the subject of Romanism, its strength, tendency, and objects, and convey some information as to the means most likely to arrest, to counteract its progress, and eventually to put it down, we shall not stand in need of an apology to our readers for its unusual length.

The twenty-second chapter of the second volume, above alluded to, exhibits the statistics, and treats of the internal vigor of the Romish Church. We give below, in a condensed form, the statistical account which is to be found in the Roman Catholic Almanac for 1844,* instead of the statistics of our author; and to

* The Metropolitan Catholic Almanac for 1844, printed at Baltimore, contains the following general statistics of the Romish Church:—

Our present most holy father, Gregory XVI., (Mauro Capellari,) was born at Belluno in the Venetian states, (the government of Venice,) 18th Sept., 1765, and elected pope 2d Feb., 1831. The sacred college consists of sixty-five cardinals, of whom six are bishops, forty-seven priests, and twelve deacons.

The number of patriarchs is twelve, of archbishoprics one hundred and forty-seven, of bishoprics five hundred and eighty-four, of coadjutors, auxiliaries, suffragans, &c., ninety-five, of dioceses seven hundred and thirty-one, of vicariates seventy-one, of prefectures nine, and of missionaries three thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, with a population of 162,439,444, distributed as follows*:—

	Dioceses.		Under Missions.	
In Europe over	577	124,993,961	3,413,584=	128,407,545
" Asia "	59	1,155,618	1,577,000=	2,732,618
" Africa "	9	758,571	231,200=	989,771
" America "	79	25,819,910	1,380,300=	27,199,510
" Oceanica "	7	3,050,000	60,000=	3,110,000
Total	731	155,777,360	6,662,084=	162,439,444

* There is some slight mistake in the *distribution* of this population, which we have no means at hand to rectify. According to the Times (London) of October last, the population of the Roman Catholic Church amounts to 200,000,000.

complete his picture of the awful size and perfect organization of that church, we must add, (see *L'Ultramontanisme, par M. Quinet*, published last summer in Paris,) 1st. That the Jesuits have succeeded in their endeavors to draw into their plans most of the prelates, and to communicate to all the monastic orders of both sexes the spirit of their own society. 2d. That the higher secular clergy of almost all Roman Catholic countries are striving to break off their dependence on the civil powers, for the purpose of placing themselves altogether under the power of Rome. Thus the Irish clergy, who twenty years ago were anxious, according to Mr. O'Connell, to get their support from the state treasury, refuse now beforehand all offers that the government might feel disposed to make them. The bishop of the Canaries, in his work "Independencia Constante de la Iglesia Hispana, 1843," advocates in behalf of the Spanish bishops the complete separation of the church from the state, for the purpose of vesting all *temporal* and spiritual authority over it in the pope. In Germany, Goerres maintains the same doctrine in regard to the German bishops, and the French prelates have already so completely gone over to Rome that, as M. Quinet affirms, the Gallican Church is nothing more than a name.—L'Eglise Gallicane n'existe plus que de nom.

So that we must now consider the Romish clergy, secular* and regular, as a well-appointed, one-minded army, preparing itself, in the unconquerable spirit of Gregory VII., to renew for the last

The number of priests, friars, monks, and nuns, is not stated; but for the United States we find in the said almanac the following summary:—

Dioceses in the United States 21: apostolic vicarate 1: number of bishops 17: bishops elect 8: number of priests 634: increase in the number of clergymen, since the publication of the almanac for 1843, 55: number of churches 611: other stations 461: ecclesiastical seminaries 19: clerical students 261: literary institutions for young men 16: female academies 48: elementary schools, *passim* throughout most of the dioceses: Catholic periodicals 15: population 1,300,000. Late accounts carry this population up to 2,000,000. In 1836 there were in the United States 12 bishops, 1 archbishop, 341 priests, 300 churches, 10 colleges, 31 convents, and 600,000 of the Roman Catholic denomination.—*New-York Herald.*

* The secular clergy of missionary countries, such as Great Britain, the Low Countries, several provinces of Germany and Turkey, the Canadas, Texas, Antilles, Hayti, &c., without exception: of other countries this is generally true, as to Ireland, the United States, South America, Belgium, Switzerland, and some other: as to the rest, this is true to a great extent in regard to the prelates of France, Spain, and of some provinces of Italy and Germany; but not in regard to the inferior clergy, whose most intelligent and pious members are strongly averse to the politico-religious despotism of Rome.

time the contest for the supremacy of the church over the state, that is to say, for the pope's universal monarchy.

That this is the true object to which the present extraordinary exertions of the Roman court ultimately tend, no reasonable doubt can for a moment be entertained. The notions of the Romish clergy concerning the nature of the church and of their sacred office, and their very rule of faith, lead them naturally and irresistibly to strive for the subjugation of the temporal to the spiritual world. Gregory *the Great* said that "the kingdom of the earth *should* be subservient to the kingdom of heaven." His successors in the pontificate accepted the idea contained in this proposition as a positive precept and rule of action, and Thomas Aquinas worked it into a formal argument, the conclusion whereof is, that "the secular power is subject to the spiritual, as the body is subject to the soul;" and hence that "in the pope is the summit of both spiritual and temporal power." Hundreds of theologians adopted this doctrine, popes carried it out in practice, and œcumenical councils converted it into an article of faith. So that Baronius could truly and justly maintain "that there can be no doubt (with a Romanist) but that the civil principality is subject to the sacerdotal:" in other words, "that God has made the political government subject to the dominion of the spiritual church." In fact, this doctrine of the supremacy of the church, or of the pope, as understood and acted upon by the popes themselves, from Gregory II. in 770 to the present day, is a logical deduction, a necessary consequence of the fundamental principles of the church, and the Jesuits, the object of whose existence is to carry it out, deserve the praise, at least, of an undaunted consistency.

Nor does the modification adopted by Bellarmine,* Benedict XIV., and their school, affect the essence of this doctrine. According to

* "Bellarmine does not go so far as to ascribe to the pope a temporal power derived from divine right; but so much the more unhesitatingly did Bellarmine attribute to him an *indirect* right. The spiritual power has, he affirms, the right, and the duty to impose a curb on the temporal, whenever that becomes injurious to the interests of religion: . . . if a law were necessary to the salvation of souls, and the sovereign hesitated to enact it, or if a law were injurious to the salvation of souls, and the sovereign was obstinately determined to maintain it, the pope is certainly justified in ordaining the one, and abolishing the other. . . . . As a general rule, the pope could not certainly dethrone a prince; but should it become necessary to the salvation of souls, he possesses the right of changing the government, or of transferring it from one ruler to another. . . . In one of his works he enumerates more than seventy writers of different countries by whom the authority of the pope is regarded in the same light as by himself."—*Ranke's History of the Popes*, vol. i, p. 408.

this class of Romish divines, the supreme pontiff, in the use of an infallible discretion, exerts a temporal power *indirectly*, viz., whenever the good of the church demands it. But it is easy to understand that the sphere of this power, though *indirect*, will always be as extensive as that of the power *direct:* for it is the pope alone who determines on the necessity and extension of its use under the boundless and indefinable cloak of the salvation of souls.

That the court of Rome does not generally exert it in our days, is no argument to disprove its existence, or to infer therefrom its relinquishment. Rome put it forth whenever she could command obedience; and we saw, a few years ago, the present pope attempting to wield it, with an unexampled absoluteness and dictatorship, against Portugal and Spain,* while he crouched most abjectly at the feet of the Russian emperor, who is crushing to death the Polish Church.†

But are there, in the present condition of the Romish Church and of Christendom, reasons to believe that the clergy will at last come out of the impending contest victorious?

The past may be a light to our feet in the darkness of the future. The Roman, the Frankish, and the German emperors took the church under their patronage for the advancement of their own political interests: and the church every time began her connection with the empire as a grateful servant, continued it as a zealous partner, and ended it as an imperious mistress; subjecting to herself, for a time, at least, the state to which she was indebted for her very existence. Constantine and Theodosius the Great, in the fourth century; Pepin and Charlemagne, in the eighth; Otho and Henry III., in the tenth and eleventh, called in the priesthood to their assistance, and the priesthood as a reward for its services compelled their successors to vacate their thrones, or to be in their turn its servants. In the thirteenth century Rome wielded an almost omnipotent authority. "A king of England received his kingdom from her as a fief: a king of Aragon transferred his to the apostle Peter; and Naples was actually given over by the pope to a foreign house." The aspirations of Gregory VII. were then near their accomplishment. But their exorbitancy forced open the eyes of the laity, and as vapors against the rising sun, they began rapidly to vanish. In the beginning of the fourteenth century Philip the Fair

* See, for instance, the allocution, March 2, 1841. Well and truly the Spanish government, in their manifesto of July 30, 1841, averred that never has the holy see, from the time of Gregory VII. until now, maintained such high pretensions, or made them known in a manner so impudent and so reckless.

† See the allocution, July, 1841.

answered the pope's bulls of excommunication by a *slap:* a little time after, the Germans resolved to secure the independence of the empire against all aggressions of Rome, and took a common stand against the principles of the Papal policy; and not long after, Edward III. refused to pay the tribute promised to Rome by his predecessors, and in the protection afforded to Wickliff he may be said to have aimed at the total destruction of the Roman power. Toward the close of the fifteenth century Rome had fallen so low in the estimation of mankind, that her pettiest neighbors themselves "obeyed the pope's commands just so far as they had a mind and no further."

The tendency of the Papal system, and the true character of the hierarchy, were then fully and openly before the eyes of the people. Sixtus IV., Innocent VIII., Alexander VI., Julius II., Leo X., and Paul III., drove laymen and clergymen to look for redress of grievances to a radical church reformation.

No doubt can be entertained but that, had the people of Europe been allowed to carry on their quarrels with the Roman Church, Luther would have seen with his own eyes the utter demolition of that power which he had so terribly shaken. But there were the emperor, the king of France, and many princes and noble houses, whose power and privileges arose and grew up with the Romish Church, and could be preserved only with her preservation. The love of power and money, which had characterized that church from her very cradle, ruled those princes also: an alliance was soon formed, which, putting on the garb of an extraordinary sanctimoniousness, and drowning all symptoms of dissent in blood, drove back the Reformation, enfeebled by internal strifes and worldly pursuits, and was at one time within an inch of crushing it everywhere, and of blasting thereby all hope of individual and social improvement for ever. Rome again was for half a century the soul, the head of the monarchs who swayed the destinies of Europe, and the thunders of the Vatican roared again as they had done in the days of Frederic II. But how transitory this effulgence of glory, this show of a renovated power! The last political drama in which the Papacy played a part worthy of her younger days was the peace of Verona in 1598. Half a century later she had already fallen so low, that the monarchs who had profited most by her spiritual and pecuniary assistance, signed the peace of Westphalia (1648,) on terms which the pope had beforehand reprobated and forbidden. In the peace of the Pyrenees (1664) the pope had no part, and his envoys were not even admitted to the conferences; and at the peace of Utrecht (1713,) countries which the pope had looked upon, and

for centuries had been considered as his fiefs, were allotted to new families without even consulting him. Clement XIII. durst not publish his allocution (1762,) in condemnation of the decree of the parliament of Paris for the suppression of the Jesuits. Clement XIV. was compelled to sacrifice to the hatred of mankind these same most faithful champions of the Papacy; Pius VI. closed his days a prisoner in France (1779,) and his successor, Pius VII., having witnessed the downfall of his temporal kingdom, consented to reside in Paris (1813) as the *primate of the Catholic Church.* The Papacy had, at length, amid the neglect of all her temporal and spiritual subjects, breathed her last, when a sudden unlooked-for turn of the wheel of fortune brings the French revolution to the grave; the cause of civil and religious liberty succumbs in the struggles against the despots of Europe, and Popery is restored to life and power in 1814.

What does this historical muster prove?

It proves that the exaltation of the Romish Church is the work of politics: that Rome always abuses the power she derives, directly or indirectly, from the state, both against the people and their rulers: and that the excesses of this abuse of power bring her down to her original impotency, thence to rise again the moment popular claims endanger the *divine right* of oligarchs and kings. Rome has no inherent power of self-preservation: left alone she would rend herself asunder in half a century; the history of her schisms is an obvious and undeniable evidence of the probability of this result. Her unity is a forced cohesion from outward compulsion: for the temporal powers keep her system together to strengthen themselves against the interests of their own subjects. Pius IV. said, "that the church could not subsist without the support of kings." History, and his own experience, established the truth of this acknowledgment. On the other hand, Pius the Fifth rung unceasingly in the ears of his kingly friends that "a union with the church was indispensable to their safety," and the transactions of the great powers of Europe since 1798 prove that they are firm believers in this article, at least, of the Romish faith.

The decisions of the two infallibles above referred to are the two hinges on which turn the politics of Europe in reference to the Romish Church; and they give us the key to the mystery which is developing itself under our own eyes to our astonishment and apprehension.

Dr. Durbin, in the last chapter of vol. i, states the true ground, and the results of the controversy which was put an end to on the battle-field of Waterloo. This chapter alone is worth more, in this country, than the cost of the whole work, and to it we advise those

among our readers to apply who want yet to learn the intimate connection between civil and religious despotism and the truth of the familiar Roman saw, "that spiritual things follow the course of temporal things."—Le cose spirituali sequono il corso delle cose temporali. We will add to Dr. Durbin's remarks only a few facts and observations.

The victory over Napoleon, by the four great allied powers, of whom three were anticatholic, restored Pius VII. to Rome and independence; to these three anticatholic sovereigns alone, who were then met in London, was the wish of the pope to recover the entire Papal states first submitted. In the allocution in which Pius VII. communicated to his cardinals the fortunate results of his negotiations, he expressly mentions "the services of the sovereigns who do not belong to the Church of Rome—the emperor of Russia, who had taken his rights into consideration with peculiar attention, the king of Sweden, the prince regent of England, and the king of Prussia, who had declared in his favor during the whole course of the negotiations."

The restoration of the pope was immediately followed by the restoration of the Jesuits. There is no doubt but this Papal measure was approved of beforehand by the great powers of Europe, England included. The witty and subtil prince De Ligne had, in his rage at the approaching independence of Europe, exclaimed, "*Je l'ai dit, il y a long temps, que si l'on n'avait pas chassé les Jesuites l'on ne verrait pas ce maudit esprit d'independence,*" *&c.*—I have said so long ago, that if the Jesuits had not been driven away, we would not now see this cursed spirit of independence, &c. The monarchs of Europe, convinced of the truth of this remark, thought that the Jesuits were likely to succeed in putting out that *spirit of independence* which had blazed during their suppression; and therefore they opened at once to them their several states, and thus reversed the sentence which their predecessors had repeated thirty-nine times, with the assent of all the world, against an *order* as infamous in conduct as inimical to the peace and the rational improvement of mankind. But what is most surprising in this transaction is, that it should have been agreed to by any Protestant power, when that institution was originally calculated for the struggle with Protestantism, and is still exclusively adapted to the purpose of building the Church of Rome on the ruins of the Protestant faith. It arose for war, it fell when peace between the parties rendered it useless, and is now revived for the accomplishment of its original object by those powers who represent the Reformed Church, and principally by that very power which was once the main

pillar of the Reformation, and ought ever to have been the bulwark of religious freedom all the world over.

The restoration of the idiotic kings of southern Europe was followed by the re-establishment of the worst institutions and practices of the Papal Church, in the expectation that they would powerfully contribute to crush the domestic foes by whom these monarchs saw themselves surrounded. Ferdinand of Spain, in 1814, overturned the constitution of 1812,* which he had most solemnly sworn, on ascending the throne of his fathers, to support, then recalled the Jesuits, and reopened the tribunals of the nuncio and the inquisition. Sardinia and the other states of Italy opened again the old convents, endowed them with national lands and pensions on the state treasury, restored to the nobles and the priests the monopoly of offices and education, and abolished all French improvements save that of taxation. In France the chambers of 1815 saw the necessity of restoring to the clergy their rights of interference in the state, communes, and families, in public business and public instruction, while Prince De Metternich recommended to the German states assembled in congress at Frankfort (1815) to make use of their utmost diligence in order not only to stop the onward march of the world, but to push it back to the position it occupied in the feudal ages.

This legitimate reaction, however, was too violently opposed to that spirit of the *Romance* nations, which had been developed under totally different auspices, to achieve a prompt or easy victory. A revolution broke out in Spain, Piedmont, and Naples: the states of the church were on the eve of a general insurrection, when Austria and France, commissioned by the other great powers, England herself consenting, ran again to the assistance of the restored

* The cortes met him (March 3d, 1814) at the gates of the kingdom, and their president, placing into his hands the constitution of 1812, addressed him in the following language: "The nation, who might have chosen to herself a chief from among her bravest warriors, gives back to you a crown she conquered again for you, but without you. Never for a moment forget, sir, that you owe it to the generosity of the people. They do not subject your authority to any other restraint than this constitution, adopted by their representatives. The day in which you should break it, shall witness, also, the breaking of this solemn contract by which you are made a king."

And the king promised and swore on the Gospels, marched straight away to Madrid, drew into his hands the government, and, on the 10th of the following month of May, dissolved the cortes, arrested the deputies in the dead of the night, dragged them from their beds to his dungeons, and abolished the constitution. *Pius VII. had annulled his oath, and released him of all his sworn duties toward the Spanish nation.*

sovereigns, and stifled all commotions and revolutions in their birth.

And what was the court of Rome doing during these events?

The great monarchs of Europe, assembled in congress at Troppau (1820,) and thence at Laybach, summoned before them the old king of Naples, who, after a little schooling at the hands of Metternich, was admitted culprit-like at the bar to receive with thanks the outrageous sentence of undoing what he and his son the regent had done, and freely sworn to do for the welfare of their subjects, namely, to put down by dint of bayonets the constitutional government of Naples. The temporal despots took upon themselves to overcome the people's aversion to Austrian and Russian regiments, and the *spiritual despot*, the pope, *removed the difficulty arising from the conscience of the king and the regent, by releasing them from their voluntary oath to their confiding people.*

On this occasion the same monarchs laid down, without any further equivocation, the true principles of the policy of the Holy Alliance. They declared to the world, "that as they had delivered the European continent from military despotism, so it was their duty to deliver it also from the misrule of revolt and crime; and that they exercised but an incontestible right in providing in common for their safety, against those states in which the overthrow of the government endangered the existence of all *lawful* constitutions and governments;" and in their circular, May 2d, 1821, they said, "that all useful and necessary changes in the legislation and administration of the states must originate exclusively with the free will of those whom God holds responsible for the power with which he has intrusted them." "Therefore," adds the Prussian circular, June 5th, 1821, "they will always mark rebellion wherever it may appear and they can reach it, they will repress, condemn, and combat its works."

The principle laid down by this sovereign conference, of *armed intervention*, as explained to the world in the above-quoted, and other published documents, was by the allied powers declared to apply *to all nations*. That Great Britain herself was considered as under the tutelar supremacy of the Holy Alliance, the noted circular of the British government, January 19th, 1821, has placed beyond controversy. The cabinet of that country openly protested against the principle of *armed intervention* asserted by the Holy Alliance at Troppau, and then again at Laybach; but secretly encouraged the three despots of the north to carry it out against Italy, "and while the scaffold was raised in Turin, and the tribunal opened at Naples, while nations goaded to madness by sufferings and op-

pression were called on to the judgment-seat of runaway kings, restored to their thrones by foreign bayonets, the organ of the English government, the Courier, applauded the avenging tyrants of Italy, calling on them *to beware of unwise mercy*, and reminded them that *indemnity for the past and security for the future demanded blood.*"

"Ay, shed blood enough, old Renault."

These same powers assembled again at Verona in 1822, *to provide in common for their safety against Spain*, (for having in 1820 reinstated the constitution which the king had in 1814 sworn to maintain inviolate, Alexander had in 1813 caused to be published and sworn to by all the Spaniards residing in his empire; Prussia had approved in 1814; and Austria had in 1820 determined to respect; and whose only guilt consisted in having brought about the expulsion of the Jesuits, and the suppression of the inquisition, the gallows, and the censure of the press,) stipulated with the pope a treaty, October 22d, the three first articles of which are as follows:—

Art I. The high contracting powers being convinced that the system of representative governments is equally as incompatible with monarchical principles, as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right of kings, engage mutually in the most solemn manner to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced into those countries where it is not known.

Art. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations to the detriment of those of princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper means to suppress it.

Art. III. The contracting powers offer in common their thanks to the pope for all he has done already in their behalf, and *solicit his constant co-operation in their design to subjugate the nations.*

This treaty reveals what the instrument of the Holy Alliance, September 26th, 1824, had hidden from the people's eyes in a haze of indefinite words, the league of the governments of Europe against the liberties of mankind, and tells clearly enough (though we shall never be able to discover all the secret workings of Rome) what was the object the despots of Europe aimed at in the restoration of the Papacy, and the condition annexed to its preservation.

But we shall not greatly err in affirming that their eyes were, even before the congress of Verona, turned toward these United States. The Jesuits, who, at the time of the suppression of their order in 1773, had found a refuge in the dominions of the empress Catha-

rine, were expelled therefrom in 1820 by the emperor Alexander. By the account of the Jesuits themselves, it would seem that the Russian cabinet had resolved on their expulsion immediately after their order had been revived in Catholic Europe, and that the delay was owing to the reluctance of the emperor to grieve the general of the order, his personal friend. However this may be, it is a fact that the Jesuits hid their humiliation under the assurance that *God in his providence called them to North America, where the nature of the government allowed them free scope for their usefulness.* In 1825 the ministry of Charles X. declared that the conversion of the republicans of America to Roman Catholicism was of the highest importance not only to religion, but to the political condition of Europe. In 1828 Frederick Schlegel, in a series of lectures delivered in Vienna before the court, and the highest nobility of the Austrian empire, proved most conclusively that "the political revolutions to which European governments had been so long subjected from the popular desire for liberty, are the natural effects of the Protestant Reformation;" that "as Protestantism favors republicanism, so Popery naturally supports monarchical power;" and that "the great nursery of these destructive (democratic) principles, the great revolutionary school of France, and the rest of Europe, is *North America.*"

In the following year the imperial court organized a society under the patronage of the emperor *for promoting the greater activity of Catholic missions in the United States.* This is the famous *Leopoldine Foundation,* warmly supported by the imperial family and the prime minister, Prince de Metternich; and to this society is chiefly owing the rapid extension which the Romish Church has during the last eight or ten years acquired in this country.* Whoever does not perceive a connection between these transactions, and supposes that the creation of the Leopoldine Society is not the execution of a design formed at least as early as the arrival of the Jesuits in this country in 1820, has a very scanty knowledge of the manœuvres of the European cabinets, and none at all of the far-seeing policy of the Jesuits.

While the royalists of France were straining every nerve to place the Gallican Church at the feet of Rome, (1815,) the old antipathy to the hierarchy broke forth in a loud war cry against the new con-

* This society went into operation May 13th, 1829. "Every member of this religious institution engages daily to offer one *pater* and *ave*, with the addition, 'St. Leopold pray for us,' and every week to contribute a *kreutzer*," (about one cent.) His holiness, Pope Leo XII., did grant to its members by letter, dated Jan. 30th, 1829, *full indulgence and remission of all their sins, &c.*

cordat, defeated the plans of the court, and laid the foundations of a conspiracy which, in 1830, overturned the throne, and with it the hierarchical party and the Jesuitical institutions of that country.

But Rome, unfortunate in Russia, and unsuccessful in France, had great cause of rejoicing in the victory her party gained in England in 1829, and a still greater cause in the splendid and unexpected triumph she obtained in Belgium in 1831. The extinction of the nationality of Poland is very likely to draw after it the total annihilation of the Roman Catholic Church in the Polish provinces under Russia. Gregory XVI., at the request of the emperor Nicholas, (who had but two years before broken his most solemn oath to the Poles and provoked their fatal insurrection,) ordered the Polish bishops and clergy to lay down their arms and die the death of the martyrs. Poland fell, and the *grateful* emperor in 1839 brought over to the Russo-Greek Church nearly two millions of his Polish Roman Catholic subjects; transferred the Roman Catholic seminary of Wilna to St. Petersburgh, and is unceremoniously conferring the best Roman Catholic bishoprics on bishops of his church. In Prussia the government and the Romish hierarchy, who, since the restoration, appeared united, but which soon after fell asunder, in 1838 broke out into violent and systematic hostility. The pope, in conjunction with the two archbishops of the kingdom, set himself in opposition to an ordinance of the king intended to regulate, in a religious point of view, the domestic relations of the mixed population of the kingdom. But while this opposition of the Prussian prelates grew so obstinate that the king had to resort to the significant experiment of putting them in prison, the emperor of Austria found no difficulty whatever with the pope, and no opposition from his clergy in the execution of a law by him afterward enacted on the same subject, and diametrically opposed to the doctrine and pretensions of the court of Rome.

In 1831 an insurrection broke out in Modena, which in a moment extended itself to the greatest part of the Roman state, while at the same time the dukedom of Parma was in tumult, and the ex-empress Maria Lousia fled into Lombardy. The allied powers did not lose a day in putting it down. In January, 1832, the eastern districts of the Papal states were again in insurrection, and the slaughter of forty inhabitants of Forli, old men, women, and children, drove the people of the country nearly mad. Before the end of the month the revolt was again suppressed by Austrian grenadiers.

The revolutions of Spain and Portugal proved highly disastrous

to Rome. The parties at present in power in these countries are anxious to secure the support of the Roman court; but it is impossible to conjecture from the present aspect of things what complexion they will at last come to. Since 1837 the French government has shown a decided inclination toward the Romish Church, a decided opposition to Protestantism, and a total disregard of the constitution of the country. In Italy, besides the conspiracy which was, in 1833, suppressed in Piedmont with a great effusion of blood, new insurrections broke out last summer, of very little consequence in themselves, but very important as indications of the disaffection of the people. In Switzerland the dissensions between the different creeds grow every day bitterer and deeper, and threaten serious evils to the welfare and integrity of the Swiss confederacy. In general, wherever the Jesuits have gained a foothold, the same results are now to be perceived that in former times invariably followed their steps: the line of separation between Popery and Protestantism becomes more distinct; discord and strife spread from the pulpit and the confessional to the hearth of the palace and the cottage, and superstition and infidelity supplant Christianity.

In conclusion, the Romish Church is now in league with the Italian princes, with Austria, with the present governments of France, Spain, and Portugal, against the people, and with the rabble of all Protestant countries against their several governments. There the prelates and their presses preach the divine right of kings, here the sovereignty of the people; there the connection of church and state, here their separation; there an absolute exclusiveness, and therefore against freedom of conscience, of the press, of education, here freedom and tolerance in everything, and to the utmost extent. However, when the head of the church speaks *ex cathedra*, and her prelates in *their common name*, no deviation, no change from the old, despotic, and sanguinary laws and discipline of the church is under any circumstances admitted, or indirectly acknowledged. "Beloved son in Christ," wrote Clement XIII., on the 30th of Jan., 1759, to Count Daun, on the occasion of his victory at Hochkirch over the king of Prussia, "as . . . thou fightest against heretics who adhere to the most abominable errors with more persevering wickedness than the infidels themselves, we impart to thee the blessing of Heaven, that . . . thou mayest exterminate heresy, the pestilential stench of which is engendered by hell. The destroying angel shall fight by thy side; he shall annihilate the infamous race of adherents of Luther and Calvin. . . . May thine arm ever reek with the blood of these impious wretches! Put the axe to the root of this tree which has borne such accursed fruit, and let the northern

regions of Germany be brought back to the true faith by sword, fire, and blood!"

"No one who is ever so little versed in history," says Pius VII., in his instructions to the nuncio residing at Vienna, in 1805, "can be ignorant of the sentences of deposition pronounced by the pontiffs and by councils against princes obstinate in heresy. Indeed, we have fallen upon times so calamitous and of such great humiliation for the spouse of Christ, that it is neither possible to practice, nor expedient to appeal *to those most holy maxims*, and that she is forced to suspend the course of her *just severity* against the enemies and rebels to the faith. But if she cannot exercise her right of deposing from their principalities, and declaring the partisans of heresy to have forfeited their goods, can she ever suffer herself to be despoiled of her own domains in order to enrich them! What a subject for derision would not the church then give to the heretics themselves, and to infidels, who, insulting her grief, would say that means had at last been found to render her *tolerant!*"

"Let our persecutors, then, for once learn," exclaims the same pope, in his bull, dated June 10th, 1809, excommunicating Napoleon, "that the law of Jesus Christ has subjected them to our authority and to *our throne; for we too bear the sceptre*, and *we can say that our person is much superior to theirs*, at least unless they would have the spirit subjected to the flesh, and the interests of earth take precedency of those of heaven."

In a circular, addressed by the said pope to his cardinals in 1808, we meet among other decisions the following: "The government of France demands that we shall allow the free public exercise of all forms of worship. This article is opposed to the canons, the councils, to the Catholic religion, and on account of the fatal consequences which would result from it, to the tranquillity and happiness of the state. We have rejected it."

In 1815 the above-named pontiff protested formally, before the congress of Vienna, against the sixteenth article of the act of confederation, granting equal rights to the Christian confessions in Germany. In 1818 he succeeded with the king of Naples in inserting in their new concordat an article by which "the Catholic, apostolic, Roman religion is the only religion of the kingdom," . . . and is to be "maintained there with all the rights and prerogatives appertaining to it according to the divine institutions, and *the canonical* sanctions."

Gregory XVI., in his bull, August 15th, 1832, says, "From that polluted fountain of indifference flows that absurd and erroneous doctrine, or rather raving, in favor and in defense of liberty of con-

science, for which most pestilential error," &c.* "Hither tends that worst, and never-sufficiently-to-be-execrated and detested liberty of the press, for the diffusion of all manner of writings, which some so loudly contend for and so actively promote."

"Hence that pest of all others most to be dreaded in a state, unbridled liberty of opinion, licentiousness of speech, and a lust of novelty," &c.

"Nor can we augur more consoling consequences to religion and to government from the zeal of some to separate the church from the state, and to burst the bonds which unite the priesthood to the empire."

And in his last bull, May 8th, 1844, he avers that Christian liberty is but another name for an insane indifference to all religion, declares that it is an enormous sin against God and his church to aid in the promotion of liberty of conscience, and calls upon the most influential sovereigns of Italy to co-operate with him in frustrating all efforts to procure to the people religious freedom. "For," he adds, "it is most evident from past experience that there are no means more certain of rendering people disobedient to their princes than rendering them indifferent to religion under the mask of religious liberty, inasmuch as *once religiously free, they will soon be politically free also.*"

Immediately after the foundation of the kingdom of the Netherlands, the vicar-general of the bishopric of Ghent, in October, 1814, presented to the congress of Vienna a memorial, in which, among

* In compliance with the doctrine laid down by this bull against the liberty of conscience, the Gazette de France published the following letter:—

Paris, September 10th, 1832.

The undersigned, editors of the *Avenir*, and members of the *Council of the General Agency for the defense of Religious Liberty*, present in Paris,

Being convinced by the encyclical letter of our sovereign pontiff, Gregory XVI., dated August 15th, 1832, that they could not go on in their labors without placing themselves in opposition to the solemn will of him whom God has charged with the government of his church; they believe it to be their duty, as Catholics, to declare that in respectful submission to the supreme authority of the vicar of Jesus Christ, they leave the arena in which they have loyally fought for the space of two years. They entreat earnestly all their friends to give a like example of Christian submission.

Consequently, first, the *Avenir*, which was provisionally discontinued on the 13th of November, 1831, shall appear no more. Second, *The General Agency for the Defense of Religious Liberty* is thus dissolved, &c.

Signed, { F. de la Mennais, F. Gerbert, C. De Coux,
{ Carlo de Montalembert, Lacordaire.

other extravagant requisitions, they demanded solid guaranties for the "only true religion," and described the Protestant confession as being merely tolerated, claimed for religious corporations a right of association independent of the state, &c. The Belgian bishops, on their part, pronounced in their *jugement doctrinel* a public condemnation of the oath required by the Netherlands constitution. They declared themselves inimical *to the equality of rights granted to all religious opinions and societies*, . . . refused to take the constitutional oath, denied absolution to those who did take it, and gave an anticipatory sanction to rebellion. The bishop of Ghent, Duke de Broglio, publicly declared it to be a sin to pray for a Protestant prince.

The following injunction is to be found in the pastoral letter of the Belgian bishops, published in August, 1843: "If any one approaches you who does not profess the doctrines of Jesus Christ, (meaning of course the doctrines of Popery,) receive him not into your houses, neither salute him: for whoever acknowleges such persons is a participator in their wickedness."

The change which the cortes of Spain, in 1837, made in the eleventh article of the constitution of 1812, relating to religion, arrayed against them almost all the prelates and monastic orders of the country. The old article was in these words: "The religion of the Spanish nation is, and shall be perpetually, the Catholic, apostolic, Roman, only true. The nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other." The amended article runs in this way: "The nation obliges itself to maintain the worship and ministry of the Catholic religion which the Spaniards profess."

The new constitution of the republic of the Equador, in its sixth article, declares "that the religion of the republic is Roman Catholic and apostolic, with the exclusion of every other public worship;" and the bishop of Quito in his pastoral letter, 1843, says, on the subject of this article, "Yes, beloved diocesans, they are pleased to explain the aforesaid article sixth by giving us to know *that far from protecting toleration, which we justly feared*, it confirms and strengthens the law which authorizes the prelates to have cognizance of causes of faith, as did the extinguished tribunal of the inquisition," &c.

In every point of controversy with the Protestant world, Rome maintains, now with a greater pertinacity than ever, the same opinions which she defended against it three centuries ago; nay, in some of these contested doctrines the divergence has been, since the Council of Trent, growing wider: for instance, on the subject of

sin, grace, justification, and the church, the Bull Unigenitus is further from Protestantism than the canons of Trent: the right and duty of every man to study the Scriptures is now, by the last pope's bull, more absolutely denied than by Benedict XIV. and Pius VI.: the opinion of the sinless conception of the blessed Virgin Mary is by a recent decree of Rome converted to an article of faith: the worship of the present day is more idolatrous than it was in the fifteenth century: the reigning pontiff, even in his bulls, presents to his flock the Holy Virgin as the only being worthy of their confidence and supplications;* and we have just read with amazement that, in a public sermon in the Roman Catholic Cathedral of Dublin, the acquittal of O'Connell by the peers in parliament was attributed to this same Romish deity.

The instinctive hatred of the Roman Church to the intellectual progress of mankind, more remarkable now than ever it was under Paul IV. and Pius V., is most strongly illustrated by the reigning pontiff's opposition to a common copy-right law for all the Italian states, and to the annual congress of the scientific men of Italy. In 1840 the emperor of Austria for his Italian states, and the king of Sardinia, concluded a treaty in favor of authors, publishers, &c., which secures to them a right of property as to all works of science, literature, and art (including pictures, statues, and drawings) which appear in their respective states, and invited the other Italian governments to become parties to it. The pope, after taking some time to deliberate, refused: but the treaty has already been joined by the two Sicilies, Tuscany, Lucca, Parma, and even by the duke of Modena.

All the Italian princes, the duke of Modena himself among the rest, allow their learned subjects to meet in congress once a year for the purpose of consulting and providing in common for the advancement of science and the useful arts. They met for the first time at Pisa in 1838. It was the greatest national solemnity of Italy. Every province, almost every town of the peninsula, was there represented by some member or spectator. But no subject of the pope was there seen in either capacity. The last congress has just now closed in Milan: it has been the most splendid of all.

* In his bull, 1832, for instance, he designated her as "our greatest hope, yes, the entire ground of our hope;" and the Papal vicar-general of London, in 1840, declared her to be "the co-redeemer of the world."

But the most curious instance, perhaps, of the blasphemous honors paid at this day to the Virgin Mary, and which certainly puts to the blush the ingenuity of St. Bonaventure, is the Lord's Prayer addressed to her by the mere change of the word father into mother.

All Italy was there, all Europe, listening, learning, rejoicing; but no subject of his holiness was there, no, not one. His holiness refuses permission to all his subjects to attend it, though no politics, no religion be in those assemblies ever mentioned.

If former popes broke without scruple the engagements of their predecessors with their people, Mauro Capellari set aside his own without hesitancy: Italy will not soon forget how shamefully he violated the capitulation of Cardinal Benevenuti. The numerous executions, and the confiscations of private property which but a few months since took place, to the scandal of Europe, in Bologne and other towns of the Papal states, prove that the reigning dynasty is more greedy and ferocious than any other within the last two centuries.

Therefore, whatever change may have taken place in the Papacy, on inquiry it will be found a change for the worse. But Rome denies most solemnly that any mutation has been wrought in her system. "Bear ever in mind, venerable brethren," exclaims *our Gregory, in his bull, August 15th*, above quoted, "that the universal church suffers from every novelty, and that from what has been regularly defined nothing can be taken away, no innovation introduced there, no addition made; but that it must be preserved untouched both as to words and meaning." Indeed, it is well known that the immutability of the Roman Church is one of the most familiar topics in the mouth of her partisans to prove her incorruption. "Yet several persons," in the words of Dean Miller, "and even some of our leading senators, suppose that Popery has long since been abundantly meliorated. But I wish they may not be nearer the truth, who think that the spirit of Protestantism has sadly degenerated."

But it is high time for us to answer the great question, Will the hierarchy come out of the approaching contest victorious?

1. If the course of events from the fourteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, as above delineated, may be taken as an index of the events which will take place hereafter, we might answer unhesitatingly, No. The faster the power of Rome increases, the greater will be its abuse, and thence its overthrow.

2. If we consider the feelings and tendencies of the European nations in nominal communion with Rome, we shall not fail to perceive that the rock on which the Roman Church stands is the crust of a terrible volcano: the smallest spark from any quarter may suffice to awaken its fury, and bury under its ruins that monstrous incubus of the dark ages.

3. If we take a survey of the several Italian states, and espe-

cially of the state of the church, we shall find it impossible to reconcile the expectations of a long-protracted existence of Popery with the strong probability of her not far distant destruction.

4. And lastly, if the Protestant nations of Europe, sensible at last of their duty and interest, should withdraw their protection from a power hostile by necessity to their religious and political principles,* which makes it a sin for any of its subjects to deal humanely by them, which, since its restoration, has striven most relentlessly and ungratefully for their destruction, &c., Popery would sink most rapidly to the grave.

It is a fact too notorious to need proof that the intelligent classes of the population of all Roman Catholic countries on the continent of Europe are averse to the despotism of Rome: they see it in league with the European princes for the purpose of overthrowing all liberal institutions, and quenching the democratic spirit of the age. How can they forbear hating it? And when they contemplate its practical workings on the prosperity of the nations, how can they cease from conspiring and praying for its subversion? For it cannot be denied that Mohammedanism, heathenism, and even infidelity may be consistent with national wealth and happiness, whereas the constant attendants of Popery are ignorance, poverty, and degradation.

Look at Spain. It might be said that Providence placed that country under the exclusive control of Romanism to show the world what effects it is capable of working out for the temporal interests of the nations. And what is Spain now? A dreary waste haunted by beggars. Cross it from the Pyrenees to Cadiz, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean Sea, and you will feel as though you were transported into an African country: no agriculture, no industry, no trade, no means of internal communication, no castles, no palaces, not even ruins of Christian origin: but there stands in the middle of the desert the Escurial, the fit abode of the destroying angel of the land. Still this is the country of the orange-tree, and the nightingale; the home of chivalry, poetry, and love; where the Moors reared the wonderful temples, the enchanted palaces of Andalusia, Grenada, and Valencia, gathered all the learning of the world, and the best scholars, artificers, and husbandmen of the

* Here is a proof quite fresh from the Popish mint:—

"If," say the Belgian bishops in their pastoral letter, August, 1843, "if any one approach you who does not profess the doctrine of Jesus Christ, (meaning of course the doctrines of Popery,) receive him not into your houses, neither salute him: for whoever acknowledges such persons is a participator in their wickedness."

middle ages, who converted it into a garden worthy of the magical Alhambra. What a contrast between the Moors and Philip II., and his successors?

What are Naples and Sicily now? Go back to the days of your youth, review the splendid scenes which the polity, philosophy, and poetry of Hesperia and the island of the sun presented to your enraptured imagination, and say if you did not almost believe that that paradise of the western Greece was a land beyond the boundaries of this world. And when you crossed in a hurry the patrimony of St. Peter, and the duchy of Rome, could you realize that that pestilential desert was the field of the long-contested battles, and the triumphs of the republic, the favored retreat of dictators and consuls, and the resort of the rusticating nobility of Rome? But there is the Papal city overlooking the melancholy Campagna as if ashamed of its desolation, and trying to escape from the malaria of her own manufacture, the most appropriate type of the religious system which buried under her ruins the gods and goddesses of the land. Lastly, compare France before the revolution under the dominion of priests and kings by the *grace of God*, with France after it, under the rule of an *infidel mind*, and what an enormous difference?

But Italy, of the present day, exhibits in her different provinces the clearest and strongest proof of the necessary evils of Popery that may be wanted in order to account for the hatred with which the Italians have always hated her.

The Lombardo Venetian kingdom contains a population of four millions five hundred thousand, or three hundred and forty-nine to every square Italian mile: the mainland provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia a population of three millions five hundred thousand, or two hundred and ninety to every square mile: the Papal state two millions seven hundred thousand, or two hundred and nine to every square mile: the kingdom of Naples, mainland, six millions, or two hundred and forty-five souls to a square mile: the island of Sicily one million seven hundred and eighty-five thousand, or two hundred and twenty-five to the square mile; and the island of Sardinia five hundred thousand, or sixty-nine souls to the square mile.

The Lombardo Venetian kingdom provides for the gratuitous instruction of every boy and girl. The government of Sardinia pays very little attention to the improvement of the lower orders, and in no part of the kingdom are there public elementary schools for girls. The Papal states have no general scheme for the elementary instruction of the poorer classes. The females of the aristocratic classes only receive some sort of education in nunneries. In the

kingdom of Naples, mainland, only one sixty-ninth part of the population are taught reading and writing. In Sicily there are no elementary schools at all for either boys or girls, and the case of Sardinia was till of late the same.

The public debt of the Lombardo Venetian kingdom is about $15,000,000; that of the continental provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia $17,000,000; that of the Papal states $65,000,000; that of Naples $70,000,000.

The foreign commerce of Italy has been valued, conjecturally, at about $60,000,000 annually. The Lombardo Venetian kingdom, with about one-fifth of the population and less than a seventh part of the area of Italy, exports annually to the amount of nearly $30,000,000; Sardinia about $9,000,000; the Papal states *an immense quantity of rags, of which the metropolis furnishes a large share, and of which a considerable part being too bad for paper making is used as a manure;* and the kingdom of the two Sicilies natural produce, as olive oil, wines, sumach, sulphur, and fruits, to the value of about $18,000,000.

In the Lombardo Venetian kingdom the illegitimate births stand to the legitimate as one to twenty-seven. The number of persons convicted of crime in the government of Milan, or Lombardy proper, with a population of two millions five hundred thousand, were, in 1838, eleven hundred and ninety; of whom for high treason, four—for murder and manslaughter, two—for wounding, nine—for dangerous exposure of children, four—for arson, forty-four—for theft and breach of trust, eight hundred and sixty-seven—for robbery, one hundred and forty-eight—for swindling, twenty-one—for assisting criminals, one.

The foundling hospitals of the Sardinian kingdom contained, in 1833, eighteen thousand three hundred and sixty-five children. In the province of Genoa, containing a population of two hundred thousand, there were found, in 1835, two hundred and seventy-five deserted children, while one hundred and sixty-three were discovered dead; and in the same province there was one illegitimate for every eleven births.

In the Papal states the number of criminals convicted and imprisoned in 1832 was recorded officially at two thousand seven hundred and eight. The crimes were the following:—State offenses, seventy-six—resisting the police, twenty-six—breach of the police surveillance, fifty-two—homicide, five hundred and eighty—wounding, two hundred and seventy-seven—burglary, two hundred and ninety-five—robbery, forty-six—larceny, two hundred and fifteen—theft, eight hundred and eleven—coining, seven—rape, ninety-one—

escape from prison, eight—other delinquencies, two hundred and forty-four. It is admitted that crime has increased since the date of that return!!

Of thirteen thousand five hundred and six children born in the city of Naples in 1832, two thousand and forty-five, or one in eight, were illegitimate. In 1824, in Palermo, with a population of one hundred and sixty-four thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, six thousand six hundred and fifty-eight children were born, five hundred and ninety-seven of whom were illegitimate. According to the latest statistics for the city of Naples the number of the illegitimate births has increased in a fearful proportion.

The Lombardo Venetian kingdom has two archbishops, eighteen bishops, seventeen thousand secular priests, and fifty-eight convents, with four hundred and sixty friars and monks, and nine hundred nuns; or one ecclesiastic to every two hundred and fifty inhabitants.

The kingdom of Sardinia has six archbishops, thirty-four bishops, and four hundred and eighteen convents. The number of the secular and regular clergy is not known, but it is very large.

The Papal states contain four archbishops, fifty-eight bishops, and more than thirty-five thousand secular priests, twelve thousand monks, and eight thousand nuns, or an ecclesiastic to every forty-nine inhabitants. In the city of Rome (not included above) there were, in 1836, five thousand four hundred and forty-five ecclesiastics of all classes, or one ecclesiastic to every twenty-eight inhabitants.

In the kingdom of Naples, mainland, there are twenty archbishops, sixty-five bishops, and (in 1832) twenty-seven thousand six hundred and twenty-two secular priests, eleven thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight monks and friars, and ten thousand two hundred and ninety-nine nuns, or one ecclesiastic to every one hundred and twenty persons. In the island of Sicily there are three archbishops, eleven bishops, thirty-one thousand secular priests, twenty-eight thousand monks and friars, and twenty-seven thousand nuns, or an ecclesiastic to every twenty-four inhabitants.

Putting side by side these statistical data we see at a glance, that where there are more ecclesiastics there are fewer inhabitants, fewer schools, less commerce, greater public debt, more foundlings, more crimes.

But the Italians have much weightier reasons for their abomination of Popery. All the historians and politicians of Europe agree in attributing to the division, or want of unity of Italy, her present weakness, poverty, and humiliation, and in tracing this want of unity to the unscrupulous ambition of the bishops of Rome. "The church" (of Rome,) the greatest political historian of Italy, Machiavelli, avers

with all his emphasis, "the church, and the church alone, held and holds this our country, Italy, divided, and this division is the cause of our ruin." It was at the call of the pope, that Pepin and Charlemagne invaded Italy, and destroyed the Lombard kingdom when the rest of the peninsula was on the eve of its reunion to the main body under the Longobard sceptre. It was, likewise, at the solicitation of the pope, that Charles D'Angio rushed into Italy at the head of an army of greedy and ferocious adventurers to overthrow the Sicilian monarchy at the time that Upper Italy, swayed by Ghibelline influence, was ready to place herself under the standard of the valiant and unfortunate Manfred. It was the pope who broke down the power of the Venetians with the arms of France, who drove the French out of Italy with the assistance of the Swiss, who sided now with Spain, then with Germany, leagued himself with English, Turks, and Saracens, with monachies, and republics, regardless alike for the exigences of Christianity, the interests of Italy, and the peace of Europe; and for what? For the purpose of acquiring, extending, and securing to *St. Peter* a temporal kingdom amidst the greatest calamities that ever befell Italy and Europe. Well and truly said Napoleon, that the declension of Italy began when the priests took upon themselves to govern her!

The resurrection of Italy depends on the destruction of the Papacy, or at least no hope for the regeneration of Italy can be entertained as long as the Papacy holds in her withering hand the heart of that country. Is it then strange that the intelligent classes of the Italian people should long and labor for the downfall of the pope?

It is the common remark of all Protestant travelers in Roman Catholic countries, and in Italy more so than elsewhere, that the people there may be divided into two classes, *the superstitious* and *the unbelieving*. The Italians themselves, who have written on this subject, acknowledge the truth of this classification; but at the same time they all agree in deriving it from the practical religion of their country. Machiavelli said that no better proof can be wanted of the declension of Christianity in Italy than that which arises from the fact, *that the people who are nearer to the Church of Rome, the pretended head of our religion, have less religion.* "*By the wicked examples of that court*" of Rome, he exclaims, "this country has lost all devotion, all religion. . . . We Italians, therefore, owe to the church and to the priests that we have become irreligious and bad." The historian, Francesco Vettori, a friend of Leo X., affirms, that "whoever considers well the law of the gospel will not fail to perceive that the popes, though bearing the

name of vicar of Christ, have introduced a new religion, which has nothing of Christ but the name." And what religion have they introduced?

A certain pope found among the rubbish of pagan Rome a bronze statue of Jupiter Capitolinus. He knocked Jupiter's head off, and clapped on another of the same metal, and then called the statue *St. Peter*. This statue stands now near the entrance of St. Peter in the Vatican, and the people, on entering that stupendous building, pay to St. Peter's bronze statue the same honors and devotions that formerly they used to pay to Jupiter Capitolinus, when it stood in the temple consecrated to the chief god of Olympus. That statue is the truest emblem of the Christianity of the popes.

Therefore, it is no wonder if almost all intelligent Italians laugh at the ceremonies of the church, or turn away from her in disgust, thinking that revelation itself (known to them by name only) is a fable for the vulgar; while the vulgar, attracted to the church by their senses, yield up to her their carnal hearts and infant understandings in return for the amusements she is continually affording them.

But of all the Italians, the subjects of the pope are his most resolute and uncompromising opponents. Lord Brougham, in his Political Philosophy, said "that the Papal government is the only one in the world that is no government at all." He ought to have said that it is the worst of all possible misgovernments. That of the Mamelukes of Egypt, though organized on the same principle, would have been a blessing to the subjects of his holiness.

When Napoleon fell, the Roman treasury was not a cent in debt: now its indebtedness amounts, as we have seen, to $65,000,000. For many years past the revenue has fallen short of the expenses about $1,000,000 per annum. In the first year of the present pope's reign the taxes amounted to the annual sum of about $10,000,000. Owing to the immense number of beggars, privileged classes of the people, and privileged lands, the weight of these taxes fell upon a small portion of the population, and in the total absence of industry, commerce, and profitable agriculture, the collection of them was very difficult and distressing. Now the government has nearly doubled its exactions, and how the people must reel under them it is not difficult to imagine, especially when we consider the enormous difference between this country and the state of the church in the value of money, and the price of labor. The poor mountaineers, in the neighborhood of the low lands cursed with the malaria, descend in summer to do the heaviest field-work on them for a shilling and a half a day: and it is known that nine-tenths of these poor laborers die

within the second or third year of the fatal effects of the climate. Moreover, those willing to work in the Roman state *may* work only for sixteen days in the month. For, besides the Sundays, there are seventy-two *feste di precetto*, (days of obligatory attendance on church festivals,) and many other days set apart for the celebration of anniversaries of saint protectors of villages, townships, counties, trades, crafts, confraternities, for missions, rogations, quarantore, &c.

It would take a large volume to set forth in a clear manner the practical effects of the Papal misgovernments on the economy and morals of the people: but in the limited space allotted to us for this article we will only relate a fact which, to an intelligent reader, will be worth all the pages which we cannot command.

About twelve years ago the grand duke of Tuscany, having a large amount of money lying idle by him, offered through a public notice to lend it in any sums at a very low interest, on good security, to Italians who stood in need of means for industrial or commercial purposes. But from this offer he expressly excluded his nearest neighbors, the subjects of the pope, on the only ground that no good security could by any of them be afforded in consequence of the intricacy of their laws, the instability of their institutions, and the nature of their courts of justice.

As to personal security, it is too well known that not only the thing, but its very name, is in that state never heard of. In 1833 hundreds of honest citizens were imprisoned without cause, and condemned to severe punishments without trial. "The oppression of the poor by the rich," (we borrow here the words of Cardinal Sacchetti to Alexander VII.,) "the perversion of justice through the influence of cardinals, princes, and officers of the palace; the delay of business which might be dispatched in two or three days for years and years; the outrages to which any one appealing from an inferior to a higher court is certain to expose himself; the forfeitures and executions, by means of which the taxes are levied; cruelties tending only to render the sovereign odious, and to enrich his servants,* are afflictions which exceed the afflictions of the Israelites in Egypt. People not conquered by the sword, but subject to the see of Rome either by the gift of princes or by voluntary submission, are treated with greater barbarity than slaves in Syria or Africa: who can witness this without tears?"

* Cardinal Della Somaglia, who died but a few years ago, left to his heirs, among other things, about two millions of francs in hard money. Few cardinals, if any, die possessed of a less sum than two or three hundred thousand francs in cash.

We have said enough, we hope, to lead our readers to the proper appreciation of the causes of the repeated insurrections in the Papal states, and of the determination of its inhabitants to put an end, in some way or other, to the kingdom of the priests. "About the year 1650 the opinion universally gained ground that an ecclesiastical government was fatal to the interests of the public." Two centuries of further experience have at length produced in the mind of the statesmen of Europe the conviction that the Roman court is an absurdity, an anomaly in the political arrangement of the Christian world, and that the act of its restoration in 1814 was a downright folly. It is already publicly known that some of the great powers of Europe begin to entertain serious thoughts about the necessity of secularizing this last and worst of all the ecclesiastical dominions of Christendom, as no reform can be introduced there with a prospect of good and permanent results: the mismanagement, itself, of that fine province by the priesthood must, sooner or later, bring its present government to an end; and the difficulties of a new arrangement of Italy, in this case, would inevitably be greater than in the other, of an immediate conventional dissolution.

Lastly, we have said that the duty and interest of the anticatholic powers of Europe may compel them to withdraw their support from the Papal throne, and that in such a case the Papacy herself would crumble into dust for ever.

It is a matter of authentic record that the tiara owed its preservation from the peace of Westphalia to the French revolution, and its renovation in 1814 to the aforesaid anticatholic governments, and especially to England. Its fate is still in their hands: Russia, Prussia, and England still rule the destinies of Europe, and they have but to say to Italy, "Arise, and be free," and the tiara is cast to the ground and broken to pieces beyond the art of all royal tinkers.

There is no need, we think, of any particular argument to convince the Protestant nations that their duty and interest bid them by all means to resist the imposition on their necks of the degrading yoke of Rome, even against the policy of their own governments. But there may be a great need of arguments to convince them of the truth of this position, that if they all have serious cause of apprehension from the present attitude of the Roman Church, those among them that enjoy the blessings of a constitutional government are exposed to greater dangers from that quarter than the rest, and exactly in proportion to the extension of their right of suffrage. That this to many will appear a paradox we doubt not. The Romish priests and press send forth daily so many warm protestations

of their sympathies with our civil and religious liberty, the doctrinal and historical truth of the *incompatibility of Romanism with republicanism* has been so inefficiently exhibited to our people, there is abroad such an exaggerated notion of the power of elementary instruction, and of the press, on religious convictions, such a morbid affectation of liberalism, such a misconception of religion and religious freedom, that we shall be pretty generally accused of extravagance, at least. Still we utter but a plain, palpable truth.

The Papal system, or Popery, is a pure theocracy, a politico-religious despotism, such as we see established in the *states of the church*. Wherever the civil power is strong, Popery clings to it, and adds to its strength in return for the support or toleration she may receive from it. Wherever the civil power is weak, Popery twists herself around it and gradually smothers it down to a mere tool of her own political domination. This is her history in all ages.

The hierarchy of the Roman Church leads irresistibly to the establishment of a like hierarchical subordination in the state. "Napoleon, who was filled with the idea of a new universal empire, came very early to the conviction, that of all the ancient institutions of Europe necessary to the accomplishment of his ambitious design, the unity of religion and a hierarchical subordination were the foremost. For it was from the battle-field of Marengo that he dispatched the bishop of Vercelli to enter into negotiations with the pope concerning the re-establishment of the Romish Church in France." The restoration and extension of Popery since the downfall of Napoleon prove that his conquerors entertain on this subject the same conviction: and it is a familiar historical fact, that the organization even of the Church of England was by Charles I. (and his father) considered so essential to the preservation of the English monarchy, that he resisted unto death its loudly called-for abolition. *No bishop no king*, was his constant and last answer.

The fundamental principle of the Romish faith, *salvation by works, and through the church*, places the laity at the feet of the priesthood, and the now universally received rule of that faith, *the infallible and irresistible authority of the church*, places the foot of the supreme pontiff on the neck of his flock, and annihilates the individuality and independence of the nations. The doctrine of the supremacy of the pope, which we have above stated, according to the greatest controversialist of the Jesuitical school, and of modern Romanism, Cardinal Bellarmine, receives from the rule of faith of the present day its amplest confirmation. So much for the religious part of the Romish theory on this subject.

The Protestant divines of the sixteenth century maintained, as it is pretty well known, that God alone set princes and rulers over the race of men, urged on the people the necessity of submission even to unjust and culpable princes, and averred that the power of the clergy regarded spiritual things alone. The Jesuits, on the contrary, maintained that God had conferred supreme temporal power on no individual in particular; but that this power resided in the people, who retained an indefeasible right to alter the forms of government, to resume the sovereignty, and to transfer it into new hands. *But at the same time they made the existence of this government dependent on the application of this power to the advancement of the interests of the church. For it is, they say, a fundamental condition of all authority in a temporal prince that he should foster and defend the Roman Catholic faith, and consequently, that no heretical monarch can be placed on the throne, and that a monarch may not only be dethroned, but even put to death, if his life be injurious to the Roman Catholic religion.* So that they incorporated into one system their theories of the sovereignty of the people and of the omnipotence of the pope, the most democratic ideas and the highest spiritual pretensions; absolute freedom, and complete subjection. Thus Barnabas Chiaramonti, bishop of Imola, in a sermon delivered and printed in 1797, undertook to demonstrate that Roman Catholicism was favorable to a democratic form of government; and in his bull of excommunication against Napoleon in 1809 he asserted, with his last free breath, the supremacy of his church over the French empire, and all the empires of the earth. So much for the celebrated civil theory of the Jesuits, Bellarmine, Allen, Parsons, Suarez, Mariano, &c., so often quoted by their successors in this country to prove their hereditary republicanism. They mooted it in France in the days of the unhappy Henry III.; by it they strengthened the heart of his assassin, and perfected it against his successor Henry IV., whom they also wanted to murder, and kept so long from the throne because a *heretic:* where it is to be noted that the Jesuits persisted in their *republican* doctrine even after it was condemned by the Sorbonne, and went into banishment rather than to retract it, just as they did afterward in the controversy of the republic of Venice with Paul V., when they chose perpetual expulsion from her territories, in preference to a compliance with the civil laws of that state against the usurpations of Rome.

The conclusion is, that Popery is the best basis of an empire, English episcopacy of an aristocracy, salvation by faith of a republic, and salvation by works of a leaden despotism. As to the *re-*

publican theory of the Jesuits, we will only remark that it explains and foretells the present and future course of the Romish Church in this country. Her success is intimately connected with, first, the annihilation of the civil power by the process of social decomposition; and second, the obliteration of our nationality.

It seems to us that an accurate exposition of the above principles of the Roman Catholic Church, and of the laws resting on them, ought to constitute the basis of a convincing demonstration of the incompatibility of Popery with our political compact; and it is from such an exposition alone that the thesis may be proved, that no conscientious professor of, or believer in, Popery, can legally and consistently be, or remain, an American citizen. The importance of such a demonstration in a popular form in the present circumstances of our country cannot be too highly estimated; and it is to be regretted that some competent person has not yet felt himself called upon to prepare and give to the public a tract on this subject: for we do not believe that this vacuum has been filled up by the labors of the lamented Dr. Brownlee, favorably known to the Christian churches of this land, nor by the Premium Tract by Civis, quoted at the head of this article, about which we are unwilling to say anything more than this—that the injury it may eventually do to its argument is more than neutralized by the injury which the answer by Fenelon, quoted in connection with the tract itself, must necessarily inflict upon the other side.

And, indeed, this answer by *an American hereditary Protestant Fenelon!!* is the oddest polemical curiosity we have ever seen, or expect to see, so long as we dwell beyond the attraction of the moon.

Our Protestant Fenelon begins with acknowledging, most candid soul of a Protestant, that "the Romish Church is coeval with the advent of our Redeemer," (page 3,) that "she is now ruled as she was in apostolic days," and consequently "cannot be changed for this or that plan," (page 25,) and continues by confessing that "it is to be regretted that the injunctions of the pope are not complied with in our common schools," that "in consequence of this non-compliance it would be far better for the cause of God and human happiness that the whole system of our common schools was abolished," (pages 42, 43,) that "the authority which the Romish Church claims to interpret the Scriptures, to bind the people to her doctrine, to forbid them the use of their discretion, &c., has been conferred upon her by her great founder!" and yet, that "she has never forbidden the people to read the Scriptures!" (page 46,) and concludes by saying, that "this is all an idle question," (that of the

incompatibility of Romanism with democracy,) "since the inspired volumes do not teach anywhere that this or that form of government is to be adopted by His followers."

After this display of the most solemn stolidity under the moon, we think it best to dismiss this matchless performance with this single remark, that it is in perfect keeping with the system followed by the *celebrated* lecturer on "the mixture of civil and ecclesiastical power in the governments of the middle ages," and his American and English compeers, which system, born before the popes, and acted upon by some of the most celebrated fathers of the church, was, without limitations, adopted into the moral rules of Jesuitism, and is commonly expressed, and known under the formula, *The end justifies the means*, or, *Evil may be done that good may come.*

What is wanted, if anything is wanted, to complete the proof of our assertion—that the greater the constitutional liberty of a country, the greater the danger to it from Popery—will be found in looking at the condition of the Romish power in the different kingdoms of Europe.

In Russia, we all know, it is entirely at the mercy of the czar. One word, a nod from him, is enough to put out the life of the Romish Church in his empire, just as one puff of the wind is enough to put out the flickering light of a lamp.

In the hereditary provinces of the Austrian empire the authority of the Roman Catholic Church depends on the sufferance and interest of the emperor; but he could not at one blow extinguish the church herself: the history of Joseph II. is a decisive proof of this proposition.

In Prussia the authority of the king over the Roman Catholic Church is as great as public opinion makes it. We have already spoken of the resistance he met in 1838 from his archbishops. "The power of Rome found, in Germany itself, ready organs and powerful support."

But in constitutional countries Rome is a truly independent power, an *imperium in imperio*. "The low qualification which, in Belgium, admits the humbler classes, in town and country, *over whom the priests most readily obtain influence*, to a share in public business, enables *them* to direct the elections: by means of the elections they rule the chambers; by means of the chambers, the kingdom. In Brussels, as in Rome, you meet *them* in the public walks well fed, and full of pretensions: they enjoy their victory." And late accounts from Belgium show that the liberties of the people exist in theory in their liberal charter, and in fact, in the hands of the priests, and through them in those of their sovereign at Rome.

Some cantons of Switzerland are as completely under the control of the Jesuits as Russia is in the power of her autocrat. As to their power in France we need only to refer to its history from the restoration to the revolution in 1830, and from the year 1837 to this day: and in regard to England, to her parliamentary history since the agitation system of O'Connell. And as to the United States. . .

We choose to say nothing in reference to our country on this subject. But we must remark that our fellow-citizens rely too much on the broken reed of public elementary instruction. In our opinion elementary education has, by far, less power to secure human reason from error than Americans are willing to grant it: and in this particular business of religion its power is very little indeed, or nothing at all. Look at the delusions of Millerism and Mormonism, at the pestilential heresy of Universalism, &c., if you want a proof of it. Besides, this education is fallen already to a great extent into the hands of Rome; and the larger share of it may fall into the same hands hereafter. What then?

Everybody acknowledges that for the last few years Popery has gone on increasing at an amazing rate, both in England and in the United States. What reasons have we to believe or hope that Popery will, in either country, at some future period halt? None whatever; unless, indeed, some change should take place either in our means of defense and aggression, or in her own bosom, so as to impair her stupendous energies. As the matter now stands, would it be absurd to believe that in fifty years hence the pope will have gained the mastery over the English government, and in a much shorter time over our own?

Hence the evident pressing necessity of changing the existing relations between Protestantism and Romanism, of devising some new plan of operations, some new means of awakening in our churches a more fervent apostolical zeal, by which to effect what the institutions already existing here and in England have, in spite of an enormous expenditure, failed to bring about, and will for ever be unable to accomplish, *the overthrow of the politico-religious conspiracy of Rome.*

Hence the creation of the Christian Alliance for the promotion of *religious freedom.*

We have already expressed our conviction that in continental Europe, at least, Rome will *certainly* be defeated again in the present attempt to recover her ancient, and more than her ancient power, over its several governments, and by the *Romance* populations, more decisively than by the Teutonic and Sclavonic races, in her communion. We feel confident that the evangelical churches

of Great Britain will awake in time to their danger, come up to the full discharge of their domestic duties, and recover the long-lost guardianship in the fold of the Protestant faith; and we are also far from despairing of the United States, as from present indications there is reason to believe that Protestantism, on this its most favored soil, will be true to itself.

But the security of Protestantism, the peace of Christendom, and the evangelization of the world, demand the speedy defeat of the great Roman conspiracy, and this defeat, immediate action: for it is not to be expected that this event will ever take place but from the operation of causes beyond the Papal control, from the agency of contrary elements that are already at work in the bosom of the Roman Church, and from external opposition and aggression.

Therefore, if we correctly understand the internal condition of Romanism, and the duty, interest, and strength of Protestantism; if we do not misconceive the spirit and ultimate object of the Christian Alliance, it seems to us that two distinct and yet co-ordinate systems of operations must be organized and vigorously prosecuted by this society to insure, under the providence of God, its success; the first for Roman Catholic countries, among which Italy occupies the most important place: the second for Protestant countries, among which England and the United States stand pre-eminent.

We have already adverted to the hostile disposition of the intelligent classes, especially of the *Romance* nations, toward Rome.

During the dark and the middle ages the pope often played the tribune of the people against kings and feudal princes: at the breaking out of, and ever after, the Reformation, he became the people's executioner. Why, then, should the middle and lower classes consent to his retaining the power they conferred on him centuries ago for their protection, now that he exerts it only for their destruction? What has he done since the restoration to deserve the good will of his *flock* and the good opinion of the world? Nothing, worse than nothing. "Perhaps a cry, sounded from the Vatican, might have proved the salvation of Poland: but not even the thought of uttering such a cry, which would have shaken the earth, was by Rome conceived." On the contrary the pope thundered forth his anathemas against bleeding Poland. "In the midst of these solemn debates, (congress,) for whom did she raise her voice when the whole world was listening? She was thinking only of her temporal possessions! Did she resume the office which she performed in the middle ages, and plead the cause of the helpless? Did she think of Ireland, Greece, Bohemia, Hungary, of all the oppressed? . . . No; she thought of Romagna! . . . . When it was proposed to re-

form the laws of nations, was it Rome who demanded the abolition of slavery, of capital punishment for political offenses? . . . When state scaffolds were raised in the midst of violent ebullitions, did Rome lift up her voice in the name of divine mercy? . . . Did Ney, Murat, all those brave men persecuted by the fury of the times, find a refuge in Rome? . . . No, a thousand times no!"

Among the elements of discord and dissent existing in the very bosom of the Romish Church, the ecclesiastical association of Germany, under the patronage of the king of Bavaria, holds an important place, a detailed account of which may be seen in the July number of the Foreign Quarterly Review, under the title, "*A Schism in the Papacy.*" It aims at the repeal of the laws on confession, on the celibacy of the priests, on the church service in Latin, and on the exclusion of the cup to the laity in the Lord's supper. The success of the German prelates in either of the first two points above mentioned would necessarily involve the destruction of *Popery*. How worthy, then, is their struggle of the sympathies and prayers of the Christian world?

But lest some of our readers should misunderstand our meaning, it is, perhaps, necessary to notice here the great difference that, in Roman Catholic countries of the European continent, exists between the idea of Popery and that of Catholicism. This difference proceeds from the opposite view the Romish and the Catholic theologians take of the functions of the pope. The former take him for the living rule of their faith: the latter for the *foreman* of the jury of bishops, only, while their rule of faith lies in the Bible, and the fathers and œcumenical councils subjected to the canon of interpretation laid down by Vicentius Lirinensis. Hence, the moderate views of the leader of the Jesuit theologians which did not satisfy Sixtus V., and the Curialists of Rome, are spurned with indignation by the opposition, or Catholic party, inasmuch as they do not find for them any countenance in the New Testament or in the usages and councils of the best ages of the church. Hence they ridicule the doctrine of the infallibility of the pope *ex cathedra loquentis*, the miracles, indulgences, canonization of saints, fasts, relics, images, and other lucrative contrivances of the Romish Church; they regard with abhorrence the union of the temporal with the spiritual power in the bishop of Rome, considering it with St. Bernard as a grievous calamity, and the source of all the corruptions and misfortunes of the church. They reverence the rights of conscience as much as Protestants do; never refer to the pretended œcumenical councils of the dark and middle ages to establish any point of controverted doctrine; and as to the Council of Trent,

(which is commonly called a conventicle, *conciliabulum,*) it is in Italy herself never mentioned but by way of reprobation. So we see the German prelates, according to the above article of the Foreign Quarterly Review, rejecting the *Romish* doctrine of confession, the celibacy of the clergy, &c., without supposing for a moment that they are rejecting any article of *Catholic* doctrine. And as to the cardinal points of the faith in reference to sin, grace, justification, &c., it is well known that the best portion of even the Italian clergy adhere to the teachings of Jansenius. Therefore, when a Catholic speaks of Popery, or Romanism, Hildebrandism, Ultramontanism, &c., he does not mean the fundamental tenets of his faith, but the novelties which the Church of Rome in the pursuit of worldly objects has added to them, and *forcibly imposed on the Catholic Church.*

These elements of opposition to the principles of the Roman Church exist, as they have done since the dark ages, stronger in Italy than in any other country. They are amalgamated with the political feelings of the people, and imbodied in their literature; the ascendency of the curia of Rome always occupies the foreground in the tragical scenes of that ill-fated land; and no Italian can read his novelists, historians, poets, from the thirteenth century to this day, without meeting at every page some new account of the sufferings of his country from the ambition, rapacity, and profligacy of the Papal court. See on this point M'Crie's History of the Reformation in Italy; Rossetti's Antipapal Spirit of the Italian Classics; Sismondi's Abridgment of his own History of the Italian Republics, &c.

Further to illustrate this subject we transfer to our pages a few facts recorded in the history of our times.

In 1797 a melodrama, or *ballet d'action,* was brought out at the Theatre della Scala in Milan, called *Il General Colli in Roma,* or *Il Ballo del Papa.* The ludicrousness of this piece, which was exhibited for many successive nights, may be inferred from the part which the pope himself performs in the last scene, in the hall of the consistory, when, throwing off the tiara, Pius VI. assumed the cap of liberty, and danced a few steps to show his handsome legs, of which he was notoriously vain, and the house, convulsed with laughter, rung with a tumultuous applause, and insisted again and again, with one voice, on its repetition.

When Pius VII. was, by order of Napoleon, carried into France in 1809, and the Papal provinces were annexed to the French empire, the inhabitants expressed their satisfaction at the change through a deputation sent across the Alps for the purpose, at the

head of which was Duke Braschi, the nephew of Pius VI.: and when the same Pius VII. in 1814, on his returning to Rome, was approaching Bologna with the intention of passing through it, a deputation from the city authorities met him with the request that he would keep out of Bologna to avoid all dangers: for the people were so incensed at the restoration of the Papacy, that they, the city authorities, could not guaranty his personal safety.

The same Pius VII. employed his last moments of freedom, in 1809, in drawing up and launching forth a most terrible bull of excommunication against Napoleon for *the seizure of the Papal state:* and the Italians did not even laugh at it; they did not notice it. And when the present pope, Mauro Capellari, laid, with all the imposing forms of Boniface VIII., the city of Ancona, in 1832, under the spiritual interdict, not only the Italians of other states, but his own subjects, sneered at it in the morning, and most contemptuously forgot it in the evening, of its publication.

The system, therefore, of *foreign* operations by the Christian Alliance, ought, it seems to us, to be based on the elements of opposition above adverted to existing in the bosom of the Romish Church and among the Italians, stronger than elsewhere, for the purpose of harmonizing, correcting, extending, and strengthening them by the introduction of our superior means of knowledge, and the legitimate exercise of all our influence.

The greater importance of Italy, in the object of the Christian Alliance, arises out of her peculiar political and moral condition as above stated, and from the circumstances, first, that Popery is weaker there than in the rest of the world, and consequently more easily wounded there, and for the rest of the world also. The late bull of the pope, May 8th, 1844, fulminated against this society, has, we are happy to hear, convinced the most incredulous of the truth of this statement. There are, in Protestant countries, many societies in active operation against Romanism even in Popish countries, and not one of them, the Bible societies excepted, has deserved the reprobation of Rome, but the Christian Alliance. Second, that several Italians, favorably known at home for their probity, talent, and influence, may be easily, and we are already sure of it, enlisted in this undertaking, and that many Italians abroad, of character and great literary attainments, have offered to this new society their gratuitous services: for to them all its object is one of the greatest national importance. After having been for ten centuries the butt of the cruelties, and the victim of every kind of treachery and plunder, to foreign nations, Italy welcomes, as the cheering harbinger of better days, this beginning of a movement which has for

its object, not conquest or spoliation, but religious freedom and its consequent benefits for all, under the benign illumination and guidance of the revealed truth.

The domestic part of the business of the Christian Alliance should, in our estimation, consist in the active extension of its organization all over the United States, England, and other Protestant countries, for the purpose of strengthening the cause of religious liberty at home by bringing the churches and governments up to the discharge of their domestic duties,* and then of directing their superabundant strength under a common authority, on a single plan, and with a single purpose to the one object, of not only resisting, but assailing everywhere, defeating and conquering this Janus-faced despotism, whose peace is compatible only with our destruction.

The superior advantages of Romanism in its conflicts with Protestantism, arising out of its unity of plans and operations, ought to teach the Protestant churches in this hour of danger, and while

* We explain our meaning fully enough by the following quotations:—

"The population of the parish of Westbury, in Wiltshire, England, amounts to eight thousand persons: there are three churches to serve and only one clergyman, whose living has been commuted at two hundred and thirty-five pounds per annum. The great tithes and estate held under the church amount to upward of three hundred pounds per annum, and are held by Mr. White," &c.—*Extract of the N. Y. Sun, Oct.* 1844, *from the Wiltshire Independent.*

Here we have one shepherd set over a flock of eight thousand sheep, for whose spiritual care he receives two hundred and thirty-five pounds, while more than three hundred pounds are extracted from them; a handsome compensation for doing *nothing*. This is one case out of thousands; and is it a wonder that Romanism under such circumstances makes such unexampled strides in England?

"Bishop Purcell last year informed the president of the Society for the Propagation of the Romish Faith at Lyons, that in St. Xavier's college, Cincinnati, there were about one hundred and fifty pupils, of whom more than one half were Protestants. If the same proportion obtains in the other Popish colleges in this country . . . we have every second year about eight thousand young people falling from the Protestant faith into the embraces of mother Church, (of Rome,) making a difference in the relative strength of the Protestant and the Popish Church of eight thousand souls every year."—*Christian Advocate and Journal, April*, 1844.

Is it then to be wondered at if the number of Romanists is swelled by accessions from the Protestant fold, and so many distressing instances occur every month of promising young men and women entrapped in the snares of Rome, and entering even convents and nunneries?

Why Protestants should be so anxious to open churches and schools in the furthest regions of the earth, while churches and schools are sadly wanted at home, we cannot, as Christians of common sense principles, understand.

this danger is still within their control, the necessity of a like union among themselves. If they should place their means, talent, and influence into a common fund, under a common direction, for their common defense, and the promotion of their own fundamental principles, Popery would soon go to destruction. Moreover, their own governments, in whose hands, as we have said, lies the fate of Popery, are under their control: at least, this is undoubtedly true in regard to the government of Great Britain. These governments have restored Popery to life, when no people under the sun wanted her resurrection, and thereby laid them under the responsibility of a moral and religious sin. As the interest of Protestant countries and the duty of the Christian churches now most undoubtedly coincide, why should they not take measures to redeem themselves from a passive guilt by compelling their ministry to leave Popery to her fate? So long as Roman Catholic powers made war on the pope for their own aggrandizement, worldly, though short-sighted, policy may have made it appear to the English ministry and others that it was their political duty to support the pope; but now the tables are completely reversed. And it is high time, indeed, that there should be some agreement between professions and actions among Protestants, and that the imputation of atheism and infidelity, which is very commonly cast on them by the Italians at home, on account of the iniquitous policy of the English cabinet in Italy, and the outrageous conduct of many English noblemen traveling in that country, should lose at least some portion of its truth.

As to the means for the accomplishment of its end, the society, as we see it most explicitly stated in its address, will employ those only that are in perfect keeping with the end itself, and therefore unexceptionable.

The first of these means will naturally be the circulation of Bibles, and other historical, dogmatical, and moral books on Biblical principles, and consistent with strict Christian morality.

The second, the establishment of missions and elementary schools wherever and whenever it can be done at an advantage, and especially in Italian territories under free governments, and in the large cities and sea-ports of Europe and America, where Italians are to be found congregated in large numbers.

The third, the ecclesiastical and secular press in this country and Europe. But the success of this movement is, and we must repeat it again in concluding, in the hands of the Protestants themselves; and the season is most propitious. Their governments must see that they have all along been fostering and nursing into life a viper, which has baffled all their calculations on its gratitude and harm-

lessness. The people of Roman Catholic countries, on the European continent, contemplate in dismay the giant proportions of that monster which mangled them in the preceding centuries so unmercifully, while their sovereigns themselves begin to feel hurt at its overbearance, and uneasy at its unmanageableness.

Let, then, we say, let from this land of Christian freedom, unfettered either by prejudices or interested prepossessions, go forth the cry, "Arise, ye slaves of the man of sin, come ye out of Babylon into the light and freedom which were provided for you, also, by our common Redeemer."

P. S. We have just learned from an authentic source that the Leopoldine society alone has contributed to the support of the Romish Church here during the past year about $200,000. When we think of the moral and physical destitution of the larger portion of the Austrian empire, of the Sclavonic and Greek populations in its neighborhood, of Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, &c., we cannot forbear declaring our honest convictions that this society has anything but a Christian object in view, and that it is an insult to the institutions and feelings of this country. It is a part and parcel of the great conspiracy set on foot by the Holy Alliance.

Art. VI.—*Protestantism in Great Britain.*

(*Translated from the French of "L'Europe Protestante," for the Methodist Quarterly Review.*)

[The following article will be found to contain a hasty sketch of the present condition and relative position of the Protestant churches in Great Britain. Many of the views presented are interesting and important, and we have no doubt will be appreciated by our readers. With the writer, we most heartily deplore the divisions among the different members of the great Protestant family. It is, doubtless, at this point that the Romanists thrust at us the most sorely. O when will Christians love one another "with a pure heart fervently?"

We do not, however, sympathize with all the alarms of the writer. The dissensions now pending upon the subject of state establishments, "the voluntary principle," &c., if they are conducted with Christian charity, will wake up a spirit in the British empire which will, we trust, by the good providence of God, work out the salvation of the country from its present embarrassments. We hope

the paper will impart lessons of instruction to the American churches. When have we ever been in such a crisis? Is it not time for the evangelical churches of this republic to lay aside all petty differences, to meet on the grand platform of the Reformation, and face the common enemy? Let charity be no longer wounded by our party feuds. Let us consult the common weal, and in the name of God rush to the fight already begun; and the God of battles will give us the victory.—*Ed.*]

We have just returned to Paris from a Protestant,—we may even venture to say, a Christian excursion in Great Britain; and our heart has been deeply affected by the divisions that are rife in the bosom of Protestantism in that vast, rich, and powerful country. We have visited a great number of its churches and chapels, have heard its Christian preachers, and have been present at those assemblies where every one speaks in favor of union, and where it might be presumed that Christian love would preside; still, we are compelled to deplore the absence of that evangelical harmony which should be the bond of union between those who acknowledge the same hope, the same Bible, the same heaven, the same Saviour. Our visits and observations have not been restricted to a single branch of the Christian church in Great Britain. Endeavoring to lay aside particular predilections, we have listened to, and conferred, and prayed, and united our voices and vows with the ministers of the churches of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. The chapels of Wesleyans, Catholics, Methodists, Independents, and Anabaptists, we have everywhere visited; and have sought to derive spiritual advantage from their lectures, sermons, prayers, and other acts of Christian worship, whether public or private. We have striven to banish the prejudices of youth, education, and habit, and to recognize facts as they exist, and parties as we have found them. We have devoutly prayed and sought for spiritual benefit from all these meetings; but *in general* the result of our journey has been painful and unsatisfactory.

We forget not the debt of gratitude due from us, as Protestant Christians, to the churches and societies of Great Britain. We love her hospitals, her charitable institutions, her dispensaries, her schools, her colleges, her universities. We see with joy her societies for the distribution of the Scriptures and pious books; those whose object is to promote peace, temperance, the progress of Christian instruction, and the abolition of slavery; as well as all her other moral and religious associations. With pleasure and admiration we contemplate their works and their progress, and are ready to

exclaim, "What hath God wrought!" We are of those who believe that Providence has given to Great Britain her commercial prosperity, the integrity of her territory, and her political power, as a recompense for her multiplied and persevering endeavors to spread the gospel over the earth, thus to give influence and force to her efforts. We never set foot upon the soil of Britain without thanks to Heaven at finding ourself again in the country of Bibles, missions, pious tracts, and religious education; and when we see the ten thousands of her people enter the house of God on the sabbath, we recall that great and terrible day of the Lord, the second coming of our God and Saviour, when a multitude which no tongue can number shall appear before him in white vestments and with waving palms, to render homage, and honor, and glory to Him that sitteth upon the throne and to the Lamb of God for ever.

As Protestant Christians, we have cherished in our hearts all the recollections and sentiments that attach to the position of the Christian churches of Great Britain. Never shall we forget those illustrious men who counted not their lives dear when called to defend the great and eternal truths of Christian Protestantism. For them the stake had no terrors; they shrank not from the horrors of the scaffold; fearlessly they marched to the funeral pile and were offered in sacrifice. They have left behind them holy examples of faith, hope, and love; and while we visited anew the places that witnessed their labors, their persecutions, their sufferings, and their death, we blessed God for transmitting to us the memory of their names and their virtues.

Our journey to Great Britain was not without other subjects of rejoicing. We were happy to see the increasing number of its Sunday schools, its churches, and its chapels; the attendance of an ever-increasing portion of its population on the preaching of the gospel; the awakening of religious sentiments in a multitude of districts; the more general observance of the sabbath; the increase of Bible and tract societies, and societies for the encouragement of abstinence from intoxicating liquors among the mass of the people. At Manchester we saw a sabbath school for a single district attended by *three thousand children;* and on leaving it we exclaimed, "With such an element of order, instruction, and piety, we fear not for Manchester." At Birmingham, where twelve new Episcopal churches will soon be erected,* we witnessed the zeal of the clergy to facilitate the attendance of the mass of the population on divine service. Other facts might be noted, which we may remark upon

* This article was first published in the original French in 1839.—T.

in the sequel of the observations we are about to present on the state of Protestantism in Great Britain.

But while we repeat, that the result of our journey to England has been *generally* painful and unsatisfactory, let us not be accused of indifference for the progress of truth, or of want of sympathy for the great cause of evangelical Protestantism in that country. We say that this visit has been generally painful and unsatisfactory, because the spirit of discussion, of violent controversy, and of rivalry, of antichristian separation, approaching almost to hatred, has taken such entire possession of the minds and hearts of the teachers of religion, that at every step of our progress the words of the apostle to the Gentiles occurred to our minds: "Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; and I of Christ. Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptized in the name of Paul?"

Few persons now living can remember a period when there existed in Great Britain a more violent, bitter, personal, and general spirit of disunion than at the present. For example, the Church of England, the Episcopal Church of England, the first Catholic Church, (not Roman,) is divided into three distinct categories. These are in open rivalry; not to excite mutual emulation to redoubled zeal against their common and persevering adversary, the Church of Rome, but to vent their rage against each other; as though they had three distinct Deities, and not the same and only God for their heavenly Father—three different and opposite plans of salvation, and not one only plan revealed by our divine Redeemer. The Oxford Tract party has created a new and dangerous schism in the church. Its chiefs are men of great knowledge, of monastic erudition, well versed in the study of the ancient fathers, and deeply convinced of the necessity of an authority in matters of faith,—insisting on a rigid adhesion to the apostolic succession. The *Pusey* party, as it is called, has made many converts. We have conversed with several of its members; and as extremes meet, we have heard some of the newly converted declare that they had formerly been Dissenters, and had become so perfectly convinced of the necessity of an *authority* in matters of faith, by the succession of continual schisms and infinite divisions in the Dissenting body, caused by the want of this authority, that they were able to see no middle course between innumerable divisions and a return to the principles of authority defended by the Oxford divines. The chiefs of this party in the Church of England are ardent and despotic men. All who agree not with them are treated as schismatics; and if you point out to them the evil which must necessarily

result from this new schism in the church, in the presence of the common enemy, the Church of Rome, they reply: "The Church of Rome flatters and compliments us in order to injure us in the esteem of our Protestant brethren; but it is not because she rejoices at our success, but, on the contrary, because she dreads us more than any other Protestant party, *on account of the near resemblance between her and us*, that she feels the need of flattering us, that other Protestants in the country may be on their guard against our doctrines, and hesitate to join us."

The Oxford divines seem to forget that, in this declaration, they admit the fact of a *near resemblance in their doctrines and principles to those of the Church of Rome.* They say: "The less we differ from the Papists, the nearer are we to gaining them to our opinions." We reply, This is a mistake. If the Papist recognizes so slight a difference between the doctrines of his own faith and those of the Oxford schism in the Church of England, he will hardly think it worth his trouble to abandon the religion of his fathers in order to adopt a faith so similar to his own in all important points. The Papists of the nineteenth century will not become converts to a faith which admits almost every article of their ancient belief. If they abandon their hereditary faith, it will be either for the adoption of skepticism or latitudinarianism, or for the reception of a Protestant Christian belief, pure, simple, and anticatholic. The middle course indicated by the Oxford divines has no attractions for the Papists: it resembles too much their ancient faith to tempt them by its novelty; but differs sufficiently from it, however, to prevent them from mistaking the one for the other.

It is not our intention, in this article, to examine the series of tracts published by the *Puseyites;* but we are anxious to express the deep regret we have felt for the schism caused by these men in the Church of England; for the bitterness of sentiment and acrimony of language it has occasioned; for the division it has sown between ministers and their parishioners. We regret the absurd importance attached to controversies of this kind by a considerable portion of the clergy, as if the point of greatest importance were not the salvation of the soul, but a continual contention on the discipline and government of the church; and, finally, the encouragement given to Popish priests, who boldly put to the timid and uneducated Protestant the question: "Well! what great difference was there between your ancient church and ours to cause a separation from us, the foremost in Christendom?" The hesitating Protestant is not aware that it is not the Church of England that has separated from the Church of Rome, but that, with respect to England, the Roman Catholics have de-

tached themselves from the ancient Catholic Church. The Oxford divines have made their confession of faith so similar to that of the Roman Church, that the illiterate Protestant can scarcely discover the difference between *Puseyism* and *Popery;* and hence becomes an easy prey to the ever-active, ardent, and indefatigable proselytism of the Roman clergy. This schism of Puseyism in the Church of England is of recent date; its birth is but of yesterday, but its growth has been rapid, and it has already become a powerful auxiliary of Popery. We have conversed with many of its defenders, both lay and ecclesiastical, and have heard them declare that *the Papist is nearer to the truth than the Protestant Dissenter.* An incendiary, torch in hand, who wished to disturb the peace of a Protestant meeting, we have heard designated as an *unfortunate Papist;* and it has been maintained in our presence, that in proportion to the greater resemblance between the doctrines professed by the Puseyites and those of the Papists, will be the degree of credit gained by the former among the latter,—as if the truth should be clothed in a form as near as possible to that of error, in order to be better relished by its adversaries. Popish priests rejoice at this state of things, and are encouraged by the work of disunion and proselytism; this the Oxford divines are unable to deny. Why has the Propagandist Society at Rome consecrated its immense funds to the work of proselytism in Great Britain, and withdrawn its support from its other missions, leaving the faithful to maintain, as best they may, the cause of the Roman Church? It is because that society has acknowledged that its efforts for the conversion of Protestants in Great Britain had a powerful auxiliary in *Puseyism* and the tracts of the *Puseyites.* Having no doubt on this subject, we can have no motive to conceal our convictions.

The aversion of the old orthodox party, as it is called, in the Church of England to the evangelical party, is also a source of division and weakness. We have heard some of its members declare that they could not support "*L'Europe Protestante,*" if it continued to publish reports similar to those of the Bible and missionary societies. During the last month we have heard language like this: "We prefer a Papist to a Puritan; we consider the Bible Society a dangerous institution and a cause of scandal; the circulation of the Scriptures without note or comment we do not consider desirable; and we fearlessly ask how the multitude can understand the Bible without explanation?" We have heard the same men declare that, in their opinion, the costume of his order should be forbidden to every ecclesiastic known to take part in a Bible society meeting; and that the Methodists and Dissenters were less cen-

surable than the ecclesiastic who, after accepting the charge of the ministry of his parish, should encourage by his subscription, his patronage, or even his silence, any auxiliary Bible society among his parishioners. This is Popery; it is placing human authority,—the fathers, tradition, and the injunctions of the church,—in opposition to the word and commandments of God. The dislike of the orthodox party for their evangelical brethren is a great source of evil in the Established Church; and in consequence of it many plans for the moral improvement of parishes and districts are rendered abortive. Want of union among the clergy prevents the realization of these plans; and instead of seeing Popery and infidelity prostrated by the united and simultaneous efforts of all the Protestant clergy, the cause of the Church of Rome is progressing amidst the divisions and discussions of those who should march together against their common enemy. Such is, unfortunately, the state of things in England in towns of from thirty to fifty thousand inhabitants, where a portion of the clergy is evangelical, while the other part adheres to the old church. We have seen, in several instances, members of opposite parties in the Anglican Church refuse to salute each other when meeting in the streets; and a much larger number practice a cold and ceremonious politeness, with which, as inhabitants of the same city, they cannot dispense. In this state of things, having no restraint, Popery and infidelity are sure of gaining ground. The Catholic priests are united; their aim is fixed and definite; they are endeavoring to extend the limits of their church, and their labors are not without success. Want of union and a good understanding between the evangelical school and that of the old church is not the only evil to be deplored. In consequence of the introduction of the Oxford schism and that of the Puseyites in the church, the clergy of the old church are not even agreed among themselves. Some are favorable to the Oxford school, and averse to intercourse with the Papists of their parishes; others are of a different sentiment. But these are poor curates, who have little influence, and who, not being ably supported, can oppose but a feeble resistance to the indefatigable perseverance of the Popish clergy. In the cities where immigration from Ireland is considerable, and where the number of English Papists has much increased, the Anglican clergy are so deplorably divided among themselves, that they are unable to concert measures to educate the rising generation of the Popish population in the truths of Protestantism,—to visit the houses of their parishioners of the Roman Church, to offer and explain to them the word of God,—nor even to exhort the Papist on the bed of suffering or death, and pre-

sent to his famished soul the holy truths of the Protestant religion. In such a city, the minister of one parish thinks the Papists not far from the truth; he is a partisan of the Oxford school: in another parish the minister considers the Papists attached to a dangerous error, and all his desires are for the propagation of the Protestant faith; but he is opposed to the circulation of the Scriptures, and loth to interfere in the spiritual affairs of persons out of his parish: hence it results that the instruction of Papists is totally neglected. In a third parish of the same city the minister belongs to neither of these categories; he is evangelical, and not of the Oxford school. He is consequently an object of aversion to the former two, who will second him in none of his plans, from a Bible association down to the establishment of a parish or sabbath school. Meantime infidelity and Popery are progressing. "See how we prosper!" say the Roman clergy, in triumph: and the fact of their perfect union, even in the promulgation of error, is, to a certain point, a guaranty of their success. In a city thus placed under the influence of an Episcopal clergy so deplorably divided, we have not cited an imaginary example. We have witnessed these facts in our recent journey through England, and a thousand similar examples may be seen in Great Britain.

The evangelical portion of the clergy of the Church of England are, in certain respects, exposed to the violent reproaches of their brethren of the old school. They are proscribed, and falsely represented as enemies of the church, semi-Dissenters, or disguised Methodists. In consequence of this imputation, their parishioners of the Established Church are often excited against them, refuse to listen to their instructions, and regard them with coldness and distrust. This diminishes the influence they would otherwise exercise over the people intrusted to their care, and creates a schism in the church by those who should be foremost to destroy its seeds. On the other hand, the evangelical members of the clergy do not always adhere to that line of duty with their brethren which they ought to follow, without compromising either their principles or convictions. Through fear of being repulsed, they often neglect the first steps toward union and a good understanding, and thus remain strangers to each other for the space of ten, fifteen, or twenty years. We have learned from unquestioned authority that clergymen of the same city live years together without intercourse; and this estrangement proceeds from no personal antipathy or private misunderstanding, but entirely from the opposition that exists between Calvinistic principles and the Arminian doctrines. This deplorable want of union has considerably weakened the influence of the clergy, and

increased the number of the adversaries of the Established Church.

If we consider the condition of the numerous Dissenters from the Anglican Church, we shall find sufficient cause of regret. The Socinians we can only recognize as nominal Christians and Protestants. This opinion may be charged with bigotry, but it is nevertheless correct. There should be but one standard of truth, and that can be no other than the Bible. The New Testament is not a Socinian book, and assuredly the Old is not. The predictions of the prophets concerning a future Messiah could not be accomplished by the birth, life, and death of a mere *man*. The prophets clearly foretold God manifest in the flesh; and if Christ was not the Messiah, then the Messiah of the Old Testament is yet to come. We would willingly reduce all controversy with the Socinians to this single argument; namely, whether Christ was or was not the Messiah foretold by the prophets. If he was the Messiah of the prophecies, he was God; if he was not the Messiah of the prophecies, he was but a man;—the Jews are correct, and the mass of Christians are in error. But no: though "despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," he was also the "Wonderful, Counselor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace." Hence, in our remarks on the actual situation of Dissenting and Methodist Protestantism in Great Britain, we shall take no account either of the numbers or opinions of the Socinians. They are not Protestant Christians, according to the text of either the Old or the New Testament, and we have no other rule by which to judge opinions and doctrines. Judaism might with as much propriety be opposed to Popery as Socinianism; and it is remarkable that in England, as in other parts of Europe, a good understanding exists between the Roman Church and the Socinian heresy. Equally estranged from the truth, relying on human reason, and not on the wisdom of God, and the clear and unequivocal declarations of the Scriptures, they mutually support each other in attacking the truth as it is recognized by Protestant Christendom. We shall, therefore, have no more to say of the existence of the Socinian heresy than of the expiring sect of Freethinkers, or the disciples of Joanna Southcote. When we speak of Protestant Dissenters we mean the *Independents*, the *Baptists*, the *Wesleyan Methodists*, the *Calvinistic Methodists*, of the two schools of Whitefield and Lady Huntington, and the *Quakers*.

We commence by deploring the painful disputes existing between the Independents, Baptists, and Calvinistic Methodists on the one part, and the Church of England on the other. At no period in

modern, and, we may add, in ancient times, have the quarrels between the Church of England and the Dissenters been so violent and acrimonious as at present. The questions of *tithes* and the *revenues of the church* have led to disputes so antichristian, and to scenes of such unheard-of fury and madness, that no one who has the great interests of religion at heart can fail to be painfully affected at such manifestations. These questions divide cities, parishes, districts, and even families; and so much importance is attached to them, that they separate and estrange fathers and sons, mothers and daughters. Ministers of the Independent, Baptist, and Calvinistic Methodist denominations preach against the Established Church, as though the church and fold of Christ contained no Episcopalians; and the clergy of the Church of England, forgetting their obligations to such men as Doddridge, Howe, and Baxter, fiercely attack the principle of voluntary support, and denounce those who uphold it as little better than heretics and blasphemers. The meetings of the Bible Society have hardly escaped the contagious influence of this spirit of disunion and controversy. We have heard Dissenting ministers say it was time to tear the veil from the pretended and affected harmony of these meetings; and members of the Anglican clergy have affirmed in our presence that they would no longer act in concert in any association of the church with Dissenters.

The consequence of such a state of things may be easily imagined. The multitude see only division and disorder, and when exhorted to connect themselves with Protestants, their reply is: "Who are the Protestants? Shall we unite with the church or the Dissenters? with the Methodists or the Calvinists? with the Baptists or the Independents? Shall we adopt the voluntary principle or the establishment of the church?" Who will answer these questions? No one. And what is the consequence? It is this: many take advantage of these divisions to enrol themselves under the banners of the Socinians or the skeptics, unless the Papists, still more active and zealous, succeed better, and persuade them to become members of *a church that is always the same*. To private Christians such a state of things is particularly painful. The spiritual state of the clergy and the Dissenters is deplorable. Their spiritual relations are feeble and vague; communion with God is neglected. Political or politico-religious meetings engross all their leisure; and instead of striving to win souls to Christ, the clergy of different denominations excite their flocks to resist the *secret ballot*, or to vote for or against the church, after the manner of worldly men in voting for an alderman, a mayor, or a member of parliament. What is this but a carnal and worldly employment?

Among the Independents, Baptists, and Calvinistic Methodists, there are doubtless many pious persons, as there are also among the Episcopalians. These persons desire above all things the salvation of their own souls, and that of the souls of their fellow-men. Were it otherwise, the state of the different sects of Protestants would indeed reach the lowest point of decline; but we are speaking not now of exceptions to the general rule, but of the general rule itself. Could a heathen enter some of the meetings of the Established Church or of the Dissenters, whether public or private, it would be impossible for him to believe that professions of love were made in both to the same Saviour, or prayers under the influence of the same Holy Spirit. The acknowledged fact, that in some of these societies much individual benefit is effected, and many souls are delivered from the death of sin by the preaching of the gospel in the bosom of the most opposing parties, is no reply to the grievous certainty that those who are thus converted remain in a state of infancy in Christ, their faith never arriving to maturity. The condition of the Protestant Christian churches in England is not one of soundness and vigor, but of enervation, resembling in its languor the dwarfed infant, the inodorous plant deprived of light, or the stunted tree, rather than the hale and vigorous man, or the stern and majestic oak, with its deep-set roots and wide-spread branches. Hence meetings for prayer are thinly attended, while assemblies which have a political aim are crowded to excess; hence also the limited time devoted to preaching in public worship, and to prayer and singing the praises of God,—two of the most important parts of sacred exercises.

The Baptists are too exclusive in their relations with other Dissenters. They make the question of baptism by sprinkling or immersion a vital question, forgetting that among the primitive Christians both modes were undoubtedly practiced. On the other hand, we have learned from a Baptist minister at Birmingham that a young woman, a servant, had been refused by her mistress, a member of the Independent Church, the privilege of attending the meetings for Baptist worship, and enjoined to partake of the sacrament in the chapel of the Independents, though the young woman had from her infancy been accustomed to the exercises of the Baptist Church. In some of the larger cities of England, and, we regret to say, in some of the smaller also, we have seen a Baptist minister quite estranged from his own mother in the Independent communion; not because they disagreed on any principal points of their non-conformist Protestant faith, but because they were divided in opinion on the manner of administering the ordinance

of baptism. We have questioned Independent ministers on the religious state of their brethren of the Baptist communion, and obtained no satisfactory reply. We have frequently interrogated a Baptist minister on the state of his Independent brethren, and he has acknowledged his total ignorance of everything that concerned them. It is a rare thing to see the Baptists and other Dissenters united as brothers against their common enemies, Popery and infidelity.

The Calvinistic Methodists, whether partisans of Whitefield or disciples of the celebrated Lady Huntington, are, in general, an isolated body. They are not increasing in numbers, and for the last twenty years they have built very few churches or chapels, except in Wales, where they are very numerous. They are, however, much more united, and are less narrow and exclusive in their prejudices, than some of their Independent and Baptist brethren, and are doubtless much more alive to the dangers and progress of Popery.

The Independents and Baptists have so long been accustomed to view the question of Popery in a political light, and as exclusively connected with Ireland, that it is almost impossible to induce them to consider it from another point of view. Attached, for the most part, to the Whig party in England, the Dissenters in general favored the great measure of 1829; and whenever they are invited to consider the increase of the Popish population in the United Kingdom, they obstinately persist in affirming that this increase is imaginary, and that the cry of *No Popery* is uttered only by the enemies of that measure. This is a lamentable and dangerous error on the part of the Dissenters; lamentable, because it is evidence of the confounding of political and religious questions, which should always be carefully separated; and dangerous, because it deprives of their assistance all the other Protestant sects and associations, in the efforts they are making to combat the common enemy. If the sincerely religious Protestant Dissenters of Great Britain would heartily unite with the truly pious members of the Episcopal Church, in all the judicious enterprises undertaken by the latter to prevent the progress of Popery, we should not see so great a number of new edifices consecrated to the Popish worship in that country as have recently come under our observation. The Roman priests are most successful in England in places where there is least union among the clergy of the different denominations. Those who have not sufficiently examined the question are often astonished that the truly pious Dissenters are so indifferent to the progress of Popery. But to us the reason is obvious; they choose

not to consider this matter as a spiritual and religious, but solely as a political question. The measure of 1829 is yet before their eyes; the opposition to that measure is still present to their memory. They insist that the adversaries of that act, which they term an act of political justice, are the only persons who affirm that the Roman Church is progressing. They refuse to examine the religious, spiritual question, such as it now presents itself, without reverting to the ancient political troubles of Great Britain. If the Protestant Dissenters would view this question in its true light, and consider it first as a question of fact, and afterward as a subject of immense importance to the spiritual interests of the true church of Christ, and if they would unite their efforts with those of the Episcopalians, it would be of great efficacy to restrain the torrent of infidelity and Popery that threatens to extend its ravages throughout the country.

The position of the Wesleyan body on the question of Popery is highly satisfactory and encouraging. There was a time when the Wesleyans were much less guarded than they are at present against the progress of Popery in Great Britain. But since the question of the Church Establishment has ceased to be agitated, and since they have unitedly sustained that institution, they have been led to examine more attentively the declarations of churchmen on the progress of Popery, and have seen them verified by the most undoubted facts.* The efforts which the Wesleyan society are everywhere making to disseminate the knowledge of the truths of Protestantism will doubtless produce, with the divine blessing, great and important results. The secession from the ancient Wesleyan body has only purified the mass. As a society, the Wesleyans have lost nothing by the withdrawal of the WARREN party. Long previous to this separation there were among them a great number of discontented spirits, who aspired only to power, and whose efforts tended to diminish the influence of the conference, as well as its temporal and spiritual authority. Some among them, with Dr. Warren at their head, have formed a species of schism in the Wesleyan association; but their chief has already abandoned them;

* Since the writer of this article visited England, considerable changes have taken place among the Wesleyan Methodists as to "the Church Establishment." The assumptions of the Pusey party, and the influence of that party over the government, as developed in the late *school bill*, have gone far toward alienating the affections of the Wesleyan Methodists from the Establishment. In this we rejoice, believing as we do that the sooner the church and state in Great Britain are entirely separated, the better it will be for the nation and the world.—*Ed.*

and although he may at first have attracted public attention by a violent pamphlet against the Church of England, he has since asked to be ordained as one of its ministers, and is occupied in collecting funds to erect a church. The bishop of Chester has promised to proceed to his ordination.

The Wesleyan Methodists are not, properly speaking, Dissenters from the Established Church. This fact has been long since demonstrated by one of the most illustrious and influential of their members, the Rev. Samuel Bradburn. But though they are not Dissenters in the ordinary acceptation of the word, they are at least separatists from that church. They neither admit the doctrine of the apostolic succession, nor acknowledge the king as temporal head of their church; they do not submit to ecclesiastical authority, and have a discipline entirely different from that of the Church of England. Thus, then, if they are not Dissenters, they are at least separatists. The Protestant Dissenters deny the necessity or the advantage of a state religion, and refuse to acknowledge a national institution in the Anglican or Episcopal Church; but in this they are not imitated by the Wesleyan Methodists, who, for this reason, have been called the Christian allies of the Church of England. By a portion of the Protestant Dissenters the Wesleyan Methodists are viewed with jealousy and distrust. The hierarchy of their conference is considered by some an imitation of the Anglican Church, and their generally favorable disposition to the established churches of England and Scotland offends the Independents and Baptists, and too often also the Calvinistic Methodists. Some of the ministers of the Wesleyan body appear deeply persuaded that their surest and most important allies are the clergy of the national church; while, strange to say, others among them are even more opposed to the church than their Independent and Baptist brethren. At London the secretaries of the different missionary societies, or at least the principal of them, unite to confer together on the interests of the great cause of missions throughout the earth. This is Christian and catholic; but this example is not followed in the counties of England. There the Wesleyan preachers remain often isolated both from the church and the Dissenters, being regarded by the former as too far from them, and by the latter as too near the Episcopalians. In this course of the two opposing parties there is neither wisdom nor charity. The Wesleyans are too powerful to be despised or oppressed. In a meeting held at Manchester, in 1838, by some of the principal men of the society, assembled from different parts of the kingdom, the enormous sub scription of 750,000 francs was obtained. The object of this sum

was to celebrate the [then] approaching centenary of Wesleyan Methodism, by founding a mission house and a Wesleyan college, fitting out a missionary vessel, and discharging the debts of all the chapels in the communion.

The doctrines of the Wesleyans are too often misrepresented by churchmen and Dissenters. It is often said that they neither profess nor maintain in its integrity the great doctrine of the Reformation—that of *justification by faith.* This is untrue. That doctrine is the foundation of Wesleyan Methodism, and during the late tour through England we have heard it declared as such by the most distinguished ministers of that denomination. It must be acknowledged, however, that the ministers of the Wesleyan body in the provincial towns are not sufficiently careful to preserve a good understanding and fraternal feeling with their Episcopal brethren; while the latter often give proofs of the most deplorable ignorance concerning the Wesleyans and their doctrines. We have heard Dissenting ministers in some of the smaller towns confess their ignorance even of the name of the Wesleyan minister in the place; and the only reply to our question has been, "The Jews have no dealing with the Samaritans." Did not Christ exhort those who loved him to love one another?

The Wesleyan Methodists are not in general of the same political opinions with the Independents and Baptists. They are for the most part more inclined to conservative opinions than the Dissenters. But should these differences in political sentiments, which ought always to be subordinate to religious considerations, prevent a friendly intelligence between those who are equally devoted to the same God and Saviour? And yet we have heard that in many parts of England the hatred of the Anglican clergy toward the Wesleyans exceeds all bounds, while in other places the Wesleyan ministers are careful to avoid the clergy. What would be the grief of the angels in heaven, if sorrow could enter their celestial abodes, to see the church of Christ thus divided and torn by those who make a profession of love toward Him who offered himself a ransom for all? We have heard members of the Anglican Church declare that the Wesleyans were no better than Papists; and Wesleyan ministers often exclaim, "Why, since they are so hostile to us, should we make so many efforts to live in harmony with the clergy of the Church of England?"

The Wesleyans, considered as a body, are gradually increasing. The division which existed for some time in their society, and occasioned the withdrawal of a certain number, excited alarm in the minds of some of the principal men; but it is evident that the mass

has not been affected by the schism, and we receive reiterated assurances that everywhere the Wesleyan body is in a sound and vigorous state. But though the Wesleyans are united among themselves, they are far from being so with their Christian brethren of other communions. The Independents, Baptists, and Calvinists are estranged from them, and they, in their turn, are rarely united with the Established Church. And with whom lies the blame? Sometimes with the Wesleyans, and at other times with the other sects; but, wherever the fault may lie, it is not the less a great evil, and cannot be too deeply deplored.

The Quakers, who remained so long united, are now also divided, and their condition is by no means satisfactory. We speak of their spiritual state, and of the parties among which they are divided. Independently of a Socinian separation, the first germs of which have shown themselves on the other side of the Atlantic, there exists another schism, of a character more orthodox and less dangerous, but which threatens, if not to overthrow, at least essentially to modify the doctrine and discipline of the Society of *Friends*.

At Manchester we have seen these dissenting Quakers united with their brethren of other dissenting communions to encourage the formation of a missionary society; and very zealous in favoring in every way the work of evangelization. Opposed as we are to every species of schism in the church of Christ, and deeply afflicted by every kind of division in Christian societies which have continued so long as that of the *Friends*, we are pleased, nevertheless, at the spirit manifested among these dissenting Quakers. We rejoice at their zeal for the salvation of their fellow-citizens, and at their activity in the cause of missions for their city. It is to be hoped, however, that they will continue, at least in some measure, to adhere to the great principles of the general body from which they have separated, especially in relying with confidence upon divine inspiration, and in imploring the aid of the Holy Spirit in all their pious efforts for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom. We have with pain remarked, that, with the exception of a partial union of the dissident Quakers with their Independent and Baptist brethren, the ancient as well as the modern members of this fraternity continue to live estranged from the members of the clergy, and from the ministers of every other Christian society. Assuredly such a course cannot but enfeeble that effusion of the Holy Spirit upon the churches, for which they are said to offer to heaven so many ardent prayers. God has promised his Spirit to those who seek it, but it is a Spirit of love, of mildness, of union, of fraternal kindness, sympathy, and charity.

And now what is the REMEDY for this deplorable and afflicting state of things in the church of Christ? A pious clergyman in the north of England inquired of us what would be the result of all these divisions, of this disunion, of these contentions and animosities, of these uncharitable and even hostile dispositions. We answered him as we now answer: All this must have an end, or God will "remove the candlestick" from Great Britain. But what are the best means to be adopted to put an end to such a state of things? We reply, first, Let the true servants of God, to whatever denomination they may belong, show themselves, and separate themselves from those who are simply political ecclesiastics, political Dissenters, political Methodists and Quakers. Let the children of God who are truly converted and sanctified withdraw from political clubs and associations; let them discountenance in their families all political discussions, or at least all violent debate on similar matters; let them unite in churches and chapels, in private houses, or in the sabbath schools, (a sort of neutral ground for all Christians,) to pray for the Spirit of union to descend upon them. Let them be present at all meetings for prayer for missions, whether of the Established Church, of Dissenters, or of Methodists; let them aid indiscriminately, and with all their means, all missionary societies, whether of Dissenters, Methodists, or the church; let them make a united effort, in concert with all, and to the extent of their ability, with one single and same desire and purpose. Let them wrest all hope from those who seek to sow divisions in the bosom of the church of Christ; let them refuse to take part in any association or committee that would tend to irritate and increase instead of healing the division between the church and the Dissenters, the Dissenters and the Methodists, the Methodists and the church. Let them withdraw their support from every publication, political, moral, or religious—from journals, magazines, or reviews, that use irritating language toward Protestant Christians of any denomination; let them, on the contrary, encourage publications founded on the principle of love and Christian union; let them establish journals for UNION, societies for UNION, seasons of prayer for UNION. Let them refuse to sign any political petition that contains injurious expressions against Dissenters, Methodists, or the church. Let UNION associations be formed in every parish of the kingdom, and the names of those be recorded who desire to live in union and Christian peace with their fellow-men, of whatever name or denomination among Protestant Christians they may be; let these UNION associations have for their object, 1. To cultivate in public and private a spirit of love and Christian fraternity; 2. The circulation

of tracts and other publications of a similar tendency; 3. To unite once a week, in the sabbath school or the parish school of the district, to pray for the spirit of peace, of love, and of union to descend upon Christians; 4. To admit new members who may be disposed to aid in this sacred cause; 5. To relieve, in proportion to the means of these associations, the temporal wants of such of their members as may have suffered in consequence of their membership. It may be that in many districts of England the attempt to form such associations would encounter numerous obstacles; but they would at length be formed, and multitudes, nay, millions of men would register in common their names, in the love of peace and union. That no one might be excluded, and that the poor might unite with the rich, it would be proper that no pecuniary subscription should be indispensable to membership in these associations; let the subscriptions of the rich be in proportion to their wealth; let the poor not contribute, or contribute according to their means; let there be for each member no other title than that of a Christian, or of a man known as such, and who desires to become a member of this UNION.

Let rewards be offered to those who distinguish themselves by their zeal or activity in healing the wounds of Christian churches; on this subject let sermons be preached, tracts published, and essays written; let the members of these associations act in some sort as Christian arbiters between churches that differ, or between separate sections of the same church. By this means, those who trouble the peace of the church of Christ would find no support in the church itself; and the friends of Christian harmony would never lack assistance in the execution of their plans or the accomplishment of their efforts. Such associations would meliorate the moral character of the country; they would elevate the spiritual state of the church of Christ; enfeeble or ruin the influence of political Anglicans, Dissenters, and Methodists; calm the existing irritation, and, without impairing the independence of each member on all spiritual or Christian subjects, would lead them to feel more and more the superlative importance of living as true Protestant Christians.

If these UNION associations were thus established, it would be proper that they should be protected and encouraged by the church, by the conference of the Wesleyan Methodists, and by the committees of the members and ministers of the three dissenting denominations; they should be openly approved by all these committees, who should invite individually each of their members to enter their names, and subscribe with the funds of their several

societies to similar establishments. By degrees all true Christians would become members, and an incalculable good would thus result to the church of Christ. These associations would gradually change the character of the Christian church; and instead of irritation, discord, and hatred, charity, love, and peace would spring forth. The points in controversy between the Church of England and the Dissenters, between the Dissenters and the Wesleyans, and between the latter and the church, are not of a nature to be decided by worldly men—by clubs or political parties. It was not thus that our Saviour or his apostles instructed us to heal such differences. No member of the Anglican Church can with sincerity say that a Dissenter cannot be a child of God; no Dissenter can conscientiously affirm that an Anglican cannot enter the kingdom of heaven. We are far from denying the importance—the immense importance—of a clear, positive, and just exposition of all religious questions; we are far from asserting that in what concerns religion and the salvation of souls there is anything of secondary interest; but we maintain that, when once a man has received by water and the Spirit a second birth, when the Holy Spirit has once sanctified the soul of that man, when he is once justified by God's grace, adopted into his family, and sanctified by his Spirit, and proves by his life that he loves the will of his Master, and labors for his glory, every other subject, opinion, and point of view is secondary; and that such Christians, whether Dissenters, Anglicans, or Methodists, should love each other as brothers, act as brothers, and unite as brothers against their common adversaries, infidelity and Popery.

In presenting these observations on the present state of disunion among the Protestant churches in Great Britain, we take God to witness that we have had no other object in view than to exhort our brethren to cast a serious glance toward the precipice to which they are hastening, and to retain them in the only path that can lead to spiritual union. May He in his infinite mercy grant that this object may be in part fulfilled by this feeble effort, and all the glory shall redound to His holy name.

ART. VII.—*No Church without a Bishop; or, the Controversy between the Rev. Drs. Potts and Wainwright, with a Preface by the Latter, and an Introduction and Notes by an Anti-sectarian.* Octavo, pp. 176. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844.

THE controversy upon church government, which has been revived by the Oxford divines, and carried on with so much spirit and ability upon both sides, has not yet terminated. The public is however, if we understand the signs of the times, less excited upon the subject than it was twelve months since. Men, we hope, are now giving themselves to sober thought, and are carefully reviewing the whole ground. We are happy that the excitement has produced, or been the means of producing, so many able works upon the various topics directly or remotely connected with the main question, and especially that the *old authors* are called in to act over the part which they acted first upon emergencies similar to those by which we are surrounded at the present time. It is scarcely possible to say anything better upon the subject than that which was said by the great champions of Episcopacy on the one hand and of Presbyterianism on the other, during the period of the Protectorate and the reign of the Stuarts: since which, with our little research, we are not able to learn that one new thought has been added to the stock of knowledge upon the subject contributed by the extraordinary minds of that extraordinary age. But when the high-church pigmies of these times elevate themselves upon the shoulders of the giants of a former age, and flourish their swords and swing their caps, it seems but right, that the sons of the Puritans should assume the vantage ground won and defended by their fathers, and hold up their impenetrable shields, and throw their banners to the breeze. This is all that the circumstances require; and as upon all former occasions, after a flourish of trumpets, our high-church opponents will throw themselves upon their reserved right of maintaining a dignified silence in relation to troublesome objections. But we must address ourselves to the task we have undertaken.

We fear that the mere title-page of the work before us will be all that many will desire to see. The controversy, as it was published in the newspapers, was so embarrassed with questions of mere etiquet, that its merits were scarcely appreciated. And the reader of the pamphlet, unless he has an extraordinary amount of patience, will do well to commence with Dr. Wainwright's "Essays" (page 75,) and follow on with the "Remarks" by Dr. Potts,

(commencing page 119.) He will find all that is of much value in this part of the work. The preceding portion consists mostly in a controversy in relation to the true issue pending between the parties, and the responsibilities which each had assumed. In his first communication Dr. Potts committed the fatal error of promising, in his turn, to prove that Dr. Wainwright's proposition—"there is no church without a bishop"—"is unscriptural, uncharitable, schismatical, and anti-republican." Though it is most evident that this was not to be the *first issue*—that Dr. Wainwright had given the first challenge, and that the simple question between the parties was, *Can there be a church without a bishop?* and that Dr. Wainwright stood pledged to take the negative of this simple question; yet, he so manœuvres as to hold Dr. Potts to the proof of what was naturally second in the order of the controversy, before he will proceed a step. And thus upon the question, who was the challenger, and who, "according to the laws of dialectics," was bound to proceed *first* to the business of *proving*, our champions had all but exhausted the public patience. But finally becoming thoroughly sensible that they stood in an awkward position, they rushed to the conflict. All these skirmishes were unfortunate at the time, and now, in the book, they present the unsightly aspect of a portico nearly as large as the house. Dr. Potts was evidently mistaken in his man. He expected no dodging—he looked for no Jesuitical arts—upon the open challenge of Dr. Wainright, he made up for fair fight; but he subsequently found he had spoken a little too soon as to what he would prove on his part. This furnished a loop-hole through which his antagonist came near escaping, and would indeed have escaped, and left Dr. Potts to fight alone, if he had dared to do so. But knowing that he would leave the field with dishonor, unless he gave some little proof of courage, he held on until Dr. Potts proceeded to lead on the discussion upon his own propositions. After a short rencounter, our champions change their relative positions, and finally proceed in the discussion, as they should have done at first, Dr. Wainwright laying down his thesis and attempting to sustain it, and Dr. Potts following with his answers.

Of the relative strength of the combatants, we shall say nothing—their productions are before the public, and every one can judge of this for himself. We cannot, however, withhold the remark that Dr. Potts has written with spirit and ability, and is entitled to the gratitude of the evangelical churches. In this paper we shall find little occasion for referring to Dr. Potts' answers, as our principal object is to notice some of the positions of Dr. Wainwright and his note-writer.

Of Dr. Wainwright's "friend"—the "anti-sectarian"—who is the author of the "introduction and notes," we have no knowledge excepting as he shows himself in this pamphlet. Indeed we care not who he is, so long as Dr. Wainwright says, "I am willing to bear the responsibility of what my friend has done." This is all we ask, giving the doctor all the advantage he may derive from the intimation, that "in a change of place" he might not "have adopted his peculiar style of language." Of course we shall consider the note-writer a mere cat's-paw, for whose acts in this connection Dr. Wainwright is alone responsible. It is all one whether he is an entity or a nonentity, so long as we have a responsible person who vouches for him. We cannot, however, proceed to our main purpose without expressing our astonishment, that a gentleman of Dr. Wainwright's character and taste should have condescended to use such an instrument. For, not to say that in doing so he has committed himself to the most rabid Puseyism, and made himself responsible for the most reckless historical infidelity, he has also offended against the common decencies of all fair Christian controversy,—saying nothing of the barbarous English which he has suffered his "friend" to tack upon his skirts. A perpetual effort to appear smart, and an offensive affectation of wit, are some of the smallest of this note-writer's offenses. He asserts for historical fact what rests upon no authentic records; he assumes as self-evident what in this controversy is always denied, and what has often been disproved; and he always treats with the most sovereign contempt those whom he condescends to oppose. In the name of consistency, if this wise high-churchman has no respect for his opponents, why should he not respect himself—or rather, as *he* is *nothing*—a mere imaginary being—why does he not respect his friend whose cause he espouses? If he has any true respect for his dignified principal in this controversy, it is a poor way to show it, to make him bear the responsibility of mountains of fictitious history, fallacious reasoning, unfounded assumption, and vulgar abuse of Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists. With specimens of these notes, merely to illustrate or confirm the truth of what we here alledge, we do not intend to mar our pages. The justice of our assertions will sufficiently appear from the references we shall make to the notes in our examination of the great leading sophisms of the book, so far as Dr. Wainwright's "friend" speaks for him.

We cannot attempt, in this paper, to notice all that is exceptionable in the positions of Dr. Wainwright and his "friend," or to treat at length the subject of the church, apostolical succession, &c.

These subjects we have treated at some length heretofore, and on this occasion our object shall be merely to point out a few high-church inconsistencies as found in the book before us, and to amplify the arguments which have been presented on former occasions.

The whole controversy naturally rests upon *the doctrine of the church.* Accordingly Dr. Potts asked of his opponent "three definitions," the first of which is, "What is the church?" But after all that Dr. Potts urged upon the importance of settling the question, the sum total of what he calls forth from his opponent is, that he uses the word church "precisely in the sense in which it is used in the standards of the church of which he is a member—these are contained in the Book of Common Prayer," (page 43.) This is a vague and unsatisfactory answer: for *first*, "the Book of Common Prayer" does not settle the point in controversy touching the nature and constitution of the church. The nineteenth article gives us the only formal definition of the church there is in the book, and that says nothing upon the subject of the *ministry*, which constitutes one of its essential parts. The article, some tell us, was designedly so worded as to embrace the foreign Protestant churches, which were without diocesan bishops. And the American Prayer Book explicitly recognizes the different denominations of Christians in this country as churches. So far from considering the Protestant Episcopal Church the only true church in the country, this standard only considers her as *one among many.*

But *secondly*, it should be observed, that the church "standards" are not embraced entire in the Prayer Book. The Homilies are recognized in the Thirty-nine Articles: and in the Homily on Whitsunday we have a definition of "the church," which adds to it attributes not found in the Prayer Book. There we have the addition of "discipline," which of course very much abridges the extension of the term church; as, according to a principle in logic, increasing the comprehension of a term diminishes its extension. This is all we shall urge here upon this point: we have elsewhere shown, as we think, conclusively that neither Romanists nor churchmen have settled the question among themselves, "What constitutes the church?" Now how can these gentlemen expect, that all the world will at once recognize in their organization the essential "notes of the church," until they settle among themselves what these notes are, and the means by which they are to be determined? Is not this demanding too much? We assert, that the church authorities are vague, and inconsistent with each other, upon this great fundamental point, and so long as this is the fact, it is an insult to common sense to assume, as most high-church writers do, that the attributes or

"notes" of the church are fully settled and determined, and that no one can now call their claims in question without being implicated in heresy. Dr. Wainwright says, "We attach to the words the church, &c.," "a definite meaning." Nothing further from the truth. Go to the Book of Common Prayer, to the Homilies, to Dr. Field, to Bishop Taylor, and to Mr. Palmer—all church authorities good and true—and in each instance you will find an independent theory of the church, and no two of them consistent with each other. Those who can take the famous catholic rule of Vincentius, *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, creditum est*—and upon an application of it to any one theory of the church, maintained either by Romanists or churchmen, can adopt that theory, must be without one grain of common sense, or, at least, so completely blinded by prejudice as to be wholly incompetent to the work of reasoning upon the plainest facts. Now would it be thought possible, under these circumstances, for our high-church friends to screw themselves up to such a pitch of bigotry and fanaticism as to claim that they are "*a divine society*," and to contrast all other churches with theirs, as mere "human institutions?" (See p. 22, notes.) What attestations have they to the *divinity* of their "society?" We believe they do not claim miraculous powers, nor that their pretensions are settled by explicit warrant from the Bible. Yet, it seems, they have in some way been able to satisfy themselves that God is the immediate founder of their church, and that all other Christian associations are mere human institutions, "like temperance, abolition, or sewing societies!" Now, where is their warrant? We challenge them, if they have any, to produce it: let them at least tell us what test the great Head of the church has authorized, which, when applied to their society and to other Christian societies, proves the first "divine," and the latter "human."

But these high-churchmen seem to themselves to have the whole ground, by the concession of "the sects," in their avowal that "the church is a voluntary association." We fear these learned gentlemen do not labor very hard to comprehend the sense of this proposition, All evangelical denominations most certainly believe the church—which is the body of Christ—and which is made up of "faithful men, *cœtus fidelium*," *congregation of believers*, to be a *divine institution*, constituted by God himself. But they claim no divinity for particular forms of church organization, which are the result of human opinions, as to the sense of the Scripture with regard to the government of the church. And "the church," so called by its supporters by way of eminence, is just as much "a voluntary association" and "a human society" as any other. And

indeed, if the assumption of a human headship, and the development of "king-craft" and "priestcraft," in no small proportions, are evidence of "human origin," "the church—the catholic church," so called, bears upon every lineament of her face the infallible signs of almost any other than a heavenly origin.

Indeed, Dr. Wainwright's "friend," in his great zeal for apostolical prerogatives, has occasionally made concessions which seem to indicate that there is, after all, some human mixture in this "divine society." The following is a specimen:—

"The church, not being perfect nor infallible, the American branch doubtless needs such a reformation, that twenty-two apostles will no longer be trammeled by the opinions of lawyers and other laymen, when they are taking measures to continue the apostolic line, by sending missionary bishops, according to the method of the gospel, and of the primitive church, to such destitute regions as Texas, Africa," &c. —P. 167.

It is a pity this "*divine* society" were not "infallible!" But it is passing strange that "twenty-two" real "apostles" should be so "trammeled by the opinions of lawyers and other laymen," that they are not able "to take measures to continue the apostolic line according to the method of the gospel and the primitive church!" What can be done to effect "such a reformation" in "the American branch" as to save "the apostolic line" from a final termination? These naughty "lawyers and other laymen" are truly making sad work in this "divine society!" If they go on at this rate they will really break up the apostolic succession, all the power and wisdom of our "twenty-two" living "apostles" notwithstanding. How in nature came this mischievous element incorporated into the policy of the "divine society?" Has not the great Head of the church said to the "apostles" of the church in all ages, "Lo! I am with you always, even to the end of the world?" And does not this imply that "the apostolic line" shall always be continued? and that nothing shall be permitted to interfere with it down to the final consummation? Has Christ forgotten his promise? and are our "twenty-two apostles" so seriously impeded in carrying out the objects of their high commission? Pause a little, dear sir. Look back to the history of the acts and doings of the *apostle of New-York* during the last year. Just remember who he made these "lawyers and other laymen" cower, in the convention of 1843; and how gloriously he carried out the objects of his apostolical commission in the *Carey ordination*. See what stern stuff "apostles" are made of, and then give over your fears as to the continuance of "the apostolic line." With a little of your aid, our

"twenty-two apostles" will most certainly bring about "a reformation" in "the American branch." And then "that which letteth"—"lawyers and other laymen"—"will be taken out of the way;" until which may you in patience possess your soul.

We shall next notice the boast made, upon the part of our high-churchmen, of apostolical origin. Their church, they say, was instituted by Christ, but "the sects" have all sprung up since. We know when they arose, and whence they came. Thus Dr. Wainwright:—

"It is true that we believe in one only visible church of Christ. We believe that it is unchangeably constituted and organized by Christ himself. We believe that it will continue one to the end of the world. And we do not believe that the various communities around us, which have sprung up at different times within the last three hundred years, and which continue to spring up every year, calling themselves churches, are so in fact. They are without Christ's organization and ministry. Their organization and ministry are recent—of yesterday. Whereas Christ organized his church eighteen hundred years ago."—Pp. 60, 61.

And thus his note-writer:—

"Whence this claim? whence this abiding sense in the church of her own perpetuity? The sects have it not. The Methodists had their *first centennial* celebration a few years ago; and the sects celebrate the Reformation as their origin. When did the church celebrate as her birth-year and birth-place anything but A. D. 1 to 300—Jerusalem and Antioch."—P. 142.

This is the favorite strain of the high-churchmen of the present day; and where they learned this lesson, any one at all acquainted with the Romish and Protestant controversy will easily determine. The Romanists asked the reformers, "Where was your religion before Luther?" Ours, say they, came from the apostles, yours came from Luther. We go upon the maxim of the fathers, "That which is old is true, and that which is new is false."

The answer which the reformers gave the Romanists is the same we give our Puseyite adversaries: *Your* religion is the *novelty*—ours is the old, the pure religion of Christ and the apostles. You had corrupted the simple institutions of the primitive Christians—we have restored them. We can mark as certainly, in the faithful records of history, when your corruptions were introduced, as you can when our great reformers delivered the church from the pressure of the superincumbent mass. Evangelical Protestantism is the old Christianity, and the evangelical churches, in all essential respects, are conformed to the churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, &c. From this immovable foundation, Dr. Wainwright,

with all the help his friend, the note-writer, can lend him, will never be able to remove us. It is indeed a very easy method of disposing of this whole controversy to assume, that "the church" was established by *Christ*, and the sects by *men*—that the one is a *divine*, the other a *human* institution—that such as the Church of England now is, such she was when she was organized by some primitive apostle, and such she has ever been. And all must concede, if this ground is tenable, the controversy between churchmen and "the sects" is at an end. But this assumption, in an argument upon the points at issue, is a perfect burlesque upon all fair discussion. Whether found in a Roman, or Anglican, or Anglo-American Catholic, it deserves rebuke, as a most pitiful and shameless *petitio principii*. Why are these gentlemen unwilling to meet us upon the arena of Scripture, and settle the controversy there? Dr. Wainwright concedes the competency of the Scriptures to decide the controversy, and yet upon the start he takes ground which, if tenable, determines the matter in dispute without this umpire. If the Bible is to determine which of us is in accordance with the primitive pattern, why then let us go to the Bible and discuss the matter upon a footing of perfect equality, and let him who is best sustained by that infallible standard be considered as having the best claim to an apostolical origin.

Not that we shrink from a thorough historical investigation of the assumptions of our high-church opponents. We have the history of *their* origin and succession, and can read and understand it. We know when the Church of England and the Protestant Episcopal Church arose, and the circumstances of their origin; and we know that they are no more of apostolical origin than the Methodist Episcopal Church, or the Congregational churches of New-England. In all those respects in which they are peculiar, they are modern institutions; and to us it is perfectly obvious, that, according to their understanding of the rule which they, in common with Romanists, adopt—viz.: That which is old is true, and that which is new is false—they must bow to Rome, and ought at once to acknowledge that they have been in schism, and have maintained, ever since the days of the Reformation, destructive heresies.

In order to sustain his proposition—"Non ecclesia sine episcopo—There can be no church without a bishop"—Dr. Wainwright must assume *the apostolical succession*, that is, a regular and unbroken succession of bishops from the apostles to the present time. This is the corner-stone of the high-church theory, and consequently is dwelled upon with great emphasis. It is admitted by these gentlemen, that if the line of bishops should be broken, the church

would be annihilated, and the ordinances would cease. Of course the evidence which we now have that the church has survived the revolutions of time, and that the sacraments are now validly administered, must depend upon the evidence we have that the line of bishops has been preserved without interruption from the holy apostles. But this work devolves upon our successionists themselves. The laboring oar is in their hands, and how skillfully they use it may be seen in their numerous publications. Their principal Scripture argument is founded upon our Lord's commission to the apostles, "Lo, I am with you always," &c. How certainly this proves that there would "always" be a *succession of prelates* in the church, who alone should have the power of conferring orders, and that wherever this deposition is lodged—whether with a saint or a sinner, a Christian or a heathen—there is the sanctifying presence of Christ; there the sacraments are truly efficacious and saving—we leave for all to judge. For ourselves, we believe this promise applies to all true ministers of Christ, of whatever grade, and so the fathers interpreted it. But we cannot delay upon this argument, if a mere unfounded assumption should be called an argument.

The Romanists from this same passage, and with equal skill, prove the *infallibility* of the church. Our old English divines meet them by saying the text proves no such thing—it only proves that Christ is with *His* church and ministers; but this does not make out that even the church of Christ is infallible. "But the Romish Church, being not the church of Christ, it cannot challenge to itself the *presence* of Christ, much less the infallibility she claims for herself." The same plain common-sense reasoning is equally effectual in reply to the argument of our successionists. The promise not being made to bishops, or exclusively to any other grade of ministers now in being, can never prove a continuous line of such ministers. Indeed, the passage is totally irrelevant to the point in hand.

The historical argument is equally extraordinary. They tell us the succession of bishops could not have failed, because the maxim, *Non ecclesia sine episcopo*, was a maxim in the primitive church; and the apostolical traditions, and the canons of ancient councils, confine orders to bishops, and make this third order essential to the being of a church. Supposing this to be conceded, will it not still devolve upon our successionists to prove that in preserving the succession, the maxims and canons of the primitive church were sacredly regarded? This we opine the wiser sort of them will not undertake. Indeed, they all take the liberty, when pressed with

difficulties, of dispensing with the most ancient and explicit of "the canons of the universal church!" And this, as the reader will see presently, they are obliged to do, or their chain of ordinations flies into a thousand pieces.

We have on former occasions referred to the difficulties of making out the succession upon canonical principles. We will now state the case more at large. Our successionists maintain, that the canons of the first six general councils, and the apostolical canons, are an imbodiment of the *apostolical traditions* upon the order and discipline of the church; that they contain what had been received from the apostles themselves, and kept uncorrupted by their successors.* We will now give several canons which relate to ordinations from these high authorities.†

"CANON I. Let a bishop be ordained by two or three bishops."

"XXIX. If any bishop, presbyter, or deacon, shall obtain possession of that dignity by money, let both him and the person who ordained him be deposed, and also altogether cut off from all communion, as Simon Magus was by me Peter."‡

"XXX. If any bishop obtain possession of a church by the aid of the temporal powers, let him be deposed and excommunicated, and all who communicate with him."

"XXXIV. The bishops of every nation must acknowledge him who is first among them, and account him as their head, and do nothing of consequence without his consent; but each may do those things only which concern his own parish, and the country places which belong to it. But neither let him [who is the first] do anything without the consent of all; for so there will be unanimity, and God will be glorified through the Lord Jesus Christ, and the Father through the Lord by the Holy Spirit, even the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

"XXXV. Let not a bishop dare to ordain beyond his own limits, in

* Of the apostolical canons Dr. Wainwright says, "They were composed very early, and were gathered together about a century after the death of St. John, it is said by Clement of Alexandria. A century after that, they were quoted as very ancient. Learned men have decided, that there can be no doubt of the authenticity of these canons."—P. 90.

† We quote from a work which has the following title: "Definitions of faith, and canons of discipline of the six œcumenical councils, with the remaining canons of the code of the universal church. Translated, with notes. Together with the apostolical canons. By the Rev. William Andrew Hammond, M.A., of Christ Church, Oxford. First American edition; to which are added, the constitutions and canons ecclesiastical of the Church of England, and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.—James A. Sparks, 109 Nassau-street, New-York. 1844."

‡ "*Me Peter*"—who can ever doubt the *apostolical* origin of these canons after this? Surely *Peter wrote this canon*, or it must be considered an *impious forgery*, and it would be horrible *sectarianism* to dream any such thing.

cities and places not subject to him. But if he be convicted of doing so, without the consent of those persons who have authority over such cities and places, let him be deposed, and those also whom he has ordained.

"XXXVI. If any person, having been ordained bishop, does not undertake the ministry, and the care of the people committed to him, let him be excommunicated until he does undertake it."

Def. Faith, Apost. Can., pp. 190, 193, 194, 195.

"IV. It is most proper that a bishop should be constituted by all the bishops of the province; but if this be difficult on account of some urgent necessity, or the length of the way, that at all events three should meet together at the same place, those who are absent also giving their suffrages, and their consent in writing, and then the ordination be performed. The confirming however of what is done in each province belongs to the metropolitan of it."

"XVI. If any bishop shall dare to usurp what belongs to another, and to ordain in his church any such person without the consent of the proper bishop from whom he has seceded, let the ordination be void."

Def. Faith, Can. Nice, pp. 33, 38.

"XIII. Let no bishop dare to pass from one province to another, and ordain any persons in the churches to the dignity of officiating, not even if he bring others with him, unless he has come upon a written invitation from the metropolitan, and the other bishops of the country into which he has come. If, however, no one inviting him, he shall proceed disorderly to the ordination of any persons, and to the regulation of ecclesiastical matters which do not belong to him, the things which are done by him shall be annulled, and he himself suffer the punishment proper for his insubordination and unreasonable attempts, being deposed forthwith by the holy synod."—*Ap. Can.* 35.

Def. Faith, Can. Antioch, pp. 172, 173.

These canons settle certain principles, which we suppose were originally considered, and ought now by all true churchmen to be considered, necessary to the validity of ordinations. These are:

1. That it shall require at least two bishops to ordain another bishop.

2. That no bishop has any authority to ordain out of his own province; but if he passes over these bounds and ordains, he shall be excommunicated, and his ordinations be considered null and void.

3. That if a bishop, elder, or deacon obtain his dignity by money, he shall "be altogether cut off from the church."

4. If a bishop obtain a church by the interference of the temporal powers, he must be deposed and excommunicated, and all who communicate with him.

No canons can be more explicit than these, and none have been more frequently repeated by subsequent councils; and that it was maintained that adhesion to the principles of these canons was

necessary to the validity of ordination is susceptible of the clearest proof. The Council of Antioch says, "If things be done contrary to the established rule, the ordination shall be null."—Can. xix. And Gregory Nazianzen says, "This man, indeed, may have a *nominal* succession, but the other has the very thing itself, *the succession in deed and in truth.* Neither is he who usurps the chair by violence to be esteemed in the succession; but he who is pressed into the office; not he who violates all law in his election, but he who is elected in a manner consistent with the laws of the case."* Here we see that the validity of "the succession" depends upon the conformity of the election and ordination with "the laws in the case." To the same effect we might quote numerous authorities. We would refer the reader especially to St. Cyprian, who rests the claim to divine sanction upon the fact, that ordination is canonical. According to him, that which the bishops do *according to rule* is done by Christ, and on the other hand, that which is done contrary to canonical order is null from the beginning; and it is clear that this is as truly a catholic canon as any upon record. But we must not enlarge; we have said that our successionists must prove that their succession is canonical, in order to prove that upon catholic principles they have a church and valid sacraments. But we will not leave them to do this at their leisure. We will proceed to prove, that their succession is uncanonical and invalid, and consequently that they have no church or valid sacraments, upon their own premises.

In the first place, Austin, the monk, who was the first Romish archbishop of Canterbury, was, according to Bede, ordained by the archbishop of Arles, and, as far as we know, without the help of any other bishop. This same Austin ordained two bishops for Britain, also without the help of other bishops. That Austin ordained these bishops alone is evident from the fact that he asked instructions of Pope Gregory as to whether, if it were difficult for foreign bishops to be present, "the solemnity of the consecration ought to be performed by a single bishop." To this Gregory answered: "As for the Church of England, in which you are as yet the only bishop, you can no otherwise ordain a bishop than in the absence of other bishops."† And it is not to be presumed, that this liberty of dispensing with the canon granted by the pope was not used. The canon requires, that "two or three bishops" be present at the ordination of a bishop; but here Augustin ordains

* Quoted by Dr. Potts, (p. 128,) but powerfully let alone by our note-writer.

† See Bede's Hist. Eccl., cap. xxvii. And Collier's Ecclesiastical History of Great Britain, vol. i, p. 158.

"a bishop—in the absence of other bishops." Here is a violation of a plain canon of "the Catholic Church" in filling up the links of the English succession. To get rid of this difficulty, our high-churchmen take the liberty of setting this canon aside. Our learned note-writer tells us, that "if only one bishop was consecrated by a bishop in the apostolic line, then the last consecrated would be a true bishop, as any one will see on examination."*—P. 133. So indeed, if the canons can be disposed of at discretion. This is the way these catholic churchmen treat the established canons of the Catholic Church! They can knock down platoons of canons, fathers, councils, and apostolical traditions, when they stand in their way. What wonderful "catholics" are Dr. Wainwright and his "friend!" What a profound respect they must have for "the definitions of faith and canons of discipline of the canonical councils!" But "the apostolical succession" must be sustained, canons or no canons.

But what is still a greater defect in the Romish succession in Britain, is, that it superseded and forced out of existence the true British apostolical succession. All their catalogues trace their succession to Augustin, who was a foreign bishop, and could have no right to ordain in Britain, and whose ordinations there were *null* and *void*, according to the canons above quoted. It must be borne in mind, that our high-churchmen maintain that the gospel was planted in Britain in apostolic times, probably by St. Paul; and that there was a regular succession of bishops preserved in the British isles from this time down to that of the mission of Augustin. Of course, as they also concede, Augustin had no canonical authority there, nor had Pope Gregory any more right to the territory than one of the British bishops had to Rome. Dr. Wainwright has given us the whole theory and a condensed history of the different periods of the British ecclesiastical history, in an Appendix, which is so full of instruction that we will give it here entire. The whole taken together is a full concession of the nullity of the English succession upon the principles of the canons of the Catholic Church. There is, however, much fictitious history in it, as we will show from the best authorities. This is the "Appendix:"—

* Mr. Chapman, who has given us a learned book upon "The Organization and Order of the Primitive Church," says, "Doubts have been raised by some theologians, whether ordinations by *one* bishop are valid; but, as seems to us, without sufficient reason. They would be *uncanonical*, and therefore *irregular*, but still valid."—P. 286, note. This expedient to save the British ordinations is a grand concession. For though these ordinations are, according to this doctrine, not invalid, they are "uncanonical" and "irregular." Such ordinations would not have stood the test during the Cyprianic age, where *canonical irregularity* invalidated ordinations and sacraments, and excluded the offender from the Catholic Church.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH IN ENGLAND.

First, or Apostolic Period.

Page 21, col. 1, 1st part. "Now it is certain that the orders of the Anglican Church have come down through the Roman Church."

A. D. 52, and sixteen years before St. Paul was beheaded under Nero, A. D. 68, and nine years after St. Peter could first have been at Rome, A. D. 43, (see Prof. Tholuck's Introduction to Commentary on Romans,) a British prince was baptized, *Lucius*. This, then, was while apostles were yet alive, and almost half a century before the venerable head of the apostle John was laid in the dust. Next, Tertullian, Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, and Hilary, speaking from distant ages, tell us of churches of Christ in Britain. Theodoret says they were founded by apostles. No authority or historian, after the New Testament, can have greater weight than these.

Second, or British Period.

Three British bishops, of London, York, and Lincoln, represented the church in Britain at Arles, A. D. 314. A. D. 359, in the synod at Ariminam, British bishops were present. In the fifth century, Germanus and Lupus, bishops from Gaul, visited Britain for the purpose of aiding the British bishops against the heresy of Pelagius. A. D. 432, the Irish churches were founded by Patrick. Such are the apostolic origin and first history of their foundation.*

Third, or Saxon Period.

The pagan Saxons persecuted the Christian Britons. A conquered people always fly to the mountains and the isles. Christianity fled to Wales and Iona, and other northern islands. Who has not heard of Columb? But some Christians remained among the heathen Saxons, and "Theonus was bishop of London and Thadiocus of York, about A. D. 586." The Britons made many efforts to convert the Saxons. Kentigern was also bishop in Glasgow and Cumberland.

Fourth, or Roman Period of Usurpation.

Thus far the British Church has had no connection with Rome, and of course does not originate from that city. When the church of Christ in the heptarchy was 547 years old, i. e., A. D. 599, the first mission from Rome was accomplished. It was begun a few years sooner, and the well-known story of Gregory, who thought that the *Angle* slaves should be *Angels;* that, coming from *Deira*, they should be saved from *Dei ira;* that, being subjects of the Saxon king, *Ella*, they should sing *Allelulia*, seems the first record of a Roman presbyter's thoughts on this theme: (see Hume.) Gregory himself set out for Britain, but a tumult of the people called back the beloved presbyter, and he became bishop of Rome before that novelty Popery was heard of. He sent Austin and forty monks; they reached Paris, and, despairing of the conversion of the barbarians, begged to be recalled.

* Palmer, vol. i, p. 215. London, 1838.

Their bishop, Gregory, denied them, and urged them on. Hearing that Ethelbert, king of Kent, had married a French Christian princess, Bertha, Austin resolved to go thither first. The devoted missionary landed barefooted in England, (and if a missionary bishop must have a salary in order to be sent,) he preached in the open air to Ethelbert on the throne, and "a nation was born in a day;" for the king and ten thousand Saxons were baptized. Seven British bishops met and conferred with Austin: (Bede, 2d book.) Therefore the British Church was far from extinct when Austin was sent from Rome. Augustin himself was not consecrated at Rome, but at Arles, the bishop of Lyons, *a Greek*, and not a Romish colony, assisting. When, by the king of *Kent*, chosen to be first archbishop of *Canterbury*, he strove to bring the British bishops to receive Boniface III., the first pope, they refused, and, in the memorable language of Dunodd, abbot of Bangor, remains to us: "We owe allegiance to the bishop of Rome, and to every other Christian man, *to love him;* but our bishop is Caerlon."* This last name may, or may not be, correctly spelled. It was a similar name; but we write from memory, the book not being at hand. It should be reprinted here. Thus the Church in Britain, persecuted by pagans, was at last visited by an apostle from the primitive, but not Papist, Church at Rome. Austin founded or revived the churches of Canterbury, Rochester, London, &c.

Irish missionaries founded churches at Lindisfain or Durham, Lichfield, York, &c., or revived them. Scotland received Christianity from the Irish and Saxon Churches: (Dr. Johnson.)

The British and Saxon Churches disagreed at first, which gives the best proof of their separate existence and foundation: one dating its origin from the apostolic age, and the other from the un-Papist Church at Rome. They united, and were everywhere confessed as a pure *branch* of *one catholic tree*. They have existed ever since. Their acts in each age are history. In Wilkins's Concilia these acts are found from A. D. 440 to A. D. 1717. They ordained bishops, held synods, corrected abuses, enforced discipline; they were protected by kings' charters, &c., &c. They never separated from the catholic tree, but the pope himself cut off his withered and feeble branch; 80 only out of 12,000 clergymen. Britain, Gaul, Rome, are the mothers of the Church in England. The eldest is British and apostolic. Nay, the three are apostolical.

As to Rome, who that knows the ancient laws of England does not recall the acts passed in each century against the usurpations of the Roman pontiff? Does not the first article in Magna Charta guaranty the "rights of the Church of England?" And even John, who cowered beneath the stern glances and before the spears of his own barons at Runnymede, dared oppose in the 13th century the arrogance and exactions of Rome. An interdict convinced him that the old minister at Rome was yet too strong for the tyrant, and brought him to the feet of the pope. Three centuries and more rolled away before bluff Harry, wicked Harry, sensual Harry, did what John could not do—cast

* See translation of the Welsh manuscripts, printed lately at London.

off the *usurped* power; and declared that, as the bishop of London was not the bishop of Rome, neither should the bishop of Rome be bishop of London; i. e. the Romish bishop hath no jurisdiction in England. And yet this brutal and beastly tyrant was "the defender of the faith," and we have had in our hand the very copy of his book which he sent to the pope. He lived a persecuting Papist, and died a bigoted Romanist. But he drove the schismatical bishop of Rome out of other men's dioceses. He was for the state, like his successors, head of the church; but in spiritual matters the king is no more than any beggar, who is not ordained a minister of God. Can he preach or baptize? Never. Thus the church has gone on from A. D. 52 to 1844. The Essays contain the history from the Reformation. See Essay, &c.

No wonder she hath a deep, settled, unshaken, and immovable conviction, and an abiding sense of her apostolicity and her perpetuity.

Esto Perpetua. Perge modo.

It is plainly sheer ignorance, or folly, or wickedness, (if well informed,) to belie the church of Christ! How great is their loss, and their sin, who, with these facts (and history ever endures, for "facts are God's footsteps") before their eyes, talk of Henry the Eighth's Church, or, like our Dr. Potts, of Pope Henry VIII! It is worse than senile folly and credulity. So the Romanists, when they ask, "Is not your Protestant" a new term? we confess it, and answer, It is not in our standards. We "believe in the Holy Catholic Church, and one apostolic," and no more. That some timid, prudent, and, not to judge them, time-serving, well-meaning men, inserted "Protestant" in the title-page (for it is nowhere else) of our Prayer Book, was their fault; and it will not be ours, if the attempt to erase it, and other un-Catholic alterations, should fail; the attempt will be made; the folly of resisting it will lie with its rejecters. Time will give truth the upper hand. But when the Romanist says, "Where was your church before Luther?" we can answer, as Usher the Jesuit, or the English knight at Rome, "Where yours was not—in the Holy Scriptures."

Now in this piece of history it is asserted that "the British Church had no connection with Rome" until "A. D. 599;" "the British Church was far from extinct when Austin was sent from Rome;" there were three "British bishops" who held their sees according to apostolic order; and they "refused" submission to the "pope" and his "archbishops." The question is, then, how could Archbishop Augustin have any ecclesiastical authority in Britain? Indeed, our high-churchmen concede all we ask upon this point. Dr. W., in his history, tells us that Henry VIII.—"bluff Harry—drove the schismatical bishop of Rome out of other men's dioceses." But "the schismatical bishops of Rome" had enjoyed these "dioceses" through the whole period which intervened between Augustin and "bluff Harry"—a period of nearly a

thousand years. What in the mean time had become of the original owners of these "dioceses?" They had been extinct for centuries. They were indeed principally destroyed by the army of the king of Kent soon after Augustin, in the pope's name, took possession of the country, as is said, according to a prediction, or, as many assert, by the instigation of this holy father. These British bishops left no successors. We appeal to Augustin's inquiries, and Pope Gregory's answers, found in all the histories of the English Church, in proof that they had no part whatever in the ordinations in the Romish line. History abundantly testifies that this line *superseded* the British; and that the British line did not *coalesce* with, but was *annihilated* by, the Romish. How then is the present British succession derived from the ancient British bishops? What becomes of Dr. W.'s beautiful theory that "Britain, Gaul, and Rome are the mothers of the Church in England?" "The eldest is British and apostolic." The "British" mother—"the eldest and apostolic"—was murdered, and left no issue to propagate her race or to inherit her domain. The claim, then, which our churchmen make to regular descent from the ancient British bishops is totally groundless, and their catalogues mere fictions, which may impose upon the ignorant, but can deceive no one at all acquainted with the ecclesiastical history of Great Britain.

The English and Protestant Episcopal succession came through an acknowledged *usurpation*—a foreign bishop in "other men's dioceses." Now, in proof that all the ordinations in Great Britain are, upon the principles of successionists themselves, *null* and *void*, we refer the reader to the canons above quoted, and might in addition give a multitude of patristic authorities. One, however, must suffice. *St. Cyprian* says: "I may presume there is no one of our brethren who will assume to himself an episcopal authority over those of his own order, or to be a bishop of bishops; or to drive any of his brethren, by haughty manners or tyrannical compulsions, into his own persuasion; since every bishop hath equal liberty of judging and determining upon any question which comes before him, and he can no more be judged by, than he can judge, another."—On the Council of Carthage: opening of the session.

Again, this learned father, speaking of the elevation of *Cornelius* to the see of Rome, and arguing that the pretensions of *Novatianus*, his rival, were wholly vain, says: "*Cornelius* was advanced to the episcopal chair, ... which therefore being filled, agreeably to the will of God, ... whoever thenceforward would be ordained to it, must be ordained *out of the church;* nor is he capable indeed of receiving ordination *from* the church who main-

tains not the unity of the church; be that person who he will, and let him boast, as much as he pleases, of his own merits and qualifications, I make no scruple to pronounce him a profane person, an alien, and one who hath no part nor lot in the privileges of the church. And since, when one is once regularly ordained, there can be no other after him, whoever pretends to any such ordination, after his, who alone is entitled to it, doth not only forfeit his claim to the effects of such a *second*, but indeed of *any* ordination; and the whole action is really a perfect nullity."—Epistle 55, sec. 5.

To the same purpose, and, if possible, still more explicit, is the following passage:—

"As to the person of *Novatian*, dear brother, concerning whom you desire to know from me, what heresy he hath introduced into the church; it doth not, I think, become us to be curious in our inquiries after his doctrine; since whatever he may teach, he teaches it out of the church; whosoever, or whatsoever else he be, he can be no Christian who is not in the church of Christ. Let him bear himself as high as he will, and boast as much and vainly as he pleases of his eloquence and philosophy, he hath lost whatever he might have otherwise pretended to, by breaking the bonds of brotherly charity and ecclesiastical unity; unless you can think him a bishop, who, when another was ordained so by sixteen of his brethren bishops, would obtrude upon the church a spurious and foreign bishop, ordained by a parcel of renegadoes and deserters, and that by canvassing and intriguing for it. And, whereas there was one church appointed by Christ throughout the world, though divided into many members, and one episcopate, whereof divers bishops, spread over the face of the whole earth, and acting together with a harmonious concert, are severally partakers; he, notwithstanding the tradition to this purpose derived from God, and notwithstanding the unity of the church, which is everywhere maintained so firmly, is now attempting to form a church of a mere human model; and accordingly, he dispatches his new apostles to divers cities, in order to lay the foundations of his new-fangled economy. Whereas, moreover, in each city of every province there are bishops ordained; venerable for their age, untainted in their principles, approved in the day of trial and adversity, and outlawed in the time of persecution; *he* is so daring and adventurous as to constitute over their heads a set of spurious pretending bishops; as if he were able to carry his new attempt through the whole Christian world, by obstinately persisting in it; or could break asunder the well-compacted joints of the body of the church, by scattering his seeds of discord in it. He considers not the usual process of schismatics, who in their first attempts are always most impetuous; but can seldom make any great increase, nor improve upon such rash beginnings; instead of it, they usually fall away, and their rival pretensions come all to nothing."—*Ib.*, sec. 2.

Again he says: "There is one God, and one Christ, and one church, and but one episcopal chair, originally founded on Peter,

by our Lord's authority. There cannot, therefore, be erected another altar, or another priesthood constituted, besides this one altar, and one priesthood already constituted and created."—Epist. 43, sec. 3.

In the last quotation the father evidently means by the "one episcopal chair founded on Peter," the chair of the regular canonical bishop of the see. As his whole argument shows, he could not have referred to St. Peter's supremacy according to the Romish dogma which was subsequently erected into an article of faith.

Novatian was ordained bishop by three Italian bishops. He was chargeable with no heresy, only differing from *Cornelius*, who had been previously ordained bishop of Rome, in some matters of discipline. But he was ordained *bishop of Rome* when that see had been already assigned to another. It is, as we have seen, upon this ground alone that St. Cyprian denounces him. Now upon a careful inspection of the history of the Romish usurpation in England, who does not see that the Novatian bishops were by far the most regular and canonical? For *one* of the irregularities, which we have shown is most marked in the case of *Augustin*, St. Cyprian pronounces Novatian "no bishop—a profane person—an alien—not in the church of Christ—no Christian—a spurious and foreign bishop—the whole action being a perfect nullity." This is a sentence of condemnation which falls in its full force upon "the apostle of Britain." This "bishop of bishops—spurious and foreign bishop," is the father of the English ordinations, and no doubt must be entertained of his being in the regular succession, although, according to Cyprian, he is "not in the church of Christ—no Christian," and his ordinations "a perfect nullity." Is not this "the true apostolical succession" with a vengeance!

Having now disposed of the British line, let us next look after that of "Gaul." In a note (p. 92) with the letters J. M. W. at the bottom, which are Dr. Wainwright's initials, we have a list of names said to be the succession of bishops from St. John through the bishops of Lyons to ÆTHERIUS, who, it is presumed, assisted the archbishop of Arles in the ordination of Augustin. If all this were veritable history it would in no way affect the objection brought against the validity of the English orders on the ground of the canons, as heretofore urged. For the union of five hundred lines in one man would never authorize him, according to the patristic and high-church doctrine of the independence of bishops, to take possession of another bishop's diocese. But we will now attempt to show that this branch of the succession is entirely supposititious.

In the first place, we see no evidence that the bishop of Lyons had a hand in the ordination of Augustin. In the letter of Pope Gregory to *Eulogius*, it is said that Augustin was ordained by "the bishops of *Germany*, to whom he had given leave." "The venerable Bede" says he was ordained by the archbishop of Arles. Baronius is confounded between these two high authorities, and falls into the inconsistency of sanctioning both. And Du Pin says he "was ordained by the bishops of France." Moreover, Pope Gregory, Baronius, and Du Pin date the time of Augustin's ordination before he visited Britain, while Bede, Baronius, (for here Baronius is against Baronius,) Collier, and the whole of the English ecclesiastical historians, say he first preached in Britain, converted and baptized a multitude of heathen Saxons, and then went over to France, and was ordained by the archbishop of Arles by the pope's order. Now what is to be done? This is the state of the great authorities; and yet our high-churchmen speak with the assurance of truth and almost of inspiration. Mr. Chapman says, "Augustin was consecrated by *Virgilius*, twenty-fourth bishop of Arles, assisted by *Ætherius*, thirty-first bishop of Lyons, A. D. 596," and refers to Bede and others in proof, albeit Bede says no such thing; but, on the contrary, makes Ætherius archbishop of Arles. Bede's words are: "In the mean time, Augustin repaired to Arles, and, pursuant to the orders received from the holy father Gregory, was ordained archbishop of the English nation, by Ætherius, archbishop of that city."—*Historia Ecclesiastica*, cap. xxii.

Again, this great historian gives us a letter which he says Pope Gregory "directed to Virgilius, *successor* to Ætherius."—*Ibid.*, cap. xxviii.

So that this Ætherius, who was, according to Mr. Chapman and Dr. Wainwright, "bishop of Lyons," according to Bede, the best authority in the case, was archbishop of Arles, and predecessor of Virgilius.

Dr. Wainwright gives us the catena of names through the several lines of succession, "taken," as he says, "from a very excellent tract, 'A Letter to a Methodist, by a Presbyter of the Diocese of Maryland;'" and in relation to the authorities upon which the truthfulness of this catalogue depends, he says, "The genuineness and authenticity of the records are as susceptible of proof as the genuineness and authenticity of the books of the New Testament." —P. 93, note.

We are a little sorry the learned doctor has satisfied himself with quoting an *anonymous tract* in a matter of this importance.

Surely if Dr. W. knows that the "records" upon which he relies are so *genuine* and *authentic*, that they are equal in this respect to the "books of the New Testament," he must have consulted them, and we should think ought to be able to produce them, and to make out his case from these "records" themselves. Why is he so sparing of his pains? The fact is, he amuses his readers with mere fiction. We invite the doctor to quote his original authorities. We doubt as to the existence of any such "records." Let the learned gentleman produce them if he can, and not impose upon his readers by quoting the results as found in a "tract," written by nobody knows who. As to "Percival on the Apostolic Succession," to whom he makes a running reference, he touches not the point. He indeed confesses the "demonstration" of the succession impossible; and proceeds with a course of moral reasoning upon the subject, aiming at nothing higher than "probable evidence." But Dr. Wainwright, far more wise, having been enlightened into the mysteries of antiquity by a "tract—A Letter to a Methodist," where he finds a perfect "list" of bishops from "St. John" through "Lyons" to the first archbishop of Canterbury, has the "demonstration" before him, as authentic and genuine "as the books of the New Testament." If "the records" upon which rest "the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament" were found as self-contradictory and doubtful, and anywhere near as far short of having obtained "unanimous consent" as "the records" upon which depends the truth of this "list," Christianity would have been extinct long since, and Dr. W. might now have been a heathen priest instead of a presbyter of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

Before we leave this part of the subject, we must notice a curious gloss in the "Appendix." In the paragraph entitled the "Fourth, or Roman Period of Usurpation," the learned writer—either Dr. Wainwright or his "friend"—remarks: "Augustin himself was not consecrated at Rome, but at Arles, the bishop of Lyons, *a Greek*, and not a Romish colony, assisting." Was "the *bishop* of Lyons a Greek and not a Romish *colony?*" or if he means that "Lyons" was "a Greek and not a Romish colony," then did this "Greek *colony*" *assist* in the consecration of Augustin? What profound wisdom is here! Who can fathom it? But supposing we were to succeed in spelling out the meaning of this foggy sentence, and should find it to mean that Lyons was a Greek colony, and the bishop of Lyons assisted in the ordination of Augustin—ergo what? Why, clearly and conclusively does this prove, that the ordination of Augustin comes down through the "Greek and not the Romish"

line. Admirable logic this! Now supposing it be true that Lyons or Arles was settled originally with Greeks, (into the fact we need not inquire for the present,) what then? Mr. Chapman very properly tells us, "if we wish to trace back the authority of the present bishops, we must go in the line of the *consecrators*."—*Prim. Church*, p. 268. And can Dr. W. assure us that "the consecrators" of the bishops of this "Greek colony" were none of them Romish bishops? We hope the learned doctor will resume the subject, and reperuse his anonymous tract, and see if the author has not made the matter entirely clear. According to all "the records" which we have at hand, Augustin was ordained "pursuant to St. Gregory's orders."* So that if he were ordained by the archbishop of Arles alone, or assisted by the bishop of Lyons, or, as Gregory says, by the German bishops, the case is the same. In either case, the ordainer, or ordainers, received their authority and orders from Pope Gregory. The supposition of the independence of the bishop of Lyons—of his being a Greek, and adhering to the customs of the Greek Church, and yet being under the control of the Pope, and assisting in ordaining one of his missionaries to convert over to Romanism churches which observed the Greek method of celebrating Easter—is too absurd to be entertained for a moment.

All the bishops and archbishops of Great Britain, (with perhaps one exception,) subsequent to the days of Augustin, down to the reign of *Edward VI.*, were ordained in Rome, or somewhere upon the continent, either by the pope or his legates. After the conquest, the bishops were mostly foreigners, so that the *foreign taint* had been pouring into the English succession in an uninterrupted stream from the commencement of the seventh century until the Reformation began in England in the sixteenth. The clearest evidence of this is found in Bishop *Godwin's Lives of the English Bishops.* Those who cannot have access to this work, it being very rare, may find the results of Mr. *Powell's* examination of it in his unanswerable treatise on the Apostolical Succession, published by Lane & Tippett, 200 Mulberry street, New-York, pp. 145–147.

The English succession is wholly and entirely from Rome. *Augustin* was a servant of the pope, ordained upon the continent, and instead of thenceforward holding the exclusive right of ordination in his line, the pope continued for centuries, as we have seen, to interpose his own ordinations, in order to hold the English bishops to a strict accountability to himself, and to make them feel their absolute dependence. So that if Augustin's ordinations had

* See Collier's Eccl. Hist. of Great Britain, p. 157.

been strictly canonical, his line of succession was crowded out and superseded by that of the popes. The English succession, then, is Romish, and only Romish, and will be nothing else *world without end!* and that succession, according to the canons and the holy fathers, is wholly without authority or validity in Great Britain.

The popes were a race of simonists—scarcely is there an exception for nine hundred years preceding the Reformation. And for nearly that length of time the English bishops purchased their sees with money. *Godwin* represents Peckham, who was created archbishop of Canterbury, A. D. 1278, as calling Pope Nicholas III. his "*creator*," and as making to his highness the following complaint: "Truly a writ of *execution*, *horrible* to be seen, and *terrible* to be heard, has lately reached me, declaring, that except I answer to it within a month after the feast of St. Michael, by paying into the hands of the merchants of Lucca the sum of four thousand marks, *according to my bargain with the court of Rome*, I am then *to be excommunicated*, and am to be *cursed* in my own and other principal churches, with BELL, BOOK, and CANDLE."—P. 245.

Again, says Mr. Powell, "The English bishops *regularly traded with* ROME *in simoniacal traffic;* evidence enough of this is found in Bishop Godwin's Lives of the English Prelates. The court of Rome *sold everything*. 'Sometimes,' says Godwin, 'those who had purchased, were, by a fraudulent clause in a subsequent bull, thrown out of their purchase.' It was then sold to a second huckster, and the pope received double. P. 106. John of Oxford, bishop of Winchester, paid six thousand marks to the pope for his consecration, and the same sum to Jordan, the pope's chancelor. P. 222. Greenfield, archbishop of York, was two years before he could obtain his confirmation and consecration from the pope, and then he paid nine thousand five hundred marks for the favor. P. 685. When Moreton became archbishop of Canterbury, Bishop Godwin says, 'He spunged from the bishops of the provinces a large amount of money, compelling them, by the authority of the pope, to bear the cost of his translation to that see—to the amount of fifteen thousand pounds.' P. 131."—*Apost. Suc.*, pp. 247, 248.

Here the *apostolical canons* again strike out a multitude of links from the English succession.

As to the canon which forbids taking possession of a diocese by the intervention of the civil power, we may say it has been, both in Rome and England, always totally disregarded. The proof we need not here adduce. And as to the one which requires a bishop "who does not undertake the ministry" to "be excommunicated,"

it has been held in equally low estimation for many centuries, both in Italy and Great Britain. If the multitudes of "unpreaching prelates" who have disgraced both the Roman and Anglican Churches could be named, they would present a fearful array. Many of the successors of *preaching* Paul and Peter *never preach at all!* And though, according to the "apostolical canons," such are to be "excommunicated," in the Churches of Rome and England these unworthy functionaries are employed almost wholly in excommunicating others—yea, all who assume to call in question their ghostly authority.

Now let it be observed, that these very *canons* constitute the strongest and best authority which high-churchmen bring from antiquity for diocesan episcopacy. And the better sort of Episcopalians, ever since the days of Cranmer, have opposed presbyterial ordination merely upon the ground of its *irregularity*. The ancient canons of the Catholic Church, they say, confine the power of conferring orders to bishops—these canons, though they are not of divine authority, show what was the *usage* of the primitive church—that usage, it is probable, was of apostolical origin—therefore it is safest and best to follow canonical order in the ordination of ministers. Episcopacy resting upon this ground is merely a *venerable* institution, and should not be lightly rejected. But what we would principally insist upon here is, that the same respect should be awarded one of these canons which is bestowed upon another. And if Protestant churches are to be cast off as "mere human societies" because they do not follow the canons in some particulars, how can the *Catholic* churches stand which discard these same canons in an equal number of particulars; and, as we must think, in particulars of still greater importance to the purity of the church? If the Roman and Anglican Catholics take the liberty to dispense with the canons of the early councils whenever it suits their convenience to do so, can they consistently adjudge us heretics for following their example in a point in which we think the councils departed from the written word? And if our Catholics are evidently *irregular*, and the evangelical churches *no more* than irregular, where is the ground of quarrel? Are they *true churches*, and we mere "societies?" If Dr. Wainwright will enter the lists with us, we pledge ourselves to prove that the *Catholic churches*, so called, have ever been more *irregular*, taking the canons in question as the standard of church order, than all the various orthodox Protestant "sects" put together; that there is a wider difference between this primitive standard and the past and present usages of the prelatical churches, than can be shown to exist be-

tween this standard and the multiform usages of the whole mass of "dissenting churches." We will meet him upon this proposition as soon as he pleases, taking the affirmative ourselves without the least difficulty as to the etiquet of the discussion.

A brief examination of the Romish line will close our notice of this subject. Though Dr. Wainwright has several expedients to get up a succession "distinct from that of the Church of Rome, extending up to the apostles," (see p. 92,) still, lest there may be some mistake about it, he must, after all, acknowledge the Romish succession "apostolical." For if the other strings to his bow should fail him, he can play the tune of apostolical succession through on this one. Well, let us see how well this will serve him.

We object to the validity of this line of succession on account of the enormous wickedness of the popes and the Romish bishops generally through the space of eight centuries preceding the days of the Reformation.

If we understand the Catholic theory—Anglican and Roman—it is this: When Christ commissioned his apostles, he gave them power to impart a saving virtue to the sacraments, and to transmit the same power to their successors, by the imposition of hands. This power consists in the actual reception of the Holy Ghost through the hands of the ordainer, when he says, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," &c. Now we hold it as absurd to suppose, that those who do not so much as know whether there be any Holy Ghost—who cannot themselves be under his influence—can authoritatively impart the Holy Ghost to others. St. Paul says, in relation to the divine commission, "We have this treasure in earthen vessels," but he does not say this treasure is deposited in *leaky* or *broken* vessels. The functions of the ministry, according to this theory, are far too high and awful. We do not believe God has committed to human hands the power to make the ordinances *saving*, or to *give the Holy Ghost* to others, by the imposition of hands. But suppose this power to be given to an *office*, and to be necessarily inherent in it, without any regard to the character of the holder, is a gross libel upon the Christian system, and an insult to its divine Author. If this dogma were anywhere written in the New Testament, we should be obliged to receive it or reject revelation. But as it is a mere theory, nowhere authorized in the word of God, we may look critically into its philosophy and practical bearings. Is there not an *a priori* objection to the idea of committing the destinies of the church and the salvation of souls to a mere *office*, which may be, and often has been, held by infidels,

and all sorts of abominable sinners? Is this the system which claims to be founded in "the wisdom of God," and commends itself to "every man's conscience in the sight of God?" This objection, in substance, being urged by Dr. Potts, is met by Dr. Wainwright's note-writer thus:—

"These instances are simply examples of bad men, who were destitute of the *inward and spiritual grace*. We can, of course, insist upon the outward sign only, because there are doubtless many hypocrites who die undetected. If it be not so, all the ministrations of hypocritical and bad ministers are invalid; and then no one knows whether he is baptized, has communed, &c., &c. So Dr. Potts is trying to prove too much."—P. 127.

This is a mere evasion. The objection does not rest upon the *hypocrisy*, the *undeveloped corruptions* of the ordainers in the Romish succession, but upon the *outward immoralities*, the *gross wickedness* of these men. Now let Dr. Wainwright and his note-writer meet the question fairly, and avow what their theory plainly implies—that a known adulterer, robber, and murderer may hold a commission from Christ to give the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands. We acknowledge the ordinances valid, if properly received, when administered by "hypocrites who die undetected," and indeed when they are detected *before they die*, if *at the time* their wickedness had not come to light. But this is entirely a different case from the one alledged. There the gross wickedness of the administrator is known to the receiver, to the church (if a church it may be called) with whom he stands connected, and to the world. What if Christ had chosen for his apostles twelve such men as the twelve worst popes of the middle ages? Would his religion have been considered a holy religion? How long would it have survived? Well, what is the difference between his selecting such men originally, and his settling the discipline of his church upon a basis which would subject it to the same state of things? If the apostolical grace now depends not at all upon the piety or outward morality of the administrator, how came it to have been a law, everywhere recognized by Christ and his apostles, that a minister of Christ must be pure—must keep himself unspotted from the world? In the character of a bishop given by St. Paul in his epistles to Timothy and Titus, we hear nothing of the necessity of the imposition of apostolic hands, but much is said of certain great *moral* qualifications. If then we follow the Scripture rule in relation to the essential prerequisites of the apostolical commission, why dispense with the Scripture qualifications, and adopt those which all admit are not explicitly asserted in the Scriptures? Is not this

elevating a mere outward circumstance above the great moral qualifications of the Bible? Is it not preferring the traditions of men to the unerring voice of inspiration? Paul says, "A bishop must be blameless, the husband of one wife, vigilant, sober, of good behavior, given to hospitality, apt to teach, not given to wine, no striker, not greedy of filthy lucre; but patient, not a brawler, not covetous—not a novice. Moreover he must have a good report of them which are without, lest he fall into reproach, and the snare of the devil." 1 Tim. iii, 2–7. But Dr. W. acknowledges those to be true bishops of the apostolical succession who were *not* "blameless"—who had *no* "wife," but *many concubines*—were *not* "vigilant," but "dumb dogs, lying down, loving to slumber"—*not* "sober," but abominable, filthy drunkards—*not* "of good behavior," but every way irregular and disorderly—*not* "given to hospitality," but notoriously selfish and inhuman—*not* "apt to teach," but not able to teach at all, because they were uninstructed themselves—"given to wine, strikers, greedy of filthy lucre"—*not* "patient," but most resentful and angry—"brawlers," "covetous," "novices"—having a most *evil* "report of them which are without." Now we pledge ourselves to prove that each and all of these characteristics were found in the life and manners of the great mass of the Romish clergy, and eminently so in those of bishops and popes of the Romish Church for several centuries prior to the Reformation. And these are the bishops—apostles—of the church of Christ, who have the fearful power of "binding and loosing—of forgiving and retaining sins!" These are the legitimate successors of the apostles! "Episcopal grace" comes through these hands!—through their *hands*, to be sure, never touching the moral man, for it would be an insult to Christianity to say that *grace* of any kind ever reached their *hearts*. In the theory here opposed, then, we recognize a principle at war with Scripture, reason, and common sense; and we shall now prove that the church authorities regard it in the same light. The following is taken from the Homily "Concerning the Holy Ghost."

"Now to leave their doctrine, and to come to other points. What shall we think or judge of the pope's intolerable pride? The Scripture saith, that *God resisteth the proud, and showeth grace to the humble.* Also pronounceth them blessed *which are poor in spirit*, promising that they which humble themselves shall be exalted. And Christ our Saviour willeth all his to learn of him, *because he is humble and meek.* As for pride St. Gregory saith, it is the root of all mischief. And St. Augustine's judgment is this, that it maketh men devils. Can any man then, which either hath or shall read the popes' lives, justly say that they had the Holy Ghost within them? First, as touching that they will be

termed universal bishops and heads of all Christian churches through the world; we have the judgment of Gregory expressly against them; who, writing to Mauritius the emperor, condemneth John, bishop of Constantinople, in that behalf, calling him the prince of pride, Lucifer's successor, and the forerunner of antichrist. St. Bernard also agreeing thereunto, saith, What greater pride can there be, than that one man should prefer his own judgment before the whole congregation, as though he only had the Spirit of God? And Chrysostom pronounceth a terrible sentence against them, affirming plainly, that whosoever seeketh to be chief in earth shall find confusion in heaven; and that he which striveth for the supremacy shall not be reputed among the servants of Christ. Again he saith, to desire a good work, it is good; but to covet the chief degree of honor, it is mere vanity. Do not these places sufficiently convince their outrageous pride, in usurping to themselves a superiority above all other, as well ministers and bishops, as kings also and emperors? But as the lion is known by his claws, so let us learn to know these men by their deeds. What shall we say of him that made the noble king Dandalus to be tied by the neck with a chain, and to lie flat down before his table, there to gnaw bones like a dog? Shall we think that he had God's Holy Spirit within him, and not rather the spirit of the devil? Such a tyrant was Pope Clement the Sixth. What shall we say of him that proudly and contemptuously trod Frederic the emperor under his feet, applying that verse of the Psalm unto himself, *Thou shalt go upon the lion and the adder, the young lion and the dragon thou shalt tread under thy foot?* Shall we say that he had God's Holy Spirit within him, and not rather the spirit of the devil? Such a tyrant was Pope Alexander the Third. What shall we say of him that armed and animated the son against the father, causing him to be taken, and to be cruelly famished to death, contrary to the law both of God, and also of nature? Shall we say that he had God's Holy Spirit within him, and not rather the spirit of the devil? Such a tyrant was Pope Pascal the Second. What shall we say of him that came into his popedom like a fox, that reigned like a lion, and died like a dog? Shall we say that he had God's Holy Spirit within him, and not rather the spirit of the devil? Such a tyrant was Pope Boniface the Eighth. What shall we say of him that made Henry the emperor, with his wife and his young child, to stand at the gates of the city in the rough winter, bare footed and bare legged, only clothed in linsey woolsey, eating nothing from morning to night, and that for the space of three days? Shall we say that he had God's Holy Spirit within him, and not rather the spirit of the devil? Such a tyrant was Pope Hildebrand, most worthy to be called a firebrand, if we shall term him as he hath best deserved. Many other examples might here be alledged: as of Pope Joan the harlot, that was delivered of a child in the high street, going solemnly in procession; of Pope Julius the Second, that wilfully cast St. Peter's keys into the river Tiberis; of Pope Urban the Sixth, that caused five cardinals to be put in sacks, and cruelly drowned; of Pope Sergius the Third, that persecuted the dead body of Formosus his predecessor, when it had been buried eight years; of Pope John, the Fourteenth of that name, who having his enemy delivered into his hands,

caused him first to be stripped stark naked, his beard to be shaven, and to be hung up a whole day by the hair, then to be set upon an ass with his face backward toward the tail, to be carried round about the city in despite, to be miserably beaten with rods; last of all, to be thrust out of his country, and to be banished for ever. But to conclude, and make an end, ye shall briefly take this short lesson: wheresoever ye find the spirit of arrogance and pride, the spirit of envy, hatred, contention, cruelty, murder, extortion, witchcraft, necromancy, &c., assure yourselves that there is the spirit of the devil, and not of God, albeit they pretend outwardly to the world never so much holiness. For as the gospel teacheth us, the Spirit of Jesus is a good Spirit, a Holy Spirit, a sweet Spirit, a lowly Spirit, a merciful Spirit, full of charity and love, full of forgiveness and pity, not rendering evil for evil, extremity for extremity, but overcoming evil with good, and remitting all offense even from the heart. According to which rule, if any man live uprightly, of him it may be safely pronounced, that he hath the Holy Ghost within him: if not, then it is a plain token that he doth usurp the name of the Holy Ghost in vain. Therefore, dearly beloved, according to the good counsel of St. John, *Believe not every spirit, but first try them whether they be of God or no. Many shall come in my name*, saith Christ, *and shall transform themselves into angels of light, deceiving (if it be possible) the very elect.* They shall come unto you in sheep's clothing, being inwardly cruel and ravening wolves. They shall have an outward show of great holiness and innocency of life, so that ye shall hardly or not at all discern them. But the rule that ye must follow is this, *To judge them by their fruits;* which if they be wicked and naught, then it is unpossible that the tree of whom they proceed should be good. Such were all the popes and prelates of Rome for the most part, as doth well appear in the story of their lives, and therefore they are worthily accounted among the number of false prophets, and false Christs, which deceived the world a long while. The Lord of heaven and earth defend us from their tyranny and pride, that they never enter into his vineyard again, to the disturbance of his silly poor flock; but that they may be utterly confounded and put to flight in all parts of the world: and he of his great mercy so work in all men's hearts, by the mighty power of the Holy Ghost, that the comfortable gospel of his Son Christ may be truly preached, truly received, and truly followed in all places, to the beating down of sin, death, the pope, the devil, and all the kingdom of antichrist, that like scattered and dispersed sheep, being at length gathered into one fold, we may in the end rest all together in the bosom of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, there to be partakers of eternal and everlasting life, through the merits and death of Jesus Christ our Saviour. *Amen.*"

Now could these monsters in wickedness, who, as the homily truly urges, "had not God's Spirit within them, but rather the spirit of the devil," could they give the Holy Ghost to others? could they give what they had not? Are these men—with "Pope Joan the harlot"—*the apostles of the Catholic Church?* Alas! alas! if this be so.—We might show up this matter of the corruptions of the

Romish succession, from the best authorities, to any extent. But we must leave the subject here. He who wishes more full proof upon this subject may consult *Platina's*, *Welch's*, *Bower's*, and *Ranke's* Lives of the Popes, or the works of Bishops *Jewel* and *Taylor*, where he will be amply satisfied.

In the next place we urge, that the Romish catalogues are not at all reliable,—they are often evidently fictitious, absurd, and self-contradictory.

We may prove this position from what we find in Romish writers in relation to the famous Joan, the female pope. As to name and date, there is no pope for several centuries more clearly identified by Romish writers. In an old Latin copy of the Lives of the Popes, by *Platina*—himself a faithful servant of the pope—and dedicating his work to Sixtus IV., "A. D. 1681," we have the Life of Pope "*Ioannes VIII.*" (A. D. 854) between *Leo IV.* and *Benedict III.* "This story," he says, "I have related barely and in short, lest I should seem obstinate and pertinacious if I had omitted what is so generally talked; I had better mistake with the rest of the world; though it be certain, that what I have related may be thought not altogether incredible."*

* We here give, for the benefit of the scholar, the whole story, which he will agree with us would scarcely be suitable for the public eye in a literal translation.

"IOANNES VIII.

"Ioannes Anglicus, ex Maguntiaco oriundus, malis artibus (ut aiunt) pontificatum adeptus est. Mentitus enim sexum, cum fœmina esset, adolescens admodum Athenas cum amatore viro docto proficiscitur: ibique præceptores bonarum artium audiendo tatum profecit, ut Romam veniens, paucos admodum etiam in sacris litteris pares haberet, ne dum superiores. Legendo autem et disputando docte et acute, tantum benevolentiæ et auctoritatis sibi comparavit, ut mortuo Leone in ejus locum (ut Martinus ait) omnium consensu pontifex crearetur. Verum postea a servo compressa, cum aliquamdiu occulte ventrem tulisset, tandem, dum ad Latheranensem basilicam proficisceretur, inter theatrum (quod Colossenum vocant a Neronis colosso) et sanctum Clementem, doloribus circumnenta peperit: eoque loci mortua, pontificatus sui anno secundo, mense uno, diebusquattuor, sine ullo honore sepelitur. Sunt qui ob hæc scribant, pontificem ipsum, quando ad Lateranensem basilicam proficiscitur, detestandi facinoris causa, et viam illam consulto declinare, et ejusdem vitandi erroris causa, dum primo in sede Petri collocatur, ad eam rem perforata, genitalia ab ultimo diacono attrectari. De primo non abnuerim, de secundo ita sentio, sedem ilam ob id paratam esse, ut qui in tanto magustatu constituitur, sciat se non Deum, sed hominem esse; et necessitatibus naturæ, ut pote egerendi subjectom esse, unde merito stercoraria sedes vocatur. Hæc, quæ dixi, vulgo feruntur, incertistamen et obscuris auctoribus: quæ ideo ponere breviter et nude institui, ne obstinate nimium et pertinaciter omisisse videar, quod fere omnes affirmant: erremus etiam nos hac in re cum vulgo, quaquam appareat, ea quæ dixi, ex his esse, quæ fieri posse creduntur. Sunt qui dicant, hujus temporibus beati Vincentii corpus e Valentia citerioris Hispaniæ civitate, a quodam monacho in pagum Albiensem ulterioris Galliæ deportatum. Dicunt præterea, Lotharium jam

Onuphrius, the commentator and continuator of *Platina*, tries various expedients to get rid of this story. His first objection is substantially repeated by Harding in opposition to Bishop Jewel, thus: "Though men had at that time been so far bewitched and distracted of their wits as they could not have known a woman from a man, (which no wise man, I mean, believeth,) yet it is not to be thought that God himself, who appointed and ordained the see of Peter, whereof he would the whole church to be directed, would depart so far from his merciful providence toward the church, as to suffer the same to be polluted by a woman, which is not of capacity for holy orders."

To this Bishop Jewel replies in this straight-forward old-fashioned style: "This guess, M. Harding, presumeth over far of God's providence. And therefore Antoninus the archbishop of Florence, when he had opened this whole story of *Pope Joan*, being offended with the strangeness and admiration of the matter, could not refrain himself from crying out, 'O the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how inscrutable are his judgments.' And why might not *Pope Joan* have as good right and interest unto the see of Rome as afterward had *Pope John XIII.*, who, being pope, had wicked company with two of his own sisters; or others, whom for their horrible vices and wickedness Platina calls *monsters against kind, and ill-shapen creatures? Luitprandus* saith, as it is before reported, '*The Pope's palace of Lateran in Rome is now become a stew of harlots.*'" Now how much more injury could be inflicted upon 'the seat of Peter' by *Pope Joan* than by many male popes who have occupied it is certainly worthy of inquiry, before we yield to the objection.

Onuphrius also objects that *Anastasius*, who lived at this time, and gives an account of the death of *Leo*, and the elevation of *Benedict*, is silent about *Pope Joan*.

Rainulphus, in his *Polychronican*, gives us the reason why the historians of the time omitted it: "*procter turpitudinem rei*—the vileness of the thing" Be this as it may, we have strong Roman Catholic authority for this piece of history. *Martinus Palonus*, who was penitentiary to *Nicholas* the Third, and afterward archbishop of Casensa—*Marianus Scotus*, A. D. 1080, a monk and a chronicler upon whom the Romanists have placed much dependence in dating their councils—*Sigbert*, abbot of Gemblaus, who

grandem natu, sumpto monachorum habitu, filium Ludovicum imperatorem reliquisse, qui statim in Germaniam provinciam rediens, omnes ad arma spectantes sua præsentia in officio continuit."—*Historia B. Platinæ de vitis pontificum Romanorum*, pp. 133, 134.

lived A. D. 1100—*Petrarch*, who lived in the fourteenth century, and many others, give the account as veritable history. After an examination of the whole matter, Bishop Jewel makes up the account thus:—

"But let truth be falsehood, and let stories be fable. Yet M. Harding, it may please you to remember, that the same *fable* was raised in *Rome*, and from thence only, and from no place else, was published abroad into the world. But let the pope's own *secretaries* and all the people there be deceived; and, to shadow the shame of that see, let *Rome* itself be the *mother of lies*. Let no man know the certain truth of matters, but only *Onuphrius*, the pope's parasite, and M. Harding. Yet neither would so many chronicles have recorded, nor would the whole world so universally have believed these things of the popes, more than of any other bishops, had there not been wonderful corruption of manners, and dissolution of life, and open horror, and filthiness in that *only see*, above all others.

"Howbeit, good Christian reader, that thou mayst well and clearly understand that our dealing herein is plain and simple, and that we have not imagined these matters, or any parcel thereof ourselves, may it please thee to read *Platina in Iohanne VIII.*; *Sabellicus, Enneadis* 9, lib. 1; *Leonicus Chalcocondyla*, a Greek writer, lib. 6; *Marianus Scotus*, that lived about the year of our Lord 1028; *Sigibertus Gemblacensis*, that lived about the year of our Lord 1100; *Martinus Polonus*, the pope's penitentiary, whom M. Harding so much defaceth, that lived about the year of our Lord 1320; *Ravisius Texton in Officina, Ca. Fœminæ habitum verilem mentilæ; Antoninus*, the archbishop of Florence, part 2, tit. 16; *Volaterranus; Nauclerus; Carion; Constantius Phrygio; Christianus Massæus; Matthæus Palmerius Florentinus; Anselmus Rid; Johannes Parisiensis*, cap. 20; *Supplementa Chronicarum; Chronica Chronicarum; Fasciculus temporum*, and others more. Of these some lived four hundred, some five hundred years ago; and have ever been counted worthy of some authority. Notwithstanding, for your *dame Joan's* sake, you, M. Harding, begin now to clip their credit. Howbeit, whatsoever they were, certain it is they were no *Lutherans*. All these with one consent agree together, that *dame Joan was pope of Rome*."—*Defense*, p. 352.

Here is a strong array of *Roman Catholic* authorities in favor of the fact of a *female pope*. We do not pretend to say that the evidence is conclusive, indeed we doubt whether it is sufficiently sustained. *Blondel* and *Bower*, two great Protestant writers, have investigated the matter more fully than any others, and come to the

conclusion that the story is fabulous. Their conclusions are based upon the want of contemporaneous history, the first notice taken of it being by an author who lived some two hundred years after the event is said to have transpired. *Bower*, however, says, what no one denies, that "the female pope owes her existence and her promotion to the *Roman* Catholics themselves; for by them the fable was invented, was published to the world by their priests and monks before the Reformation, and was credited, upon their authority, even by those who were most zealously attached to the holy see, and among the rest by *St. Antoninus*, archbishop of *Florence*, nor did they begin to confute it till Protestants reproached them with it, as reflecting great dishonor upon the see of St. Peter."—*History of the Popes.*

The case then is this. There is given in the chronicles to which recourse is had for the Romish succession, written by the "priests and monks" of the Church of Rome—credited and related by the high functionaries of that church, *archbishops* and *penitentiaries*, and *universally* believed for the space of *five hundred years*—the name of a female pope—fictitious, if you please—who is said to have reigned about *two years and a half* and *ordained bishops!* Thus we have the "quod ab omnibus" evidence for five centuries to a female link in the succession which Catholics—*Roman* and *Anglican*—now laugh at as a fable of the monks. Now let the reader not forget that it is to these very chroniclers that our successionists go to identify each link of the Romish succession for at least the space of eight centuries! Doubtless all their "records"—excepting that of "*dame Joan*"—"are as susceptible of proof as the genuineness and authenticity of the books of the New Testament!" Dr. Wainwright being the judge.

We will close what we have to say upon this matter with a brief notice of the explanation of the origin of the story given by *Onuphrius*. He thinks the tale arose from the fact that Pope John the Twelfth had many concubines, and among them *Joan*. He was made pope at the age of *twelve years*, and was so governed in all he did by "*dame Joan*," that perhaps in derision the name of this woman was given to her obsequious paramour. And hence, says the learned apologist for the pope, "some idle head or other invented this tale of her." This then is the version of a learned Romish historian. A licentious boy of twelve years old, who has "many concubines," is so entirely under the dictation of one of them in particular, as that he is called by her name! All that he did being known to be done by the dictation of a "concubine" named "Joan," he is called "Pope Joan!" A vast improvement this! No doubt

Dr. Wainwright and his note-writer will think that the succession is quite safe coming through "John the Twelfth," though it would be somewhat doubtful had it really come through "Joan," though, for our part, if the history of Joan were well authenticated, we should think her far the more competent of the two.

We have had two objects in view in this discussion. The first is that we may show how little authority is due to the Romish chronicles for several centuries; and the second, to put the case of the "female pope" upon its true basis before our readers. Having said all that is necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes, we now leave the subject.

We shall now pass to a few miscellaneous matters, and shall then dismiss this pamphlet, without pretending to notice a tithe of its objectionable features.

It is remarkable that the note-writer, who takes frequent notice of the Methodists, though he sometimes classes them with "Mormons," and all sorts of fanatics, still arrays them against the Presbyterians, on the side of *Episcopalians*. Now we protest against this classification. The Methodists, in this country, have adopted an episcopal form of government, as, according to Archbishop Whately, they had a perfect right to do. But Methodist episcopacy is based upon, and grows out of, the *presbytery*. It is an *official* relation concerted for the harmonious action of the great itinerant scheme, and the better government of the church. But it claims no *divine right* or *apostolical succession*, as these things are understood by high-churchmen, for its basis. In the great controversy between Presbyterians and Episcopalians, upon apostolical succession, we symbolize with the former and not with the latter. Our episcopacy is not antagonistic to presbyterianism as we understand it, but is the very modification of it which *Baxter*, *Gillespie*, and many of the reformers, seemed to have in their conceptions, but did not realize in history. An exception to this remark, perhaps, should be made of the German Lutherans, who have a *superintendency*, or an *episcopacy*, somewhat similar to ours. We are not, then, to be ranked among *Episcopalians*, when the great essential elements of their creed, episcopacy *jure divino*, and a *personal succession of bishops from the apostles only having the right of ordination*, are taken into account. We are at war with these principles, not because we *would* have, but *cannot* obtain, what our successionists call "a legitimate episcopacy;" but because we believe this episcopacy to be contrary to Scripture, and destructive of true Christian unity. No, gentlemen; we do not want your "succession." We would not thank you for it. We

reject it as a usurpation, and would in no case *descend* to accept it at your hands. We understand what our note-writer means by "the wishes of the Methodists, who would have it if they could, and might if they would."—P. 12. Now, dear Mr. "Antisectarian," we wish you to understand, if indeed you are capable of learning anything, that "the Methodists" have no "wishes" for *your* "episcopacy," even "if they could" have it without price; and though they knew very well, before they were told by you, that they "might if they would" *join your church*, and come under the jurisdiction of your episcopacy, they will not be very likely to avail themselves of that *gracious* proffer. They have a *legitimate, Scriptural, primitive* episcopacy, and they have no itching to exchange it for one whose highest boast is that it is in the line of *Roman popes*.

The oft-repeated proposition that the "dogma," that "there can be no church without a bishop," was universally received in the church for fifteen hundred years, we meet with a flat contradiction. What can our high-churchmen do with this plain declaration of *Tertullian?* "*Sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici—Moreover, where there are three, there is a church, although they be laymen.*"* We have not space for the authorities which might be added to this very decisive one. We hope Dr. Wainwright and his "friend" will answer those which are adduced by Bishop *Jewel*, in his Defense of the Apology, and Mr. *Goode*, in his Divine Rule of Faith and Practice, when they again come before the public; until they do which, their positive assertions will be entitled to very little respect or attention.

The note-writer generally goes the whole figure upon the episcopal assumption, but we find one small exception. He says: "It is a simple fact in history, that it [the dogma in question] never was disputed, and hardly doubted, *except by some Papists*."—P. 45. The italicising is ours. The italics mark an exception which Dr. Wainwright does not make. He says: "The Church of Rome, in common with the great body of the church catholic, at all times and in all places," held this "dogma;" and that "its truth was never disputed, and conformity with its distinctive provisions never departed from, until the days of the Reformation."—P. 43. It might have been a little more consistent for the learned doctor not to suffer his note-writer, on the very next page, to contradict what he here so explicitly lays down. But *consistency* is a jewel rarely found in these days. If we were to compel our high-church friends to conform to its rules, we should stretch them out of joint. As this would be cruel, we must leave them as they are.

* De Exhort. Castil, c. 7; also, De Pudicit, c. 27.

The fact is, the first and purest ages of Christianity knew nothing of *prelacy*. The institution as it now exists in the Church of Rome, the churches of the east, and the Church of England, is the offspring of subsequent ages, and its history is traceable; though it cannot be expected, at this distance of time, when ancient records are few and doubtful, that the historical evidence should be perfectly clear and unembarrassed. This want of clear historical evidence, our high-church exclusionists sometimes deny, and at other times plead, just according to circumstances. We can scarcely expect to convert them, but must leave them in the shades of antiquity, where they love to hide themselves, like Adam "among the trees of the garden," and where they will probably continue to roam at large until "the voice of God" shall call them out into the light of revealed truth. Let the patient reader just for a moment glance at the state of this notable controversy.

When we bring "the exclusive dogma" to the test of Scripture, our high-churchmen exclaim, "When will Christians learn that the books of the New Testament were written on special occasions, or to meet certain errors? and therefore things may be true which are not recorded at large in so brief a compend as the New Testament."—P. 41, note. "Things *may be true* which are not recorded;"—well, what then? Why we must go to "the traditions of the church," and learn what "the oral preachings of the apostles" say upon these "things" which "may be true." We go then to tradition, and taking with us the catholic rule of Vincent—that "what is believed everywhere, at all times, and by all," is catholic truth—we apply this rule to the episcopal regimen; and it might indeed stand some sort of test, if we were to pass upon the mere name without defining the thing. But only analyze your subject, and then apply your catholic rule to its various parts, and after rejecting every attribute which does not stand the test, what will you have left? Inquire what is a bishop? Is he of an order superior to presbyters by divine right? What is essential to episcopal ordination? What jurisdiction has a bishop in the church? What power has one bishop over another? What vitiates the ordinations of a bishop? What is the church? Upon these questions he will find no "consent of doctors." During the fourth and fifth centuries, adhesion to the canons of the general councils was generally deemed essential to the legitimacy of any branch of the Catholic Church, and to the validity of ordinations and the sacraments. But after the elevation of the Roman see, these canons were set aside as often as convenience required. There were such conflicts of opinions, and such gross irregularities prevalent, for

centuries, that conformity to the canons of the church of the Nicene age is not to be supposed a matter of course. When all these things are presented to our opponents, they then bid their old friend *Vincent* farewell—throw away the canons of discipline of the Catholic Church—and, generalizing upon the largest possible scale, they make mere ordination by the imposition of the hands of one bishop all that is strictly necessary to the validity of orders. That bishop may be out of his own diocese—may be induced to ordain by money—may be forced upon the people by the interposition of wicked rulers—may be a mere *boy*—a heretic—an infidel—a heathen—as wicked as Satan—and yet his ordinations, though they might be "irregular," would still be perfectly "valid!" Two bishops may mutually expel each other, and yet the ordinations of each are perfectly "valid!" There may be popes and antipopes through whole centuries, who put each other under the ban, and yet the ordinations of both are "valid!" All these positions are gulped down by Dr. Wainwright's note-writer without the least sign of nausea. And indeed the successionists must adopt this whole system of absurdities and blasphemies, or give up their doctrine of apostolical succession. Here, then, is the point where we come out. It cannot be that the succession has failed: therefore all these difficulties must either never have existed in fact, or, having existed, they could not have vitiated the true apostolical succession! Now who will say but we are fairly vanquished?

There is a gross absurdity in the relations which our high-churchmen affect to hold with the Roman Catholics. They acknowledge the Romish Church to be a branch of the Catholic Church, and receive their clergy without the reimposition of hands, on the ground that they have "the apostolical succession," and receive all the articles of the faith. But the evangelical churches, though they have kept "the faith," not having the apostolical succession of bishops, are not to be recognized as branches of the Catholic Church. The government of the Romish Church is a *monarchy*, and does not rest upon the *divine right* of *bishops*, or "apostolical succession," but upon the supremacy of St. Peter, and the power of the keys lodged in his seat. But all the radical differences which are found between Roman and Anglican Catholics, as to the nature of the episcopal office, or the line of apostolical succession, it would seem, are mere trifles in comparison with those which separate prelatists from Presbyterians. A difference in matters of *order* with Roman Catholics can easily be overlooked, but a difference in matters of *order* with "the non-prelatical denominations" is *fundamental*, and cannot be overcome.

As to *faith*, the evangelical churches are, we believe, not accused of departing from the primitive standards—they are not necessarily *heretics*, but are merely *out of the church*, because, as our opponents assume, "there can be no church without a bishop." But how do they get over the acknowledged *heresies* of Rome? Why, this is a small matter enough! The wise note-writer eases it off almost without an effort. He tells us that Rome has merely *added* to the faith. She receives all the doctrines of the Catholic Church, *and a little more*, that's all. And Mr. Carey held that the matters of difference between the Church of England and the Church of Rome *were not matters of faith*. This would do if the matter added were consistent with the original creed. The canons of the Council of Trent and the creed and articles of the Church of England, are in many essential points perfectly antagonistic. For instance, how does the worship of the Virgin Mary, and of relics, agree with the doctrine of the one living and true God? How does the mediation of saints and angels agree with the doctrine of the "one Mediator, Jesus Christ?" And how does the doctrine of justification by the merit of works agree with that of "justification by faith alone?"

The old English divines saw all these contrarieties, and many more which we might notice, in a strong light, and steadily maintained that Rome had corrupted the very substance of religion. We need go no further than the *Homilies* to prove this. There Rome is charged with such radical errors as vitiate her claim to the character of a church. Witness the following language: "Now if you will compare this with the Church of Rome, not as it was in the beginning, but as it is at present, and hath been for the space of nine hundred years and odd; you shall well perceive the state thereof to be so far wide from the nature of the true church, that nothing can be more. For neither are they built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, retaining the sound and pure doctrine of Christ Jesus; neither yet do they order either the sacraments, or else the ecclesiastical keys, in such sort as he did first institute and ordain them; but have so intermingled their own traditions and inventions, by chopping and changing, by adding and plucking away, that now they may seem to be converted into a new guise." —*Homily on Whitsunday.*

We would recommend to our *Puseyites* to discard these *uncatholic* notions, and wholly to repudiate all there is in the Homilies and Thirty-nine Articles against Romanism, if they do not even dig up the bones of the old English reformers, if they can be found, and burn them over again. For really if our modern high-church-

men are right, the old reformers were the worst of heretics. With them Rome was *antichrist*—her doctrine and government—her "whole estate"—essentially variant from the gospel. But with our modern high-churchmen *Rome is right in essentials*. We, however, rather agree with the English fathers, and are consequently forced to the conclusion that their unworthy sons are *essentially* wrong. That they have left *the old paths*, any one with half an eye can see.

Among the small matters which a critic might incidentally notice in this pamphlet are a few specimens of orthography. One of these is the obsolete word *sectarism*. *Webster* inserts this word with the parenthesis, "*little used.*" *Johnson* retains it upon the authority of "King Charles"—probably "the martyr"—and cites the following example from the royal author: "Nothing hath more marks of schism and *sectarism* than this presbyterian way." Now we cannot quarel with Dr. Wainwright and his learned "friend" for an affectation of high antiquity, and a truly ancient and catholic mode of expression. Certainly they have as good a right to copy the style and own the orthography of "*King Charles*, the blessed martyr," as they have to consider him an example of catholic orthodoxy and correct Christian morals, albeit their *church* "way" "hath" as many "marks of *schism* and *sectarism*" as the "presbyterian way" of the sainted king Charles. But we hope these gentlemen will not soon be so completely imbued with the spirit and policy of the Stuarts, as well as with their chaste orthography, as to threaten to "*harry* out of the land" all those who are of "this presbyterian way."

Another instance, as it occurs but once, may possibly be an error of the printer. We are told of the "*liquidation* of the blood of St. Januarius."—P. 29. Now if this be a mere typographical error we would suggest that it is a pity so splendid a book should be thus marred, and we ought slightly to take Dr. Wainwright and his "friend" to task for the carelessness with which they passed the proof sheets. But if it be an instance of a new and strange sense given to an old word, all we have to say is, that the *authority* of Dr. Wainwright and his friend is not quite sufficient. We shall wait at least for the *liquefaction* of the icebergs of exclusiveness, among which they have entrenched themselves, before we shall feel called to the "liquidation" of the debt of gratitude which they may think they have brought the world under by their discovery.

Heartily sick and tired of this miserable specimen of high-church logic, we now bid it a final adieu.

Art. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Miscellanies: consisting principally of Sermons and Essays.* By John Harris, D. D., author of "Mammon," "The Great Teacher," "The Great Commission," &c., &c. With Introduction and Notes, by Joseph Belcher, D. D. Post 8vo., pp. 287. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1844.

Dr. Harris is extensively and advantageously known in these United States, and this interesting volume will by no means detract from his well-merited fame. It consists of eight sermons, eleven essays, and a short but affecting memoir of his deceased wife. The sermons were all preached on public occasions, such as the anniversaries of the London Christian Instruction Society, the Home Missionary Society, the British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel among the Jews, the Wesleyan Missionary Society, the opening of the Lancashire College, and at the dedication or anniversaries of three churches; the essays were mostly written for a periodical conducted by the editor of the present volume. The same correct sentiments, enlightened piety, and catholic spirit which distinguished Dr. Harris's former works, will be found in this. The Introduction and Notes furnish us with much interesting information relative to the author, and the institutions for which he so ably pleads.

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2. *A Treatise on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants. With an Appendix, containing several Memoirs on Capillary Attraction, Electricity, and the Chemical Action of Light.* By John William Draper, M. D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of New-York. Harper & Brothers.

Whatever may be thought of the doctrines maintained in this elaborate treatise, the author is certainly entitled to the credit of having brought to the discussion of the subject an inquiring disposition, a discriminating judgment, and an industry in making experiments and observations seldom surpassed. He announces, in the Introduction, the great idea which his work is intended to illustrate as that which connects the production and phenomena of organized beings with the imponderable principles, denying the existence of what is known to physiologists as the vital force, and contending that all physical structures are the results of the mechanical action of a variety of natural causes. This is not the place to controvert his opinions, though we presume that he himself scarcely expects that they will pass unchallenged. We cordially pay the work the tribute which it certainly merits, of being a rare and most creditable one, an honor not only to the author, but to the country.

The papers collected in the Appendix have been published in some of the most celebrated scientific journals in this country and in Europe, and are in the highest degree valuable and interesting. The work is issued in a very elegant quarto volume, printed in the very best style of the art. It is scarcely too much to say that it will elevate the character of American science throughout the world.

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3. *The Anatomy of the Human Body.* By J. CRUVEILHIER, Professor of Anatomy to the Faculty of Medicine of Paris, Physician to the Hospital of Salpetriere, and President of the Anatomical Society of Paris. The first American, from the last Paris edition. Edited by GRANVILLE SHARP PATTISON, M. D. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work of Cruveilhier is recommended by the American editor, who is one of the most celebrated anatomists in this country, as by far the best treatise on the subject ever published. It has been republished and adopted as a text-book in England, and enjoys a very high reputation among medical men throughout Europe. Coming before the American people under such auspices, it cannot fail to prove a welcome accession to our medical literature. It is published in a thick octavo of nearly a thousand very closely-printed pages, and contains an immense amount of matter. The engravings which were added in the London edition have been retained in this, and the latest corrections and additions of the author have also been adopted. The editor, in his Preface, speaks in high and just terms of commendation of the cheap and most excellent series of scientific medical productions which the Harpers have recently issued.

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4. *The Autobiography of Heinrich Stilling, late Autic Counselor to the Grand Duke of Baden.* Translated from the German, by S. JACKSON. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844.

IN an age of extraordinary books, this is one of the most remarkable. It is veritable biography, with more interest than romance ever excited. Such a combination of simplicity, fascination, and religion is scarcely to be met with in our own or any other language. Talent of the highest order is shown, by leading us almost to forget its existence; while the simple-hearted piety of this illustrious scholar makes its way to the heart of every reader. We are not surprised that in Germany this book is received by all classes as the Pilgrim's Progress is with us, nor that our contemporaries are placing it in the list with Robinson Crusoe. The translator has performed his work admirably, and we hope his labors will be appreciated in the United States as they have been in England.

5. *A History of Greece.* By the Right Rev. CONNOP THIRLWALL. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work has recently been completed in England, where its appearance has been very cordially welcomed by the best critics and most judicious scholars. It is written in a style of great elegance, and aims at a more philosophical analysis of the character of the people and institutions of Greece, than has yet been given. It has been commended in very decided terms by some of our most eminent scholars, and will doubtless take its place among the standard histories of the ancient world. The Harpers propose to complete it in eight numbers, of which the first only has as yet been issued.

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6. *A Grammar of the Greek Language, principally from the German of Kühner.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1844.

To many it may seem useless to go on multiplying grammars of a language that, like the Greek, can never change; but although the language is invariable, constant progress is made in the knowledge of it, and it is this progress which renders new grammars necessary. In this department of learning, the scholars of Germany have uniformly taken the lead, and philology is mainly indebted to them for the great advances it has made in the present century; but it is commonly found that their books, however well they may suit their own methods of instruction, need revision by our own teachers before they can be used to advantage in our schools. In such revisions Dr. Anthon has done good service, as is shown by the extensive adoption of his whole series of school classics. Combining the experience of a practical teacher with the learning of an indefatigable student and a philosophic critic, his books are well aedapted to the minds for which they are intended. The grammar before us contains all the important improvements to be found in Kühner's recent grammar, which are held in the highest estimation both in England and in our own country. In the inflexions, particularly in the paradigm of the verbs, Dr. Anthon has closely followed Kühner's admirable arrangement; but in the syntax he has followed his own judgment in adapting it to our own forms of expression and modes of thought. The German is the more purely philosophical—Dr. Anthon's the more intelligible and the better suited to the comprehension of young minds; and one has only to compare it with any other Greek syntax existing in our language to be satisfied of its superiority for every purpose of instruction. These are the two points which constitute the peculiar excellence of the "New Greek

Grammar," and they are sufficient, we think, to give it the preference over all others for schools and colleges. A boy who has made himself master of it will find few difficulties in studying the language which will require the aid of a living teacher, for such in fact is the grammar itself.

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7. *Elements of Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, &c. For the Use of Schools and Academies.* By J. R. Boyd, A. M. Harper & Brothers.

The author of this work is a practical teacher, and his object in preparing it has been to present such rules and examples as would most effectually teach to children the art of expressing their thoughts in language. He has executed the task with a good degree of skill and judgment. The rules are simple and easily understood, and the examples are judiciously selected from the best authors. His work is highly commended by the State Superintendent of Common Schools, and by a large number of teachers, by whom it has been examined.

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8. *The Reformers before the Reformation.* By Emile de Bonnechose. Translated from the French by Campbell Mackenzie. Harper & Brothers.

This volume gives a most animated and interesting account of the life and labors of John Huss, who doubtless did more than any other man in the fifteenth century to prepare the way for the glorious Reformation achieved by Luther in that which succeeded. The author is librarian to the king of France, and has thus had access to manuscripts and other authorities which do much to illustrate the great events with which his history is concerned, and which have never before been consulted. The work furnishes a very useful introduction to the history of the Reformation, and cannot be too widely read.

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9. *Theological Sketch-Book, or Skeletons of Sermons; carefully arranged in systematic Order, so as to constitute a complete Body of Divinity; partly original, but chiefly selected from Simeon's Horæ Homiliticæ, and Skeletons; Sketches of Sermons; Pulpit Assistant; Benson's Plans; Preacher; Pulpit, and other approved Publications. Designed for the Use of Students of Divinity, Ministers of the Gospel, and private Christians.* In three volumes. Vol. 1. Baltimore: printed at the Publication Rooms, No. 7 South Liberty-street. New-York: Robert Carter, No. 58 Canal st., &c. 1844.

Though works of this class are often abused, they still have their use. When they are used as a mere clew to the proper division of a text, they sometimes save time, and prevent the unpracticed preacher

from an unnatural arrangement of the matter of a sermon. But when used by the idle as a *crutch* to assist them in stumbling through a sermon, and to save them the trouble of thinking, they serve but a poor purpose. And the abuse of books of "Skeletons" is so frequent that we are sometimes led to doubt whether, upon the whole, they are not a positive evil. As models of sermonizing, the skeletons in the work before us are admirable; and those who need anything of the kind can scarcely do better than to procure these volumes.

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10. *The First Three Books of Homer's Iliad, according to the ordinary Text; and also with the Restoration of the Digamma.* To which are appended English Notes, a Metrical Index and Homeric Glossary. By CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. Harper & Brothers.

THE labors of Professor Anthon, in the preparation of school books for the study of the classics, have been too long continued and are too well known to require mention here; but we cannot avoid extending a cordial welcome to this edition of Homer, which has been prepared in the same manner as the Latin classics which have preceded it. The notes are very full, and elucidate every portion of the work which to the learner might be obscure. Only three books have been thus presented. The edition, we should think, would at once be universally adopted in classical schools throughout the country.

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11. *Persecutions of Popery: Historical Narratives of the most remarkable Persecutions occasioned by the Intolerance of the Church of Rome.* By FREDERIC SHOBERL. Harper & Brothers.

THE author of this work urges the remarkable effort which Popery is now making to regain its power and dominion, as the reason for laying before the public this history of the bloodshed and agony of which it has been the cause. He writes in the spirit and with the zeal of a true Protestant. Prefixed to the body of the work is a brief sketch of the rise and progress of the Papal power; and a chapter is appended showing that the Romish Church is at the present day actuated by the same persecuting spirit which, wherever it was possible, it has always exhibited. The work will be read with general interest.

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12. *The Works of Charlotte Elizabeth.* In two volumes, 8vo. New-York: published by M. W. Dodd, Brick Church Chapel, opposite City Hall. 1844.

WE always recommend works of fiction with care and reserve. The Works of Charlotte Elizabeth we consider among the least exceptionable of the whole class. They may, in particular states of mind, be read sparingly by several classes of readers. Their imagery is "true to nature," their spirit truly pious, and their moral good. They should

not, however, be devoured in so large quantities, especially by the young, as to superinduce an appetite for fiction. Light reading, however free from the fatal faults of our popular novels, like condiments, should be resorted to with great caution, and, especially by the young, under proper advisement.

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13. *Scenes, Incidents, and Adventures in the Pacific Ocean, on the Islands of the Australasian Seas, during the Cruise of the Clipper Margaret Oakley, under Capt. Benjamin Morell.* By THOMAS JEFFERSON JACOBS. Harper & Brothers.

THIS is the title of a work professing to give a true account of the voyage mentioned in the title. Mr. Jacobs was a passenger in the vessel, and gives his own personal knowledge as his authority for the statements. The narrative possesses considerable interest, and will well repay perusal. It is issued in a handsome volume, accompanied by maps and numerous engravings.

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14. *Demonstration of the Necessity of Abolishing a constrained Clerical Celibacy; exhibiting the Evils of that Institution, and the Remedy.* By the Right Rev. DIOGO ANTONIO FEIJO, Senator and Ex-Regent of the Empire of Brazil, Bishop Elect of Marianna, etc., etc. Translated from the Portuguese, with an Introduction and Appendix, by Rev. D. P. KIDDER, A. M. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. 1844.

THIS is a work of great interest, and we hope it will be extensively read. We could say much of its merits, had we space. It is an encouraging fact that there are those in the Romish Church who see the evils of the system, and have the courage to enter their protest against it.

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15. *Sabbath School Books.*

UNDER this general head we intended to give the title-pages, with brief notices, of the several new books in this department which have been issued since the late General Conference. We have not space, however, to carry out this design. We are happy to bear testimony to the great diligence and eminent abilities of our new editor. Br. Kidder is rapidly filling up the catalogue with such works—both original, and selected from the best European publications—as are necessary fully to meet the wants of our sabbath schools. Our sabbath-school literature will soon take the elevated position which we have long desired, and which existing emergencies absolutely require. Soon, very soon, we hope our sabbath schools will be supplied from our own press with *all the books* they need. And when this shall be the case, we doubt not but those who have the management of these nurseries of piety in our church will draw upon our agents at New-York and Cincinnati for all they want to fill up their libraries.

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J. Penne Painter

E. Hallock Sculpt

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REV. PETER LABORDE, D.D.D.

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in the hours of our labor, strife, and the weariness of our pilgrimage on earth, we have been accustomed to look for the reward of our faith and patient endurance: indeed, as the consummation of our desires and interest in Christ Jesus our Saviour.

Upon a doctrine so grand in its object,—so rich in the anticipations which it awakens,—one so intimately and eternally connected with our final state, he who shall shed any additional light by the true exegesis of the symbols under which it is brought out upon the page of inspiration, who shall clear it in any degree of the

sensual drapery in which it has been clad by the superstition or unbridled fancy of the low and vulgar, thereby leaving it to stand out before our faith in the full sublimity of its outline, and to exert its undivided power in the formation of our character, will have given to the church a benefaction which she will not be slow to acknowledge, nor tardy in bringing her tribute of confidence and affection, with which to crown him while living, and to consecrate it to his memory when the grave has closed over his mortal remains. But, on the other hand, whomsoever he be that shall invade the sanctuary of her faith, or shall sacrilegiously take hold of the pillars of her long-cherished hopes, to remove them from their basis, or mar their capitals, may not justly hope to be shielded from her rebuke, or slumber quietly under the loud and long-sounding protestations which she will utter against an act so cruel in its tendency, and which, if it succeed to unsettle the ground-work of her faith, will be so disastrous in its results. From such a one the church will turn away: nor will literary splendor, facility of invention, or ingenious theorizing save him from the distrust of those whose faith he has so cruelly assailed.

Let no one think that we are writing prophecies against the author of the "Anastasis." We are not inspired with this gift. Still, however, we cannot repress the expression of our settled conviction that the volume before us will go further to affect the theological standing and reputation of its author, than all his works which have preceded it.

In entering upon a review of the doctrines of this book, we feel the embarrassments of our assumed task; embarrassments, however, which do not arise from any tremblings of our faith, or misgivings of our understanding upon the general question at issue: but the method and plan of the book are such, (as no doubt would best subserve the purpose of the author,) that it will be difficult, within the limits prescribed for articles in the Quarterly, to do full justice both to the author and the reader. Were it our only business to herald it to the world with an unqualified approbation, we could easily mark and collate its beautiful passages, and indicate to the reader its bright and superior points, and then turn it over to the compositor. If such were our task, it would be a pleasure to perform it. But alas! this pleasure is denied us. Unwelcome as it is, our duty leads us to exercise a sort of literary onkotomy,—to cut, probe, and dissect; and, as in this case it will be a bloodless operation, we hope, also, that it will be without any sacrifice of the personal regard which we are conscious of entertaining toward the author of the work subjected to the operation. The results to which

the author is led, by the course of argumentation employed in his book, are not very fully indicated by the title-page, and if, in any sense, they are the offspring of their asserted paternity, they seem to us to be degenerate children; to be, in fact, deeply depraved by fancy and mere speculation. It will be the principal object of the remarks that we shall set down upon the doctrine of this book, to show that the deductions and ultimate opinions of its author are neither rational nor Scriptural. True, our author avowedly believes in the doctrine of a resurrection; but still, if the construction which he puts upon the proposition affirming it be the true view of the resurrection, it will follow that what has generally been regarded as the voice of revelation upon this branch of our faith, is only a chimera of our own misguided fancy, and the Bible doctrine of the resurrection has been hid, until now. What the true "Anastasis" is, according to the doctrines of the volume now under consideration, may be seen from the following quotations:—

"The resurrection body is that part of our present being to which the *essential life* of the man pertains. We may not be able to see it, to handle it, to analyze it, or to describe it. But we know that it exists, because we know that we ourselves exist. It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state, *because it never dies*. It is immortal in its own nature, and it is called a *body*—a spiritual body—because the poverty of human language, or perhaps the weakness of the human mind, forbids the adoption of any more fitting term by which to express it."—P. 70.

The elementary substances of this *body*, philosophically considered, are intimated by the following paragraph:—

"And so when we resolve solid substances into gases, we are confounded to find that which before answered all our ideas of matter apparently assuming other attributes and coming under other laws. Our knowledge is here nonplused, and still the facts are palpable to our senses. We know that there are these subtil elements mixed up in the grosser materials of our bodies, with which our mental operations are connected, and upon which they are dependent, and we cannot know but that they may exist separate from our bodies, and form in fact, in the strictest propriety of speech, a spiritual body."—P. 77.

The *time*, *mode of production*, and the relative nature of the resurrection body, are given in the succeeding quotations:—

"It would seem then, on the whole, from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion is to be formed, that the judgment of reason would be, *that a spiritual body is developed at death*. By spiritual, in this connection, we mean refined, subtil, ethereal, sublimated. By the development of a spiritual body, we mean the disengagement—the extrica-

tion—of that psychical part of our nature with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected, and which differs from the pure spirit, the intellectual principle, as the Greek ψύχη, or *sensitive principle*, differs from νοῦς, the *self-conscious intelligence*. It is a *tertium quid*—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body."—P. 78.

Again: "We cannot understand the apostle's reasoning, unless he means to affirm that there is something of the nature of a germ which emanates from the defunct body, and forms either the substance or the nucleus of the future resurrection body. But this principle we contend to be what the apostle calls *spiritual*, that is, invisible, impalpable, refined, ethereal,—something that is essentially connected with vital operations—something that is exhaled with the dying breath, or, in other words, that goes forth from the body before it is consigned to the dust."—P. 178.

Here are the grand conclusions of our author:—

"We are inevitably thrown back, then, as far as we can see, on the theory, so to term it, of the immediate development and assumption of the spiritual body, and its entrance at once upon the resurrection state. We know not how to conceive of a pause—a long suspension—in the essential activity of the vital principle with which thought and consciousness are connected. We are not, we presume, addressing those who believe in the sleep of the soul after death, but those who expect to retain their conscious existence in the world of spirits; and if our intelligent principle goes with the vital, which depends upon various hidden ethereal agencies constantly operating around us, why shall we not infer that our spiritual mode of being commences at once upon the abandonment of our gross corruptible tenements?"—P. 181.

"The prevailing sense of *resurrection* in the New Testament is simply that of *future existence, the future state or immortality*."—P. 145.

The quotations now before our readers are sufficient to give them a just view of our author's opinions as to what is involved in the proposition affirming the resurrection of the dead. The theory of the resurrection, unfolded in the passages above quoted, will be best appreciated if we reduce it to an analytical formula. Thus:—

I. The true anastasis is the *development of a spiritual body at death*.—P. 78.

II. A resurrection by development is *the disengagement—the extrication—of that psychical part of our nature with which vital and animal functions are, in the present life, intimately connected*.—Ib.

III. The psychical body *is a tertium quid—an intermediate something between the cogitative faculty and the gross body*.—Ib.

IV. A *psychical body* is one formed of *gases separated from the grosser materials* of our natural body.—P. 77.

V. The properties constituting this *tertium quid a spiritual body, are refinement, subtilty, etherealism, sublimation, impalpability, and invisibility.*—Pp. 78, 178.

VI. This gaseous germ *is exhaled with the dying breath, or, in other words, it goes forth from the body before it is consigned to the dust.*—Pp. 77, 178.

VII. This *exhaled spiritual body* LIVES AGAIN *in another state,* BECAUSE IT NEVER DIES.

VIII. *The resurrection state commences with the development and assumption of the spiritual body, which takes place immediately upon the abandonment of our gross corruptible tenements.*—P. 181.

IX. There will be NO RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.—P. 202.

X. The true resurrection being the development of a spiritual body, occurring at the death of each individual, there will, consequently, *be no simultaneous resurrection of mankind.*

The last item in the preceding analysis we have set down as the grand conclusion to which the theory arrives. If the opinions of our author upon the subject of the resurrection are not new, they are not generally known, and are contrary to the generally-received views entertained upon this great and interesting feature of our faith. Still, however, if this be the true doctrine, if Professor Bush has obtained an insight into this great mystery and can resolve the questions, "*How* are the dead raised up, and with *what* body do they come?"—despite all our former opinions, we are bound to adopt the conclusions to which he has been conducted by the process of investigation contained in the work before us.

It may scarcely be proper, at this stage of the investigation, to suggest that our author, possibly, is as likely to be mistaken upon a subject of this nature as the whole church—as, indeed, the thousands of eminent divines who have studied this point of our faith with the deepest and most prayerful solicitude. Indeed, such an intimation will be of small account if the view which he holds upon the *progressive knowledge of revelation* be true. He lays it down as a "main position that our knowledge of the contents of revelation is destined to be progressive;" meaning thereby "that Biblical science is like all other sciences, *progressive*:" a progress which not only modifies, but in some cases, perhaps, supersedes established ideas.—P. 17. We should not hesitate to make the "concession" if this were affirmed of the development of individual faith, or if, by the progress of general knowledge and philological science, the church should attain larger and juster views of the general economy of divine grace. But our readers will perceive that this is not the application which our author makes of his "main position." The

proposition is to be understood in an absolute sense, and consequently the *church* is to descry, upon the page of revelation, truths as new, and to the moral system as fundamental, perhaps, as is the law of gravitation to the natural world. This main position, in the view of our author, is supported by evidence found in the general analogy of nature and providence:—the confessed obscurity remaining at this day upon the word of God, and in the fact that the volume of revelation comes to us clothed in the drapery of a foreign and dead language. Well, we admit the *facts:* but we ask what have the facts to do with our author's hypothesis upon the general issue? Does it inevitably follow that because there is some analogy in what appears to us as different departments of the divine government, that our ignorance of the mysteries of the one must limit our knowledge of the plain statements of the other? Our knowledge of the doctrines and facts of revelation does not result, and therefore does not depend upon, either induction, mathematical demonstrations, or scientific experiments. The thing to be known or believed is plainly stated in the text book of our faith. Yet our author labors to press into his service these general admissions. Now it is most obvious to us, that his proposition, *there will be no resurrection of the body*, so far from having sprung spontaneously from the process of reasoning employed in the "Introduction," is an antecedent hypothesis, and the Introduction a kind of logical *ruse de guerre*, to prepare his readers for his ultimate deduction. We do not intend by these remarks to charge our author with designed sophistry, but to say, that so far as we can see, this is the logical relation between the subject of our *progressive knowledge of revelation*, and the conclusion maintained in the book that *there will be no resurrection of the body*. If Professor Bush had brought forward any essential point of evangelical doctrine, which had been discovered since the sacred canon was completed, we might have been led to suspect the correctness of our own judgment upon the force and conclusiveness of his argument. This, however, he has not done. What, then, if our knowledge of nature is gradually attained, or what if he had shown that ten facts, essential in the nature and relation of matter, had been recently discovered, would the conclusion be logically necessary that therefore there are unknown truths in *revelation* yet to be discovered?—ergo, that he had found out one of the class?

Notwithstanding our tardiness in receiving this novel theory of the resurrection, and the doubts which these suggestions are calculated to throw upon the subject of our author's new views, if his arguments are really what he esteems them to be, we and our readers

are bound, despite our prejudices, to come to his conclusion. But his argumentation bears so strict a resemblance to the following aphorism, that whether he did or did not so regard it, we cannot resist the conviction that it was, nevertheless, the *standpoint* from which he went forth, and that its spirit was the presiding genius which directed his subsequent course. This governing maxim is, "that which is false to true philosophy cannot be true to true faith." Now if this were true as a general proposition, it may nevertheless be false in this particular application.

But our author supposes that he has shown, by a "process of the strictest and fairest logical and philological reasoning," that the objections to the theory of the resurrection of the body are insuperable: that is, that *the resurrection of the body* is philosophically untrue; consequently, that our faith in this point is false. Upon a matter of faith so important as that, the grounds of which Professor Bush has attempted to unsettle, and in support of professions of confidence so unequivocal as those in which he indulges in regard to his favorite conclusion, we think our readers will concur with us in demanding proofs, clear, strong, and numerous: nay, that we have something more than mere philosophical evidence, notwithstanding the boldness of the proposition that "that which is false to true philosophy cannot be true to true faith." For it must be remembered that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is *exclusively* a doctrine of *revelation*. It is taught nowhere else: and it can neither be proved, nor disproved, by any other evidence than that found in revelation itself. If it is found there, philosophy cannot disprove it, and reason, if *rationally* exercised, cannot discredit it. As a question of *fact*, the doctrine of the resurrection is independent of, and uninfluenced by, those laws of evidence by which we prove the propositions affirming the immobility of the sun—the universal pervasion of caloric—and the instantaneous agency of electricity. Reason is out of her province, then, when she attempts the denial of the *facts* of revelation, after she has admitted the *authority* of that revelation.

If a man wholly discards revelation, he may, consistently with his own position, deny any doctrine of the Scriptures; but if he concede the inspired character of the Bible, he is not at liberty to deny any of its doctrines, and certainly not one so prominent as that of the resurrection of the body.

We would not interdict all inquiry into the modes and relations of things which are presented to our faith in the sacred volume; but then we may protest against any right or necessity to deny any fact or doctrine of revelation, or to pursue the question of *mode* so far as

to annihilate in theory the very *fact* of which such a mode is predicated. This we think the author of the "Anastasis" has done. For, unless we have totally misapprehended the scope of the argument, the question which is raised and discussed in this treatise, is not whether the popular opinion in relation to the resurrection body is true or false, but whether in fact there is to be a *resurrection of the body* at all. This we understand our author to deny, and the denial, together with the theory of a developed psychical body before or at death, is attempted to be supported upon philosophical and exegetical grounds.

That our readers may be able, in some degree, to appreciate our author's methods of deduction, we shall quote a few brief paragraphs:—

"The mere fact that any truth, however mysterious, is a truth of revelation, does not prevent its being at the same time a truth of nature, and amenable to its laws. A revealed fact, which is at one age of the world received simply by *faith*, may afterward become a fact of *reason*—something which we *know* as well as *believe*. We see, therefore, no special grounds, from the peculiar sanctity of the themes of revelation, to forego the most rigid researches into their nature, or for being alarmed at the thought of bringing them more and more within the limits of our positive cognitions. It is by no means impossible that the most signal miracles on record may ultimately resolve themselves into the operations of some higher law, which may never have been previously known except to its Author."—Pp. 34, 35.

"Must we not, necessarily, submit every position propounded in revelation to that intelligence by which alone we can understand it? *Understand* it, we say—for we must understand it, in order to believe it. Let us here be apprehended aright. We say that we must understand a proposition, in order to believe it. We may not, indeed, understand the *mode* in which the asserted truth or fact exists; but the *verbal proposition* affirming it we must understand, or we cannot believe it."—Pp. 35, 36.

"The simple assertion that the dead body is to be raised does not constitute an intelligible proposition, for the reason that it leaves it utterly uncertain *what body is meant*. A resurrection is, indeed, predicated of *a* body, but this is a very different thing from the resurrection of *the* body, and our inquiry cannot possibly be satisfied without a more minute specification."—P. 36.

We are left to conjecture what our author means when he says "a truth of revelation" may be "at the same time a truth of nature and amenable to its laws." His terms are so general, as, necessarily, to be vague and indefinite in their meaning. But let us look, for a moment, at the only application which he has made of his own doctrine. "The most signal miracles on record may ultimately

resolve themselves into the operation of some higher law, which may never have been previously known except to its Author." These "higher laws" are, of course, natural laws or philosophical agencies. Now we have been accustomed to regard a *miracle*, not as the effect of a natural cause, nor yet as an effect even of divine power immediately exerted through, and subjected to the modes of physical action; but as a mediate effect of omnipotent power, exerted independently of all secondary causes. Thus it is that the phenomenon becomes a miracle, and hence miracles become evidence of a revelation. Philosophical effects, however *signal*, can never become evidence of a revelation. To confound *revelation* and *nature* as our author does, in the quotation from pp. 34–5, involves consequences which, if pushed to their logical results, it seems to us, must inevitably destroy our faith in the Christian religion.

If, then, "the onward progress of our knowledge" is to annihilate our faith in revelation, and cast down to the dust all the hopes which we have built upon it, we do most devoutly pray that the half-prophetic anticipations of our author may be falsified, and we be left to believe the testimony which God has given of his Son, although according to the doctrine in question it is but so imperfectly authenticated.

The two remaining quotations exhibit the philosophical and logical difficulties which the credulity of our author cannot surmount. Let our readers recur to the passages cited from pp. 35–6.

Now it appears to us that the professor has created his own dilemma by making a distinction without a difference. For, pray what is the difference between *a body* and *the body*, in regard to the simple proposition of a resurrection? Of what is the resurrection predicated? Not of the soul, certainly; for this does not die. In affirming a resurrection of human beings, it must be of their *bodies*; and WHAT body is meant must be very obvious, unless, indeed, we have more than one body. It really does appear to us that if our author had adhered to his own definition of the term *'ανάστασις* he would have been saved from the perplexities in which he seems involved in relation to the proposition affirming the resurrection of the body. "In relation to the subject before us," he says, "the term is evidently metaphorical, and applied from the fact that *living things*, especially of the animal kingdom, generally *stand* more or less erect, while those that are *dead fall down* and *lie prostrate*. Hence, a very natural term to express *living again*, would be, *ἀνάστασις*, *resurgence*, *resurrection*, that is, re-rising. The phrase, it is true, is drawn from corporeal objects, and suggests, at first

blush, what we may term a *corporeal* idea; but it does not appear that any more is necessarily included in the term, in this connection, than the simple sense of *reviviscence*, without any reference to the *rising again* of the *defunct body*."—Pp. 144–5.

Is not this conclusion too hastily drawn? What is it that *revives*, if it is not the "DEFUNCT BODY?" Does not the merest novice in the art of reasoning know that *reviviscence* cannot, with any logical propriety, be affirmed of the soul, unless, indeed, it should be shown that the soul becomes defunct? But this is not claimed. Nor can we see how a reviviscence—a *living again*—can be predicated of our author's *psychical body*, which, by a process of respiratory elimination, is developed at, or just before, the death of the gross body. This is not a living again, but a beginning to live, so far at least as the body is concerned. If, then, the resurrection is a reviviscence, a living again, it must be the resurrection of what, at some intermediate period, did not live; otherwise it is not a *resurrection*. To say, then, that *anastasis* is metaphorically applied to the subject of the resurrection, seems to us to be contradicted by the etymological import of the word as admitted by the author himself.

Again: "We must understand a proposition," says the professor, "in order to believe it. We may not, indeed, understand the *mode* in which the asserted truth or fact exists, but the *verbal proposition* affirming it we must understand, or we cannot believe it." Our author can understand the verbal proposition that all material bodies gravitate to the earth; and the proposition comes at once within the grasp of his intellect (that is, his understanding) that "God is three in one sense and one in another:" but he cannot understand (nor believe) the verbal proposition affirming the resurrection of the dead body, "for the reason that it leaves it utterly uncertain WHAT body is meant."

Our readers will now be able to appreciate the nature of our author's difficulty, even if we shall be unable to deliver him from its logical power. But of this we have some hope; for if the verbal proposition that "God is three in one sense and one in another," comes at once within the grasp of his intellect, we do not despair of making it appear, even to the professor himself, that the verbal proposition affirming the resurrection of the dead body, is no more embarrassed, and that its verbality is no more difficult to be understood or its fact to be believed, than the facts of the propositions which he has admitted.

Upon what grounds, then, does our author believe the *fact* contained in the verbal proposition, "that God is *three* in one sense

and *one* in another sense?" Certain it is, that it cannot be upon the philosophical consistency or the logical perspicuity of the proposition: we mean the *verbal* proposition. The verbal proposition is, that God is *one*, and that the same God is *three*. Does our author grasp this? Does he feel the philosophical consistency of this? Does it come at once within the grasp of his understanding? Now we put it to the candor of our readers to say whether the professor fairly escapes this dilemma, by saying that it is the *mode* of the fact only that he does not grasp. For who does not know that it is *the fact* which the verbal proposition asserts, which has put the doctrine of a Trinity under ban by the Socinian philosophers? We may, possibly, have been erratic in our views upon this subject. But whatever imputation may fall upon us for the admission, candor obliges us to confess that our faith in the *fact* of a Trinity never rested upon philosophical grounds. Indeed, it derives no support whatever from evidence of that sort. If our faith in this great doctrine of the Bible were subjected to that kind of tests, so far as we are now able to see, they would annihilate it. It is the sophism of our author's maxim, that "whatever is false to true philosophy is not true to true faith," applied to this subject, that has nourished skepticism, nay, has generated the flat denial of the doctrine in question. For what is more palpable than that *three* are not *one*, and *one* is not *three?* This affirmed, would be philosophically untrue; and hence it would be *theologically* untrue, according to this maxim. Now we are free to confess, and you may call it superstition, servility, or what you please, our faith or belief of the *fact* couched in the *verbal proposition*, that *God is three in one sense and one in another*, does rest solely upon the announcements of Christianity, or more properly, the Christian revelation. Although our author can understand the *fact* contained in the verbal proposition, that God is three in one sense and one in another, yet he cannot understand nor believe the simple assertion that the dead body will be raised up, for the reason that "it leaves it utterly uncertain what body is meant."

The philosophy of this objection is sufficiently apparent by what is said upon p. 37, a brief portion of which we here quote:—

"No fact in physiological science is better ascertained, than that the human body, in regard to its constituent particles, is in a state of constant flux. It is perpetually undergoing a process of waste and reparation. Strictly speaking, no man has the same body now that he had seven years ago, as it is in about this period that a complete change is held to take place in the bodily structure, by which we may be said to be corporeally renovated. . . . . The phrase, *the body*, does not accu-

rately represent the object intended, if the idea conveyed by it be restricted to the body as existing at any one moment. The idea of existence in continuity is indispensable to it. The question, then, again recurs—what body is to be raised?"

This, upon philosophical principles, is a grand difficulty. And our wonder abates somewhat that our author cannot understand the verbal proposition that the dead body is to be raised up; for according to this application of "constant flux" in the "constituent particles" of the human body, either we have no body, that is, one in continuity of existence, or we have so many bodies, that when we affirm a resurrection of the body, it is utterly uncertain what body is meant. Is not this "*obscuram per obscurius?*" Up to this hour we had fondly cherished the notion that we had a body: but alas! it was but a mere illusion. We had supposed, too, that our family and friends have bodies; real bodies: but no! they are currents of *constituent particles* in a state of *constant flux;* and, inasmuch as "existence in continuity" cannot be affirmed of them any two successive moments, why they are not the *bodies* either of our friends or ourselves, but particles of matter in a "state of constant flux." Let not our readers suppose that we are indulging in a mere play upon the words of our author; for it must be remembered that he is reasoning, *reductio ad absurdam*, against the proposition affirming the resurrection of the body. And to show that we have not misapprehended him in the general purpose of his argument, it will be sufficient to remark that he quotes "Pearson on the Creed," (art. xi, p. 568,) and pronounces his an unintelligible belief, for the reason "that no regard is had to the physiological objection which [he is] urging," and then, as if Pearson's theory annihilated itself, the professor asks, "Can any one *believe* in opposition to his positive knowledge? Now we know," he adds, "that the bodies deposited in the grave are not the same bodies with those that previously existed in the order of physical succession," and that "the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, *in any sense whatever*, encounters difficulties in our view absolutely insuperable, arising from the changes and new combinations which the particles of the dead body undergo in the interval between death and the resurrection."

Here, then, you have the two grand objections of our author to the resurrection of the body.

First, we have no body; that is, none entitled to the particular distinction *the body;* for the *same* particles of matter never cohered in it for two successive moments: and secondly, that the aggregate particles of gross matter, (for they do not constitute a *body*,) which were deposited in the grave, "undergo changes and new com-

binations in the interval between death and the resurrection;" hence the same body, "in any sense whatever," cannot be raised. It is due to our readers, who may not have read the book under examination, to say, that these objections of the professor, arising as they appear to do out of a true philosophy, involve the doctrine of identity, and are influenced by the views which he holds upon this point. Before we investigate the objections, we must turn to chapter ii, which treats of the "distinction of personal and bodily identity," and let him define the point for himself.

He says: "We are at once arrested by the inquiry, whether the *identity of the person* implies the *identity of the body*. In strictness of speech a body which is undergoing a constant change in its constituent particles cannot be said to be the same in any two successive moments of its duration. This of course applies to the human body, the component atoms of which are in a state of ceaseless fluctuation. A precise use of language will not warrant the assertion, that our bodies are the same this hour that they were the last. The paring of a nail, the clipping of a hair, leaves the body a different body from what it was before this subduction from its integrity took place. It is true, indeed, that for all the purposes of ordinary and popular discourse, it is, perhaps, an unexceptionable mode of diction to say, that we have in mature life the same bodies that we had in childhood. But when we subject the phraseology to a rigid test, it is obvious that it cannot be true. That cannot be the same through a given lapse of time, which is constantly changing its constituent parts during that time."—Pp. 58–9.

"Affixing the seat of identity to the seat of personality, we can see the body wasting by exhalation and repairing itself by new accretions, and still perceive the central substratum of our being remaining unmoved, indestructible, and eternal, in the midst of all cycles of change. Something assuredly there is, which lives abiding and untouched in the midst of, and in spite of, the incessant flux of our corporeal existence. In that something our personality inheres, and to it our true identity cleaves. Of the body we cannot predicate identity at all in any two successive moments of its being, much less after centurial intervals and unknown transmutations. It is a mere centre of centripetal and centrifugal particles continually arriving and departing without any permanent stay. What can any man make of the unmodified averment that the same body is to rise at some indefinitely future day? If a man rises in the morning with a different body from that with which he lay down—though he still remains the same person—with what propriety can he be said to rise from his grave with the same body with which he entered it?

"Personality implies intelligence and self-consciousness. A beast is an *individual*, but not a *person*. The mere animal feels itself, but is not conscious of itself.* The seat of personality is the centre of all our bodily and mental activities.† The idea of the bodily structure does,

* How does the professor know this? † What is that *centre*?

indeed, enter into the general conception of the person, but it is related to it just as our clothes are related to our bodies—as a mere adventitious appendage. It is not essential to the *reality* of the person, as that which constitutes a man's *self* survives the body; it is not essential to the *identity* of the person, as that remains unchanged amid all the changes of the body. The personality of a human being is centred in that which thinks, and reasons, and wills; which loves, and fears, and hopes; which suffers, enjoys, and feels. The *vital principle*, whatever that be, is intimately, and probably indissolubly, connected with the intellectual and moral principle, but no philosophy has yet shown that it is identical with it."—Pp. 62–3.

Admitting this to be a true definition of personality, what has it to do with the doctrine of the resurrection? Nobody affirms the resurrection of our personality. Our *intelligence and self-consciousness* do not, that we are aware of, die, or ever become defunct. How then could we predicate a *living again* of our personality? Or if it be true, as our author supposes, (p. 64,) that our "*entity*" is "the seat of our permanent *identity*," why must we look to this as "the true basis of the doctrine of the resurrection?" What unsophisticated mind, in reading the language of the New Testament upon this subject, would ever have supposed that it was speaking of either our *entity*, or *personality*, as the *subject* of the resurrection? It would, we think, impress every reader that the *body* and not our *personality*, nor yet our *entity*, (which, according to this theory, is the ground of it,) is that which is the subject of the resurrection of revelation.

Now, to the question, Does "*the identity of the person* imply *the identity of the body?*" we unhesitatingly answer, Yes, when the *identity* is affirmed of a living human being: that is, A is the same MAN to-day that *he was* yesterday; and if he lives, he will be the *same man* twenty years hence that he is to-day. He still will be A, and not B, although there has been a constant flux of the particles of his body, and "subduction by the paring of a nail and the clipping of a hair." Our author may affirm with *philosophical accuracy*, that his well-known acquaintance whom he meets to-day has not the same body (meaning thereby the same in the constituent particles) that he had ten years ago: but can he "in strictness of speech" say, "I behold the same *person*, but not the same *body?*" Now we deny that he sees the *person* of his acquaintance at all, unless "the identity of the *person* imply *the identity of the body.*" And we rest this denial upon his own definition of personality. "Personality," he says, "implies intelligence and self-consciousness." Upon what grounds did he recognize his friend? Upon his *identity*, if at all. But *intelligence* and *self-*

consciousness are attributes of the race. These, therefore, could not distinguish him as his particular friend. It was not, then, upon the ground of his *personality* that he recognized his friend, unless personality imply the identity of the body.

Take the other example which our author has selected to illustrate the doctrine of identity. The falls of Niagara, because "the particles of fluid are every instant changing," and consequently that which the beholder "sees at one glance of his eye is not the same with that which he sees at the next;" that is, he not seeing the same particles of fluid, consequently he does not see the falls of Niagara. He may think that he sees the same falls; but alas! it is only a deception. Now, who ever thought that the identity of the falls of Niagara depended upon the particles of fluid which at any instant were rushing over the precipice of that mighty rock? If, then, the beholder "predicates sameness of the circumstances, relations, and effects" before him, and these, and not the identical particles of fluid, make the *falls of Niagara*, what is there unphilosophical in calling them the falls of Niagara, even if there is "nothing plainer than that the particles of the fluid are every instant changing?" If, then, *the human body* is not *mere particles of matter*, if something more is necessary to make them *a human body*, why is it unphilosophical to call it a body, and when a definite application is given, to say *the body?* Instead, then, of his "reason correcting the report of his senses," it seems to us that our author's philosophy perverts his reason when he says, "I behold the same person, but not the same body."

To us, it is perfectly apparent that Professor Bush has been led into this labyrinth of speculation by confounding things which are wholly different in themselves; viz. *elementary particles* of matter, and matter in a state of *organization*. We have been accustomed to suppose that it was the practical object of natural philosophy to ascertain, among other things, the diversity of organization in which the elementary substances of nature exist: and also, that we might affirm, with philosophical *truthfulness*, an identity of all the phenominal diversity of organization which scientific demonstration has ascertained, as well as of the several elementary substances of which these organizations are formed. Whether what is here assumed be true, our readers will judge. And if it be true, then we may affirm identity of genus and of species; of the abstract and the concrete; of simple elements and of any compound of those elements. If this be admitted, the conclusion is inevitable, so far as we are now able to see, that there is an *identity* of the *body* as well as of the soul.

Will any one pretend that there is no difference in fact between elementary substance, vegetable and animal organization, the vital principle, and the personality of man, implying intelligence and self-consciousness? If there is *diversity*, may we not, indeed *must* we not, affirm *identity* commensurately with that diversity? I may, then, say *the oak*, meaning thereby the *identical* oak, and thus distinguish it not only from the cedar, but from all other oaks of the same species, notwithstanding there has been a succession of particles during the elaboration of its parts. And why may I not, upon the same principle, say *the body* of my friend G, and mean thereby not *a* body merely, but *the* body of my *friend G*, and thus distinguish his body not only from the substances of which it is composed, but also by comparison from the body of any other man, nay, bodies of all other men? If this distinction between *body* and *personality* is not mere *fancy*,* then "identity of the person," when

* Professor Bush says, p. 64, "That erroneous estimate which has been formed of this doctrine has arisen from confounding some fancied identity of the *body* with that of the *person*:" that "Mr. Locke has, indeed, developed the distinction with pre-eminent ability; but the assumed exigencies of theology," he adds, "have frowned upon its recognition, and it still finds a slow and reluctant admission."

That our readers may judge between Professor Bush and Mr. Locke, we here insert a brief quotation from Locke's Essay, book ii, chap. 27, which treats of Identity and Diversity:—

"Let us suppose an atom, that is, a continued body, under one immutable superfices, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: and while they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matters alter not the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak: and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse; though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is, that in these two cases, a mass of matter, and a living body, *identity* is not applied to the same thing.

"We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this: that the one is only the cohesion of the

affirmed of a living human being, does "imply the identity of the body."

For if we affirm the *personal identity* of E, we affirm it upon the ground of that which distinguishes the *self-hood* of E from the

particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c., of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant, which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of *matter*, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment both forward and backward, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.

"The case is not so much different in *brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or construction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished, by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal, with this difference, that in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

"This also shows wherein the identity of the same *man* consists, namely, in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the *identity* of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successive fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an *embryo*, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ishmael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Cæsar Borgia to be the same man. For if the *identity* of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange use of the word *man*, applied to an *idea*,

self-hood of F, otherwise E and F are identically the same existence. But if the BODY of E is a *thing*, and not a mere *ideal* or *mode of speech*, it is a part of the *person* of E, and is an integral part of that of which we affirm his identity, while he yet exists as a living man. If the body of E is a *reality*, identity may be affirmed of it when the vital principle has ceased to animate it as truthfully as before it was defunct. At the period of his death there will be two things of which identity can be affirmed, namely, soul and *body*. And where is the *impropriety* of saying the *soul* of E and the *body* of E, although when they were united by the vital principle, we thought and spake of E as *one*, as in fact he was? And although the *constituent particles* of his body were "in a state of constant flux," yet E had but *one body* during his life upon the earth. Is it, then, "utterly uncertain *what body* is meant," when we assert that the body of E shall be raised up from the dead? Or is it the barbarism of its verbality which renders this "simple assertion" so "unintelligible?" If the proposition, that "God is three in one sense and one in another," comes at once within the grasp of our author's intellect, really it defies our ability to conjecture the precise nature of his inability to understand the "simple assertion" that the dead body is to be raised up, unless, as we have before hinted, he blends with the *fact*, the *mode* of the resurrection. Evidently, this is the real source of the embarrassment of our author's faith in the resurrection of the human body. The state of the case seems to be about this: The Scriptures are mostly, if not wholly, silent upon the question regarding the precise nature of the resurrection body; but ingenious speculations

out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, nobody could be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.

"It is not, therefore, unity of substance that comprehends all sorts of *identity*, or will determine it in every case: but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what *idea* the word it is applied to stands for; it being one thing to be the same *substance*, another the same *man*, and a third the same *person*, if *person*, *man*, and *substance* are three names standing for three different *ideas*; for such as is the *idea* belonging to that name, such must be the *identity*: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning *personal identity*, which, therefore, we shall in the next place a little consider."

have resulted in absurd and conflicting theories upon this point, all of which our author very justly rejects. But should not these very failures of his predecessors have made him chary upon a subject confessedly obscure, and difficult to be understood? If the hypotheses which have been put forth upon this intricate point were tenfold more absurd than they are, does it justify him in implanting himself in another hypothesis, the logical result of which, if true, would annihilate the *fact* of the resurrection itself? To us, then, the verbal proposition that the dead body shall be raised up is an intelligible one, and the *fact* which it asserts, so far as its truth rests upon our ability to affirm identity of it, is supported by the whole weight of the evidence upon which we predicate the doctrine of diversity. And if we have made out the doctrine of *bodily identity*, our readers, no doubt, will agree with us in the conclusion that the deduction of our author is a mere fallacy, when he asserts that there can be no resurrection of the body because, when we affirm it, "it is utterly uncertain what body is meant."

An objection, fundamental in the estimation of our author, is thus stated by him, on pp. 77–8:—

> "The grand point which we combat throughout is that which affirms that no true resurrection can take place but by means of the *re-union* of those principles, soul and body, which constitute our being in the present life. We maintain, on the other hand, that neither reason nor revelation countenances the idea of any such re-union. All the purposes of a future existence and a state of retribution, we contend, may be answered without it; and as this view completely disembarrasses the subject of difficulties which are insuperable on any other, we must hold its claims on our credence to be imperative."

What might, or might not, answer "the purposes of a future existence, and a state of retribution," is not now the point to be settled; but simply, What do the Scriptures teach respecting the doctrine of the resurrection of the body? If they assert that the body is to be raised, it must be for the purpose of a *re-union* of it with the soul: for besides this there can be no conceivable object of a resurrection of the body. But "neither *reason* nor revelation countenances the idea of any such re-union." What *right* has *reason* to frown upon this doctrine? It is not her province to say what shall be or what shall not be. And it is a little gratuitous, to say the least of it, to assert the discountenance of revelation until it is shown that revelation denies the doctrine of a re-union of the soul and body. It is our author's philosophy, and not reason, we imagine, that refuses countenance to the idea of a re-union of soul and body. For neither reason nor revelation will say that God cannot rejoin

what has thus been separated. Certainly not. What then? Why, our author says "the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, *in any sense whatever*, encounters difficulties . . . . . absolutely insuperable, arising from the changes and new combinations which the particles of the dead body undergo in the interval between death and the resurrection."

The soul and body, then, cannot be re-united because the constituent particles of the body, from their having gone into vegetables, perhaps metamorphosed into an animal, perchance a horse or a hog, or some meaner creature, cannot be recovered to an organization to which they had anteriorly belonged. But we have shown that the identity of our bodies does not depend upon the numerical particles inhering in them at any single moment, but upon something else, so that if it were impossible to collect the *identical* particles again, this would not preclude the possibility of the re-union of the soul and body. But why is it unreasonable to suppose that the soul and body may be re-united? Is it that the soul has taken possession of a "*psychical* body," and, being a unit in itself, cannot occupy *two* bodies at the same time? If Professor Bush had proved the assumption that *a body* is exhaled just before death, we confess that our faith would have been shaken in the common view of the resurrection, and that we must inevitably have gone over to the belief of the new creation. But as the case is, we remain in the settled belief that "*he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken* [our] MORTAL *bodies*."

We must now pass to a brief examination of the Scriptural argument of our author, in favor of his theory of the ANASTASIS of *reason* and revelation, and *against* the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body*. For if the doctrine of the development of a new *body* at death be proved, that of the resurrection of the corporeal body is disproved; or it is shown, that after the *resurrection* we shall have *two* bodies. The passages upon which Professor Bush comments in his general argument are to the number of eleven from the Old Testament, and twenty-three from the New; besides which, several texts are considered, in which some other doctrine is stated in connection with that of the resurrection, which he examines in view of their reciprocal influence upon the subjects involved.

We shall not be able, for want of space, to examine in detail the exposition which he has put upon these texts severally.

It will be important to introduce to the consideration of our readers more fully than we have incidentally done before, the rules under which these texts are examined, and the tests which our

author has applied to them in order to evolve their meaning in relation to the doctrine in question. These will be sufficiently indicated by quoting a single short paragraph. In his "Conclusion," page 385, he says:—

"The point that will probably be regarded as most liable to exception, is the making our rational deductions the criterion in regard to the meaning of the inspired word on a theme of such moment as the mode of our future existence."

We beg the reader's particular attention to the doctrine of this brief paragraph. Here is, by confession, the full and explicit evidence that the conclusions to which our author has arrived in the course of his verbal exegesis, are the expressed results of his *rationalism*, and not the spontaneous fruits of an obvious and natural interpretation of the language of revelation, in which is couched the great and glorious doctrine of the resurrection. Our feelings of personal regard for the author, as well also as our sense of what is due to the deservedly high literary and moral character in which he stands before the American churches, forbid us to express ourselves as otherwise we might in regard to the nature and tendency of the doctrines which throughout characterize the volume before us. We do except, most emphatically, to the ratiocination employed in this treatise. It is not, if we may judge of its character, very dissimilar from those modes of deduction, the sad fruits of which are seen in the philosophical sentimentalism which at present, to a great extent, is substituted for evangelical piety, and also in the scientific dogma which, in creeds and theories at least, is superseding the plain and wholesome doctrines of revelation. But this quotation settles another point, namely, that the denial of the resurrection of the body is a necessary logical consequence of our author's theory of the mode of the resurrection. At least so we shall, for charity's sake, choose to consider it; for we cannot believe that he wishes, for the sake of novelty, or any interested consideration, to disturb the long-settled and fondly-cherished faith of the church upon this most interesting and important subject. What we deprecate in this case is, that Professor Bush should have settled himself so immovably in a deduction, confessedly from a mere philosophical speculation, that he feels himself obliged, by a logical necessity, to deny the resurrection of the body; than which we can regard no doctrine of revelation as more obviously and fully taught. But to proceed: Starting from a point so far removed from the central basis of Biblical hermeneutics, our readers will naturally expect that our author's path will describe a very eccentric line as he passes on from point to point of the lights which

indicate the regular orbit of our faith. But we doubt not that the brief view which we are about to give of the remaining portion of this book, by the novelty and boldness of the positions which its author has been obliged to take in support of his theory, will surprise our readers still more than anything that has yet been placed before them.

The argument from the Scriptures opens with an examination of particular passages taken from the Old Testament, which the professor supposes would be employed to prove the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. But respecting these passages, and his exegesis and reasoning upon them, we have nothing now to say, for the reason that they, in our judgment, present nothing upon the issue under examination. Still, however, we consider ourselves entitled to the full benefit of our author's main conclusion upon them, (p. 141,) "that the teachings of the Old Testament, so far as they throw light at all on the theme of human destiny in the world to come, do not go beyond the announcement of the simple fact of *a future life*." Be it so. Then they prove nothing in *favor* of his theory of a resurrection, and certainly nothing *against* ours. The author might very well have spared himself the labor and expense of this part of his book. But as it is, we judge, so far as the doctrine of the resurrection is concerned, it will be entirely harmless. Not so with his exposition of the New Testament evidence of this doctrine. This demands a more minute examination.

Having extended our remarks to this length, in what we have further to say we must confine ourselves, mainly, to our author's exposition of the fact of Christ's resurrection. And this we may very safely do: for whatever sense is to be affixed to the statements of the New Testament respecting that event, must also be taken as the true meaning of those texts which reveal the fact of the resurrection of mankind. This the professor was fully aware of; for he says, (p. 151,) that "if he actually rose in his *material* body—in the self-same body in which he was crucified—it doubtless affords some countenance to the idea that his people are also to rise in like manner in the same bodies which they laid down at death." *Why* does our author say, "IF *he* actually rose in *his* MATERIAL *body?*" Does *he* doubt upon this point? Most certainly not; for on page 167 he informs us that he "knows not what resistance to offer to the conclusion that *our Saviour rose from the dead in a spiritual body*, the same in which he ascended to heaven." But how does he get to the conclusion that Christ rose in *a spiritual body?* Thus: the Saviour ascended to heaven in a

spiritual body; but he ascended in the *same body* in which he rose from the dead, therefore he *rose* from the dead in a *spiritual* body. Hence the *material* body of Christ did not rise. Here there is a denial of the *fact* that the material body of Christ rose from the dead. But our readers will perceive that this denial rests upon an inference which is drawn from the *assumption* that Christ ascended to heaven in the *same body*, that is, unchanged in its condition, in which he rose from the dead. Did it not occur to the author, that the body of Christ could have been changed to an *adaptedness* for heaven just as well *after* the resurrection, and *before* the ascension, as *during its entombment?* We beg pardon for putting such a question to our author, especially as we knew before that in his opinion "*the resurrection of the same body, in any sense whatever,*" IS PHILOSOPHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. We ask our readers, then, whether such a supposition is not supportable by as many probabilities as the theory of our author? But if Christ *breathed out the substance or germ of a new body* upon the cross, or if it went out by evaporation while he yet lay in the tomb, and if he rose in a "psychical" body, did he not have TWO *bodies?* Or did the *natural* body cease to be the body of Christ when the vital principle ceased to animate it? But our author says, (p. 151,) "the *fact* itself of his emergence from the sepulchre on the third day is of course admitted." But then what does he mean by "HIS *emergence?*" Does he mean that his *personality* rose? Was this then defunct, and buried? He certainly cannot mean that *the body* of Christ rose, for his *personality* does not imply the *identity* of his *body*. What then does this mean?

Now the whole drift of his argument upon this point is to show "that the resurrection of the Saviour's *material* body is not incontestably taught in the language of the sacred narrative." But if it is not taught there, it is not taught anywhere, and of course it is not true. This is a very bold position. Very conclusive evidence must be brought forward in the maintenance of it, or the credence of the church will be very slowly gained, if ever it come to be a point of her faith. But our author must be heard in his own defense.

I. He rests this conclusion, in part, upon the assertion "that it is nowhere explicitly affirmed in the narrative of the evangelists, or any other part of the Scriptures, that the identical material body of Christ rose." Of course he does not deny that the Scriptures speak of the resurrection of Christ, but then "when we subject the phraseology to a rigid test," it is incompetent to prove the point; "for no language can adequately establish a fact of this

nature, but that which cannot be properly understood in a different sense." But "the language that is used respecting that event is such as to be capable of being consistently understood without the implication that his material body had any share in the resurrection or ascension," therefore the material body of Christ did not rise from the dead. See pp. 152–3. Well, if this be a valid canon of interpretation, and the mode of argumentation under it conclusive, it will avail very little for the theory of our author. Let us then apply it to his hypothesis of a *psychical body*. "It is nowhere *explicitly* affirmed in the narrative of the evangelists, or any other part of the Scriptures," that Christ *rose*, by the "development—the extrication—the disengagement of the psychical part" from the grosser parts of his body. But "no language can adequately establish a *fact* of this nature, but that which cannot properly be understood in a different sense," but "the language that is used respecting that event is such as to be capable of being consistently understood without implicating," in the *fact* of his resurrection, the development of a new body, by "the disengagement—the extrication of the psychical part" of his body from the grosser portions of it; therefore the resurrection of Christ by the *development of a new body* is not taught in the Scriptures.

II. The next argument is thus stated:—"It seems to be a fair presumption that the same body which rose also ascended. But the evidence is certainly conclusive, that it was not a material body which ascended to heaven;" therefore the material body of Christ did not rise. A slight modification in the statement of this argument will exhibit its full power and bearing upon the issue. It is certain that Christ ascended to heaven in a spiritual body; but it is *presumed* that he did not rise in a material body, therefore it is certain that he did rise in a spiritual body. This conclusion rests, then, upon the assumption that Christ did not rise in a *material* body. This is the very point at issue; and until this question is settled, no conclusion is entitled to credence, however legitimately drawn from the premises, while the premises themselves remain to be established. We shall, then, for the present, enter our denial of the premises from which the conclusion is drawn, and await a re-examination of the question.

III. Again: "The circumstances of his appearance to his disciples, in repeated instances subsequent to his resurrection, are far more consistent with the idea of his possessing a spiritual body than the reverse." The principal circumstance alluded to here is that recorded in John xx, 19, where it is said, "At evening, on the first day of the week, *when the doors were shut*, where the disci-

ples were assembled for fear of the Jews, came Jesus, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you." See also Luke xxiv, 36, 37; John xx, 26. The conclusion upon these passages is thus stated:—"We have here the evidence of a body divested of the conditions of matter, at least as matter is commonly and philosophically defined. It is one endowed with the power of entering a room when the doors were closed, and all the ordinary avenues of access precluded. Such a body must have been spiritual."

What is it that renders this conclusion so certain and necessary? Is it not a mere assumption that the body of Christ had the capacity of such indefinite compressibility or attenuation, that it could pass through any mechanical crevice, or of penetrating the organical interstices of the substance of the walls of the edifice in which the disciples were assembled? We must apply the canon of interpretation which our author has laid down to this view of the subject, namely, that "no language can adequately establish *a fact of this nature* but that which cannot properly be understood in a different sense, much less when equally clear expressions can be adduced in support of the contrary." But this "language can properly be understood" otherwise, therefore it does not prove that the body of Christ was sublimated or etherealized when he appeared in the midst of his disciples. So far as we can see, all that is absolutely proved by it is, that Christ's approach was *unobserved* by the disciples. The natural effect was, as is stated by St. Luke, "they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit." But not only were their fears relieved, but also their error was corrected by the evidence given through their senses, as they pressed the hands and feet of their Saviour, and more especially when he said, "SPIRIT *hath not flesh and bones as ye see* ME *have*." Could the Saviour have given more incontestable proof that his body was not a psychical body? The speciousness of our author's mode of interpretation will be sufficiently shown by referring to a similar occurrence, in intimate historical connection, from this same evangelist; indeed, it is found in the same chapter. Beginning with verse 13, it is narrated that Christ came into the company of two of his disciples as they went to Emmaus, without being recognized by either of them. Why did not our author cite this example to prove the doctrine of *a spiritual body?* We may suppose, to answer our own question, because it would inevitably argue the other way. But why did they not know their Lord, whom it may be supposed they had seen within a few days previous? The 16th verse answers by saying, "*their eyes were*

holden that they should not know him." But as they sat at meat, "their eyes were opened and they knew him, and he vanished out of their sight," verse 31. The miracle, it is here shown, was wrought upon *their eyes*, and not upon *his body*, as it necessarily must have been if he rendered his *invisible* body VISIBLE. How much more consistent is the interpretation which we are forced to put upon *this fact*, than that *enforced* by our author upon the case before alluded to, we leave our readers to judge.

IV. We must not entirely pass over the fourth argument which our author, in support of his theory of the resurrection of Christ, draws from the circumstance that Mary, when coming to the sepulchre, and seeing Jesus, mistook him for the gardener. And pray, what was there very extraordinary in that? or what proof does it afford that Christ then had, and that he rose in, a spiritual body? especially when, as we are informed by this same evangelist, Mary came to the sepulchre "*when it was yet dark.*" John xx, 1. It is not at all surprising that she mistook him for the gardener. A timid female, whose head was bowed with sorrow, would not be very likely to scrutinize the person of a man at that early hour in the morning, so as at once to distinguish one from another. But if there is anything at all miraculous in the case, how does it prove that Christ had a spiritual body at that instant? Thus, according to the reasoning of our author:—Mary mistook the person of Jesus for that of the gardener; "he must, therefore, have been clothed, and in habiliments appropriate to a gardener;" but it is unknown whence he obtained those garments, (his own having been distributed among the soldiers, and his grave-clothes still lying in the sepulchre,) therefore he was not clothed, only in an "apparent garb," and consequently his body was only an "apparent," and not a material one. It seems to us that a cause which is obliged to rely upon so slender proof for its support, and especially when it is a point so essential to the theory to which it is related, must be hard pressed for want of evidence to sustain it.

The remaining argument is built upon the belief of our author that Christ "ascended to heaven on the very day on which he rose from the dead," from which he infers that he had a spiritual body. The criticisms and exegesis resorted to, to sustain this position, fail entirely to induce us to the belief of his opinion in regard to the point. We shall, therefore, leave the general argument against the resurrection of Christ's body. We must, however, ask the reader's attention to the manner in which the author disposes of certain *facts* upon which he supposes reliance would be placed in an attempt to prove the resurrection of the *material body* of the Sa-

viour: as, for example, that Christ ate "fish" and "honey-comb," which it is declared he did by St. Luke, chap. xxiv, 42, 43.

Our readers who may not have seen the book now under examination, would be puzzled to *guess* how our author invalidates testimony apparently so pointedly in favor of a bodily resurrection. And we have very little fear, in quoting his method, that our readers will be made converts to his conclusion. He says: "As to the act of eating, it is certain that it could not be from any necessity of sustaining his body by material food. It was doubtless an *optical* act, like that of the three angels that came to Abraham." The argument is this: Material food is necessary to sustain a material body, but it was not necessary that Jesus Christ should take material food in order to sustain his body; therefore his body was not *material*. Logical as this conclusion appears, evidently our author felt that it would be insufficient to meet the historical statement respecting it; for that says, he "did eat before them." The *act of eating* cannot be denied, and so it must be explained, of course, upon *philosophical principles*. The result is, that though Christ *ate* after his resurrection, it was only "an *optical* act." But our readers must not ask us, What is *optical eating?* for we cannot answer the question.

Under these novel rules of interpretation, the evidence in favor of a bodily resurrection, arising from the facts that the disciples held Jesus by the feet, that one of them put his finger into the print of the nail, and thrust his hand into the side of the Saviour, all vanishes away. These, too, were *optical acts;* at least "they were mere *appearances*." So says Professor Bush, p. 162.

We shall content ourselves with placing the plain language of the inspired record in opposition to this exposition. And let it be distinctly remembered, that what our Saviour says was to disabuse the minds of his disciples from the impression, produced by their fear, that they saw a *spirit*. Hear him: "Behold MY *hands* and MY *feet*, that it is MYSELF: *handle* ME, and see; for a SPIRIT *hath not* FLESH and BONES, as ye see ME *have*. And when he had thus spoken, he *showed* them *his hands* and *his feet*." Luke xxiv, 39, 40. Are *flesh* and *bones material substances?* Did these identify the self-hood of the Saviour? If so, does not "personal identity imply the identity of the body" in this instance? The professor's assumption of *psychical body* will not relieve this case; for, according to his own showing, a spiritual body is one which is *invisible* and *impalpable*. Now, to conclude our remarks upon this subject, either the disciples did see and handle the hands and

feet of the Saviour, or they did not. If they did, then it was a *material body* in which Christ appeared to them, and consequently Professor Bush's theory goes for nothing. If they did not *see* and *handle* the body of Christ—if the whole thing were a mere *appearance*, a deception—then Jesus Christ wrought a miracle in order to enforce upon the belief of his disciples, and perpetuate in the world, the most palpable and gross falsehood ever recorded upon the page of history, sacred or profane. Our author can make his own election of these consequences: for ourselves, we remain in the unshaken belief of Christ's *bodily* resurrection.

There are many more points, perhaps equally entitled to notice, in respect to this single portion of the book under examination, which we must pass over; especially as it is not our intention to write an *answer*, but an *antidote*, to the general doctrines which it contains. It would be in no sense disagreeable to us to follow our author through his whole remaining field of exposition upon the passages in the New Testament. But this, for the obvious reason that the medium which we have selected through which to utter our dissent from his doctrine is such that it would be improper, even if we felt it necessary to the cause of truth to make the attempt. Besides, for reasons which we shall hereafter give, we deem it unnecessary to examine his comments upon these passages respectively. One, however, we cannot omit to notice. It is John v, 28, 29: "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth: they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." Upon this passage the professor makes some important concessions. He says: "This is undoubtedly the strongest passage in the New Testament in favor of the common view of the resurrection;" that, "as understood in its literal import, does certainly encounter the force of that cumulative mass of evidence, built upon rational and philosophical grounds, which we have arrayed against *any* statement of the doctrine that would imply the participation of the *body* in that *rising again* which is predicated of the dead." Now, it is gratifying in no small degree, after he has seemed to plant himself immovably in positions antagonistic to the resurrection of the body, to hear him say: "We do not by any means affirm that the conclusions from that source," (reason and philosophy,) "to which we have come, are sufficient of themselves to countervail the rebutting conclusion which may be formed from the present passage." And but for a single obstacle to his conversion to the common view of the doctrine in question, we should

hope yet to see a full abjuration of the doctrine of his book. That obstacle is, that "reason *preponderates* in favor of the idea of the immediate entrance at death upon the resurrection state." But what is to be done with this passage of *revelation*, which, upon "first blush," so formidably encounters the "cumulative mass of evidence" in favor of *his* theory from *reason* and *philosophy? Some* disposition *must* be made of it; at least some justification must be shown for that *preponderance* of his reason which impels him to the belief of "the immediate entrance at death upon the resurrection state." Fortunately for him, he has a convenient door of escape always at command. He has only to put his hand upon "the *elasticity* of import in the language of the sacred volume," and a door opens at once for his escape from any dilemma in which otherwise he might ensnare himself. Hence, after having *seemingly* made a concession to the *verbal truthfulness* of this passage, in order to rid himself of a "rebutting conclusion" against his theory, he has only to say, that in "the text under consideration, and perhaps a few others, the doctrine of a future, simultaneous bodily resurrection *seems* to be explicitly taught." Upon this he adds: "Here, then, we are reduced to a new dilemma. The character of the difficulty is changed. It is not so much now a conflict between revelation and reason, as it is *an apparent conflict between one part of revelation and another*." But what is this "*new dilemma?*" Why it is this—Professor Bush says: "The evidence from reason *preponderates* in favor of the idea of the immediate entrance at death upon the resurrection state;" and "this evidence," he adds, "we have seen to be confirmed by the testimony of a multitude of passages which yield this more easily and naturally than any other sense." "But in the text under consideration, and perhaps a few others, the doctrine of a future, simultaneous bodily resurrection *seems* to be explicitly taught;" that is, some do not teach it at all, and others only *seem* to teach it; therefore the "conflict" is not "between revelation and reason," (that is, his theory,) but between "*one part of revelation and another*."

Our readers, from the manner in which they have seen the fact of Christ's resurrection disposed of by our author, will be able to judge of the nature of that pressure which has been applied to this "multitude of passages," in order to make them "yield" *such*, rather "than any other sense." But then precisely one half of this "multitude," it is not claimed, have any reference whatever to the subject. How they can *confirm* "the evidence from reason," we are not able to see. But we have not yet done with this subject. "The passage, as understood in its *literal import, does cer-*

tainly encounter the force of that cumulative mass of *evidence* built upon *rational* and *philosophical* grounds," against *a bodily resurrection*. Very well: then, unless *reason* is of higher authority than *revelation*, the point is made out, is it not? Our readers, we think, most assuredly will say yes; especially as Professor Bush dare not "by any means affirm that the conclusions from that source . . . . . are sufficient of themselves to countervail the rebutting conclusion which may be formed from the present passage." But then it will not do to say that *reason* is superior to *revelation*, for that would shock the feelings of his readers; and yet this "rebutting conclusion" must be invalidated, or his theory will be endangered. What then is to be done? What *does* our author do? Nothing; only, with his usual adroitness, he says that "the doctrine of a future, simultaneous bodily resurrection *seems* to be explicitly taught" in this passage. But then "*this* passage" does teach this doctrine or it does not. If it does teach it, then that ends the controversy. But if it does not—if it *only* "SEEM" to teach it—how is it in "conflict" with other parts of "revelation," or with "the multitude of passages" which, according to the showing of the professor himself, teach a *contrary* doctrine? For if it *only* "SEEMS" to teach the doctrine of a *bodily* resurrection, it does *not teach it at all*. Where, then, is the "new dilemma"—the "*apparent conflict between one part of revelation and another*." Really, we are tempted to apply here the French proverb, and leave our readers to give it a free Anglican translation. It runs thus: "Comme le voilà accommodé!" Although *we* are not then in the "dilemma" into which our author supposed he had thrown us, still we thank him for the sympathy which he manifests in a readiness to yield, upon this "emergency," his "antagonistic attitude," and make "common" cause with all "Christians" in "harmonizing the Scripture statements," and to help in clearing up "such seeming discrepancies in the sacred writers" as he thinks he has shown to exist. Our readers, we doubt not, will unite with us in awarding the merit of a kind intention; and also in the opinion that the overture of our author is quite unnecessary.

That our author did not believe that this passage taught a *bodily resurrection* is shown by the fact, that he labors to make it, if not a quotation from, yet at least a parallel to, Dan. 12, 2, which, though the "phraseology is somewhat varied, the general identity of import," he says, "is obvious." To know what this text does teach, according to Professor Bush's exposition, we have only to turn back to his labored exegesis of the place in Daniel, and read, on page 140, that the "awaking from the dead, announced by Daniel,

points mainly to a *spiritual* and not a *corporeal* resurrection." This passage, then, which "*seems* to be explicitly" uttering the doctrine of a bodily resurrection, is, after all, "to be considered as having simply re-echoed the announcement" of the earlier prophet, "without professing to give any other additional light respecting it than what concerned the divine agent by whom it was to be effected."

A little critical attention to "this passage," and the context, will show that our author was right in his judgment of it, when he penned the first sentence of his critique upon it, and admitted that "it is undoubtedly the strongest passage in the New Testament in favor of the common view of the resurrection." And moreover we think it will also show that it not only *encounters*, but utterly sweeps away, the "cumulative mass of evidence built upon rational and philosophical grounds," in favor of his "developed" *psychical body* at or before death. If our readers will take their Testament and turn to John v, and read verses 24, 25, they will have before them an announcement of a *spiritual resurrection*, that is, a resurrection of the *soul*. For, although *θανάτου* in verse 24, and *νεκροὶ* in verse 25, are the terms used to signify *death* and *the dead*, yet they are also the terms which are employed to express the idea intended to be conveyed by the phrase "*spiritual death*." The original meaning is retained in this use of the words, but a *moral* application is given to them, so that they express the sinfulness, and its consequences, of man in his natural state. An example of the use of the former term may be found in 1 John iii, 14, where it is said, "We know that we have passed from *death* (*θανάτου*) unto life, because we love the brethren." A corresponding use of the latter word may be seen in Eph. ii, 1: "And you hath he quickened, who were *dead* (*νεκροὺς*) in trespasses and sins." This use of these terms is very common in the New Testament.

But will the passage in question bear this construction? Can there be a figurative sense enforced upon it at all? *Enforced* it must be if it "yield this sense" in any manner whatever. We think we may say, unhesitatingly, that *μνημεῖον* is never used in the New Testament in a sense corresponding with the figurative application of the words *θανάτος* and *νεκροὶ*. In Matt viii, 28, where the word occurs in the plural form, it is rendered "*tombs*." See also chap. xxvii, 60. But in John xx, 1, *μνημεῖον* is rendered "*sepulchre*." And we have failed to find it used in the New Testament in any sense differing from the most natural and obvious import which is given to it in the texts here cited. Our readers will perceive that its proper etymological meaning is strongly retained in the use of the term in these places; namely, a *memo-*

rial, monument, or tomb, which to a great extent was a remembrancer. How then is it possible that the predicted resurrection, in the text under consideration, can be a *spiritual* resurrection? This is not being saved or delivered from the κρίσιν, of verse 24, (which, by the by, reflects the legal sense in which θανάτου is to be understood,) but a resurrection of the *entombed* dead; of those "*who are in the* GRAVES." Could our Saviour have used more explicit language to assert the great *fact* of a future general resurrection? We see not how it could have been possible. And how Professor Bush could have given it the construction he has we cannot imagine, unless, indeed, he was driven to such extremes by the force of the evidence which he attempts to resist.

We must now conclude our remarks upon this ingenious, but, as we believe, specious book. We do not feel it necessary to pursue any further his exposition of "particular passages." For if the remaining ones afford no better proof of our author's theory than the one we have just examined, (and in our judgment they do not,) our readers, we think, will have very little, if any, apprehension for the safety of their strongly-cherished "hope of a resurrection from the dead." And especially will they feel confident of this, if they think, as we do, that the arguments of our author against the bodily resurrection are wholly insufficient to disprove this fact so fundamental to any important view of the resurrection of mankind.

Our author is not the first who has attempted to go beyond the precincts of revelation, and failed to illumine the inscrutable future with the feeble flame of reason and philosophy. But, from one of such various reading, versatility of talent, and philological acuteness, as we esteem our author to be, the Christian church had a right to expect, that instead of these high endowments being employed to dethrone the truth and power of revelation, they would have been used to rescue it from any *reputed* scandal which skepticism has attempted to fasten upon it. The divine Scriptures have been charged with an ambiguity which admitted of their being applied in proof of almost any dogma or theory that human ingenuity can produce. And with weak minds, the conclusion, that *if* God had given a revelation to man, it would have been in such terms as that there could have been no doubts resting upon its meaning; and that it is shown by the conflicting uses of the Bible that it cannot be a book from God; has been used to annoy, confound, and sink them in the depths of infidel darkness. We were not a little surprised, therefore, indeed we were deeply afflicted, when, upon the perusal of the volume before us, we saw given the elements of a wider currency to this reproach upon the

sacred Scriptures, under the sanction of one whom, if we had not been permitted to esteem as a friend, we nevertheless could admire for his great ability and worth. Not to admit the validity of this objection against the truth and integrity of the Bible, still we must concede that we have nowhere met with a stronger justification of it, than is furnished in the mode of argumentation employed in this treatise upon the resurrection. Whether the fundamental idea which is developed in this book germinated in his own prolific fancy, or whether it was suggested by the "theory" of "Swedenborg," with which our author admits a "substantial identity," we know not; nor is it of any considerable importance to know this. For it is not the naked "theory" from which we apprehend that the danger will arise, in the circulation of this book, so much as from the ratiocination by which it is attempted to be supported. On page 238 the professor says: "That without acceding to the full extent to the canons of interpretation adopted in the *accommodation* school of Semler and others in Germany, we may still admit that the principle is to be in some degree recognized in the didactic procedures of Christ and the apostles." If Professor Bush has given us a sample in this treatise of the results arising from the application of the principles of "the *accommodation* school," *only* in "some degree," our readers will be able to judge what would be the fruit of the application of the "canons" of "Semler and others in Germany," when applied in their "full extent." For if a fact so palpable as is the resurrection of the body of Jesus Christ —a fact, which, since the memorable morning of its occurrence until this hour, has been continuously and almost universally believed—a fact so undeniably essential to the truth and integrity of the Christian religion; indeed, that fact which has been to the hopes of every Christian as the "mountain of the Lord;"—if such *a fact*, under the influence of the principles of interpretation employed by the "accommodation school," and that, too, when applied *only* in "some degree," is made to fade away to *mere appearances*, pray what would become of our gospel if these rules were applied without restraint? And then, too, when language, than which we cannot imagine words to be more explicit, nor to have been uttered with greater *absoluteness* in regard to their application, than is that of John v, 28, 29, in relation to the general resurrection of mankind, is made, by the violence of the construction which is put upon it, to *only* "*seem*" to speak what the most natural sense of the words would lead us to suppose was meant by them,—what, we ask again, are we to conclude respecting the canons of interpretation to which they have been subjected, in order to make out

this alledged verbal deception? Whether these are the legitimate results of the "canons" of that "school," we shall not attempt to decide; but the results arise in the course of our author's attempts to disprove the doctrine of a *bodily* resurrection, and the argument for the support of *his* view of a "psychical body developed at death." They are at all events, then, chargeable upon his theory of the resurrection; and as this is the product of his reason and philosophy, rather than the fruit of the teachings of the Bible, "as understood in its literal import," they may be deemed as pretty conclusive proof of the impotency of *reason* and philosophy to unlock to us the unknowable secrets of the future. The New Testament formally announces the doctrine of the resurrection "of all that are in *the graves*," but it does not inform us "how the dead are raised up or with what bodies they come," otherwise than in this general sense, that they are sown *natural* bodies, and are raised *spiritual* bodies. This is the amount of our information upon the subject.

Whoever, then, shall substitute the mere deductions of philosophy for revelation is chargeable with an act of the highest folly: and whoever shall subject the authoritative teachings of revelation to, and make our knowledge of their meaning depend upon, philosophical speculations, is not, in our judgment, less guilty of presumption. O.

New-York, 1845.

ART. II.—1. *General View of the Geology of Scripture.* By GEORGE FAIRHOLME, Esq.

2. *Scripture and Geology.* By Rev. PYE SMITH, D.D.

THE problem of the world's origin is one under which philosophy has been staggering for nearly four thousand years. But what has been the result of its toilsome lucubrations, its indefatigable effort to search out and reveal the primeval history of this mundane system? Have philosophers been able to thread its mazes, and to pour the light of discovery and of science upon the darkness that has ever brooded over the birth of nature; or does this problem still remain unsolved—the *crux philosophorum* of the world? Solutions have, indeed, been numerous as the ages through which the problem has stood; but it may justly be added,—*various* as are the ever-changing phases of man and nature. Human language was not more utterly confounded in the scenes of the Babel confusion,

than is human science before this more durable Babel tower—the problem of the world's origin.

One tells us that the origin of all things is in air; another, that it is in fire; another places it in water; and still another, in earth. One tells us that the universe has existed from eternity; another, that *matter* is eternal,—but that the present order of the universe has been brought about by the slow operation of physical causes—a thing supposed to be by no means incredible, especially when these *causes* have had millions of ages assigned for the sphere of their operations. It must, however, be confessed that these little *physici*, though it took them so long to perfect the system of nature, nevertheless possessed not a little mechanical skill and plastic energy. Alas for them! They must all have perished about six thousand years ago; for since that period the world has given but few evidences of their existence. And, indeed, it has been getting so sadly out of repair, both morally and physically, that according to certain modern philosophers, it is soon to pause in its course, to receive "extensive and thorough repairs." But admitting that the "laws of nature are immutable," and therefore that "physical causes" do not die, a curious problem arises for solution, viz.—If no sensible progress has been made in the beauty and perfection of nature, notwithstanding the unceasing operation of these physical causes, for the past six thousand years; how long did it take them to bring it to that degree of perfection and beauty it then possessed—when the eye of intelligence first beheld its glories—glories which caused *the morning stars to sing together and the sons of God to shout for joy*—and when the first record was entered upon its history?

But, just here, old Chaos and Night, personages that figure largely and sustain important functions in the earlier philosophy of man, however much they may want for respect now-a-days when philosophy has become "full grown," slip in a claim that disturbs greatly the quietude of our ancient *physici* in their claims to the earth's paternity. We are, indeed, to consider them not exactly physical, but rather mythological, causes. Aristotle* says, "The Theologi affirm that all things were born from night; the Physici, that all things were mingled together."† But the Orphean fragments bid us "sing of Night, the father of gods and men,—Night, the genitor of all

* Aristotle very curiously remarks concerning the animal creation:—"If men and animals have sprung from the earth, they must either have crawled out as worms, or come out of eggs."—*De Gen. An.*, (ascribed to Aristotle.)

† Metamorphoses.

things." Here, then, we have the problem of the world's origin solved; nor are vouchers for its paternity wanting.* But still there might be some question whether the earth's genesis could philosophically be assigned to old Night exclusively. What philosophy has left obscure, drama has elucidated. It was, perhaps, natural, that philosophers, whose minds were accustomed to seek for unity rather than duality, (according to the most approved parlance of modern philosophy,) should rest upon the stronger cause, the *primum mobile*, and thereby forget the claims of the mother, when, indeed, the *mater-familias* is as indispensable as the *pater-familias*. But Aristophanes good-naturedly supplies the deficiency, and by so much is philosophy indebted to drama. "First of all, was chaos and night, dark Erebus and gloomy Tartarus. There was no earth, nor air, nor heaven, till obscure night, by the power of the wind upon the wide Erebus, brought forth an egg."† Still, it may be safely granted, this system is not perfect (what production of man is perfect?) as it hardly gives us to understand whether the earth is to remain an egg *in perpetuam*, or is yet to be hatched. But this imperfection results no doubt from the "modesty of true science." The sage philosophers, from whose brains this system was evoked, were undoubtedly reluctant to take a single step beyond the point to which the true Baconian method of induction would lead them.

Had they been initiated into all the mysteries of modern science and art, had they been only apprised of the wonderful application of *steam* to *hatching*, they would no longer have doubted but that the earth would some day crack its shell and not remain an "egg" for ever. Thus, their theory would not have been left to limp its way down through all time, nor would the earth have been condemned to remain for ever an egg, simply because chaos, the old hen that laid it, had died.

One tells us that the earth was made by an intelligent designing cause;‡ another, that it made itself.§ One tells us that God made

* Mr. Ellis, in his Polynesian Researches, says that "the Otaheitans believe that their principal deities were born of night, and that darkness was the origin of all things."—See vol. ii, p. 191, &c.

† Drama of the Birds.

‡ Socrates says to Enthydemes, "Since you cannot behold the form of the gods, let these, their works which you see, suffice you. Adore the gods for them, and think that in them they show themselves to you."

§ Kepler assigns vital powers to the globe; mountains are its organs of respiration, and seists its secreting organs. Also, its elementary atoms possess instinct and will.

the universe ;* another, that the universe is God. One denies that the earth was ever formed, or that it has anything more than an ideal existence. Such is the class who negate existence to everything except *ideas*—affirming that, though entities in themselves, ideas have no corresponding reality without. Idealism—that idealism which supersedes the problem of nature's origin by denying the existence of a material universe—has laid the foundation of its empire upon the mighty assemblage of ideas; but to these ideas no position in space can be given, and no period in time can be assigned,—like the atoms of Epicurus, they are left to "dance about in emptiness." Philosophers, sound and true, no doubt, idealism has had. The celebrated Pyrrhus penetrated so deeply into its occult mysteries, and became so fully convinced of the non-existence of a material world, as to give no credit to his senses, even when they warned him of approaching danger. David Hume appears also, sometimes, to have adopted the same transcendental faith. The former, it must be confessed, unfortunately and to the great scandal of his philosophy, had a momentary forgetfulness of his theory when, enraged at his cook for burning his roast of beef, he pursued him with his spit in hand even into the market. We will not question the claims of the latter to science; but he seems also to have had a lapsus in his philosophy, when he willed to a fellow-chip a dozen of claret and a pack of cards. We will not, however, undertake to invalidate the Berkeleyan philosophy; nor will we say that the *idea* of beef well cooked, and of claret and cards, are not as essential to *idealists*, as their corresponding realities are to *realists*.

The Mosaic account of creation, which one might think was at least tolerably explicit, has also been contorted to adapt it to the various hypotheses and theories with which sophists have thought it necessary that they should afflict the world. Indeed, it has been worked up into so many phases by philosophic theologians, that it has become somewhat difficult to determine what is really narrated in the first chapter of Genesis; unless the inquirer is happily ignorant of the geologico-theological expositions with which it has been encumbered, and especially of the endless theories which reduce these transactions to a chaos of difficulty and doubt. Should the old patriarch of history and philosophy revisit our earth, and, through the glasses of some critics and commentators, read the history his own hand had penned in the early infancy of our race,

* It was a splendid conception of Plato, and one worthy of a more advanced age in philosophy—"*Dei Artem, vel Artificosum Dei Organon.*"

it is quite clear that he would have some difficulty in discovering its identity, if he were not absolutely led into the error of supposing that the whole transaction had reference to some other system or planet.

To the simple reader, uninitiated into the mysteries of philosophical speculation and metaphysical criticism, this chapter seems to be a plain, unvarnished narration of facts. Poor soul! he has never yet comprehended to what profound depths human science has penetrated, nor to what refined speculations it has given birth. That which, to his uninitiated understanding, seemed to be a plain narration of facts, under the magic influence of *criticism* has been transformed into a splendid *mythos*, invented by Moses to wean the children of Israel from the pantheistic idolatry into which they had fallen in Egypt. This, if we may credit our venerable theological critics, was the masterpiece of Moses,—"a fiction contrived with great wisdom, dressed up in the garb of history, and adapted to the shallow intellects of a rude and barbarous nation."* It is well known that the ancient Egyptians were so profuse in their objects of worship, as justly to subject themselves to the lampooning of the satyrical poet:—

"O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis lumina!"

For the productions of the earth, leeks, onions, and radishes; also the whole variety of the animal creation, whether on or above the earth, or in the sea; and the sun, moon, and stars, were all transformed by the magic lamp of human credulity into gods and goddesses, so that of this comfortable commodity there was no scarcity. Most justly did Bossuet remark concerning the gods of Egypt,—*Tout étoit Dieu, excepté Dieu même.*

Here, then, we have the reason why Moses invented this *fable*, and passed it off upon the "shallow intellects" of his followers, to the great perplexity of the critical world. Skillfully did he do his work. We hardly know which to admire most, the profound wisdom of his contrivance, or the skill and ingenuity with which he has executed it: for what could be more effective in weaning man from his pantheistic idolatry than to reveal to him a universal God —a creator of his gods? Idolatry must have been fixed, indeed, in its channel, not to be diverted by so broad, deep, and inviting a sluice-way as was here dug out by Moses.

But this is not the only theory that has poured its radiance upon this difficult subject—a subject rendered difficult and encumbered

* See Geddes' "Critical Remarks" on Genesis.

by the trappings of "learned criticism," which have been thrown profusely over it. Moses is not exactly accused of writing a fiction, but of allegorizing when he narrates the work of creation. Even Josephus says that "Moses, after the seventh day was over, begins to talk philosophically;"* thereby intimating, at least, that the account of creation was to be considered as an allegory rather than a history. Eusebius, Cyril and others of "the fathers," also find it necessary to apologize for the Mosaic account of creation, by intimating that he did not design it as a philosophical account of creation, but as an allegory to teach that the universe was created by God. Philo is still more energetic; for he declares it to be a "piece of rustic simplicity" to imagine that God was employed six days in the creation of the world. Now, this disposition to do away with the force of the Mosaic history, by turning it into an allegory, need not have been referred to only as an idle speculation peculiar to a darker age than ours, had we not too much reason to believe that our own age has been more or less tinctured with the same speculation. We need not travel into the province of geological speculations, where, by universal consent, fancy has been permitted to run riot with reason—we need not, indeed, travel out of the legitimate province of theology to find minds that have been smitten by this mania.

But our allegorical theory is not without its difficulties; for though it may change the ground of the difficulty, it can never elucidate the fact. A fabulous *creation* involves the idea of a fabulous world created; and the whole system of duties and morals, based upon this primary and original fable, are resolved into a skillful congeries of fables. Now, Moses has not informed us where the fabulous ends, and the historical begins; nor has he the ingenuousness to acknowledge any part of it to be allegorical, but the whole is presented in the style and with the air of a plain matter-of-fact history. Those who believe that Moses could thus palm off upon the "shallow intellects" of his followers a *fable* as a matter of grave and important history,—and that it was done too under the direction and by the inspiration of God,—must be deeply tinctured with the sentiment that "the end sanctifies the means." Admit a theory of such monstrous absurdity, attach to Moses and his divine Guide a narration so discordant with facts, and you affect not merely the question of the time and manner of the earth's origin, but you make, at one and the same time, a broad infraction upon the doctrine of inspiration. You make it questionable whether that which is given by inspiration from God is to be credited or not; for if He has

* Antiquities of the Jews, b. i, ch. i, § 2.

inspired one man to palm off a fable for a fact upon the people, he may inspire another to palm off fiction for truth.

But admitting our allegorical interpretation—that Moses really intended his account of creation only as an allegory—still there are difficulties in the way; nor do critics who start from this point seem to pursue their subsequent journey very harmoniously together. For as Moses does not give the point at which the *allegory* terminates and the *history* begins, each critic has done it for himself, just as his fancy dictated. Accordingly, some terminate it when creation was completed; others include "the fall;" and others include the entire five books written by Moses.* Thus Moses is exhibited as a *novel-writer*, though one of the highest order—the Bulwer of Israel! Absurd as may seem this conclusion, and harshly as it may grate upon the ears of some, yet, for ourselves, we confess that we have our partialities for this latter class of fabulists. If Moses commenced with *fable* and ran into *fact*, it is but rational to conclude that the ending of the fable and the beginning of the history would have had some marks of discrimination; unless, like the "iron mixed with miry clay" in Nebuchadnezzar's image, the fable and the fact are blended together.

But, again, there are more serious objections to this allegorical theory. The Bible, though its parts were written by different authors, at different times and under different circumstances, exhibits a most perfect harmony in its minute details as well as in its general scope and design. We must then suppose that the authors of its subsequent parts, especially if we admit their inspiration, possessed greater facilities for a right understanding, and are more authoritative expounders of the true intent and meaning of the preceding, than the hyper-critic in philology, or the dogmatical geologist, however deeply he may be read in nature's primeval fossil records. Let us turn, then, to see what light subsequent revelations will throw upon the Mosaic record of creation. It may be proper, however, to remark in passing, that if the "six days" in which the work of creation was performed were "allegorical" days, or "periods of indeterminate length," then the "sabbath" on which God "rested," and which he "hallowed," must also have been an allegorical sabbath, or a period of indeterminate length—either of which suppositions would nullify its design and use. But let us turn to the exposition of this subject afterward given by God himself, and see if the allegorical construction of our philosophers will not impair the general doctrine of inspiration. Now, when the "ten com-

* See Horne's Introduction.

mandments," that sublime summary of the laws of the moral universe, were given, Jehovah himself asserts the creation of the world in six days and the rest on the seventh, as a reason why the sabbath should be everywhere observed by man.* Here it should be observed, the text admits of no "allegorical" sense and no "periods of indeterminate length;" because "six days" are specified, and the length of the day had been determined long before, and was now universally understood. If, then, the term "days" was not used in its commonly-received sense in this passage—a sense obviously designed to be impressed upon the mind—we can hardly reconcile its use to the immutable truthfulness of Jehovah, as there must appear a deliberate design to deceive the children of Israel, and not them only, but the whole human race; for the observance of the sabbath was designed to be universal and perpetual. If the Mosaic account of the creation, then, is to be considered an allegory, the delivering of the law must also be considered of the same character; it can harmonize with the legend of creation in no other point of view; and if this be admitted, those sublime precepts, that mighty condensation of the code of immutable morality, is transformed into a mere rhetorical flourish to give flavor to a fiction. Instead of an eternal code of morality, the Almighty has here woven a garland to deck an allegory.

The sacred writers often refer to the account of creation, and uniformly as a veritable record of actual events. Our Saviour and his apostles also allude to it in the same manner; hence, if it were not true, they must have been deceived, or were guilty of deceiving.†

Now we protest against this summary way of "laying the spectre," conjured up by hyper-critics from the Mosaic account of the creation. If we cannot fully comprehend so stupendous a work, let us remember its miraculous character as well as its magnitude, and also the fact that it is but a brief *outline* that is given us by the inspired historian, not so much designed to gratify scientific curiosity as to give us some of the primary data concerning the world's origin. Or, if the developments of science should seem to be contradictory to the Bible narrative, let us not be hasty in subjecting

* "Remember the sabbath-day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do any work. . . . For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the sabbath-day, and hallowed it." Exodus xx, 8–11.

† Among other allusions to the earliest scenes in the Mosaic narrative, found in the New Testament, the following are worthy of notice:—Matt. xix, 4; 1 Cor. xi, 9; xv, 45; 2 Cor. iv, 6; xi, 3; 1 Tim. ii, 13, 14.

the Sacred Word to the vice of "Biblical criticism," in order to screw out a "construction" that will quadrate with the *present phase* of science; but calmly bear the "insinuations of the modest learned," and the contemptuous sneers of the dogmatist, whose brain has become the receptacle of a partial fact, and patiently, yet confidently expect, that science, of itself, will yet develop some new phase that shall harmonize every seeming contradiction, and clear away every difficulty. Let science push its inquiries far and wide, let it dive deep into the occult mysteries of creation,—revelation has nothing to fear. If from the turbid waters of science a mist arise to obscure its brightness, its lustre shall dazzle the more when that mist has passed away. But to endeavor, by any process of criticism, to veer our interpretations of the Bible so that they may quadrate with the partial facts of science, discovers a lamentable want of faith, or a contemptible pliability and indecision. The man, who has been haunted by some ghost-like spectre, may quiet himself with the assurance that it was only the excited conception of a disordered brain. But to leap over the problem of creation by pronouncing the whole history a *mythos*, appears to us strikingly absurd, unless we level down the whole Bible to a continuous series of *mythi;* since the narrative of creation is everywhere blended with the frame-work of the Sacred Word, and is, in fact, the very corner-stone on which the superstructure was afterward reared.

The conclusion, then, to which we seem led, is, that the Mosaic account of the creation is neither enigmatical nor allegorical,—neither a fiction nor a fable; that Moses was not a novel-writer, but a veritable historian. Hither are we carried by the Divine Word, and here must we rest, till science ("falsely so called") has achieved the signal exploit of exalting itself above the truth.

Against this conclusion, skepticism has arrayed itself with all its native virulence and illiberality, and the professed defenders of the truth have too often cowered beneath its insolent bravado. What labors have not the modern school of infidels undertaken to invalidate and bring into contempt the Mosaic account of creation! Heathen traditions have been consulted; the chronological records of the East, extending through many thousand years anterior to the creation, have been brought forward; ancient astronomical calculations, whose dates were fixed long before sun, or moon, or stars, began their courses in the heavens, have been sought out; obscure hieroglyphics, inscribed on time-enduring obelisks, have been tortured to make them confess something inimical to the Christian religion; and lastly, the bowels of the earth have been penetrated,

and nature forced to give up the secrets of her birth, lest, perchance, she had secreted something in her bosom which might give the lie to her Author. All these arguments have, in turn, been brought forward and insisted upon with a pertinacity and doggedness well befitting infidelity. But—mark the result—even heathen tradition has turned against the enemies of the Lord. The boasted chronological and astronomical records have been dissipated by the light of investigation; and though these modern priests of Baal have worshiped, from morn till eve, before the altars of pagan obelisks, yet no fire from heaven consumed their unholy offering, and no voice from God responded to their prayers. And even nature's bosom, which is ever true to itself, has not been found to contain those secrets so eagerly sought by the enemies of revealed truth. The science of geology, it is true, was for a long time the strong-hold of infidelity; but truth has bearded the lion in his den, and wrested from him his prey. In fact, along the frontiers of every science, infidelity has planted its standard and raised its bulwarks against Christianity; but as scientific knowledge has advanced, as its facts and principles have been more widely comprehended and more fully understood, it has been obliged to surrender one strong-hold after another, till no place is left on which it can rest—except in the regions of wild conjecture and speculative philosophy.

There may, indeed, be some miserable ghost of a skeptic, whose shade still wanders on this side of the Styx, who still strives to infuse vital energy into the defunct cavils which the skepticism of a former age has produced; but such efforts will be for ever vain and abortive. "Infidelity," says Sharon Turner, "is one of the characters of the human mind, which, from the days of paradise to our own, has never wholly left it; and till our knowledge is greatly multiplied, will, perhaps, not be universally extinguished, because it is the champion of matter against mind, of body against spirit, of the senses against reason, of passion against duty, of self-interest against self-government, of dissatisfaction against content, of the present against the future, of the little that is known against all that is unknown, of our limited experience against boundless possibility."* We may then expect that the formula of skepticism, perhaps in new and varying forms, will be propounded to every succeeding generation. That formula, however, seems to have become stereotyped, since science has been compelled to receive the loathsome form of skepticism to its fraternal embrace. Its "key note," which is followed by sundry "variations," is, "There

* Sacred History of the World.

are historical and geological facts wholly irreconcilable with the Mosaic account of creation; for science has demonstrated, and history has added its testimony to the demonstration, that the world and the present order of things have existed for thousands of ages; hence, the Mosaic chronology must be incorrect, or the generally-received interpretation of it must be wrong." This, then, is the great question at issue, if, indeed, its issue be not already closed against infidelity, between skepticism and religion—the problem of the world's origin.

We should, however, premise that in speaking of the creation, we refer to the establishment of the present order of things, and not to the origin of the gross material of our globe; for neither revelation nor science makes us acquainted with the precise period when the creating fiat called it into being. "*In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;*" but how many ages elapsed after its creation till it was fitted up for the residence of man, we will not undertake to say. But with regard to the period when the present order of things was established,—when *the Almighty set a compass upon the face of the great deep, when he established the clouds above, and strengthened the fountains of the deep, when he gave to the sea its firm decree, when he appointed the foundations of the earth, and made his delights with the sons of men,**—all revelation and all science, when properly understood, agree in placing not far from four thousand years anterior to the Christian era.

The scene of creation, as well as of revelation, opens with an exhibition worthy of a God, and well calculated to fill the mind with veneration and awe: "*In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.*" Was ever a conception more sublime, or a description more complete? The imagination at once beholds the gathering of the rough materials for the formation of a universe—shapeless and void at first, but it needed only a new exertion of creating energy, and the wild chaos is reduced to order, harmony, and beauty. The mighty ocean, teeming with its myriads of living creatures, settles back into its bed, and rolls its harmless waves upon the surrounding shores. The darkness that had vaulted the face of nature flees away before those larger and lesser lights which are placed in the firmament above. The face of nature bursts upon the sight, clothed in all the loveliness of virgin spring, and enlivened by the thousand voices of a new and more wondrous creation; all the bright retinue of worlds, "the host of

* Proverbs.

heaven," begin to traverse their ceaseless rounds through the vast circles of the universe. Who can contemplate so sublime a spectacle without feeling his spirit glow with adoring and reverential wonder! What is there in all the discoveries of science, or in all the revelations of infidel philosophy, that can make so powerful an appeal to the more elevated and sublime feelings of our nature! Compared with this sublime spectacle, how insipid does that philosophy become, which would form a universe by the slow and devious operation of natural causes, through the long lapse of innumerable ages!* How utterly revolting that infidelity which can discover no other origin of the glorious frame-work of nature than the chance convolutions of atoms!

The science of geology has been the arena of extravagant speculation, as well as of the wildest and most discordant theories. Indeed, the mania for world-making has, in a peculiar manner, been the besetting sin of geologists,—each one feeling himself bound to tell how and when the world was formed; and with too many, it has seemed an object of paramount importance that the world be so originated as to exclude the Creator. But we may at least hope that a brighter day has begun to dawn even in geological science, and that this passion for world-making is dying away. Men will, after awhile, become wearied with mere idle speculation—inviting as may appear its fields in the distance, they will sooner or later be discovered to be barren and fruitless, and the human mind will, by its own spiritual wants, be driven back to the homely truth it once discarded for the alluring fiction decked in a more gaudy but less substantial garb. Truth is not fixed in the centre of the orbit around which the human mind ceases not to circle, but in one of the *foci;* whence it is apparent that however great may be its digression, however elliptical the orbit on which it may shoot out, it will by and

* M. Boubée, in his Geologie Populaire, affirms that "though the world is not eternal, it is nevertheless very ancient; it cannot be less than three hundred thousand years old." M'Culloch, in speaking of the formation of a series of the oldest sandstone in the bed of a Scottish lake, says,—"No sound geologist will accuse a computer of exceeding, if he allows six hundred thousand years for the production of this series alone." This, let it be remembered, was the time required to form a single series only three thousand feet deep, while geologists claim to have demonstrated the existence of successive strata to the depth of *sixty miles;* but when the earth's age has been computed by this data, the calculation is still incomplete, since "successive strata" undoubtedly exist to a greater depth, if not to its very centre. M'Culloch discovers his own incredulity when he closes by saying, "But let the reader supply the figures, which it is useless to exhibit, since they cannot be true." These data would make the earth over sixty millions of years old.

by return to the same point. We need not doubt, then, the ultimate triumph of truth. Burnished by the conflict of a thousand minds, it shall at length come forth from the vast accumulations of alloy, to be dimmed and clouded no more. What glorious truth, what mighty principle is there, that has not been thus wrought and rewrought in the vast laboratory of mind, before it has acquired a consistency impervious to the doubt of the skeptic, an elevation too high to be dimmed by the vapors and fogs of human reason, and a permanency too confirmed to be shaken by any mental or moral revolution!

But, to return to the speculations of geologists,—the problem of creation is said to be, "*Matter and motion given, to form a world.*" In the solution of this great problem, geologists have exhibited every variety of discordant and contradictory opinion; and yet each has clad his own bantling in a coat of mail that would seem to bid defiance to the bolts of a thousand Joves. Theory dashes against theory in wild confusion, and "fact" meets its counter "fact" in fearful contest. Here may be found the real "Kilkenny cats"—no spurious half-way breed, I assure you, but the real "Simon-pure;" for though they have again and again devoured each other, they have never so much as abated their eternal din and clatter. Now, as to the most approved method of world-making, whether Wernerian, Huttonian, Neptunian, or Plutonian, &c., we will not undertake to say. Were we called upon to solve the above problem, that is, were we a geologist and going to make a world, we have serious doubts whether we should not find some difficulty in the exclusive application of either, and might, perhaps, be driven to the necessity of laying each under contribution. If, then, practical and theoretical geologists agree so little among themselves; if their theories are so contradictory—while each in turn is forced to give way to its successor—what are we to infer, what *can* we infer, but that observation is yet too little extended and geological knowledge too limited, while its facts are in too crude a state, to warrant such comprehensive inductions as are sometimes made; or, indeed, to lay the foundation of any infallible "general rule" for world-making?* We do not mean to undervalue the science of

* "Buffon was one of those who began the extravagant chronology of the earth, by his gratuitous fancy that the earth had been a fiery comet, or red-hot splinter of the sun, which he calculated would take twenty thousand or thirty thousand years to cool. This unfounded imagination was soon adopted and reasoned upon as a fact; and it soon became fashionable to discountenance the Mosaic chronology, in order that these groundless dreams might be substituted instead."—*Sharon Turner's Sacred History*, vol. ii, p. 271.

geology. There are few sciences that possess deeper interest, or have stronger claims upon our attention. But we would restrict it, as we would every other science, to its own legitimate province. What we protest against, is the founding of important principles and conclusions upon loose analogies, or upon facts partially developed and imperfectly understood. These premature theories, however, are not without their use, and perhaps subserve important purposes in the progress of science. We cannot doubt that the rival theories of Werner and Hutton awoke and stimulated a spirit of investigation, and called forth discussions, that have eventuated in greatly increasing the amount of geological knowledge, and also contributed largely to its present certainty and precision.

Our propensity to reduce everything within the limits of some theory will also be checked, by remembering that critical examination of geological phenomena has extended as yet over but a comparatively small portion of the earth, and penetrated to but a very inconsiderable depth beneath its surface.* On this point Mr. Fairholme very justly remarks, "When we have reduced to their true and proper scale those objects on the earth's surface which we consider greatest; and when we further consider that the theories of philosophy, on the formation of the *whole* earth, are formed on a view of the minute portions of its diameter to which we have access, these portions not being more than, at the very utmost, *five miles in height*,† and, by analogy, *five in depth*,‡ out of eight thousand miles; how trifling does the theorist appear with his cabinets of minerals on which his theories are founded! Let him cast his mind's eye along the diameter of a section of the globe, and say if he is justified in forming theories of the *mode of first formations* on so slight a view of its mere surface."§

* The dogmatism of geologists is equally striking with their flagrant violation of sound inductive philosophy. M. Boubée, in his Popular Geology, not only claims that the world is three hundred thousand years old, but has even given us the classification of this time into four periods, with the duration of each. (1.) The primitive state of the globe when the atmosphere was all on fire, from which it gradually cooled, sixty thousand. (2.) The first appearance of organized beings, plants, and aquatic animals; the formation of beds of coal, the extinction and successive creation of organized beings, two hundred thousand. (3.) The appearance of land animals, increasing progression of the organic kingdoms, and decrease of the inorganic, thirty thousand. (4.) The fourth period, its beginning marked by the universal deluge; immediately after which appears man, eight thousand. This period has, probably, just commenced.

† The height of the highest mountains.

‡ The estimated depth of the ocean.

§ Geology of Scripture, pp. 36–7.

Sharon Turner, after alluding to the extravagant notions of M. Boubée, whom he declares to be "a geologist of real talent," goes on to say, "I do not press this theory peculiarly against this gentleman, because he has done no more than imitate many scientific predecessors, who have indulged in such dreams; I merely adduce him as one of the latest of those able men who have done so, to show with what inveteracy ideas of this sort cling to the human mind when they have once gained an admission into it. Their long retention shows that no talents and no science will lead us to a perception of the true chronology of our globe; and that we must either receive it from the sacred authority which has declared it to us, or abandon our minds to all the wild and baseless theories which individual excitement may invent and propagate, without any one having greater probability or better foundation than another. Without this superior guide, human speculations on this point only lead us into a chaos of undigested dreams and conflicting hypotheses; for whenever fact is deserted, or cannot be had for the deciding appeal, no one thinks another's conjectures to be preferable to his own."* As a further illustration of the same proposition, this learned and excellent author narrates the following circumstance: "One author inferred from the appearances in the mines of Elba, that they had been worked forty thousand years ago. Another, after examining the same thing, reduces this time to five thousand years. Thus the eyes and judgment of one saw, in the same natural circumstances, only what five thousand years could have accomplished, while those of the other inferred that forty thousand years were requisite to produce them. All the speculative conclusions of the extravagant duration of the earth, from the consideration of the nature and remains of its rocky beds and their organic fossils, are precisely of this character. The assumed period is made large or small, according to the fancy of the individual who theorizes upon them; and yet what stronger demonstration can we have that such conjectures have no real foundation at all, when very different periods are thought to be equally inferable from the same phenomena? Such contrary deductions by men of abilities and science from the same natural facts, seem to me to be satisfactory evidence that these phenomena, though they truly mark the succession, give no evidence at all of the chronology of the deposits and formations."†

In the judgment of all sound and candid minds, the wild extravagancies and conflicting conclusions of those who have made the

* Sacred History, vol. ii, p. 270. † Ibid, p. 271.

partially-explored geological phenomena the sole data on which they have formed their theories concerning the chronology of the globe, must greatly weaken the force of those theories; and furnish us, at least, presumptive evidence of the inadequacy of these data to such comprehensive conclusions. And yet, we believe that the human mind here, as it does everywhere, through the wild chaos of theory and extravagant speculation, progresses *toward* truth. Geologists are now pretty generally agreed on at least three very important points, viz. (1.) That the earth is not eternal.* (2.) That the human race has not existed more than six or seven thousand years.† (3.) That the earth underwent a general deluge in some period not remotely distant from the first origin of the human race. These are important concessions of science. They are no faint indications that light shall yet arise out of darkness; that when geological phenomena shall be better understood, and the mind is capable of contemplating them, not through the medium of an imagination highly excited and extravagant in its frenzy, but as facts of science and observation, they will be found to harmonize with, and perfectly authenticate, the Mosaic record. How greatly would this desirable consummation be hastened, would geologists restrict themselves to the proper and legitimate sphere of geological science, and attempt merely the solution of the real problem before them! That problem, we humbly conceive, has been mistaken by too many. It is not, "Matter and motion given, to form a world;" nor is it, "Nothing given, to tell how God formed the world;" but simply, "The world given, to trace out the changes which natural causes have produced on its surface." To us, it appears that if we would place this simple problem before us, and patiently and perseveringly labor for its solution, we should be, in the end, driven to no extravagant theory to account for the earth's origin, and to no uncounted ages to explain the existing phenomena

* Even M. Boubée, extravagant as are his notions of the earth's chronology, yet declares that "the world is not eternal."—P. 7.

† "Every authentic observation that has been accumulated up to the present moment, has convincingly corroborated the conclusion that the human species are subsequent to the last of the catastrophes that has laid bare our continent." —*Prelim. Obs., Cuv. on Fos. Bones.*

Brongniart also in substance states, that the last geognostic period, during which the crust of the earth has been in a state of repose, and at the beginning of which the race of man originated, occurred at least four thousand years ago.

M. Boubée also asserts "that man has only six or seven thousand years of antiquity on the globe."

of its surface. We have read with some care the speculations of various geologists, and witnessed some of the phenomena on which their reasoning has been founded; but we have not yet seen reason to doubt, though we might not be able to explain every distinct phenomenon, that all the appearances on the surface of the earth, and upon which the theories of philosophy have been founded, may, when fully understood, be accounted for and referred to one or more of the following general causes for their origin—1. The creation. 2. The formation of a bed for the primitive sea, with the natural causes acting within that sea for upward of sixteen centuries. 3. The deluge, in which the bed of the antediluvian sea was raised up and became the postdiluvian earth. 4. The natural causes now in operation, in connection with those known to have been in operation since the deluge, or for upward of four thousand years.* We cannot now enter upon the discussion of this question; but it appears to us, that if the first three facts be admitted—and they are facts strongly attested by geological observation—we need look no further than to them, taken in connection with natural causes known to be, or to have been, in operation, to fill out our geological formula; but deny them, and we are thrown back upon natural causes, molecules, atoms, and chaos, there to dance to the tune of theory upon their eternal convolutions.

But our limits will not allow us to pursue this subject further. A history of the successive assaults which skepticism has made upon revelation and religion would afford matter of interesting and profitable reflection. We might be shocked at the daring presumption of man, and at the same time humiliated at his ignorance. A more striking commentary upon the short-sightedness of human philosophy, and the imperfection of human science, can hardly be found in the history of mind. It might seem that the temerity of reason, in its endeavors to extinguish reason's greatest luminary, had been sufficiently rebuked. How many fanciful theories—how many "scientific" and "historical" demonstrations have, from time to time, been reared up against revelation and religion; but now—like floating wrecks upon the sea of exploded notions—they only remain as so many monuments of human folly, and can only provoke a smile at the credulity that could ever have yielded assent to them.

The brief notice of a few illustrations of this point must close this article.

1. The observation of Brydone will furnish us a striking illus-

* Fairholme's Geology of Scripture, pp. 24, 25.

tration. He noticed, in examining the pit near Aci Reale, seven different strata of lava, each overlaid with a rich vegetable soil; now as it required two thousand years for such a soil to be formed by the slow process of the decomposition of lava and by the vegetable formations, he inferred that this volcano must have been in operation at least fourteen thousand years, and probably much longer. Following in the train of Brydone, others observed in the vicinity of Vesuvius at least twelve different strata, and, reasoning upon the same grounds, inferred that the earth could not be less than twenty-four thousand years old.

The credence given to these wild vagaries is truly astonishing. They were alluded to and used, even by learned and scientific men, as facts and inferences unquestionable. Sharon Turner says: "In my youth, Brydone was used as a leading authority for overturning the Mosaic history." Thousands were confirmed in their skepticism, and imboldened to cast away the Lord. For a time, even the great champions of revelation stood aghast, lest infidelity had indeed triumphed. But, mark the result. When the town of Herculaneum was discovered some years ago, the workmen pierced through six strata of lava, each covered by a good vein of soil. Now this city was overwhelmed A. D. 96 or 97; consequently these six complete strata of vegetable soil were formed within a period of seventeen hundred years. Hence, the whole twelve strata, which are said to have been found in some places, may have been formed in a period of less than thirty-four hundred years: so that we have no reason to suppose that either Ætna or Vesuvius began to pour out their floods of molten lava till nearly eight hundred years after the deluge of Moses. The observations of M. D'Aubuisson are to the same point. He states that the lava of 1157 was covered with twelve inches of vegetable earth proceeding from its own decomposition; while the lava of 1329 was covered with eight inches. Hence, by comparing these two dates, one hundred and seventy-two years were sufficient for the decomposing of four inches of lava. And yet the same author states that at Auvergne, from local or other peculiar causes, several of the lavas have not changed in the least.* This fact will demonstrate to us that no precise chronological dates can be determined by these observations.

These conclusions we have been led to, without questioning the accuracy of Brydone's observations. Their accuracy, however, seems to be justly questioned by more recent travelers, who are

* D'Aubuisson, Geognoise. See Dr. Ure, Geol. xivi; also Sacred Hist., vol. ii, p. 273.

in every respect entitled to credence. Daubeny, in his Geology of Sicily, after examining the same pit, says: "At all events, Brydone was grossly deceived in imagining that the seven beds of lava, seen lying one above another near this spot, have been sufficiently decomposed into vegetable mold. The substance which really intervenes between the beds is nothing more than a sort of ferruginous tufa, similar to what would be produced by a shower of volcanic ashes, such as often precedes or follows an eruption of lava, mixed with mud, or consolidated by rain."* Hence, it would appear that his whole theory was based upon insufficient observation, and an entire mistake of the nature of the data on which his calculation was based.

Thus has that, which was once accounted one of the strong scientific towers of infidelity, become so completely dilapidated that it can only call forth a smile from the passer-by. But its moral effects remain. Thousands, perhaps, became confirmed in their skepticism; and when the tardy, though sure, refutation came, they had gone where it was not needed, and where it could not avail, or, perhaps, if still living in skepticism, never took the trouble to examine it, easy and conclusive as it is. To descend the abyss is easy; but the return voyage is attended with labor and difficulty, and, alas! few ever attempt it.

> ———Facilis descensus Averni:
> Sed revocare gradum, superasque evedere ad auras,
> Hoc opus, hic labor est.

2. The astronomical records of eastern nations, running back through many ages, were once appealed to with unbounded confidence by the enemies of revelation and religion. But all these visionary statistics have passed away under the close scrutiny of science; and even the sublime science of astronomy has become the hand-maid of revelation, and affords some of the strongest presumptive evidence in favor of the truth of the Mosaic history.

But here we have not time to pause: a single example will serve for an illustration. The Chinese have recorded in their astronomical tables a remarkable conjunction of the sun, moon, and several of the planets, which, they say, occurred almost at the earliest dates of their history, and was one of the great and early observations of their astronomers, in a record which claimed an antiquity far higher than that of the Bible. There was but one way to meet this objection to the Mosaic chronology, and that was by calculating back, and determining, from astronomical data now in

* See Dr. Ure, &c.

the possession of astronomers, when this conjunction actually took place.—This method was at last happily resorted to; and the celebrated astronomer, Cassini, after immense labor, ascertained that such a conjunction actually took place in China, on the 26th day of February in the year of the world 1992, or three hundred and thirty-six years after the flood. Thus was exploded another "scientific objection" to the Mosaic chronology.

3. It is also well known that several nations of the East have laid claims to an antiquity that could not be made to quadrate with the chronology of the Sacred Writings. Indeed, it was not many years since this was a common boast and a common triumph of infidelity; but later investigations have thrown such a flood of light upon the subject, in vindication of divine truth, that it may be doubted whether a man of ordinary reason and information could be found, who, however skeptical he might be with regard to religious truth, would undertake soberly to vindicate these fabulous narratives.*

Here we must also restrict ourselves to a single illustration, though several, equally to the point, might be given. It is universally conceded by those who have devoted attention to the subject, and who are competent judges, that no nation has higher claims to antiquity than the Celestial Empire. But when we scrutinize its claims to almost interminable antiquity, they one by one disappear, till that which seemed so formidable against the divine record loses all its antagonism, and becomes pliant as a conquered foe. A few facts only need be mentioned. The name of their first king sounds so much like a corruption of the word Noah, and the length of his reign corresponds so nearly with the age of Noah, that we are at once almost led to suspect that in the misty legends of their antiquity they have confounded their first king with the Noah of Mosaic history.† This suspicion is further confirmed, when we hear them assert that he was "without father," and remember that Noah was the first of the postdiluvian patriarchs—that he preserved "seven clean animals to sacrifice to the Great Spirit," and remember that Noah took into the ark clean animals by sevens‡—that

* "It is very true that man has only six or seven thousand years of antiquity on the globe. Modern historical researches are now agreed on this point. The traditions which seemed to give him a much greater antiquity were founded only on imperfect observations."—*Popular Geol.*, by M. Boubée, Geol. Prof. at Paris.

† Fohi, the Chinese chronologers say, *began to reign* B. C. 2952. See Anc. Frag. This would be in the year of the world 1052: now, Noah was *born* in the year of the world 1056. ‡ See Genesis vii, 2.

"the sky, in his day, fell to the earth, and destroyed the race of men," and then remember the deluge, of which so many memorials now remain, and which destroyed every living thing upon the earth except those with Noah in the ark. Also, when we hear them speak of his mother being encircled with a rainbow, we cannot help being reminded of that bow which was to be the pledge to Noah and to his posterity that seed-time and harvest should continue for ever.* These, and other circumstances recorded in the sacred books of the Chinese, confirm the opinion, that these records are only "blotted transcripts of the truth."

Another curious circumstance connected with these confessedly-ancient records is worthy of notice. They speak of the dynasties of gods who reigned in their country, a thousand years each, before the "sky fell." This evidently has reference to the ten generations of Moses, that existed before the flood. The discrepancy in point of time will not appear too great to be accounted for on the supposition that the Chinese, in order to extend the glory of these dynasties of superior beings, made each son begin to live just when his father died, or, in other words, confounded the *age* with the *reign* of each.† These records also state that during the reign of Yao, [Joshua,] the sun stood so long in the sky that the world had well nigh been burned up.‡ Now if we look at the date given to the reign of Yao, we shall find that it corresponds to that of Joshua, the son of Nun.§ With us, the wonder is not that the

* Genesis ix, 9–17.

† The following table will show the discrepancy between the time claimed by the Chinese records for their ten generations, and the aggregate of the ten antediluvian patriarchs.

The Chinese history—10 gods, each 1,000 years,	- -	10,000
1. Adam attained the age of	-	930
2. Seth, " "	-	912
3. Enos, " "	-	905
4. Cainan, " "	-	910
5. Mahalaleel, " "	-	895
6. Jared, " "	-	962
7. Enoch, " "	-	365
8. Methuselah, " "	-	969
9. Lamech, " "	-	777
10. Noah, " "	-	950
		8,575
Total difference,		1,425

‡ The "Five Volumes," or the canonical books of the Chinese, are ascribed to Yao and Chun.

§ See Stackhouse.

Chinese history disagrees with the Mosaic history in some essential particulars; but that, when handed down by tradition through so many ages, it should still retain the general outlines of truth.*

Thus do we find, that, as science progresses, as the range and accuracy of observation are extended, the objections to the sacred records vanish away, and divine truth is vindicated and established.†

4. We will now content ourselves with putting a simple inquiry to the reason and judgment of the reader. If the race of man has lived on the earth so much longer than is indicated by the Mosaic chronology, and, perhaps, from all eternity, why have we no authentic history of our race to that effect? and no earlier memorials of its existence? Even geology is here at fault, if our race really have so great an antiquity; for "it tells us out of its own records," says a learned professor, "that man has been but a few years a dweller on the earth; for the traces of himself and of his works are confined to the last monuments of its history. Independently of every written testimony, we therefore believe that man, with all his powers and appetencies, his marvelous structure, and his fitness for the world around him, was called into being within a few thousand years of the days in which we live."‡ Mr. Lyell also says: "We need not dwell on the proofs of the low antiquity of our species, for it is not controverted by any geologist. Indeed, the real difficulty which we experience consists in tracing back the signs of man's existence on the earth to that comparatively modern period when species, now his contemporaries, began to predominate."§ The facts of geology, and the statements of authentic history concerning the human species, are in perfect agreement. That history runs back for a few thousand years; but beyond that, no ray of light springs up to tell us that man then lived. All is involved in darkness and silence more impenetrable than that of the grave. We may follow backward the current of time for these few thou-

* The Egyptians also laid claim to an antiquity of myriads of years; but in order that their chronology might harmonize with the number of their kings, they made their first kings each reign over 1200 years. The Assyrians, less modest in their claims, find it necessary to make their earliest monarchs reign over 40,000 years. The Chaldeans, Phenicians, and some other nations, make equally extravagant pretensions. See Stillingfleet's Origines Sacræ. It is astonishing that these extravagant fictions were ever thought worthy of a serious refutation.

† Modern Hist. Res.

‡ Professor Sedgwick, Discourse on the Studies of the University. See also Godwin against Atheism, sec. 2.

§ Principles of Geology.

sand years; but then we reach its fountain-head, the place where its waters first began to flow. We can trace not only the first powerful nations that have appeared on the broad field of empire back to their origin; but we can also trace society back to its first formation, and determine the origin and history of most of the arts and sciences. All these date their birth within the allotted time of Scripture chronology. These facts, coupled as they are with the universal tradition that the earth, and also our race, have had a comparatively recent origin—a tradition whose existence and universality have never been accounted for on any other supposition than that of its being founded in fact—furnish a demonstration in favor of the Mosaic history, before which skepticism must stand convicted, till, eel-like, it has been able to slip its slimy length through the iron grasp of reason and truth.

ART. III.—*The Philosophy of Christian Morals.* By SAMUEL SPAULDING, M. A., of the London University. London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman. Black & Co., Edinburgh. 1843.

As the above work is the only treatise from the pen of the writer, and as this is posthumous, the following extract from the Introduction seems necessary for the information of our readers:—

"The author passed his examination at the London University in May, 1840. He was highly commended for his proficiency in the subjects on which he was examined; but more especially by the professors of mental and moral philosophy, who strongly recommended him to write on these subjects. This recommendation encouraged him to write the following work.

"The attainments of the author were the result of the most intense application; and there is no doubt that the severity of his studies induced the disease which terminated, at so early a period, his earthly career. Shortly after he had obtained his degree, he found it necessary to repair to a warmer climate, and accordingly went to Italy, where he remained nearly two years. During his residence there he penned this work; it is, however, the result of many years of close investigation and reflection."

It will suffice to add that he returned to England, in the spring of 1842, with still more impaired health. With a view to its improvement he was induced as a last remedy to try a sea voyage, and sailed for the Cape of Good Hope in September of the same

year, where he died the ensuing January, with great composure, in the thirty-sixth year of his age. In evidence of the estimation in which the author held this treatise, written as it was under such peculiar circumstances, the editor says, that "almost the last words that he uttered were expressive of the gratification it afforded him to think that he had lived to finish this work."

The two grand questions in moral philosophy are: First, What is virtue? Secondly, Whence do we derive our notions of virtue? On no branch of science, reaching, as does moral philosophy, back to the days of ancient Grecian philosophers, and extending down through all subsequent periods to the present time, has greater diversity of opinion obtained than as to the proper answer to these questions. The inquiry has become invested with new importance since the revival of this science, and the increased interest which has been cherished toward it during the past and present centuries.

Among moral philosophers we find three classes of writers. We classify them according to the form of religion to which they adhered. First, those ancient philosophers who flourished before the Christian era, and whose religion was consequently polytheistical. Secondly, those who, though living under the brilliant splendors of the gospel, adopted as their religious creed some Utopian form of skepticism. Thirdly, those who not only cordially embraced the system of revealed religion as contained in the Holy Scriptures, but availed themselves, to a greater or less acknowledged extent, of their unerring guidance in searching for the truth on the recondite elements of this science. With regard to the first class of ethical writers, who lived, thought, and wrote, without the aid of revelation, it is not strange if their notions were both extravagant and unfounded. For illustration, take two or three examples. Plato, the most famous disciple of Socrates, was the earliest moral philosopher whose writings have come down to us. He employed his genius in the composition of philosophical dialogues. These dialogues or conversations frequently quote, and doubtless often allude to, the opinions of predecessors and cotemporaries, whose works have perished, and of whose doctrines only some fragments are preserved. In these circumstances it must be difficult for the most learned and philosophical of his commentators to give a just representation of his doctrines, if he really framed and adopted a system. These dialogues comprised philosophical, as well as ethical discussions. In the latter his object is obvious; it was to inspire the love of truth, wisdom, beauty, especially goodness, the highest beauty; and of that supreme and eternal Mind which con-

tains all truth and wisdom, all beauty and goodness.* Virtue, according to the Aristotelian theory of morals, was *the mean between two extremes*. But it may well be asked, What are the extremes on either hand? These must first be fixed before the medium can be determined. And all this known, why, it may be asked, is the middle line the only line of rectitude? Why is this alone right and the extremes wrong? To such inquiries we have no answer. According to the Stoical system, the system of the school of Zeno, virtue consists in *living according to nature*. But who is to determine whether we are to define the terms with a view to the nature of things in general, or the nature of man? and if the latter, as believers in revealed religion, we might inquire, whether according to his original pure and holy nature, or his present lapsed, depraved nature. If the latter, as is almost necessarily understood from Aristotle's relation to revealed religion, the thought is monstrous. The Epicurean system made virtue to consist in *happiness*. To this term some attach a sensual acceptation. Others understand Epicurus to teach, "that a steady course of virtue produces the greatest quantum of pleasure and happiness of which human nature is capable." But this describes the office or tendency of virtue rather than its nature. Such, then, was the character of ethical science under the first class of ethical writers. The true God was to them an "unknown" God. And as Dr. Wardlaw justly remarks, "Where there is an unknown God, there must, to a great extent, be an unknown law. When wrong conceptions of Deity are entertained, it is impossible there should be right conceptions of duty. Man cannot be right with *man*, if he is not right with *God*." The same is predicable of ethical writers of the second class, and almost to the same extent, as it would not be a difficult task to show from an examination of their respective varying and groundless theories. To give the reader some connected view of the unsettled state of the question—What is virtue? and the diversity of conflicting opinions which have obtained among modern as well as ancient ethical writers, in addition to the three definitions of virtue already given, take the following:—Cudworth, Clarke, and Price, make virtue to consist in the *fitness of things*. Dr. Adam Smith, in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments," holds that we judge of the actions of others by a *direct*, and of our own by a *reflex*, sympathy. If we are conscious of a full sympathy with the emotions of the agent who performs the action, we pronounce the action right. And with regard to our own conduct, we imagine others sympathizing with us, and

* Sir James Mackintosh.

we sympathize with their sympathy, thus reversing the process. Next is Hutcheson's theory of the *moral sense*, which he makes the instrument of determining the moral quality of actions; and Brown's theory of *the vivid feeling of approbation;* and the theory which makes *utility* the criterion of virtue or rectitude, as maintained by Hume and Paley, however much they differed on other questions.

We are now prepared to enter directly upon the examination of the theory Mr. Spaulding lays down in the work named at the head of this article. In a professedly philosophical treatise we are not authorized to look for anything of a purely practical character. Our author has a single object in view throughout the entire work. To this he directs his undivided attention. In laying down and establishing his theory of the philosophy of Christian morals, he specifically discards at the very outset the *transcendental* philosophy, which ostentatiously pretends to examine the nature of facts—to penetrate into the reason, the origin, the end of things—not limiting itself to the present, but looking back upon the past, wanders in the future, and embraces possibility as well as reality. He confines hiself to that *experimental* philosophy which studies, examines, and describes facts; which takes cognizance of the difference and analogy by which they approach or are separated one from another; which establishes primitive facts, as primitive; and derivative, as derived, apart from all the systematic views; which aims at precise classification, and attempts nothing beyond. It is, moreover, a peculiarity of our author as a writer—a peculiarity sometimes indulged almost to a fault—to illustrate the important points which he makes and the principles he lays down, by striking examples in a clear and full manner. As an illustration of these two modes of philosophical investigation, take the following:—

"To the experimental philosophy belong such inquiries as the following: What are the changes which take place in nature? What are the sensible properties of matter? What are the effects it is capable of producing on mankind? What are the laws which regulate the succession of our thoughts and feelings? To the transcendental philosophy belong such questions as these: What is the nature of matter? What are the efficient causes of the changes which take place in nature? What is the nature of the connection between body and mind? It is hardly necessary to add, that answers to questions such as these are altogether beyond the power of the human intellect in its present state. We have no faculties by which we can acquire a knowledge of the nature of either body or mind. It is quite absurd to talk about leaving observation and experience, and taking reason only for our guide; for if we do so on any subject which involves actual existence, we must

reason without premises. Observation and experience are the two great sources whence all our knowledge is derived; we have no other data from which we can draw any conclusion respecting either matter or mind, and therefore, transcendental philosophy, whatever it may be to other beings, is certainly beyond the sphere of human knowledge. For man to attempt to solve the questions it proposes, is just as foolish as it would be to attempt to fly without wings. It would be thought very strange if any philosopher were to contend that we could see in the dark. It ought not to be thought less strange that philosophers should be constantly aiming to make discoveries in a region where intellectual vision is quite impossible. The experimental philosophy stands in direct opposition to that of the transcendental kind in this respect. Its objects are entirely within the field of observation. We can assuredly know the changes which take place in nature, for they are going on every day before our eyes. We can examine the laws which regulate the mental phenomena, for we ourselves are the subjects of those laws."—Pp. 14, 15.

It is our object to give our readers some adequate view of the principles maintained by our author. This we cannot better do than by giving the following synopsis in the writer's own language. Its comprehensiveness and clearness will compensate for its length. The author says:—

"To assist the reader in understanding the principles we advocate, we shall subjoin a list of the principal doctrines which this volume contains. Our primary notions of virtue or of vice are derived from those feelings of moral approbation or moral disapprobation which we experience in reviewing the conduct of others. These notions acquire new force, and become more distinct, from the emotions which we experience in the review of our own conduct. Self moral approbation, or remorse, is always the consequence of conformity or non-conformity to the dictates of moral obligation. The objects of moral obligation are two; the first is, virtue itself; the second is, the mode in which virtue ought to display itself in the outward conduct. The great rule of action for man is the will of God. This is, in some cases, expressly revealed; in others, it must be inferred from the end or object of the virtuous affections themselves. The notion of moral obligation is an immediate consequence of the testimony of our moral emotions. By the latter we learn that the right to command is an essential element of virtue. The right to command necessarily supposes in us the duty or obligation to obey. Virtue is a state of mind. It is the object of moral approbation. The great object of moral approbation is the principle of benevolence, chosen as the highest and most valuable principle in our nature, and possessing, on account of its superiority, the right to command and rule over all our faculties, feelings, and affections. Fortitude, temperance, and all sister virtues, are the necessary consequence of the supremacy of benevolence, and may, therefore, be said to be contained in our notions of virtue. They possess, however, no intrinsic value. They derive all their importance from the principle of love.

Compassion, natural affection, and all other feelings, so far as they are purely pathological, possess no moral value whatever. The exertion of voluntary agency is a distinctive mark both of virtue and vice. The nature, or rather the moral character, of volition depends entirely on the object of our choice. Although, in point of fact, the pathological principle must necessarily operate in the first instance, that is to say, before volition has been exerted, yet it is volition which alters the nature of the pathological feeling or affection supposed, which confers upon it a value which it could not otherwise possess, and which becomes, therefore, prospectively, to a certain degree, the reason and object of the choice to be made. To express the same idea in different words, the object of the virtuous mind's choice is benevolence as a principle, and not the kindness of natural disposition."—Pp. 24, 25.

Writers on morals may be distributed into two classes, according to their mode of treating the subject, and the sources whence they derive their data. This is forcibly expressed by our author. He says:—

"There is, in the present day, a certain class of writers who, on this and similar subjects, would derive all their notions from the Scriptures, irrespective of any examination of the human mind; and there is another class, who would derive all their notions from their examination of the human mind, irrespective of any inquiry into the testimony of God's word. These predilections are evidently the result of early and often of casual associations. They may be referred to that class of delusions which Bacon calls prevalent studies. The theologian has chiefly studied the Scriptures; the man of science, the works of nature; and self-love will not allow the neglected subject its relative importance. The one is magnified at the expense of the other, and truth is sacrificed to both. These prejudices have been the cause of great confusion. They have led to mistaken views both in science and in religion.

"It is to be remembered that the Scriptures and the volume of nature are equally revelations from God. The information which they convey is in some respects the same, in others it is different. The latter conveys to us the existence of the Creator—and, manifesting unity of design everywhere, declares the unity of his being. The vastness of the material universe shows his omnipotence. The adaptation of various means to certain definite ends, and especially the adaptation of external nature to the human mind, affords abundant proof of his wisdom and love. The unvarying order of nature's laws evinces the immutability of his character. These are the great truths of natural religion. They are also the basis upon which the former is built: for even when we have proved that revelation is from God, unless we have some evidence that truth is one of the great attributes of his character, there can be no resting-place for the truth of revelation.

"As these great truths are written in the volume of nature, to declare them formally is not the object of revelation. It would be an error, however, on the opposite side, to suppose that revelation had nothing to do with them. By the influence of moral evil, these great truths are

disregarded—their evidence is unperceived. Revelation calls our attention to them, and gives them new and more striking evidence. It presents to us the divine Being, not only as our moral governor at the present moment, but it gives us a glimpse of his incomprehensible administration in past and future ages. It evinces the omnipotence of God, not in his empire over matter, but in moral and intellectual dominion, which he maintains over the minds of his creatures, and portrays the attributes of Deity,—his wisdom, justice, and love, in the work of human redemption, in deep and crimson characters, with a light and with a glory that we shall in vain attempt to find in any other department of his works."—Pp. 5, 6.

We have already given a synopsis of the doctrines which Mr. Spaulding maintains, in his own words. The following extract shows what system of mental science he adopts as the basis of his philosophy of Christian morals. It is that system which makes the human mind exist in certain various states, instead of investing it with various distinct faculties. The difference, however, we conceive, as to all practical purposes, is rather one of nomenclature than anything else; because those philosophers, who, in keeping with their theory of mental states, discard the old doctrine of mental faculties, often find it more convenient, for example, to speak of the *will* than of the mind, in the *state* of volition, and so of other faculties compared with states of the mind. But our author will best explain himself. He says:—

"The human mind is a substance capable of existing in various states, known by consciousness. They may be divided into three classes, as follows: sensations, intellectual states, and emotions. Every state of mind is composed of one or more of these elements.

"Sensations are those states of consciousness which we cannot suppose ourselves capable of possessing without a body. Their antecedent is invariably an affection of some corporeal organ. They serve to connect man with the external universe, are the first occasion of thought, and part of the great means by which the divine Being prompts the mind to pursue that which it supposes good, and urges it to avoid that which it deems evil.

"Our intellectual states are those in which thought is the most prominent object of contemplation. Their antecedent may be any one of the three great divisions of our consciousness. It is impossible to define them by words, but every one knows what it is to think, remember, compare, generalize, reason, and determine. Their object is truth. By their agency man penetrates into the mysteries of his nature,—explores the objects around him,—examines the qualities of matter and of mind,—discovers the various relations of things.

"The emotions are certain vivid feelings which cannot be defined, but which every one understands by his consciousness. Every one knows what it is to love or hate, rejoice or be sorry, hope or fear. They

are never antecedents to themselves. They must be preceded either by a sensation or by an idea. Their object is very similar to that for which we have been endued with sensation. The latter, however, has relation merely to the preservation and welfare of the body; the former to the whole nature of man,—they urge him to the pursuit of everything which he may think to be for his advantage,—excite the sluggish intellect to pursue the best ends by the best means,—quicken the suggestive powers to adopt new expedients,—stimulate the imagination to pour forth its effusions in the most beautiful forms,—unite society in the soft ties of friendship and domestic love, and by their respective influence, in different constitutions, create all that variety of pursuit and character which is one of the most interesting features of the moral world."—Pp. 19–22.

Such, then, is the basis of the philosophy of Christian morals according to our author. In other words, such is the mental philosophy of his moral philosophy. In its application to his moral theory he holds the following language:—

"It is from these latter states of consciousness that our notions of right and wrong are derived. Every one must be conscious that on reviewing certain states of his mind, he has experienced a certain vivid feeling,—termed self-approbation or approving conscience; and that on reviewing certain other states of mind, he has experienced a different feeling, of a most painful nature,—termed remorse. So in considering the conduct of others every one has, at certain times, experienced a certain vivid feeling,—termed moral approbation; and again, a feeling of an opposite nature,—termed moral disapprobation. There is nothing particularly mysterious in this process, for the mind is so created and endowed that, when it experiences these emotions, it cannot help referring them to some cause; and hence the ideas of right and wrong arise, just as it is constituted to receive certain sensations, and to refer them to a cause, whence we gain the idea and attain the conviction of a material world."—P. 23.

On the same principle that certain ideas arise out of certain states of sensation or emotion, do our ideas of right and wrong arise out of our moral emotions. We mean, for example, by a red, blue, or black object, one the sight of which produces in us the respective sensations which we thus denominate. Thus we say that ice is cold, because through the sense of feeling we receive from it the sensation of coldness. Anything ludicrous, frightful, pleasing, or melancholy, is so regarded because such objects excite in us these sensations. Unreflecting men, it is true, ordinarily spread the emotions of their own minds over surrounding objects, and then imagine them to possess those qualities which in fact have no real existence except in their own consciousness. Than such illusion nothing is more common. The vulgar invest objects with their

own emotions. It is the philosopher's province to explain the principle of philosophy involved in the phenomenon. This, with regard to morals, our author has attempted; with how much success the reader for himself must determine. He sums up on this point in the following language:—

"The whole process may be thus described. The human mind is so constituted, that after it has existed in certain states, it is immediately the subject of remorse or self-approbation, moral approbation or disapprobation; just as the body, after existing in certain states, becomes a cause of pleasure or pain. It is also so constituted as to refer these results to their cause. The cause which is in the body we call disorder or disorganization. The cause whose existence is in the mind we call virtue or vice. In neither case are they known *at first* except as the universal antecedent of succeeding states."—P. 26.

The two grand questions in moral philosophy, it will be recollected, are: 1. What is virtue? 2. Whence do we derive our notions respecting virtue? Following the order adopted by our author, we have reviewed the principle on which he resolves the second inquiry. Leaving the order in which the questions are stated, Mr. Spaulding chose to discuss the latter question first. This may seem at first sight to betray a little want of system; but we imagine it will be found on examination quite as conformable to the natural order. He thus states the nature of the first question:—

"Our knowledge of the various objects around us may be,—either of their powers and susceptibilities, or of the elements of which they are composed. The first of these is called the knowledge of objects as they exist in time; the second, as they exist in space."—P. 51.

Most happy in his talent for illustration, he gives us two examples; gold, and the atmosphere. Of gold our first perception is, it is yellow, next it is hard, fusible at a certain temperature, &c. Such is our notion of its susceptibilities and powers. But as to the question, What are its elements? we can only say it is matter, a substance distinguished from mind.—Atmospheric air is a fluid, a substance capable of great compression, expansion, and rarification. It is an important agent in the preservation of life, both animal and vegetable. These are some of its susceptibilities. We are also acquainted with its elements. It is a compound substance, composed of two gases, nitrogen and oxygen, in the proportion of four to one. Hence we know it as it exists in time and as it exists in space. This principle applied to the mind, Mr. Spaulding says:—

"Although the mind cannot be literally divided under any circumstances, like a piece of matter, yet we may regard that mental state which is termed virtuous in a twofold aspect. It may be asked, for example, what are the susceptibilities of virtue, and what are its elements? The reply to the former would be a very imperfect answer to the question, What is virtue? Imperfect, because it is impossible to comprehend the relations which may hold to the various objects and existences in creation, or the value of those relations when discovered. It would be esteemed exceedingly strange, if one philosopher were to contend that atmospheric air is capable of being condensed; another, that it is a fluid frequently rarified by the sun's rays; and a third, that it is a fluid which supports animal and vegetable life. Strange as this would seem, however, it is precisely the error into which some philosophers have fallen on the subject of morals. Virtue, says one, is that which tends to the production of the greatest good, both to individuals and to society. No, says another, it is the mean between two extremes. A third, it is that which produces in us the feeling of self-approbation. It is the felt relation of a certain emotion to its cause. These assertions are indeed true. Virtue is useful; it curbs the excess of passion, and is the cause of certain moral emotions. But such assertions convey a very inadequate answer to the question, What is virtue? What we want to know is, not the effects of virtue, but virtue itself. We must analyze the various elements of which it is composed, ascertain the various simple ideas that enter into the complex notion, then, when these are found together, there virtue may be found to exist. It is precisely similar to the question, What is the cause of fear? or, What is the cause of surprise? In all cases this cause is a certain state of the mind, just as a certain state of the body is always antecedent to those states of the mind which we call sensation."—Pp. 53–6.

Virtue is a state of mind. But, as he elsewhere shows, it is not a mere pathological or passive state. Man cannot be virtuous without volition. He cannot be virtuous without pursuing virtue as an end; because this is the only way by which it can be made his own. On every other supposition it would be pathological; on which ground mere natural affection might be regarded as such. But hear him in his own words. He is showing the harmony between human depravity and his theory. To this point attention will be immediately directed. He says:—

"It must never be forgotten, that in the human mind there is a pathological as well as a voluntary department. The mind has been rendered susceptible of various feelings, in reference to which, under certain circumstances, it cannot choose whether it will or will not become the subject of them; just as much as it has been endowed with certain other powers, which it can direct to any object or pursuit, applying them or not applying them, as fancy, imagination, or desire of any kind may lead. In this respect it resembles the body. Man has control over some functions of the body, but over others he has no control. The heart does not beat by the will of man, but by the power

and volition of God. The most important offices in the animal economy are not left to the care of man, because that gracious Being who is well acquainted with his weakness, knows too well how inadequate the creature is to pay attention to the various provisions necessary to the performance of the functions of life. He has therefore taken them under his own guardianship and control. The case is similar with respect to the mind. If, indeed, all our mental states were the subjects of immediate volition, the fall might have produced that entire subversion of the human faculties which some have imagined. Over a very large part of our mental state, however, we have no direct control. It is not by man's volition that remorse succeeds a vicious state of mind, any more than it is by his volition that the blood circulates in his veins."—Pp. 77–8.

As to the question, how far the fall has affected the moral constitution of man, there is a diversity of opinion among moral writers. Some proceed on a principle which tends to merge everything into theological views. They draw their moral science directly from Scripture. That our theory of morals should perfectly *harmonize* with the Scriptures, few, we imagine, will question. But theology and moral science should both rest on their own proper basis. They are distinct sciences. They should not be blended. Nor can they be identified. While it is the province of theology to describe the effects of the fall and the divine provision for our recovery from these effects, the fact of the fall and the divine provision must be assumed in all correct theories of Christian morals. But how far the human mind has been affected by the fall is still the question. Dr. Wardlaw, in his work on Christian Ethics, maintains that the fall has so affected the whole nature of man, as to render any attempt to discover a correct theory of morals by an examination of the human mind entirely fruitless. On the contrary our author finds, as he believes, abundant data in the mind itself on which to ground his philosophy of Christian morals. And he claims for his theory the entire suffrage of Scripture in its favor. On the effects of the fall he says:—

"It must be admitted that the fall has had a most injurious effect on the successful pursuit of moral subjects. It is very important, however, to estimate as far as possible its precise effect, as well as the extent of the evil it has induced, since general expressions on such a subject can only lead to skepticism. The most obvious effect of the fall, then, is to turn men's minds away from the contemplation of the subject. By the fall, man is led to view God as his enemy, and hence turns aside from the most delightful of all contemplations, the original dignity of his nature, its capacities for virtue, its relationship to God, its powers of assimilation to the supreme and infinite Mind."—Pp. 68–9.

The whole is thus summed up in page 82:—

"The influence of the fall, then, may be briefly stated thus. It has given a bias to the understanding by which it may be perverted; and it has lessened the emotion in every instance, in proportion as the habit of sin has been confirmed. Its tendency has been to sear the conscience so as to prevent the rise of the emotion, and as our conceptions of sin depend on our moral emotions, it has prevented our attaining adequate notions of its malignity; but it has no power to pervert our nature to such a degree as to make remorse succeed our consciousness of virtue. Its whole effect has been to pervert man's moral nature so far as it depends on his own volition, but it has never perverted, although in some few instances it may have *effaced*, that nature which the divine Being has mercifully placed without the limits of man's control."

Such, then, are the views of the author of the philosophy of Christian morals on human depravity. Is it not remarkable that no cognizance is taken of the Spirit's influence on the mind as counteracting human depravity? It may be said, the influence of the Holy Spirit is a question which belongs to theology. Granted. Why does not depravity also? Is not one as clearly taught in revelation as the other? Is not one practically as much a matter of experience as the other? Admit that conscience is a constitutional faculty of the human mind, and has the Holy Spirit less to do in enlightening it than depravity in obscuring this instrument of moral discrimination? Without the enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit we should be in much the same condition morally, as we should be naturally without the light of the sun. Man might be physically described, and the eye in particular, without viewing it as receiving the rays of solar light at all. But the existence of light must be assumed to illustrate the adaptation of the organ to vision through its medium. As a matter of experience and practice, light must always be viewed as present to the eye. Why then should the influence of the Spirit be totally excluded from the philosophy of morals? The above remarks are equally applicable to all the existing theories of Christian ethics.

The following statement may seem highly paradoxical, especially in a treatise professing to delineate the philosophy of Christian morals. It shows the light in which the writer viewed the science of morals at the present time—in an imperfect state. He expresses the hope that his work will elicit closer attention and more thorough investigation. He says:—

"In the present state of the science of morals, we do not accurately know what virtue is. But we know certain feelings or states of mind which are virtuous either in a derived or an independent sense. We

know, also, that the practice of those virtuous acts which these virtuous feelings induce, tends to invigorate the principle from which they proceed."—P. 213.

Mr. Spaulding gives distinguished prominence to voluntary motive as an index to the virtuous mind. For a state of mind to be virtuous, the motive must be good, and the *will* must be determined under its influence. A bad motive is universally disapproved. A good motive or desire is only approved so far as it is capable of influencing the will. The motive must not only be good, but it must have the ascendency, it must be the object of volition, and without these there cannot be a virtuous mind. A mind constantly under the control of virtuous affections will determine to act in accordance with existing relations. Directed by reason in ascertaining our existing relations, such a mind will always aim to promote the happiness of all related beings. Benevolence would be the governing motive—love, the ruling principle, "the fulfilling of the law." A mind thus affected will desire to know the relations sustained, with a view to a corresponding course of action. In our author's own language:—

"Light and love, therefore, the two leading characteristics of the divine Mind, ought to be the two leading characteristics of every human being. It is by the union of these two great principles that man will be able to learn the duties which arise out of the various relations in which he is placed. It is by the combination of these two great elements that human nature is to be carried forward. Religion is to be the governing—the supreme power; placing the affections upon God, as the great centre, and radiating with quickened energies to all the objects of God's creation. Knowledge and science are to discover in what way the affections may display themselves in entire accordance with the will of God, as also to guide and direct its impulses. They are to rove throughout the creation, find new proofs of the excellence of the divine character, and thus rekindle the very fires under whose influence they have gone forth."—P. 125.

Mr. Spaulding thus resolves all morality into religion—supreme love to God, and loving our neighbor as ourselves. He has laid down an important principle. Some moral writers make *piety* consist in duties done in accordance to our relations to God, and *virtue* in actions performed in accordance to our relations to our fellowmen—a distinction without a difference. It is more: it is one of the most dangerous errors which ever found its way into any theory of Christian morals; an error, however, utterly discarded by our author, as the above extract shows. The following are to the same purpose. They are the last with which we shall trouble the reader. He says:—

"To suppose love to be the ruling and governing principle in any individual, and to suppose him to possess no love to the divine Being when the conception of his character has arisen in his mind, is utterly impossible. To suppose perfect love to God, and disobedience to his commands, carelessness respecting his will, or indifference to man, is a contradiction in terms."—P. 127.

"An act of benevolence differs from an act of justice. The first seeks to confer a favor, the second to grant a right; the former desires to bestow happiness, the latter to guard and protect that already bestowed."—P. 194.

"The love of virtue, therefore, in its highest exercise, is eminently the love of God. Virtue, we have seen, is a state of mind. But there is one Mind in the universe which is not subject to successive states, which "is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." In that Mind, therefore, virtue, or the highest moral excellence, must reside, essentially, eternally, independently, unchangeably. But no quality can exist without a subject. All moral excellence must, therefore, ultimately be referred to God. The divine Being is the great centre of gravitation in the moral world, just as the sun is the great centre of gravitation in the planetary system. Our Saviour, therefore, in directing man to God, directs him at once to that point to which all philosophy must ultimately come in its notions of virtue. He directs him, not to a nation, which, although important in its place, is only adapted to scientific speculation, but to that Being who is not only the moral Governor of the universe, but whose very nature is the moral law of the universe."—P. 262.

"But love to the divine Being necessarily excludes the notion of any instinctive tendency. There is no natural affection to God, as there is in the bosom of the parent to her child. Association does not attach us to the Deity, as it does even to our neighborhood or our country."

"It is the glory of Christianity not only to have directed man to God, as the living fountain of all excellence, but to have presented that fountain itself, as far as the mysterious union of the human and divine natures rendered it possible, under circumstances in which it might become a perfect model for the conduct of man in the various relations in which he may be placed. In the person of our Saviour perfection exists in human nature. Virtue does not only become personified, vivid, and concentrated—it becomes humanized—it is made man—it addresses itself to our sympathy—it touches our hearts—it shows its perfect adaptation to our wants and our nature, as well as its capability of sustaining the mind under the most appalling trials. Let it not be forgotten that he has left us an example that we should walk in his steps. It is only in imitation of his character that human nature can find its true centre. It is only in possession of his principles that the human mind can attain that peace, and order, and self-possession, which are so essentially necessary to the just exercise of all its faculties. It is only in the exercise of love to God and his fellow-creatures that the frail and feeble nature of man, now often agitated in divers manners by the troubles and conflicts of life, can find a sublime repose

in communion with that Mind whom nothing agitates, and with that Being to whom all events are equally foreseen, and who is able and willing to control the most untoward circumstances to the production of our own happiness as well as that of the universe at large. Without these principles, genius may exalt itself for a moment, but it cannot be kindled at its real source; it will shine only in a pale and borrowed ray; reason may argue and demonstrate, but unless it come to the fountain of truth, it will be urged on by powers which will drive it from its true orbit, by forces which will cause it to wander in the universe, exiled, solitary, and lost; while the emotions, having broken the bonds which restrained them within due limits, will exercise a dreadful tyranny over those very faculties which they were intended to obey, will separate the mind into different combinations and really opposing powers, until the soul becomes the theatre of an intestine war that will never terminate, and the prey of passions that can never cease to agitate and annoy."—Pp. 269–272.

Here we take leave of our author. The science of morals, which has thus transiently passed under review, is the sublimest of all sciences. It is both anterior and ulterior to all others. Other sciences are in a sense human; this, divine. It is entitled to vastly-increased attention. If this article shall contribute its mite to this result, the writer's object will be gained.

We said the distinction made between piety and virtue by some moral writers is fraught with the greatest danger. We do think so. It countenances the very prevalent and popular practical error—prevalent because it is popular—dangerous because it is practical—that a man may be moral without being religious—moral merely on the ground of commercial justice—moral, whether he "believes in one God or twenty;" whether he believes in the Bible, the Koran, or the Shaster, or in neither—a "believer in all unbelief"—moral, without love to God or man; without keeping a single command of the moral law. Yet how many take refuge in this delusion from the arrows of divine truth sent out from the sanctuary! How many on this ground soothe and quiet their consciences with a false peace! Your efforts to dislodge them from this fortress will be fruitless while you admit their definition of morality, as is so generally done in the pulpit. Admit the above groundless distinction, and you concede the point. It behooves the gospel minister to think of this. Let him review the whole ground. Let him ask himself, What is morality—not heathen, but Christian morality? Will he not find it to be the "keeping of God's commandments?" thus defined by Christ himself: "This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments." In the language of another, "The meaning is, that there is no love of God with-

out the keeping of his commandments; and that there is no keeping of his commandments without love to God—a statement which amounts to the same thing as the other, that there is no religion without morality, and that there is no morality without religion. He who loves God keeps the commandments in principle; he who keeps the commandments loves God in action. Love is obedience in the heart; obedience is love in the life. Morality, then, is religion in practice; religion is morality in principle. It is one of the distinguishing peculiarities of all Bible morality, that it *begins with God*—that it makes godliness its first and fundamental principle. The first command in the moral code of the Bible is a requisition from God: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," &c. Thus God stands first. For him is claimed the throne of the heart. The foundation of all morals is laid in devotion. No moral principle is there admitted to exist, independent of a primary and supreme regard to Deity. No true goodness is acknowledged without this. There is no such anomaly to be found there as that which meets us so frequently in the nomenclature of the world's morality—a good heart, or a good man, without the principles and sentiments of godliness. According to its representations, the religious principle is the first principle of all morals—a good heart is a heart in which the fear and the love of God reign; and a good man, a man of whose life the love and fear of God are the uniform regulations. Everything assuming the name of virtue that has not these principles for its foundation is there set aside, as coin that has not the image and superscription of Heaven, "reprobate silver," "weighed in the balances, and found wanting."

ART. IV.—*The Works of the Rev. William Jay, of Argyle Chapel, Bath. Comprising Matter not heretofore presented to the American Public.* In three volumes. Vol. 1. *Morning and Evening Exercises.* Vol. 2. *Short Discourses to be read in Families—The Christian Contemplated, in a Course of Lectures—Prayers.* Vol. 3. *Sermons—Life of Winter—Memoirs of John Clark—Charge to the Wife of a Minister,*—and *The Wife's Advocate.* New-York: Harper & Brothers.

WILLIAM JAY, the well-known and universally-esteemed and beloved preacher of the Independent Church at Bath, in England, is one of those striking proofs of the elevating power of the gospel, and of the commanding influence of genuine oratory, which are

exhibited by divine Providence, to convince us that there is a mental, and moral, and spiritual nobility, superior to the distinctions originating in merely earthly acquisitions. Brought up in a retired hamlet, without any family influence to aid a change of life from that obscurity which appeared to envelop him beyond escape, with no literary advantages which could encourage a single hope of extensive usefulness or elevation, and passing his days in the rustic employments common to the menial residents of the Wiltshire Downs, in the vicinity of Salisbury Plain, the youth attained nearly sixteen years of age, when the head of the church appointed that friend of George Whitefield, Cornelius Winter, to take charge of the boy, and to train him up for the service of the sanctuary. If ever, in modern times, those ancient dignitaries, Eli and Samuel, were imbodied before human view, it was in the example of Cornelius Winter, and, as he used familiarly to call him, his "DEAR BILLY."

The intercourse between them was so unique, that it seemed to partake of the hallowed atmosphere, where, amid the scenes of devotion, the rapt attention and excited countenance of the lad first arrested the regard of the fervid preacher. Directed by Him who makes all things work together for good to them who love God, Mr. Winter inquired of Mrs. Turner, a Christian woman of great worth, the name and character of the stripling by whom his feelings had been so much attracted. From her report, the tutor concluded that William Jay possessed attributes which ought not to be buried in a husbandman's toil, or a shepherd's watchfulness—and that he developed "gifts" which should not be circumscribed within the limited meeting for social prayer and lay exhortation. Therefore, Mr. Winter called the youth away from his humble sphere to the theological school, where a few young men had been collected, that under Mr. Winter's instruction and supervision they might be formed for usefulness in the church of Christ. The "happiness and harmony" of the course of life, in domestic society, which prevailed among them, Mr. Winter, at a late period of his mortal sojourn, delineated in the poet's beautiful and melodious strains:—

> "The day glides swiftly o'er their head,
> Made up of innocence and love,
> And soft and silent as the shade,
> Their nightly minutes gently move."

To those earliest years of his career, Mr. Jay, in a recent annotation upon the life of his beloved patron and paternal friend and tutor, adverts in a manner so impressive and replete with instruction,

after the lapse of nearly sixty years, that the memorial is too precious and characteristic to be omitted.

Retracing his biographical representation of Cornelius Winter, Mr. Jay expressed his wish that he could convey his deeply-felt

"conviction of the unspeakable advantage and importance of an *amiable and eminent example*, especially, when, from relation or circumstances, it will often be called to mind. If, in a long life, he has been preserved from falls and indiscretions, and if he has been enabled to pursue, as a Christian and as a minister, a course in any degree useful, he owes it more, under God, to his keeping the image of this individual, *Cornelius Winter*, before his mind, than to any other instrumental cause. In his perplexities, he thought how WINTER would advise him—in his dangers, how he would caution him—in his trials, how he would cheer him—how in his difficulties he would encourage him—how in every backwardness he would stimulate—and in any laudable effort, how he would approve. Thus, though dead, he has still been speaking; and the author's prayer is, that, by this memorial,* he may continue to speak—and not in vain!"

It is worthy of remembrance, that the above undesigned but edifying eulogy was written nearly thirty-five years after the death of Mr. Winter; and more than half a century after their domestic fellowship had ceased. This fact alone would give a peculiar charm to the religious writings of a man so taught, so directed, and so blessed.

We return to William Jay at Marlborough. One of Mr. Winter's profound convictions was this—that it was essential to cultivate that grand qualification for the ministry of the gospel, which is included in the apostolic phrase—"APT TO TEACH." Mr. Winter's own acquaintance with the middling class of society, and especially his long and intimate familiarity with George Whitefield and his peerless labors, had satisfied him, that "PREACHING THE WORD" was the indispensable quality of an efficient minister of the gospel—and that with Christian experience, and a clear view of evangelical doctrines, and a devout, trustful reliance upon the Spirit of truth, an assembly of "the common people" might be edified, even by very juvenile speakers.

Around Marlborough, at the eastern end of Salisbury Plain, were many small villages and hamlets, amid which the "gospel trumpet's joyful sound" had never probably reverberated since August 24, 1662, the day which marked the expulsion of the two thousand Nonconformist ministers from the pulpits of the parish church edifices. Mr. Winter himself constantly peregrinated among those

* Memoirs of the late Cornelius Winter, with a Selection of Letters, comprised in this edition of the "Works of William Jay."

desolate places, the large majority of the inhabitants of which were unable to read or write, living as "sheep without a shepherd," until he could obtain a house for stated public worship, and a little congregation to hear the word of life. When he was strengthened by the young Christians who resided with him, as soon as he deemed it advisable, he sent those juniors to occupy his post in rotation; thus facilitating their expositions of revealed truth, and enlarging the circle of their missionary labors. In this work, William Jay was early called to partake. Before he was sixteen years of age, and with the appearance only of a ruddy rustic lad, Mr. Winter, as it has since been demonstrated, justly appreciating his mental capacity and his oratorical ability, appointed his adopted son to go round among the villagers, and to pray for their spiritual welfare, and to tell them of "the wonders of the cross on which the Saviour bled and died!" It is still in traditionary record, if not in the actual remembrance of some aged living survivors of that period, how utterly astonished were the villagers assembled at their usual place, when Mr. Winter first put forward the "BOY PREACHER," as he was denominated, to pray and announce the "good tidings of great joy." The tutor was not disappointed in his judgment and anticipation—and the youth was animated and encouraged, until all the country round was filled with astonishment at the eloquent "lad," while they listened with rapture to his musical voice and more enchanting evangelism.

The testimony of his sterling endowments was too powerful and wide-spread to be extinguished, until at length the increasing usefulness and popularity of the boy-like orator attracted the regard of that peculiarly-distinguished servant of Christ Jesus, ROWLAND HILL; who, with his usual promptitude and decision, resolved to transfer the wonder of Wiltshire rustics to Surry Chapel—there to impress the citizens of London with novel specimens of evangelical harmony and power, stamped with youthful raciness and the experience of mature wisdom. That was the trying or sifting time of William Jay's character and principles. Not more than two or three years previous he had been a village rustic, "alike unknowing and unknown." Under the tuition and influential example of Cornelius Winter, and encircled by the villagers around Marlborough, he had preserved all the native simplicity and freshness of his original course, only strengthened and beautified—but what might be the consequence of trusting a country boy to the imposing array of Surry Chapel, with its auditory of four thousand persons; and to the temptations of that applause which would attend him? Nevertheless, Winter knew that he jeoparded not

the future usefulness of his protegé by the exposure. The mellifluous intonations of voice which had charmed the uncultivated yeomanry of Wiltshire, absolutely enraptured the polished assemblies of the metropolis; and the aptness of Jay's illustrative imagery, the clearness of his Scriptural theology, and all that harmony of evangelical doctrine, amplified experience, and strict practical requirement, which is included in the epithet, "pure religion and undefiled," all of which ever have been the distinctive features of his pulpit oratory, delighted the Christians of all ranks—and gratified Rowland Hill beyond measure. Yet a greater contrast can scarcely be conceived than that which existed between the occasional electric flashes and strokes of the preacher at Surry Chapel, and the steady light and warmth of the Marlborough student—and it powerfully develops the versatility of mankind, that ordinarily, the Christians who were agitated by Rowland Hill's vigorous assaults and impassioned eloquence, were equally edified with the less suddenly-exciting impression, but the lasting effect of the deep-toned fervor and sincerity, and artless eloquence, with which the junior theologian from "Winter's college" enforced "the glorious gospel of the ever-blessed God." What a difference for a youth at nineteen years of age! He had exchanged the fellowship of Christian devotion in a hovel on the Wiltshire Downs for the spacious edifices and crowded assemblies of the British metropolis. Instead of walking in coarse shoes amid the natural paths made on the Salisbury Plain, he was driven about in chariots. For the coarse fare and humble abodes around Tisbury, and the White Horse, and the Saxon Mounds, he was encircled with the palaces and the splendor of the Thorntons, the Webbers, the Hills, and Wilberforce. More than all, the youthful preacher had to withstand the witchery of a myriad of young women of all ranks and charms, who would have been delighted to be called by the name of the popular favorite.

The term, to which his visit to London was limited, having expired, and the fiery ordeal being ended, the young evangelist returned to the residence of his preceptor. With ineffable delight and gratitude to the Preserver of men, Winter instantly perceived, that not a London-spoiled clerical coxcomb had condescended, for form's sake, to pay his exterior respect to the patron to whom he was indebted, but that he received his own "dear Billy," with all his simplicity, and tenderness, and humility, unabated. Since then, fifty-five years ago, William Jay has been commingled with nearly "all that earth calls good and great;" and nothing can so powerfully attest his intellectual grandeur and his moral dignity,

as the fact, that in all the elements of his original character as they were developed to the perspicacious discernment of Cornelius Winter, sixty years ago, the renowned author of the "*Morning and Evening Exercises*," and of the "*Christian Contemplated*," is the identical William Jay who was called from the rustic cottage to Winter's domicil.

After his first visit to London, he continued to preach wherever divine Providence directed, until, by the death of Mr. Tuppin, the Independent Church, who met for public worship in Argyle-street, Bath, required a minister. The cause of Christ among them had become very low; and it was of great importance, in selecting a pastor, to have a preacher who could collect an auditory, and also counteract the baneful preponderance of the church and state irreligion around them. With the exception of London and Bristol, at that period, the "bishop's see," as the residence of the state prelate is named, was notorious for enmity to all devotion and "practical piety," except that which was encircled by the cathedral and its ecclesiastical dependencies. The prelate, the dean, the archdeacons, the prebendaries, the canons, the chancelor, and the chapter, with their immense revenue, patronage, and power, exercised almost unbounded sway; and, with few exceptions, displayed their persecuting spirit against all who had Christianity enough to acknowledge the Lord Jesus Christ as head of the church, instead of the earthly civil potentate. That predominance was fully exhibited at Bath. On account of its medicinal waters, that city is the resort, for several months of the year, of the debilitated aristocracy, with their numerous associates, dependents, and friends—all of whom nominally were of the "parliamentary religion," and exclusively associated with the state ecclesiastical confederacy. Tradesmen of all classes, and manufacturers, and mechanics who live entirely by those spendthrifts, were obliged to conform to their exactions; and not only avowedly to belong to the Establishment, but also to oppose and revile every follower of Christ who could not be convinced that the apostles Peter, and James, and Paul, and John, were entitled "most reverend fathers in God;" and that they read dull, prosy, ethical essays, crowned with a mitre, and robed in a Babylonish gown, and scarf, and lawn sleeves! From that cause, with other actively-opposing impediments, Mr. Tuppin's ministry at Bath had been partially unfruitful; and the score of surviving members found themselves in the situation delineated by the prophet Amos:—"By whom shall Jacob arise? for he is small." In that perplexity, "being then known and not unpopular"—for Mr. Jay had *preached* nearly a thousand sermons before he was twenty-

one years of age—Cornelius Winter, Rowland Hill, John Thornton, and Wilberforce, with the ministers of the neighboring Independent churches, and what had probably a more weighty impression, Mr. Tuppin's solicitation, when dying, that Mr. Jay would be his successor, all combined to urge his residence as an Independent minister in Bath. His resistance to the temptations of London at a prior period, and his unshaken identity while preaching for a year at Lady Glenorchy's Chapel at the Hot Wells, near Bristol, unaffected and unchanged by the whirlpool of fashion, and folly, and splendor that encircled him, convinced his friends, that through divine grace he would not be contaminated by the seductions, even of Bath worldliness and of Bath corruption. Those brethren believed that Mr. Jay's previously-ascertained consistency might rebuke the dissipation of the giddy and gay throngs of "the city famed for cures;" and that his Christian, dignified simplicity would efficiently contrast with the gorgeous prodigality of the pampered nobles and magnates—and that his pulpit oratory would attract the thoughtless, perishing sinners, who never heard the gospel, "as the truth is in Jesus," mumbled forth by the prosing readers of semi-heathen ethics in the Bath cathedral, and the parish churches. The result proved that Mr. Jay was guided by Providence; for powerful indeed must have been the attraction of the then small and humble edifice, which could gather within its walls, not only the titled secular grandees, but Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Hannah More and her sisters, the Thorntons, and Wilberforce; and, as was well understood, not only Beilby Porteus, the prelate of London, but also other dignitaries of the Establishment, wrapped up so as not to be recognized, mixed with the worshiping assembly on the Lord's day evening in Argyle Chapel, there to hear all the words of life; without controversy, in tones of sensibility, and with a lucid forcefulness which had never been witnessed in either of the Gothic buildings that had been wrested from the domain of Babylon the Great.

One paragraph of instruction from Wilberforce to his friend, the "boy preacher," written just after his ordination in January 30th, 1791, is a high testimonial to the Christian qualifications of that philanthropist. Having exhorted Mr. Jay to be very explicit in his public announcement of revealed truth, as it respected the doctrines of "Christ and him crucified," and to glory in nothing, "save only the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ;" that renowned friend of humanity added,—"*You are a debtor both to Greeks and to Barbarians. Consider the situation in which you stand—not another minister in Bath whom any of the poor, wretched upper classes*

are likely to hear, who preaches the gospel! They come, perhaps, to your chapel. They never heard the word of life before. They never may have another opportunity. PITY THEM! *Above all others they deserve to be pitied. I, alas! have been more acquainted with them than you; and thereby am the more impressed with the sense of their wretched ignorance in spiritual things.*"

A short period only elapsed before the small one had become so strong a nation, that the church were obliged to "enlarge the place of their tent, to stretch forth the curtains of their habitations, to lengthen their cords, and strengthen their stakes." They continued under the divine auspices to "break forth on the right hand and on the left," until the ancient prediction was literally accomplished. The spacious Argyle Chapel could not be additionally crammed, after the third or fourth amplifying change. To extend its walls was not feasible; therefore, they sent forth their "seed to inherit the Gentiles, and make the desolate city to be inhabited,"—for the other Christians in Bath, who now enjoy "the communion of saints" as Independent churches with the brethren of Argyle Chapel, are those who virtually were obliged to seek another "place for the Lord," where they might invoke his mercy and chant his hallelujahs; because the old evangelical "*homestead*" could not contain the increasingly-numerous "household of faith."

One circumstance, which occurred a few years after Mr. Jay's settlement at Bath, contains such exemplary instruction, and so strikingly develops the prominent attributes of his official course, that it must be recorded. Mr. Jay ever acted under the remembrance of Wilberforce's advice, already quoted; and from the transparent simplicity of his character, and the unaffected Christian correctness of his manners, he was equally at home in the palace-like mansions of the opulent, as among the humble class amid whom he was reared. Hence, one great object with him was this: not to diminish the impression which, by divine assistance, he made in the pulpit, by any acts, even in connection with the church, which should repel the haughty worldling, and the ignorant bigot of the "parliamentary religion," from the devotions and truth exhibited in Argyle Chapel.

At that period, about seven years after Mr. Jay was permanently stationed at Bath, a *sabbath school*—by the whole mass of the British "churchmen," that is, the people who were continually shouting "church and king!" while they never entered the parish building, and habitually violated all the laws of the first table of the decalogue, and lived in indecorum, as having no hope and without God in the world"—by all that class, a *sabbath school* was denounced

as a monster of Jacobinism, and a nursery of the most atrocious wickedness. In the city of Bath, probably not one person anticipated that such a noble and capacious outlet for children, by which they might escape "from sin's old yoke and Satan's chain," would ever be established among them. But the Lord chose "the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty." Two young women "*in their teens*," belonging to the congregation, pitying the little girls whom they encountered on the Lord's day and at other times, wandering about in their ignorance and wretchedness, resolved, if possible, to amend their mental, moral, and social condition. With this design, they requested the permission of the deacons of the church, and the sanction and co-operation of Mr. Jay, that they might occupy the vestry-room of Argyle Chapel, on the Lord's day afternoon, as there was not any public worship at that season; and there to instruct any girls whom they could collect for that purpose. Mr. Jay, fearing the consequences of so direct an assault upon the junior portion of those who were living in darkness, gave to the proposition his decided veto. But the two Marys, that "highly-favored" name, knowing that "one thing is needful," and having themselves "chosen the good part which shall not be taken from" them, were not disconcerted, either by the timid indecision of the church officers, or by the more resolute negative of the watchful shepherd. They argued with one, appealed to the sensibilities of another, refuted the objections of a third, and so effectually pleaded with the preacher, that at length his sympathy, and tenderness, and convictions, could no longer resist their urgent importunity, and thus the Marys coerced his almost reluctant assent. The anticipated evils never appeared; and unexpected good ensued. At the Sunday-school anniversary of his church, Mr. Jay often has adverted to the fact; and with his characteristic humility, acknowledging that the two young women were imbued with more wisdom, in that important concern, than the minister and the deacons of the church; and with affectionate exultation recording, that the sabbath school, thus commenced, had ever been the fertile juvenile garden of Argyle Chapel; whence the Christian plants had been auspiciously transferred, to bear fruit as trees in the Lord's vineyard of his terrestrial church; and gratefully attributing to the inflexible earnestness of those two young disciples one great source of their religious prosperity.

Fifty-four years have elapsed since Mr. Jay began his pastoral duties in connection with the church of Christ at Argyle Chapel, Bath; and as laziness was not a morbid ingredient in his character, and as the great Physician has preserved his "good and faithful

servant" from debility and disease, his labors have been almost uninterrupted, and, except in his personal appearance—for Mr. Jay is now nearly seventy-six years of age—his power, and acceptance, and usefulness in the pulpit, remain identical.

Having passed half a century in the ministerial service of the Independent Church at Argyle Chapel, the congregation and other friends resolved to hold a jubilee on the occasion; and the memorial of that interesting celebration comprises some impressive details connected both with the history of the church, and of Mr. Jay's ministry.

But we must turn from the preacher to his volumes. Some time ago Mr. Jay was desired to superintend a complete and uniform edition of his works. He assented to the proposition. The whole series it was designed to include in twelve thick duodecimo volumes, which are not yet finished. Mr. Jay's first publication, except the sermon before the London Missionary Society, in 1795, then issued by the directors, was his admired Discourse on the Mutual Duties of Husbands and Wives. In 1803 appeared his first twelve sermons; which were succeeded, about a year afterward, by a similar volume. From that period he has edified the Christian world with a variety of religious works of the highest value. His "*Morning and Evening Exercises*" will be read, and will edify, until the more luminous dispensation shall render stronger meat necessary for those future advanced Christians. His "*Prayers*" will be esteemed as elevated models of sincere devotion as long as the believer is encompassed with imperfection. His "*Christian Contemplated*" will be pondered over and admired until the beauteous earthly portrait is eclipsed by the heavenly image in the likeness of Christ. His "*Memoirs of Cornelius Winter*" will be valued as a "pearl of great price," as long as there are eyes to discern and hearts to love the faithful disciples and servants of Immanuel.

Mr. Jay's didactic works are among the richest specimens of pulpit oratory, adapted to the experience and practice of all Christians. One of the extraordinary attributes of his discourses is this, that he never wrote his sermons prior to having preached them. With the exception of those which were taken by stenographers when delivered, all the rest were written after delivery; but such is his tenacity of memory, that many of his earlier printed sermons must be nearly verbatim the faithful record both of the matter and of the language as originally advanced.

The American edition of Mr. Jay's Works, noticed at the head of this article, will contain all his writings without diminution, as

collated by himself. When the collection of three volumes was first made, it included every publication which he had presented to the churches. Since that period, Mr. Jay has issued several single sermons of high value. There is also the small volume entitled the "Jubilee Memorial," which will be imbodied in the series. To the "Memoirs of Winter" a large addition has been made, and also an entire applicatory discourse to the "Christian Contemplated." This edition is especially recommended to us by its cheapness; being about *one seventh* of the price of the English copy; and for the attractive style in which it is published.

We felt much difficulty, amid such a treasury of spiritual worth, to select one passage that should furnish an accurate specimen of Mr. Jay as an author, a preacher, an example, and a companion, and which should be in unison with the preceding narrative. His Christian liberality, and his beautiful illustrations of Scripture, are so well known that they required not any exhibition in this form; but while we were searching the volumes of the last English edition, so far as completed, we discovered one short disquisition, which we think will display the author in his genuine nobleness as a moralist, and in his own unaffected truthfulness and delicacy.

In his "Memoirs of Cornelius Winter," when first published, Mr. Jay introduced these impressive sentences: Mr. Winter "*was peculiarly attentive to the behavior and manners of his young men. It was an object with him to teach them how to appear in the parlor as well as in the pulpit. He did not think it unnecessary to guard them against superfluous wants and unseemly customs—against the sottish and offensive habit of smoking—against giving trouble where they happened to lodge—against the use of spirituous liquors—and against fondness for delicacies!*" In his new edition Mr. Jay has appended a note, which is of so much wider application in this country than even in Britain, that we extract it as a high recommendation of Mr. Jay's entire volumes.

Smoking.—"Here the author has been not slightly censured by some of his brethren. One very renowned *smoker* said his language nearly approached to blasphemy—expressing withal his wonder that Milton, in speaking of the productions of Eden, had never mentioned the noblest of them all, the tobacco-plant! There have been some to whom perhaps few things would be deemed so paradisiacal as that stupid luxury.

"The author, however, does not renounce or soften his expressions. His opinion has been confirmed and strengthened by the observation of many years; and he cannot but lament that no physical or civil consideration, and no motive derived from usefulness or decorum, can induce many preachers to avoid or break off this exceptionable habit.

"He called it a '*sottish practice.*' Is it not so in its appearance? fume? smell? and immoral associations in the mind of the observer? Does it not hint almost inevitably the pot-house, and the low and sailorly fellowships there? Let a person enter a room in the morning where there has been smoking over night, will the devout savor remind him of a sanctuary, or lead him to think of an assembly of divines?

"He called it an '*offensive practice.*' Is it not so to many of his own profession, and to many of his own sex? But how trying is it to women, almost without exception! though from the kindness and obligingness of their nature and manners, they frequently submit to a usage which annoys their persons, and defiles and injures the apartment and furniture whose neatness they so much value. Can ridicule and satire do nothing here?

The pipe, with solemn interposing puff,
Makes half a sentence at a time enough;
The dozing sages drop the drowsy strain,
Then pause and puff, and speak and puff again.
But often, like the tube they so admire,
Important triflers! have more smoke than fire.
Pernicious weed! whose scent the fair annoys,
Unfriendly to society's chief joys;
Thy worst effect is banishing for hours
The sex whose presence civilizes ours.
Thou art indeed the drug the gard'ner wants
To poison vermin that infest his plants;
But are we so to wit and beauty blind
As to despise the glory of our kind?
And show the softest minds and fairest forms
As little mercy as the grubs and worms?

"We say nothing of the *silliness* of the practice, especially in '*a bishop,*' who '*should be grave*'—but to see a man of education, and filling an office which would dignify an angel, passing so much of his time with a tube in his mouth, and emitting therefrom the smoke of a burning herb, as if his head was on fire, were it not for its commonness, must always excite an inquiry or a laugh. Nor do we speak of its *vulgarity*. But is not every silly coxcomb, and every pert fop now seen with a pipe in his mouth, or a cigar? And should its *expensiveness* be overlooked? Can every preacher afford such a dear indulgence consistently with the claims of household comfort and the education of his children, and some charity to the poor and needy?

"Should its injuriousness be forgotten? TOBACCO IS A VERY POWERFUL NARCOTIC POISON. If the saliva, the secretion of which it produces, being impregnated with its essential oil, be swallowed, the deleterious influence is carried directly into the stomach; or if, as most frequently happens, it is discharged, then the blandest fluid is lost. But is it not an *ensnaring habit* with regard to the waste of time, the danger of drinking, and fondness for company, not always of the most refined and improving sort?

"Were I upon a committee of examination, *I would never consent* to

the admission of a young man into one of our academical institutions, but upon the condition that *he did not and would not smoke.*

"I would exact the same condition from every student, if I filled the responsible and honorable office of tutor.

"If I were a man of affluence, *I would not on any application afford any pecuniary assistance to a preacher* who, while he complained of the smallness and inadequateness of his means, *reduced it by indulging that needless and wasteful expense.*

"The author was one day attending a missionary meeting. Before the close of it, a minister arose and said that he had to present a donation. 'These two guineas,' said he, 'are sent from a servant, who was allowed by her mistress so much *for tea;* but during the last two years she has denied herself the use of that beverage to aid your collection.' But suppose a person had immediately said, 'Go thou and do likewise. Spare for the same all-important cause the eight or ten pounds which you spend in wanton, in needless, and noxious gratification'—SMOKING—'and at our next anniversary how many will praise and bless you!' A minister should be an example. But behold! 'THERE ARE FIRST THAT SHALL BE LAST, AND THERE ARE LAST WHO SHALL BE FIRST!'"

The Christian who would encourage devotion, should study Jay's "Morning and Evening Exercises," and "Prayers." If we would learn how to live, that when we shall die we may "enter into peace," we should imbibe his "Christian Contemplated," and "Practical Sermons." The master of the household can read every Lord's day to his family one of his "Short Discourses." Theological students will comprehend the best modern models of preaching, not *reading*, by attentively exploring Jay's volumes. All ministers, young and old, of every denomination, may learn what a "burning and shining light" in the church of Christ is, by contemplating the life of John Clark, and by searching the "Memoirs of Cornelius Winter."

Mr. Jay's labors as an author, even if his life is graciously spared as a blessing to the church, will terminate with the publication of the last volume of his Works, with the exception of a sermon on some memorable occasion, and a posthumous memorial—a legacy for his church and friends—his "REMINISCENCES." And long may it be ere the blank spaces in his epitaph, for the day of his decease and the number of his years, shall be filled by his deacon, TITLEY!

B.

ART V.—*A Narrative of Iniquities and Barbarities practiced at Rome in the Nineteenth Century.* By RAFFAELE CIOCCI, formerly a Benedictine and Cistercian Monk, Student and Honorary Librarian of the Papal College of San Bernardo, Alle Terme Diocleziane, in Rome. First American, from the second London edition. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell, 98 Chestnut-street. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1844.

WE have so often read of the iniquities and barbarities of Popery that their recital fails to strike us with astonishment. A young mind, imbued with those tender sensibilities which Christianity inspires, the knowledge of these things fills with a thrill of horror. Those unacquainted with the history of persecution for conscience' sake, when they first read of the cruelties inflicted on pious Protestants by Roman Catholics,—of the fines, the imprisonments, the tortures to wring from the sufferers a confession of their guilt,—of the rack, the gibbet, and the slow fires,—are astonished at the recital of such acts of barbarous wickedness; and this is increased tenfold when they are informed that all this was done by professed Christians to advance the cause, and to vindicate the character, of Him who said to his disciples, "Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart." Yet, these are the stubborn facts of history. These facts are unfolded to our view every time we read the history of the Roman Catholic Church, and they stamp it with the indelible mark of the beast. We cannot, therefore, even if we would, shut our eyes upon these barbarities, and particularly those which are revealed in the periods of history which relate to the days of the Reformation. And however changed the aspects of Popery may appear in our day, and more especially in our own country, we must remember that its sterner principles remain ever the same—that its infallible head can never do wrong—and that, therefore, what was once done may be redone, should the same circumstance, that is to say, should the power be granted to furnish the means of doing it. An infallible hand cannot undo what another infallible hand has done; and that hand which is restricted only by the want of power, will, whenever this power is restored, do again that which it had formerly done. Hence there is no security against the encroachments of Popery but from its weakness—its want of power.

We have evidence of this in every new development of the character of the practices of Popery. It is true, it does not

now persecute "unto the death!" It does not now show its iron teeth in devouring the flesh of its victims, and chewing their bones to dust. It appears under the guise of the lamb instead of the skin of the lion. But its nature is still the same. It seeks by every means within its power to gratify its voracious appetite by crushing those it cannot devour, by cajoling those it cannot force, by deceiving those it cannot convince, and by threatening those it may hope to intimidate into submission to its mandates.

The truth of these remarks we shall see exemplified in the Narrative under consideration. It is not like some other tales of Popery, which appear to have been invented by their authors to serve some sinister design, nor is it a mere romance or fiction, prepared for effect, or to amuse the reader with ancient scenes of suffering which were never either experienced or witnessed. If, indeed, the author has falsified facts, he has done it without any adequate motive, as all his interests, his educational biases, and his relative position in society, must have swayed him to suppress the facts, allowing them to be true, or to have prevented their fabrication, allowing them to be false.

We take for granted, therefore, that, bating somewhat for the coloring which his excited state of feeling almost unavoidably led him to put on, the Narrative is an honest statement of facts; and they surely exhibit the same spirit in the Papal Church which has characterized it ever since it came into possession of an infallible head.

It seems that Ciocci, at the age of seven years, was sent by his bigoted Roman Catholic parents to the college of the regular clergy, known as that of "S. Redentore," commonly called the "Order of Liguorini," which, besides adopting the iniquitous maxims of the Jesuits, forged the weapon of ignorance in order to strengthen its own despotism, and to put their vassals in willing subjection to its decrees. Strange association! A college founded and kept in operation to foster ignorance! Yet such is the fact, from our author's account of the discipline and mode of instruction.

We do not object that pains were taken to instill maxims of piety into his youthful mind. This, most certainly, was praiseworthy. But the maxims themselves were false. Instead of opening to his mind the truths of evangelical religion, he was taught to confide in a round of external duties, weekly confessions, flagellations, repeating Ave Marias, fastings, and other bodily austerities. The following is his own account of the severities to which he was sub-

jected at this early period of his life, and at the very threshold of his collegiate studies:—

"What shall I say of the practice of corporeal mortification, to which I was incited by the counsels of my confessor? I shall, among others, name that of flagellation, which was prescribed to the youths of the college every Friday, when assembled in the chapel. Each one, at the extinguishing of the candles, was to strike his shoulders with a lash of knotted cords during the slow and solemn recital of the psalm, '*Miserere.*' I was sometimes commanded to repeat seven Ave Marias, in memory of the seven sorrows of the Virgin, with my hands the whole time placed between my knees and the pavement. It was also frequently suggested to me that I should, at breakfast or at dinner, leave my portion of food untouched, and that I should at times abstain from those amusements most congenial to my lively disposition, in order that I might, by such acts of self-denial, acquire command over my appetites and desires. Sacrifices of this nature are called by the friars in Italy, 'Flowers whose odor is agreeable to Mary.'"—P. 9.

Exhibiting marks of a precocious genius and a pliability of disposition, these Jesuitical fathers thought fit to persuade his parents that he was qualified, though but eight years of age, to be received as an ecclesiastic, and accordingly seven days only elapsed before he received the "tonsure," a sure indication of his being devoted to the ministry. Though his extreme youth must have prevented him from understanding the nature of his priestly functions, yet these crafty fanatics induced him to believe that this was the sure step to his future elevation, to his usefulness in the world, and to his final entrance into the kingdom of glory.

After remaining in this house of ignorance, submitting patiently to its discipline, and enduring its privations, he was removed, at the age of twelve, to the "College of the Jesuits at Rome." Here he was subjected to the same round of austerities, alike abhorrent to common sense and the Holy Scriptures; but in addition to these he was directed to the "study of the classics and rhetoric," which afforded some relief to a mind oppressed with the bondage of burdensome ceremonies. We cannot particularize all the intricacies of the labyrinth through which he was led by his Jesuitical instructors, with a view to initiate him into the mysteries of the Roman Catholic faith and practice. Suffice to say here, that he was taught to extol the Virgin Mary as the mother of God, to confess his sins to the priest, to hate all Protestants as the "worshipers of mammon instead of God, that they did not believe in Christ, that they slaughtered each other daily like ferocious beasts, that they put Roman Catholics to death, that they attended to no social restrictions, but intentionally lived in a state of anarchy." What

wonder is it that youth, trained up in the belief of "these diabolical assertions," as our author calls them, should imbibe strong prejudices against Protestants, and afterward be impelled on by an implacable hatred toward them! Such was the effect upon the mind and heart of young Ciocci.

During the course of these instructions he began to feel the weight of his chains. He sighed for liberty. This, however, was as yet far from him. He was doomed to undergo a long train of evils ere he could regain his freedom from the tyranny of Rome, and breathe the pure air of Protestant liberty. Wearied with this perpetual round of dry ceremonies, which neither fed the understanding nor softened the heart, he sighed for liberty to read the classical poets of Italy. In this desire he was at length gratified, not by the officers of the institution, who had prohibited all access to these models of polite literature, but by the kind assiduity of friends, who had penetrated the secrets of his heart, and found means to furnish him "with the works of Metastasio, Goldoni, Tasso, Pignotti, and others." These authors he read with indescribable pleasure, and they afforded a solace to his mind in his solitary moments.

Through his pressing solicitation to his mother, to whom he was attached by the strongest ties of filial affection, she was induced to set him free from the "house of bondage;" and he eagerly accepted the boon, celebrating the day of his release as one of the happiest of his life. Feeling the buoyancy so natural to youth, though he attended the school of La Sapienza five days in the week, Sundays and Thursdays being considered as holydays, he occasionally gave full play to his feelings, and, in company with other young gentlemen who attended the school, exercised himself in imitating military exploits. These juvenile sports, however, soon attracted the attention of the grim father Braudi, the Jesuit who had charge of the school. This man was confessor to his mother. Abusing the confidence reposed in him by this credulous woman, father Braudi represented to her the danger to be apprehended from allowing a youth of the talents and enterprise of her son to indulge himself in these athletic sports, lest, in an evil hour, he and others of a like temperament might plot against the Roman government, and finally upset the hierarchy. This intrigue and its development are related with such vivacity of style, and with such a lively feeling of youthful regrets and disappointments, that we give the account in his own words:—

"Behold me, then, condemned to be a saint by force. He commenced his scheme by representing to my mother the danger of my present pursuits, and added, that unless a remedy were applied to the disease at an

early stage, it might, in the end, prove fatal. He told her that the signs of a tempestuous future were but too manifest in my present conduct,—that my passions were violent—and that the road which I was taking, with such rapid strides, was the road to perdition. What a reproach, he continually whispered in her ear, that a holy family should be dishonored by a wild member! Who knows into what precipice this inconsiderate youth may, in the course of time, throw himself? And yet, with only a little firmness, a little energy, all may be well. It is an attested fact, that continual droppings wear away stones. What wonder, then, if the reiterated and insidious words of the priest sunk, by degrees, deeply into the heart of my mother, who looked upon him as the minister of God, and believed that she heard, in his exhortations, a celestial voice! Too true, thought she, is that which this holy man tells me of my son. If, at the age of sixteen, warm with the sentiments of piety instilled into his heart at the colleges, he shows himself thus unmanageable, what will become of him at a later period, when his impetuous passions shall have obtained a stronger hold? Tormented by these doubts, to which maternal fears gave gigantic forms, and to which the constant insinuations of the Jesuits added monstrous physiognomies, she, at length, resolved to give herself to the undertaking.

"Secure in my integrity, and perfectly unconscious of the storm that was gathering over my head, it was not without a mixture of surprise and perplexity that I observed in every member of my family a certain anxiety of manner as regarded myself. Their looks bespoke a sentiment of tenderness mingled with compassion. Their conversation abounded more than usual with ascetic phrases concerning the salvation of the soul, the dangers of the world, the wiles of the devil, the weakness of human nature, the necessity of repressing the passions, and similar subjects. I knew not what to conjecture from all this; when, one day, my mother, calling me aside, pressed me affectionately to her bosom, kissed my forehead, and said:—

"'My son, the salvation of your soul is the most anxious wish of my heart, and it is with feelings of the deepest regret that I have of late marked your growing attachment to the frivolities of the world. Quit, I conjure you, those associates with whom you are now linked, and who will, otherwise, one day prove your ruin.'

"I instantly replied, 'Mother, the young men with whom I associate are well educated, and of good families. I devote the greater portion of my time to study, and never neglect the duties of religion. What harm, then, can arise from my uniting myself with them for a few hours' amusement on the Sunday and Thursday? Our proceedings are all carried on in public, and there is nothing of which we can possibly be ashamed.'

"'Ah no, my son! but yet you must relinquish your present pursuits.'

"'But what do you fear? What do you desire of me?'

"Here again, embracing me, she said, 'If you love me, do not oppose my wishes, but prepare yourself to enter some college for the purpose of studying philosophy.'

"As if struck with a thunderbolt, I remained stupified, but after a few seconds, the aversion which I had conceived to those monastic prisons

overcame my astonishment, and, in a burst of indignation, I sprang up, exclaiming, 'O no! never, never shall that be! Now I perceive that some unworthy, some cruel friar, envious of my happiness, has been advising you' . . . .

"I should have continued my exclamation, and who knows what more dangerous expressions might have fallen from my lips, had not the copious tears of my dear mother, who was totally unprepared for such a reply, softened my resentment. I flew to my room, and, locking myself in, refused to answer any one who came to summon me; and it was not till the following day that, subdued by the entreaties of my sisters, I quitted my chamber.

"I went immediately to my father, who in kind terms reproached me for my arrogance toward my mother, and signified his unalterable determination that I should enter a college. My mother at this moment joined us. . . . Let me here be permitted to wish, with the patriarch Job, that this hour might be blotted out from the number of the hours of my life. The agreement for my slavery was now concluded—my replies were still negative; but the opponents with whom I had to contend were powerful and numerous; and vigorous as was my resistance, I was at length obliged to yield. The tears of my mother, the imperativeness of my father, and the prayers of my sisters, triumphed over my reluctance. They concluded with saying to me, 'You will only remain in college the necessary time for the study of philosophy, and then you will return home.'"—Pp. 18–21.

Here properly commenced his imprisonment. Partly by bland words and courteous manners, and partly by force, he was inveigled into a compliance with the rules of the cloister, though contrary to all his inclinations, to the dictates of his judgment, and the most ardent wishes of his heart. After three days of comparative liberty, during which time he anxiously inquired for the rules of the house, and the course of study, without any satisfactory answer, he was delivered over to the "master of the ceremonies," who conducted him into an inner apartment.

Here he soon found himself in company with ten young men, whose pallid countenances and sunken eyes revealed to him the nature of the place to which they were doomed, as well as the inward anguish with which their hearts were wrung.

Through persuasion and threats, alternately resorted to for the purpose of reconciling him to his destiny, he submitted to put on the tunic, and thus habited in the dress of a monk, after contending for awhile with fierce passions which raged within him the more furiously from the chagrin of disappointment, he bent down to his situation and strove to make himself contented under the delusive dream that his days of probation would soon end, and that by the study of philosophy he would be the better prepared for usefulness in the world. But even this hope was doomed to disappointment.

Instead of entering upon philosophical researches, as he had been led to expect, he was directed to the study of Latin and Italian literature. In this manner he lingered out the first year of his novitiate, alternating between hope and fear.

In the mean time a scene of such a startling character occurred that it would appear incredible had we not been accustomed to read of the cunning hypocrisy of the satellites of Rome. This cannot be described so graphically as in the words of the author himself. After expressing his joy at the annunciation of the word "liberty," from the hope of soon exulting in its possession, he says:—

"'Shall I then be free? shall I be permitted to walk out alone?' and I was preparing myself to enumerate a list of joys, which I conceived this word liberty to comprehend, when the monk interrupted me with

"'O no.'

"'Then in what does that liberty you promise me consist? If nothing is to be gained by it, I will not change my dress; it is better that I should remain as I am.'

"'Young man, you go on too fast—the liberty of going out alone will one day be acceded to you, but not at present; we must proceed by degrees. You will now be permitted the pleasure of returning home occasionally, for a few hours, accompanied by me, or by any other person whom the superior may think proper to appoint; besides which, you will be allowed to receive the visits of your relations once a month. And to conclude, this change of dress authorises you to commence the study of philosophy.'

"Although the monk's tart 'O no' had hurled me from a heaven of light to a chaos of darkness, yet the promise that I should see my parents shed around me a ray of hope, and I exclaimed, 'Well, upon condition that I shall return to my paternal home, that I shall once more embrace my parents and friends, I am ready. Where is the dress?'

"'My son,' replied the father, 'there are certain formalities attending the assuming of the dress; it will be necessary to bless the tunic, and to go through an appropriate ceremony in the church—but it is merely a ceremony; and you must also sign a paper, called a "*deed of humility.*"'

"Accustomed, as I had been, from infancy, to a strict mode of speaking, I understood this word humility in its usual sense, as implying an internal conviction of our own nothingness, and of the insignificancy of all human powers, and therefore did not ask for any further information respecting this deed, but at once showed myself disposed to do all that was required.

"The monk, rejoicing in his easy triumph, tapped me caressingly on the shoulder, saying, 'To-morrow you shall sign this deed, and you must then immediately enter on the "*holy exercises.*"' (A penance of fifteen days, during which, far removed from all accustomed occupations, the person gives himself up to meditation, passing from the reading of serious books to prayer, and from prayer to other devotional prac-

tices, according to the example of Ignazio Lojola, who pretended to have had a revelation from the Virgin with regard to the duties to be observed.)

"'How long will it be before I see my family?'

"'After the fifteen days of "*holy exercises*" you will assume the habit, and be permitted to go home.'

"The anxiety that I felt to behold again those faces so dear, so familiar to me—to unburden my griefs to my parents, and to ask their counsel and aid, for my mind was filled with doubts and fears—made every hour appear an age.

"The following morning the master came to conduct me to his apartment. There I found Signor Ciccolini, a public notary of the court of Rome, Signor Baini, and two other gentlemen who were unknown to me. The notary, after having written the usual preliminary formula, turning toward me, interrogated me thus:—

"'Are you, Signor D. R. Ciocci, willing to assume the habit of a monk?'

"'I am willing.'

"'Are you willing to give up all that belongs to you?'

"'I am.'

"'But reflect well—do not allow yourself to be carried away by your fervor. You may, without scruple, make some little reserve to supply your wants.'

"'What wants? Have I not parents who will supply all I need?'

"'Very good—but your parents will not live for ever.'

"'I know it; but when it shall please God to call them to himself, shall I not succeed to their property? My eldest brother is married, and has an establishment of his own,—my brother the priest cannot marry,—of my sisters, one is married, and one is a nun; they have each received their fortunes,—the third, who is very young, will at the appointed time receive her portion,—and I also shall myself succeed to a portion of the paternal property.'

"'Pardon me, Signor Ciocci,' resumed the notary, 'but in this statement you manifestly contradict yourself. You declared a few minutes since your willingness to renounce all that you possessed, and you now say that, at the death of your father, you shall have property of your own. I do not understand you—explain yourself, if you please, more clearly.'

"I was silent for two or three minutes, not knowing how to extricate my thoughts from the labyrinth into which the serious remonstrance of the notary had thrown them. I knew not what to think of this '*deed of humility*.' A thousand misgivings filled my mind, and hoping to receive from him an explanation that would assist me in fully comprehending its intention, I anxiously broke silence with—

"'I must request, sir, that you will inform me what is expected from me. Tell me what is this deed—whether it be really a mere form, as has been represented to me, or if' . . . . Here the master arose, and in an imperious tone interrupted me, saying,—

"'Do not be obstinate and rebellious, but obey. I have already told you that, when you have assumed the habit of the order, the chapter

"*de humilitate*" shall be explained to you, according to the rule of St. Benedict. In this paper you have only to make a renunciation of all you possess on earth.'

"'Of all I possess! and if I renounce all, who, when I leave the college, will provide for me?'

"The notary now interposed. 'That,' said he, 'is the point to which I wish to call your attention, in advising you to make some reservation. If you neglect doing so, you may find yourself in difficulties, losing, as you irrevocably will, every right to your own.'

"At these words, so palpable, so glaring, the bandage fell from my eyes, and I saw the abyss these monsters were opening under my feet. 'This is a deception, a horrible deception,' I exclaimed; 'I now understand the intention of this "*deed of humility*," but I protest that I will not sign it, and that I will have nothing more to do with it.'

"The state of my feelings, at this moment, may be more easily imagined than described. Horror at the sight of the danger into which I had been running with so much confidence—repugnance to the monastic life—indignation at the insidious manner into which they had endeavored to draw from my lips an assent to an irrevocable misfortune—added to a naturally-impetuous disposition, completely mastered me. I broke out into bitter expressions of irony and reproach, directed now against the notary, now against the witnesses—calling them villains, deceivers, men destitute of religion and charity. At this moment my passion knew no bounds. I was reckless of what I uttered, and set them all at defiance. The notary Ciccolini sat astonished, the witnesses were pale and mute, and the master threatened, hoping to subdue my impetuosity, and check my resentment, by thundering in my ears menaces of penance, deprivation of food, and imprisonment; but his efforts were useless. These inflictions appeared to me as nothing in comparison with the danger I had escaped. I returned to my room, and, feeling the full force of my melancholy situation, I burst into tears."—Pp. 34–39.

These extracts are sufficient to show the reader the diabolical arts to which these ghostly fathers resorted to accomplish their designs. Ciocci did but narrowly escape the trap that had been laid for him, with a view to persuade him to sign the "deed of humility," by which he would for ever have dispossessed himself of all legal claim to his share of his father's estate. Having discovered their nefarious designs in time to defeat them in this particular for the time, and perceiving the deep plot which had been laid for him, by which the enormity of their iniquity was more fully disclosed to his mind, he lamented bitterly over his fate, while he rejoiced at his deliverance from their crafty hands. In this perturbed state of mind he wrote to his mother, and received an answer full of tenderness, but exhorting him to humble obedience to his superiors. What a horrid deception did this letter unfold! Instead of being written by his mother, these complotters against his happiness

had opened his letter, read it, and, imitating her hand-writing, had framed such an answer as suited their own selfish views, and then succeeded in procuring his signature to the "*deed of humility*," by doing which he renounced the world, and consented to "assume the monkish habit." By the command of his master, who stood by him while he wrote, he sent the tidings of what he had done to his parents. After this he was doomed to solitary imprisonment for fifteen days, that he might devote himself to religious exercises, in consequence of which he became quite indisposed, his feet swelled, he was oppressed with nausea, with constant pain in his head, so that if he attempted to walk he became so dizzy that he was compelled to throw himself upon the bed. This severe probation ending, he was prepared to consecrate himself more fully to the service of the priesthood of the Romish Church, in the character of a monk.

Notwithstanding deceptions had been practiced upon him, through the persuasions of his mother and the assurance that his father would exert himself to secure the rights of his son, he was induced, after a short visit to his friends, though with great reluctance, to return to the "detested walk of his prison," as he denominates the place of his abode. We should take up too much space to relate minutely all the vexations to which he was subjected, the mental agonies he underwent, while contending with the merciless tyrants who ruled over him. It should be remarked, however, that his inward and outward sufferings led him to earnest prayer for deliverance, and that, in answer to his prayers, a ray of divine light shot into his mind. This induced him to examine more critically into the foundation of his hope, and to inquire more sedulously into the pretensions of the Papal Church. Enough of its absurdities were already revealed to his mind to beget within him an abhorrence of its peculiarities, and to induce him to suspect the soundness of its faith, and to make him lothe its practical influence.

On his release from his "penance chamber," as he calls his place of seclusion, he applied himself to the diligent study of philosophy, to the history of the popes, the annals of Italy, and of the councils. In these studies, particularly the latter, he could not but observe that pride, a thirst for dominion, the cupidity of riches, together with a love of ease and voluptuous living, had distinguished the higher orders of the Romish Church, even from the beginning. This discovery riveted the conviction still deeper in his heart of the antichristian tendency of Romanism, and increased his disgust at its unmeaning mummeries. It was during this season of comparative liberty, yet struggling under great mental suffering, that he fell into conversation with a member of the fraternity, who com-

mended to him, under, however, the charge of secresy, the holy Bible, as the best of books. This divine book he had never seen; but from the eulogy pronounced upon it by his friend, he felt an eager desire to peruse its pages. This, however, was denied him; nor would the general of the institution allow the man who proposed to effect a reformation among the monks by its truths, to try the experiment: so conscious were he and his coadjutors of like disposition that their rules and practices would not bear the light of Bible truth.

At the commencement of the third year of his sojourn in the monastery of San Bernardo, the master, who had tyrannized over him with so much craftiness and cruelty, was removed by death, and was succeeded by one of a far milder temperament, with whom he frequently conversed with a degree of familiarity not usual in such relations. He finally succeeded, through the kindness of a friend and the aid of his faithful servant, in procuring the use of a Bible, which he read with great eagerness, though he had to do it secretly, for fear of his superiors. Through the reading of the sacred Scriptures, light was reflected upon his understanding, and impressions deep and abiding were made upon his heart. By this means he became convinced of the evils of "auricular confession," of "transubstantiation," of "purgatory," of "indulgences,"—all of which he had been taught to believe in from his infancy. This conduct roused the wrath of his enemies, which led to the idea of putting him out of the way by poison. By the timely aid of the ordinary physician, who was his friend, his life was saved, though, through the effects of the poison and the remedy, he was exceedingly ill.

Soon after his recovering from his sickness, most evidently brought on by the murderous agency of the monks, he obtained an interview with the Hanoverian ambassador, a Protestant by profession, to whom he revealed the exercises of his mind respecting the falsity of the Romish peculiarities, and of his belief in the Protestant faith. This gentleman heard him with surprise, and embraced him with Christian affection, though he could not afford him any external relief, consistently with his official relations to the government of Rome. This incident he records, that the ambassador may bear testimony to its truth, and to the true state of his mind at that time. Still unable to extricate himself from the difficulties with which he was environed, he endeavored to improve himself, as best he might, in reading, in conversation, and occasionally in preaching; though his sermons were subjected to a most rigid censorship by his superiors, and he often found whole sen-

tences erased as "heretical," and of course unfit for the ears of a Popish audience. One consolation he now enjoyed, and that was a free intercourse with his mother, who interested herself much in his welfare, while she never dreamed that her son was preparing to breathe in the atmosphere of Protestant liberty.

Through her advice he was induced to memorialize the pope. This memorial, which was drawn up with artless simplicity, set forth the difficulties of his situation, exposed the iniquities of the monks, and earnestly prayed that he might be delivered from his bondage. It was committed to the care of his mother, and she presented it to the holy convocation, which was then in session. Its contents created a wonderful sensation, but produced no other result for the present than to make his confinement the more irksome, by increasing the vigilance of his tyrannical overseers. His words were criticised with malignant ingenuity, his actions watched with sleepless diligence, and he was commanded to observe the ceremonies of the church with the utmost exactitude. At length, however, after four months of solemn deliberation, he was summoned to hear his sentence, which amounted to an absolvment from his monkish vows, but to a condemnation to the life of a secular priest, which included a prohibition of marriage—he was doomed to a life of priestly celibacy.

This decree, though ostensibly meant to favor his wishes, by no means liberated him from his confinement. Through various pretences, all of which showed the duplicity of their hearts and the shameless manner of their lives, they continued to disappoint his hopes of freedom from monastic restraints, to which he had been doomed against his will. To detail these artifices, as wicked as they were deceitful, would be only to repeat, in varied forms, those scenes of hypocritical cant and rant on the one hand, and that fervid remonstrance and manly resistance on the other, which have before been exhibited. There is one instance of duplicity and injustice, however, of such a flagrant nature, that we cannot consent to pass it without particular notice, as it shows in most striking colors the blackness of their deep depravity. We will give it in his own words. He says:—

"The general Tassini exchanged his residence in the monastery of San Bernardo alle Terme for the more commodious and magnificent one of Santo Croce in Gerusalemme, and prepared to take with him all the young monks; the aged men coming to fix their abode in the monastery of San Bernardo. I, of course, expected to be included in the number of the young men; how could I possibly suppose otherwise? But, however, while my companions were preparing for their

change of habitation, I was summoned by the general, who, in the presence of the monks, D. Florenzio Garcia and D. Gioachino Aleñ, thus addressed me:—

"'Tell me, should you like to go with the young men to S. Croce in Gerusalemme; or do you prefer staying here?'

"'Most assuredly I should prefer accompanying my companions. I trust you consider me as one of the young men?'

"'That depends entirely on yourself; if you prove docile, which is an indispensable qualification for youth, you will go with us; if you prove obstinate—a failing common to the aged—you will remain with them.'

"'How will that be? Explain yourself, if you please.'

"'The explanation is given in few words: sign this paper, and you will go with us; refuse, and you will remain here.' Thus saying, he unfolded a sheet of written paper.

"'May I ask what I am required to sign in that paper?'

"'Nothing but what it is your duty to sign, viz., the retractation of the step you took in a burst of phrensy, of the scandal you have given rise to, and of the appeal uselessly made to the holy convocation of bishops and regulars. In short, a declaration in which you declare yourself contented with the holy state voluntarily chosen by you.'

"At these words I started, and exclaimed in a tone of indignation, 'Never, no, never will I subscribe my name to that paper.'

"'Very well,' he replied, with that horrid grin which adapts itself so well to the lips and physiognomy of tyrants, 'very well; you show that you are as stubborn as an old man, and therefore you must remain with them.'

"I did not at that moment understand the malignity and cruelty of this new method of torture, nor can any one fully comprehend it who does not maturely reflect on the different natures of youth and age."—Pp. 81, 82.

With a view to reconcile himself as much as possible to his situation, he endeavored to please his elder associates, to conciliate the good will of his superiors, the principal of whom, father Laurenzi, was his real friend, and had, indeed, suffered a degradation for having borne testimony in his favor before the convocation which had passed upon his memorial. He so far succeeded in gaining their confidence, that they appointed him librarian, which afforded him an opportunity of spending much of his time in examining books, and working in the garden belonging to the cloister, sometimes in agreeable company with D. Candido Laurenzi, between whom there had grown a mutual attachment. He occasionally assumed liberties which exposed him to the censures of the monks. Among others, of this sort, one was his opening the doors of the church to gratify the curiosity of some English ladies, namely, the duchess of Cambridge, and her daughter, the princess Augusta, who had signified their desire to be admitted within the

sacred inclosure. He was induced to this act of courtesy contrary to the remonstrance of the monks, because he believed they were Protestants, and because he conjectured that hatred to Protestants had led the morose monks to reject their application. Either from policy or indifference, he escaped punishment for this act of disobedience, and continued to be treated with lenity and a degree of tolerant kindness to which he had been unaccustomed for some time past.

These days of comparative enjoyment were of short duration. He had become suspected. The frankness of his nature would not allow him to act a double part. He openly avowed his disbelief in Popery, and this exposed him to the vengeance of the monks; his appeal to the Jesuits and cardinals did but expose him to fresh insults. He was, finally, under the guise of friendship, by commands glossed over with words of kindness, accompanied by hypocritical smiles of love, induced to remove to a place of close confinement—a dungeon, indeed, where he was persecuted as a criminal, the quantity of his food diminished, and where he was otherwise treated with cruelty. All this was inflicted upon him for the good of his soul! The following account of his sufferings will be read with interest by all whose sympathies are not blunted by an abandoned course of iniquity:—

"I had been shut up in this wretched place for thirteen days, when, one day, about noon, the father Mislei, the author of all my miseries, entered my cell. At the sight of this man, resentment overcame every other consideration, and I advanced toward him fully prepared to indulge my feelings, when he, with his usual smile, expressed, in bland words, his deep regret at having been the cause of my long detention in this retreat. 'Never could I have supposed,' added he, 'that my anxiety for the salvation of your soul would have brought you into so much tribulation. But rest assured the fault is not entirely mine; you have yourself in a great degree, by your useless obstinacy, been the cause of your own sufferings. Ah, well, we will yet remedy all.' Not feeling any confidence in his assurance, I burst out into bitter invectives and fierce words. He then renewed his protestations, and clothed them with such a semblance of honesty and truth, that when he ended with this tender conclusion, 'Be assured, my son, that I love you,' my anger vanished.

"It is undoubtedly a great advantage to be endowed by nature with a feeling, open, and ingenuous heart; but even this blessing becomes a misfortune, when its possessor is surrounded by cunning men, deceivers, whose value is estimated by their power of fraud. I at once lost sight of the Jesuit, and thought I was addressing a man—a being capable of sympathizing in the distresses of others. 'Ah, well, father Mislei, in my situation I have need of some one on whom to rely—some one toward whom I can feel kindly, and therefore I am induced

to place confidence in your protestations. I now ask for a proof of the sincerity of your words, a proof which you can easily give, for it is in accordance with the laws, both human and divine.'

"'Speak, my son, I am come here to do for you all that is in my power. What do you desire?'

"'That you will convey a letter from me to my mother.'

"'I am only sorry you demand so little; be assured I will not fail in serving you. Is it written?'

"'Not yet, but if you will have the kindness to wait a moment, you shall have it quickly.'

"I then wrote as follows:—

"*From the house of S. Eusebio, Aug. 9th*, 1841.

"Dearest Parents, Brothers, and Sisters,—These are the last words of your son, of your brother. I die—and death, which would be less terrible to me did it come from a strange hand, will be most bitter, coming as it does from you. I have no other hope of deliverance than that which God offers to the unfortunate—the peace of the tomb. Though you renounce me as a son, as a brother, I love you still; and that with an affection more holy, more pure, since it is not engendered by flesh and blood, but comes from God. Benedictions, not curses, will proceed from my lips. I shall die, but the assurance that my blood will be shed in testimony of the truth, will support me at the sacrificial altar to which I am being dragged by the Romish Inquisition. Had I bowed my head to the iniquitous idol, instead of condemning me to punishment, they would have peaceably guided me on to honor, pride, and luxury. And this was your advice. But to have obeyed you, I must have resisted the stirrings of the Holy Spirit; and whether 'man is to be obeyed rather than God, judge ye.' May God illumine your hearts, and mitigate your feelings of remorse for having sacrificed a son, a brother! That I may, at least, if not on earth, see you again in heaven, is the prayer of

"Your deceived RAFFAELE CIOCCI.

"Scarcely had I put the letter into the hands of Mislei, than he turned toward me with an air of kind concern, saying, 'By the by, I had almost forgotten the best part of my errand. His eminence, the cardinal Castracani, has commissioned me to inform you that he is anxious you should leave this place, and to inqure if you are yourself desirous of doing so.'

"'If I desire it? What a strange question! You might as well ask a condemned soul whether he is desirous of escaping from hell!'

"At these words the Jesuit started, like a goaded animal, and forgetting his mission of deceiver, knitting his brows and compressing his lips, he allowed his ferocious soul for one moment to appear; but having grown old in deceit, he immediately had the circumspection to give this movement of rage the appearance of religious zeal, and exclaimed, 'What comparisons are these? Are you not ashamed to assume the language of the atheist? By speaking in this way you clearly manifest how little you deserve to quit this place. But since I have told you that I love you, I will give you a proof of it, by thinking no more

of these irreligious expressions; they shall be as forgotten as though they had never been spoken. Well, then, the cardinal proposes to you an easy way of returning to your monastery.'

"'What does he propose?'

"'Here is the way,' said he, presenting me with a paper; 'copy this with your own hand, and nothing more will be required of you.'

"I took the paper with convulsive eagerness. It was a recantation of my faith, there condemned as erroneous, and was couched in these words:—

"'I, Raffaele Ciocci, a Benedictine and Cistercian monk, inexperienced in theological doctrines, having, in good faith and without malice, fallen into the errors of the Protestants, and being now illumined and convinced, recognize my errors. I retract them, I reject them, and declare the Roman Church to be the true Catholic and Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ. I bind myself, therefore, to teach and to preach according to her doctrines, being ready even to shed my blood for her sake. In conclusion, I ask pardon of all those to whom my anti-catholic, heterodox discourses may have been an occasion of stumbling. And I pray to God to pardon me my sin.'

"Upon reading this, I shuddered, and, starting to my feet, in a solemn attitude and with a firm voice exclaimed, 'Kill me, if you please; my life is in your power; but never will I subscribe to that iniquitous formulary.' The Jesuit, after laboring in vain to persuade me to his wishes, went away in anger."—Pp. 102–106.

Overcome at last by their alternate persuasions and threats, he signed the recantation, and all peace instantly fled from his mind. These fiends in human flesh exulted in their victory, congratulated him on his conversion, while he, worn down with suffering, emaciated, dirty, and ragged, appeared before the cardinal, and presented his recantation with his signature attached, which the cardinal deposited with the archives of the church. Though, after this seeming reconciliation to the see of Rome, he was treated with greater lenity than heretofore, was permitted to visit his friends, and enjoy the solace of conversing with his mother and other relatives, yet the stings of his awakened conscience gave him continual uneasiness, and "imbittered every pleasure." This created an anguish of spirit from which he could not extricate himself, and what made it doubly grievous was, that he dared not speak of his sorrow to any of his acquaintance, for fear of an exposure, which would inevitably bring upon his devoted head fresh persecution. While he stood in conscious innocence, pleading for the truth so far as he perceived it, he could bear the persecutions of his enemies with manly firmness; but not even all the blandishments of friendship, nor the endearments of social life, could make amends for the guilt he had brought upon his soul by subscribing to what he did not believe, and for joining in the performance of ceremo-

nies which he knew to be displeasing to God. In this distressing state of mind he lingered until Providence opened a way for his escape.

After revolving the subject in his mind for some time, he at length resolved to quit Rome, to quit Italy—in a word, to separate himself from home, friends, and society. But how was this to be accomplished? His movements were all watched with sleepless vigilance. He was fearful to reveal his mind to any one, lest he might be betrayed.

The difficulties of accomplishing this desire of his heart thickened around him. His enemies continued to suspect him and he found that his movements were still watched, and one day, on his return to the library, he found his papers had been seized, and were strewed in fragments upon the floor. Complaining to the superior of the convent for this act of Vandalism, he was treated with cold neglect, and utterly refused all redress of his grievance. Believing his longer stay would only expose him to fresh insults and outrages, having obtained a pass in the name of his servant to visit Leghorn, after suffering many anxious hours, he eluded the vigilance of his enemies, and set off in a carriage for the place to which his passport authorized him to go. Passing through various perils, he finally arrived in safety at Paris, and thence went to London. Here he felt himself safe, and in the enjoyment of liberty. But even here the emissaries of Rome followed him. His flight soon became known to the monks, his old associates, and it was communicated to the supreme pontiff, and the chaplain of the Sardinian Chapel in London received information that Ciocci was there in the character of a monk who had eloped from the convent of San Bernardo. This personage paid him a visit, and used all his arts to entrap him, and when he could not succeed by persuasion, he resorted to violent threats. He stood firm, however, against his wily arts, nor was he intimidated by his threats.

We have traced this youthful Italian from the time of his entrance into the college of S. Redentore, at seven years of age, through his various scenes of suffering, with but short interruptions of enjoyment, until his emancipation from his thraldom, and his safe arrival in the metropolis of England. And what a mass of human corruption has this short but eventful narrative unfolded! Let those who flatter themselves that Popery has changed its character, read this narrative, and they will become convinced of their mistake. Far more than twelve hundred years has the Church of Rome carried the "mark of the beast on her forehead," and she still bears

the same indelible imprint of her deep apostasy from God. The land of Italy, favored by Providence above all lands for the salubrity of its climate, the fertility of its soil, and the genius of its inhabitants, is now cursed with poverty and wretchedness, its government tottering to its fall, under the despotic rule of the sovereign pontiff, and the people beggared by the rapacity of an idle and vicious priesthood. And as to pure religion, it has long been banished from the precincts of Rome, and substituted by a meretricious garb of outward sanctity, which assimilates it nearer to the point of ancient paganism than to the external habiliments of Christianity, while the spirit and life of Christianity lie buried beneath the rubbish of human inventions, which have been accumulating for ages. This is no fancy picture. From the accounts which have come down to us in history, and which we daily receive, the reality far exceeds all that fancy could paint—truth is more weighty than fiction.

Rome has grown old in "iniquities and barbarities." Her debaucheries have corrupted her life-blood, and she betrays the feebleness of age without any of the symptoms which indicate her return to health. We believe that a reformation is impossible—unless, indeed, God should invert the natural order of things, and save, by a miracle of almighty power, those who refuse all the offers of grace and mercy. That individuals in that church may be saved we do not doubt: for though encumbered with a multitude of unscriptural requisitions, rites, and ceremonies, and sunk in her head and members to the lowest degradation of moral pollution, there are, doubtless, those in her communion who may escape from her polluting breath, and, abjuring her abominations, may flee from the midst of her, and finally be "saved so as by fire." And though she neutralizes the grand doctrine of justification by grace through faith in Jesus Christ, by teaching salvation by the merit of works, and greatly obscures the character of God by sanctioning image worship, and virtually obliterates the atonement of Christ by the sacrifice of the mass, yet she nominally acknowledges these truths; and may, therefore, escape the condemnation of a professed repudiator of these cardinal doctrines of divine revelation, and thus make it possible for the sincere worshiper of the true God to draw nigh to him by faith in Jesus Christ, and obtain the remission of sins through his blood.

But while this allowance is made in behalf of individuals who are sincerely pious, we do not believe that the Church of Rome, as a church, will ever be reformed. The many attempts which have been made at different times to effect a reformation, all of which

have signally failed, seem to demonstrate the utter hopelessness of her case. She must, therefore, be utterly uprooted. The pope must lay aside his claim to infallibility, strip off his pontifical robes, dash the mitre from his head, and take the idolatrous buckle from his slipper, and cease to exercise his lordly rule over the souls and bodies of men,—and the church itself must change its external character in claiming for her priesthood the power of absolving the sinner from his sins, of changing the bread and wine into the real body, soul, and divinity of the Son of God, of requiring the worship of saints and angels, and many other absurd puerilities—all this must be done, and then the pure doctrines of the gospel must be confessed and preached, in order to effect a reformation. Should all this be done, the Roman Catholic Church, in all that distinguishes her from the evangelical churches, would cease to exist. There would be no longer a pope seated "upon the seven hills," nor no longer a priesthood usurping the throne of Christ, by dispensing pardons to the penitent, and changing the elements of bread and wine into the godhead and manhood of the adorable Redeemer.

Whether such a radical change will ever be effected or not we cannot tell. Sure we are, however, that if the day shall ever arrive when the "knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters do the great deep,"—"when all shall know the Lord from the least to the greatest,"—then Popery shall cease to exist. Meantime we do well to study its character, to watch its progress, and to guard against its insinuating approaches, and finally to repel with suitable indignation offers of its guardianship.

Its guardianship! What guardianship can it offer to American citizens? Are not all her bishops, priests, and deacons, sworn to yield obedience to a foreign potentate? Does any one of these dignitaries ever take the oath of allegiance to our government? Whatever his holiness, the pope, shall command, they must obey. What security, then, can they give to us, that they will not rebel whenever an opportunity shall offer to favor their plans? We believe that not a single imported priest in the Roman Catholic communion ever becomes a naturalized citizen of America. How can he? Can he make his oath of allegiance to the pope of Rome, who is a secular, as well as a spiritual prince, compatible with his loyalty to the American government? However pliable the conscience of a Jesuitical bishop or priest may be, we cannot perceive how he can, without committing perjury, swear fealty to two governments so opposite in their principles and tendencies as are the government of Rome and the government of the United States. Let, then, the

people of America look well to these facts, and study their practical bearing upon their civil and religious institutions.

And then, as to religion, it seems to be out of the question, any further than the building up an hierarchy and the external aggrandizement and embellishment of the church are concerned. Had we not the indubitable evidence of all history, both civil and ecclesiastical, to prove the moral corruptions of Popery, the single Narrative we have been reviewing would be sufficient to convince us of the fact. Such a scene of duplicity, of intrigue, of cruelty toward an unsuspecting youth we should hardly have looked for in the middle of the nineteenth century. It proves what we have before said, namely, that Popery has not changed its character. It is the same system of deception, of relentless cruelty and hard-hearted persecution that it ever was—only it dare not erect its gibbets, nor kindle its slow fires, which it did in the days of its glory. It cannot bite, not because it has no will, but because it has lost its teeth. It is the same enemy to freedom of thought that it ever was, manifests the like hostility to Bible truth, to Protestant faith and freedom, and would, if it could, keep all its vassals bound in its "slavish chains" without any hope of emancipation.

We do not say these things from any hatred or ill will to Roman Catholics as men, and as citizens. We do, indeed, hate their errors, their idolatrous superstitions, their masses, confessions, and transubstantiations, and, above all, their abominable iniquities, their persecutions and hypocrisies. These things we are bound to hate, because they must be hateful to a holy God, to a God of sincerity and truth, of wisdom and love. But while we thus declare with all frankness our hostility to these peculiarities of Romanists, we can say with equal truth and sincerity, that we love them as fellow-beings. We abhor all persecution of them, equally with all their persecutions of Protestants. Persecutions of all sorts are abhorrent to the spirit of Christianity, to the God of Christianity, and therefore must be to every experimental believer in Christianity. Nor would we utter a word needlessly to offend even Roman Catholics, much as we abhor their abominations. What we have said in this connection has been forced from us by the pressure of truth, and not from a desire to irritate the feelings of the members of that communion. We would deal with them precisely as we would with all others, whether Protestants, pagans, or infidels, that is, tell them what we believe to be their errors, that they may see and forsake them, and then turn to God that they may live.

We know, indeed, that an unconverted Protestant is as wicked in the sight of God, and exposed to the same condemnation, as is

an unconverted Roman Catholic. We know, also, that many Protestants have disgraced themselves and the religion they professed, by persecuting those who dissented from them, as heretics. All this is unfolded to us in the page of history. What then? Is persecution, therefore, right. No, in nowise. It should be condemned wherever found. Christianity condemns it. The hearts of all true Christians condemn it. It must not, then, be tolerated. We, therefore, say to all the unconverted, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of God." When this conversion is effected in the heart, the spirit of persecution is exchanged for the spirit of love, which is as incompatible with that hatred which actuates the heart of the persecutor, as is the spirit of Romanism with pure Christianity.

We should have been much more gratified in reading the Narrative before us, if we could have discovered an evidence of this radical change in the disposition of Ciocci. Though he became sufficiently enlightened by reading the Bible to discover the errors of Popery, and in some measure to feel the miseries of his moral condition, and was thence led to prayer to God for deliverance, yet he does not seem to have been conducted to an appreciable view of the plan of redemption by Jesus Christ, to the necessity of evangelical repentance and justification by grace through faith, all of which accompany the work of regeneration, and which, when effected, shows itself in meekness of mind, gentleness of deportment, and patience in tribulation. Hence his passions very often got the better of his judgment, and led him to the use of intemperate language, and to vex himself unnecessarily under the ill-treatment he received from his enemies and persecutors. We may hope, however, that the light of divine truth which has already dawned upon his mind will be so followed, that he will yet be led into the full blaze of the gospel, and finally be made "free indeed."

ART. VI.—*A Chronological Introduction to the History of the Church; being a new Inquiry into the true Dates of the Birth and Death of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; and containing an original Harmony of the four Gospels, now first arranged in the Order of Time.* By the Rev. SAMUEL FARMAR JARVIS, D. D., LL. D., Historiographer of the Church, &c., &c. New-York: Published by Harper & Brothers.

FOR the publication of the above work, in the best style of American typography, the literary world is indebted to the same enterprising house which brought out the "Ferdinand and Isabella" of Prescott. Although these two works are unlike in their subject and style, we have instinctively associated them together, because they are alike in their *character*, being both original works, drawn from the sources of knowledge in their respective departments; and because (if we may venture a prediction in regard to one of them) they are both destined to raise the standard and the reputation of American authorship. Whatever other honorable exceptions to the rule may be adduced, we must in candor admit, that our scholars and authors are for the most part content to receive upon trust, and to put forth at second hand, the results of European labor and research. Editorship, or compilership, (if we may use the term,) rather than authorship, is our accustomed line of literary effort. Nor do we say this in the spirit of fault-finding. It has been in great measure a necessary consequence of our condition; and has been, upon the whole, the best thing we could do under our circumstances. And we must still be content to borrow largely from our more favored literary brethren of the old world, who are better qualified than ourselves for profound research, by thorough preparatory discipline, and are at the same time more liberally supplied with needful leisure, books, and means of every sort. Nevertheless, there ought to be, and must be, a limit to this dependence upon our elder brethren. Sooner or later we must not only supply more fully our own intellectual wants, but must also repay, in part at least, the debt we have incurred. In the practical application of science to the arts, where the near prospect of reward has stimulated our ingenuity and encouraged our industry, we are bidding fair to compete with our teachers. That, at no distant day, we shall engage in a friendly and honorable rivalry with them, in the higher range of mental effort, where truth is viewed in her *moral* and *religious* aspects, we are encouraged to hope and expect, (among other signs,) by the appearance of such works as that

which we are now about to examine, and the other with which we have associated it. When, in the good providence of God, the internal qualifications and the external advantages for the production of original contributions to our literature, meet in the same person—as they have done in the two cases referred to—it is encouraging to find the gifted individual holding and employing his rare endowments as a trust, committed to his stewardship for the general good, by the Supreme Dispenser of all gifts and blessings.

But we must not wander too far from our proper topic of inquiry, which is the matter and the execution of Dr. Jarvis's book. To begin, then, at the beginning. Were we to canvass the *title-page* in the spirit of "the trade," we should be tempted to complain that it is constructed too much on the "*ex fumo dare lucem*" principle; that it does not seem to promise all that the book performs; in short, that it would not sell to that class of purchasers who pay chiefly for the title-page, or who buy, at any rate, according to its promise. Such book-inspectors would be apt to say, "What, pay three dollars for an inquiry into *two dates!*" There is, it is true, something said about "an original Harmony of the four Gospels, now first arranged in the Order of Time." But then this is in less-imposing type, and looks like a sort of "*Appendix;*" which such book-buyers are apt to regard as a handful over and above, thrown in to make a measure, not quite full and overflowing, pass muster with a suspicious customer. Had the book been "got up" to suit such critics, it would have had some such title as the following: "A Chronological Introduction to all History, Sacred and Profane, in which the Chronological Systems of the Greeks, Romans, &c., are examined, and harmonized, and made to elucidate the History of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ: accompanied with an original Harmony of the Gospels, &c., &c." This would not only be a more "taking" title, but it would be a *true* one; for the book does all this, and more.

No doubt, should this article meet the eye of Dr. Jarvis, he will think we are making very free with his title-page. We beg leave, therefore, to say, that for ourselves we have no fault to find with it. We do not say that our suggested title-page would be a *truer* or *better*, though it might be a more *ad captandum* one. A single sentence in the "Introduction" (p. 2) vindicates to the Christian mind the truth, and *fullness* too, of the present title-page: "*In a word, the birth and death of our Lord Jesus Christ are the centre around which all history moves.*" Pregnant words! How little of their meaning can we as yet gather and apprehend; although we know that as He, being "THE TRUTH," must be the centre

around which all truths move, so in and about his history all other histories must revolve, and in it meet at last!

We may venture here to answer, though at the expense of a seeming digression, an objection to which books of this class are liable, from the utilitarianism of the day. "*Cui bono?*" speciously asks the Benthamite. "Where is the use of a *new* chronological inquiry, when we have so many; and when previous inquiries have led to such various and contradictory results?" This, if we mistake not, will be the unconscious process of reasoning in the minds even of many who are very much above the groveling utilitarianism of the Bentham school. Our author has anticipated this objection in his "Introduction," and has partly answered it, by referring to the fact, that the labors of chronologers have been "progressive" since the revival of learning. It were enough to say, in answer to such objections as those referred to, that if previous inquiries have not led to the truth, there is the greater need of perseverance in inquiry until the truth shall have been ascertained. To urge the *difficulties* in the way of success, as an argument against all effort, were a base mode of opposition. But, in fact, chronology, like its twin-sister geography, has kept pace with the progress of science in general. "The two eyes of history" have been growing gradually clearer and brighter, as one and another film that obscured them has been removed by scientific skill, and both are letting in more and more light from day to day upon the great subject of history.

It is encouraging, moreover, to find that the *chronology of our Saviour's life*, which "the generality of ecclesiastical historians have left almost unnoticed," is beginning to receive due attention. Besides the general reason given above, in our author's words, why this should be the case, there is a special reason, arising out of the intellectual tendencies manifesting themselves in our day, why the *minutest details of fact* in the history of our Lord should receive fixed attention, and to that end be the subject of elaborate investigation. Infidelity has well nigh abandoned its long-cherished hope of exploding bodily the facts of the gospel history. It finds them *stubborn* facts; they wont do its bidding, and be gone. So it is now trying a more "spiritual" method of assault; it is striving to *explain* away, by a refined process of "philosophizing," the facts it could not *deny* away. The same sort of criticism, which has resolved old "Homer" into an abstraction, and the kings of Rome into thin air—would that the critics, with Thersites, had been brought to their senses by the "sceptre" of Ulysses; or by the lictor's *rod* of Tarquinius Superbus!—has assailed, under

the garb of rationalism, the miracles of the Bible, and has gone on, step by step, until it has dared, with sacrilegious profanity, to treat the history of our Lord as a *myth*—in plain English, "a lie!"—and, with a compound atrocity of unbelief, has resolved his person into an idea; with the Gnostic Phantasiast, denying his humanity, and with the Socinian, his divinity! And although few among us, we trust, are infected as yet with this most subtil and deadly infidelity, we dare not flatter ourselves that we shall long escape with impunity. Now we submit that the very best antidote to this form of infidelity is to be found in, and will be administered by, works like that of our author; in which our Lord's personal history is treated as a reality, and even its minutest facts examined and dwelt upon, and presented in their several relations. Is not this the manner of the Gospels, which, although not annals, much less journals, do nevertheless present him to us as a *person*, feeling, speaking, acting; and, that we may realize his personality, set before us *facts*, rather than principles or ideas?

Thus, for example, is the truth of our Lord's generation, conception, and birth to be taught: the assertion is not made in a general or abstract form; but the angel Gabriel goes, before our very eyes, to the Virgin Mary, and announces the descent of the Holy Ghost upon her, and states explicitly the mysterious object and result; and then, in due time, Joseph and Mary repair to Bethlehem, and all the circumstances of the birth of Jesus are presented with singular exactness,—the stable, the manger, the very swaddling clothes, no less than the exulting angels and the wondering magi. And so throughout his history. Does Christ miraculously cure the blind man? the clay, the spittle, the anointing, are severally mentioned. Does he multiply the loaves and fishes; their number, and that of the hungry multitudes, is stated; the marshalling of the company, the blessing, the distribution, the gathering of the fragments, are specified: all is described so dramatically and naturally, that we see and hear the blessed Actor, and seem to feel his presence and to share his bounty. And so does he enjoin duties, humility for example; he takes a little child, and sets him forth his living text and witness; or he "riseth from supper, and lays aside his garments; and takes a towel, and girds himself; and after that he poureth water into a basin, and begins to wash the disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith he was girded."

There lies, if we mistake not, at the foundation of this mode of teaching, a principle which has been of late too much neglected in the study and illustration of God's holy word; a principle—we will not pretend to say on which the incarnation is founded, but—

which the incarnation sanctions and illustrates. That principle is, *the necessity of imbodying truths*—or of giving them *objectivity*,* as the Germans say—in order that the human mind may apprehend and realize them. Thus *one* object of the incarnation was to make God "*manifest*," viz., "in the flesh," in the person of Jesus Christ. The heathen nations had some notion of a Supreme Deity, or of a divine nature; but it was to them an unreal abstraction, and they practically lost sight of the one God in their idolatrous Polytheism. And even the Jews, in spite of their many significant types, and their prophecies of Messiah, *knew* not God as they ought. It is the Christian's privilege to see and know God in Him who is "the express image of his person," at once God and man. "He that hath seen me, hath seen my Father also." But this great privilege is often lost, in whole or in part, by the too prevalent mode of viewing and presenting Christ. In the preaching of the apostles and their immediate disciples, "Jesus Christ was *evidently set forth before their eyes*,"† in all the facts, and actions, and sufferings of his life and death; and was made their all in all of doctrine and example. Was God's mercy taught? his only-begotten Son was shown, given up for sinners. Was God's justice dwelt upon? Christ on the cross was pointed to as proof that he "cannot look upon iniquity." Were pardon for the past, and grace for the future, tendered? the one High Priest was disclosed at the right hand of the Father, interceding for the truly penitent. The critical exegesis of these latter days has taught us the trick of serving up God's word in broken fragments, and of teaching doctrine and duty both in their abstract, rather than their concrete, forms. And as a consequence of this unreal method of studying and teaching the gospel, men are coming fast to forget both doctrine and duty; or to regard the one as a matter of speculation, and the other of fashion. Once more, then, in concluding this long digression, we beg leave to submit, that the study of our Lord's history in minute detail, as it is recorded in the Gospels, is one of the very best cures for the dangerous theological tendencies of our day; and as a means to this end, and as a token of better things

* Lest we should be suspected of countenancing here, what we have condemned above, it may be well to say, that there is this material difference between the principle for which we are here contending, and the infidel German theory of Strauss and others: that we hold the *outward facts* to be as *true and real* as the *truths* they imbody; while they, on the other hand, treat the *imbodiment* as a *mere semblance*, the *facts* as purely *fictitious*.

† Gal. iii, 1.

to come, we hail gladly the present work, as one of happy omen, over and above the value of its particular results or peculiar conclusions.

But it is time that we should examine the method in which it treats its important subject, and render a brief account of its chief results.

The first point that deserves particular notice are the *canons* or *rules*, according to which the investigation has been conducted. These rules are set forth in the Introduction, and are substantially as follows:—

"1. To take nothing for granted. Every necessary question, from beginning to end, must be examined on its own merits, and decided by acknowledged authorities from history, verified, whenever the case allows it, by astronomical observation and arithmetical computation.

"2. With regard to all such questions, conjecture is never to be allowed. In the adjustment of a series of events, where the truth is to be arrived at by approximation, and in the absence of positive testimony, probabilities are to be weighed. But in all cases they are carefully to be distinguished as probabilities only."

"No theory before examination is to be assumed. Testimony is to be followed, whithersoever it may lead. The two great objects to be constantly kept in view must be the investigation of truth for its own sake, and the lucid communication of that truth to others.

"4. In the examination of testimony, the original author is, if possible, to be consulted. This rule is as necessary, in order to arrive at the truth of history, as it is in a court of justice to reject hearsay evidence."

"5. The testimony of the original witnesses is, as far as possible, to be laid before the reader in the very language of each witness."

These rules speak for themselves. They are, *mutatis mutandis*, identical with those by which philosophical inquiry, in modern times, has so successfully questioned the history of the natural world; and with those which enlightened jurisprudence has laid down to guide and control judicial investigations. Had such canons been acted upon since the revival of learning, in the department of historical research, with the same constancy that has characterized the application of Bacon's rules in the department of natural philosophy, it is probable that Dr. Jarvis would have been spared the pains of prefacing his proposed History of the Church with such a laborious Introduction. It is saying not a little in favor of that Introduction, to affirm, that the critical canons, so judiciously established and laid down in the outset, appear to have been kept steadily in view throughout the work, and applied with singular diligence and severe impartiality.

The body of the work is divided into two parts; the first appertaining to ancient history in general, the second to the history of our Lord in particular. The former of these divisions, which fills three hundred and forty pages—more than half the work—"is occupied in giving the evidence from original sources of the ancient methods of computing time, and exhibiting the certain laws by which they are to be connected with modern computations now in use. This has been neglected or erroneously stated by most of the writers who have attempted to determine the true dates of our Lord's birth and death. Yet the establishment of the one is absolutely essential to the due computation of the other. The first is the foundation—the second the superstructure."—*Introduction*, p. 4. Although Dr. Jarvis thus regards this portion of his book as merely introductory and subsidiary to the latter, it is nevertheless obvious that the first part addresses itself, not merely to the theologian and the Biblical student, but also to the classical and general scholar. It would occupy more space than we can allow to this entire article to develop the merits of this portion of the book alone. We can only cursorily survey its component parts.

It is divided into twelve chapters. The *first chapter* treats of the Grecian method of computing time by Olympiads; gives a correct list of them, from the Armenian version of the long-lost Chronicon of Eusebius; and shows how they are adjusted to the modern computation of time, both by historic testimony and astronomical calculation. It gives all the information that can be desired on this important subject. The *second chapter* discusses, concisely but clearly, the year of the foundation of Rome. The *third* treats of the Roman year, from the time of Romulus to that of Julius Cesar, with admirable ingenuity and learning. We were particularly pleased with the skill exhibited in showing that the year of Romulus was probably nearer the true solar year than that of Numa; and that the latter was less of a reformer, of the calendar at least, than is usually supposed. The most valuable part of the chapter, however, is the third section, which compares the reformed calendar of Julius Cesar with that of the Council of Nice, and with the later calendars. The *tables*, illustrating the calculations and arguments in this chapter, are exceedingly useful. The *fourth chapter* discusses the Julian period, the era of Dionysius, and the method by which Scaliger connected them. The *fifth chapter* examines "the remaining eras mentioned by Censorinus," and concludes with "tables adjusting the whole to the Julian period." And here we may say, once for all, that the numerous tables, which illustrate the several parts of this work,

are admirable specimens both of scientific and typographical skill and fidelity. In the *sixth chapter*, the succession of consuls, from the birth of Augustus to the death of Tiberius, is connected with the dates previously established, and the computation, as usual, made palpable to the eye of the reader, by a luminous table. The next *four* chapters—from the *seventh* to the *eleventh*, inclusive—strengthen and extend the foundation already laid for the argument of the second part of the work, by an examination of the history of Augustus and Tiberius, from the death of Julius Cesar to that of Tiberius himself. In these chapters the dryness of chronological calculation is greatly relieved by a large amount of valuable historical information, the discussion being made to assume the narrative form. The *twelfth* and last chapter is supplementary to the foregoing. It aims at removing a difficulty by adjusting the chronology—which has been perplexed by the partial disagreement of the lists of consuls that have come down to us—from the death of Tiberius to the year in which Censorinus wrote, viz., A. D. 238. And here our author's diligence has been rewarded by the discovery of an important error, occasioned by the suppression of a consulship, (A. D. 160,) whence the confusion which he sought to remedy.

The twelve chapters, whose leading topics, rather than contents, we have thus imperfectly indicated, make up the first part, which, viewed by itself, is a work of great value to all historical students. It is, however, in the author's plan, only the foundation—one of "rock" certainly—upon which the second part is built. That part, "appertaining to the personal history of our Lord Jesus Christ," addresses itself more exclusively to the student of Biblical and ecclesiastical history; though many of the discussions have a direct—as all of them, upon the principle adverted to above, have an indirect—bearing upon general history. The first chapter treats of the reign of Herod the Great, and—as in the case of Augustus and Tiberius, in the latter chapters of the first part—we have in fact a history of his reign; although *the* object of the chapter is to ascertain the year of Herod's death, which "must of necessity be the latest limit of that period within which the incarnation of our Saviour could have taken place." By historical and astronomical evidence combined, the death of Herod is fixed in A. J. P. 4710; and as A. J. P. 4707, the year in which Augustus shut the temple of Janus the third time, had been established as the *earliest* limit of that period, (page 210,) the whole question as to the date of Christ's birth "now ranges between the spring of the year 4707, and the spring of the year 4710 of the

Julian period, corresponding with the Julian years 39, 40, 41, and 42, or from the seventh to the fourth before the common Christian era."

Having thus narrowed down the question, our author proceeds to investigate in the six following chapters the true date of our Lord's *death*, which, "being a subject of more notoriety," is more easily ascertained than his birth. This being settled, a computation backward to the time of his birth will determine its *exact* date with great probability. As our Lord suffered under Pontius Pilate, the *second chapter* is occupied in deciding the year in which his administration ended, which must of course be the *latest* possible date of Christ's passion. And here again we have a valuable biographical narrative, over and above the main discussion, or rather as subsidiary thereto. The *third chapter* exhibits the "testimony of the Latin Church as to the date of our Saviour's death;" and is full of valuable information. It shows that the testimony of the Latins is more trustworthy than that of the Greeks upon this subject, because they had access to the public archives at Rome; and, in so doing, it gives a full and clear account of the Roman method of preserving and using their records, and vindicates satisfactorily the genuineness of the "Acts of Pilate"—his official account to Tiberius of our Lord's passion—to which Tertullian appeals. The rest of the chapter illustrates, by quotations from the early Latin fathers, the general agreement in the Western Church about the very day of our Lord's birth and death. The *fourth*, *fifth*, and *sixth* chapters are devoted to an examination of the testimony of the Greek Church as to the date of Christ's *death;* and that testimony, upon the whole, is found to confirm the evidence of the Latin Church; notwithstanding the early disagreement of the East and West as to the *duration* of our Lord's ministry, and the time of his birth; which disagreement is satisfactorily accounted for. The opinions of Eusebius and Epiphanius, "the first of the Greek fathers who departed from the received opinion, that our Saviour suffered on the 25th of March, in the consulship of the two Gemini," are searchingly examined and skillfully set aside in the fifth chapter. The *seventh chapter* determines the true date of the passion to be March 26th, in the fifteenth year of the sole reign of Tiberius, A. D. 28, and reconciles seeming contradictions consequent upon the adoption of that date. It also reviews the whole week of the passion, and harmonizes its various events. The chapter is one of great value; we need not add, of deepest interest also. The *eighth chapter* likewise is very important, in view both of its subject and of the manner in which

it is handled. The subject is, "The duration of our Lord's ministry;" and the chapter reviews, in *four* sections, all the events that occurred between the beginning of John's ministry and the close of that of our Lord. In the first section, which treats particularly of John's ministry, the probable time of our Lord's baptism, and the duration of his ministry, are settled. Three years are assigned as the period of the latter; which, notwithstanding the opinion of the Greek fathers, seems to us the only tenable opinion. Dr. Jarvis, by accounting for their error on this point, as a choice of the smaller horn of an *apparent* dilemma, relieves us from the charge of presumption in venturing to differ from them on a subject, touching which they might seem at first sight the most competent witnesses. The *second section* of the same chapter treats of "our Lord's ministry in Judea;" the *third* of his "ministry in Galilee;" and the *fourth* of his "ministry beyond Jordan."

The *ninth chapter* seeks to determine, by help of Biblical criticism and ancient testimony, the exact age of our Lord at the time of his baptism; and arrives at the conclusion that he had *completed* his thirtieth year. As the year of his baptism had been previously determined, this is an important step toward fixing the date of his birth. The only remaining step toward the conclusion of this elaborate investigation is taken in the *tenth chapter*, in which "the *day* of our Lord's nativity" is fixed by giving the preference to historic evidence, as compared with the method by computation. Then, counting back thirty years from his baptism, it is concluded that "HE WAS BORN on the 25th of December, A. J. P. 4707; the 6th month of the 2d year of the 193d Olympiad; on the 5th day of the 9th month A. U. C. 747;" (that is, *six years before the common era;*) "in the very same year in which Augustus shut the temple of Janus the third time, in token of UNIVERSAL PEACE."

The *eleventh chapter* contains "A NEW HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS," in a condensed form; and, although compressed into less than thirty pages, it was entitled, we think, to the dignity of forming a *third part* by itself; inasmuch as it applies the results of the two preceding "parts" to the arrangement of the whole gospel history. There are on each page seven parallel columns—the first giving the *time;* the second, the *place;* the third, the *events*, in their order, concisely stated; and the remaining four, the *references to the four Gospels* respectively. Although Dr. Jarvis suggests a simple method by which any one, at the expense of a little time and trouble, may arrange for himself, with the help of this condensed Harmony and of the Synoptical Table which follows, a

full harmony of the Gospels, "and with regard to most of the recorded events of our Lord's life, in the exact order of time;" we, nevertheless, hope that he may see fit to prepare and publish such a harmony, both in *Greek* and *English*, that the learned and unlearned alike may have easy access to his arrangement of the gospel history in an *expanded* form. An *English* harmony by itself would do excellent service to the cause of Biblical knowledge.

The Synoptical Table, referred to above, concludes the work, and gives a condensed view of its results. It is most skillfully constructed, accurately executed, and beautifully printed.

In this hasty survey of the several portions of this most learned and elaborate work, we have not paused to give our judgment as to the conclusiveness of particular results; partly because we deemed it comparatively unimportant, and partly because, where we differ from the author in opinion, we feel bound still further to examine with his help the grounds of such difference, before openly avowing it. For it is no disparagement of any man's industry to say, that few, if any, in our country, have pursued this line of investigation as far and as diligently as our author. On most, however, of the main questions, we have the good fortune to have agreed with him before; and on one or two others, about which we had held, traditionally perhaps, a different view, his argument has forced us to suspend final judgment until after further consideration. We may instance the *year* of our Lord's birth; in regard to which we had been accustomed to hold to the *fourth*, instead of the *sixth*, year before the common era. On this point the argument of the ninth chapter of the second part, about the true interpretation of Luke iii, 23—on which a whole year depends—is much stronger than we had supposed it could be made. And so in other cases.

In conclusion, we desire to record our deliberate judgment—the result of a careful examination of the work—that it would be difficult to select a book of the same compass, on this or any kindred topic, in which the same amount of varied erudition is brought to bear so ably, so judiciously, and so impartially upon the subject discussed. It is a book which all Americans should place in their libraries, for the sake of encouraging the growth of ripe and thorough scholarship among us; and which all students of history, and especially of the History of histories, should have in their hands, that they may familiarize themselves with a high standard of historical investigation, and by its help attain the habit of diligent research, as well as arrive at the truth touching matters of high import.

We trust and pray that the expectations which this volume will raise, respecting Dr. Jarvis's promised History, may not be disappointed; but that God's providence will spare, and God's grace incline him to apply the same candor, learning, and ability, which are manifested in this "Introduction," to the preparation of a HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST.

ART. VII.—*Elements of Logic, together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and a Preliminary View of the Reason.* By HENRY B. TAPPAN. New-York and London: 1844.

A STRIKING characteristic of the American mind, in many of the fields of its operation, is its originality. In the various means of locomotion, in the mechanic arts, in the construction of implements of every kind for facilitating labor, our countrymen, having no easy access to the methods employed in Europe, have been driven, by the necessities of their position, to create for themselves the means of accomplishing the objects which have been presented in a country of such vast resources, and such novel features, as our own.

Even in the experimental sciences there have been exhibited a freshness, vigor, and independence of thought which have been productive of the most fruitful results, adding essentially to the great stock of human knowledge in this important department, and placing some American names high on the roll of fame.

In literature it has been different. Here, we fear, little boast can be made for us of originality. Books, like cloths and cutlery, are easily transported. The high degree of civilization which they require, and the great number of readers necessary before the expense which their publication involves will admit of their production, especially if they be of an elevated character, have made us dependent, until a very recent period, upon England for almost everything in the shape of literature in the English language. Our school books, our works of history, poetry, fiction, criticism, and periodical literature, were for a long time almost exclusively English. It was thus that our tastes were formed, and our standards of excellence conceived, under the trammels of a system which had kept the European mind strait-laced for centuries, and which was the worse in our case as being received

at second hand. We were not only confined, by a servile consent, to copy implicitly the specimens placed before us, but our models themselves were miserable imitations of original beautiful workmanship. The desire which has been felt by our own writers to achieve for themselves a fame reaching beyond our new world, in which readers are supposed to be easily satisfied—a fame coextensive with the whole region of English letters—is no doubt laudable; but it has led to a more cautious conformity with the patterns of successful authorship abroad, inasmuch as they were supposed to be safe guides to the approbation of the foreign critics, whose favor we were seeking to win, and to whose authority we knew we could safely trust for our reputation at home. The dominion of these foreign professional critics over the minds of the better-informed class of readers in this country is quite absolute. No one here will venture to admire a book which the English quarterlies have condemned. With our own review writers we venture sometimes to differ. Nay, we never read one of their articles without being on our guard against the errors to which we think them occasionally liable.

To some extent English readers look with a similar eye of caution upon the critical notices which they find at home. Especially is this the case, if they suspect any political bias in the writers; for political motives mix themselves up with the productions of literature in England to an extent of which we know little in our own experience. But if the English themselves do not swallow everything with a good grace which their reviewers choose to thrust down their throats—a form of expression which the dogmatic tone of these gentlemen warrants us in using—we, it is to be feared, do; and a more creditable reason may be found for it than might at first view be supposed. It results from the misleadings of our imaginations, which very naturally present to us the conception of a state of things in the far-off world of European letters much above the reality. We look across the water, and there see the old seats of learning; the systems of education which have been centuries in perfecting; the vast confraternities of educated men; the intellectual and cultivated character of the political and social organization; and we are very ready to take for granted, that the writers in the periodicals of chief repute abroad must represent the highest order of intellect of the age, and such as it is preposterous for us to attempt to cope with. And yet there are wise men, who have had opportunity of looking at the machinery behind the scenes, who tell us that these oracles, as we are accustomed to regard them, are superficial, rash, unscrupu-

lous, and impose upon the credulity of their readers by the promptness and apparent confidence with which they utter their dicta, often most strongly expressed when founded upon least knowledge or information.

Unreasonable as is this intellectual slavery of ours—which we find harder to shake off than that political slavery under which we suffered as colonies, and subsequently when we submitted to the right of search upon the high seas—it operates most powerfully to check that freedom of mental action where the mind, reveling in the consciousness of its own inborn power, calls forth from an uncorrupted imagination the inimitable forms of native beauty, or evolves from the deep recesses of thought those luminous exhibitions of truth which excite the admiration and become the guides of the world. Such freedom produced a Homer and a Burns; while the slavery of artificial systems during all the ages of both ancient and modern times has produced neither. A genius of this unfettered growth must, we think, ere long appear among us. England herself looks for a heart and voice to convey a vivid transcript of this new world, with all its wild romance, its young hopes, its freshness, its giant forms, its mighty destiny.

An original work in philosophy has been attempted by scarce any author in this country since the time of Edwards, our writers in this department having confined themselves to the business of compiling books of instruction from the ablest productions abroad. The work before us, however, is certainly to be regarded as possessing some claim to be viewed in a different light from the great mass of its predecessors. If not original in the matter, it is certainly so in the mode of presenting it; and the complexion of the whole is so affected by the author's peculiar turn of mind, that the thoughts of others, if others they be, assume the appearance and much the value of new truths. The period of time, and the peculiar position of our country in its relations to science abroad, are most favorable for the appearance of such a work, both as regards the writer in fitting him for his task, and his readers in qualifying them to appreciate its performance.

When, a few years since, Coleridge, tossed upon the ocean of uncertainty, and longing for truth with that deep anxiety which might be expected in a mind as gifted as his, yet preserved from worldly and common-place systems of belief by misfortune sufficient to keep keen the edge of sensibility, set out upon his German pilgrimage, the first link was formed in the chain of events which terminated in an entirely new state of philosophy both in England and America.

With the humility of true genius, Coleridge was content to sit at the feet of Kant and Schelling, instead of striking out, as he was capable of doing, by the aid of his own capacious and well-stored intellect, a more perfect system of philosophy than had been produced by those whom he was willing to acknowledge as his masters. His highest ambition was the honor of introducing their philosophic views, and if possible a Germanized style of writing upon philosophic subjects, into his native country; though the latter, we believe, he afterward abandoned as an unnecessary, if not an ill-judged, undertaking—at any rate, a hopeless one. What he did in this way was irregular and fragmentary, serving rather to excite thought and more full and orderly development in other minds, particularly of those just coming into the philosophic arena, than to perfect its fruits in his own. And, indeed, this would seem to have been his principal object, as the title of one of his largest works, "Aids to Reflection," distinctly shows. He lived scarcely long enough to see his merits and services acknowledged; but, dying poor, and not only neglected, but reproached by his countrymen, for, as they said, wasting extraordinary gifts, yet, shortly after his death, when he came to be fully understood, and justly appreciated—which was first the case beyond all doubt in this country, and in consequence probably afterward in England—he was lauded as the great man of the age.

Coleridge's writings became known in this country through the good taste and discernment of his American editor, our countryman, Marsh. The work found many readers here who gladly exchanged the hackneyed systems of the Scotch school for a more spiritual philosophy. A taste was created which led to a desire for better acquaintance with German philosophical writers, and the German language and literature having begun already to be cultivated, the way was open for many to have this desire gratified. The eclectic philosophy of the French school, and particularly the writings of Cousin, whose volume upon Locke was translated by Professor Henry, and introduced into some of our colleges, served still further to extend the views of the more cultivated minds in this country beyond the narrow limits in which they had been shut up by the inherited prejudices and prescriptive authority of the old standards.

These late philosophical writers in France, necessarily, from their favorite principle of eclecticism, taking a wide range in their investigations of the philosophies both contemporaneous and anterior to their own, have saved great labor to the general reader by the brief though clear expositions which they have given of the

principal systems, ancient and modern. Even the English and Scotch philosophical writers have been better understood by us through their aid, owing to the searching analysis to which they have been subjected, and to the comparisons which have been instituted between them and those who have written not only independently, but in actual ignorance of their performances. The peculiar features of the late philosophy in France have led its disciples to pay much attention to the history of philosophy, and, so far as their influence has extended in this country, it has created a disposition to become acquainted with the learned and able writers in this department in Germany, and, through them, with more primitive sources.

The effect of all these influences upon the American mind, so far as it has been directed to subjects of the class under consideration, has been to enlarge and liberalize its views—to give a sort of universality to its philosophical conceptions, analogous to the influence produced by the contemplation of nature herself, with the advantage of all the achievements of the human mind in past ages and other countries, without the narrowing effect of prejudice, which, under the influence of a more partial training, it is impossible to resist.

This favorable state of things in our country for the last ten or fifteen years might fairly be expected to exhibit some fruits. We think that we can see its effects distinctly in the work before us. These are, an independence of thought and of style, a comprehensive acquaintance with the various philosophical opinions which have prevailed from the most ancient times to the present, showing itself, not by a repetition of them in the forms in which they were originally presented, or, still worse, in which they have been again and again retailed, but by an infusion of their spirit into the writer's own mind, and thence into his exhibitions of truth; so that we have in brief space in his book the most useful and profound views which have ever been given to the world, presented in a unity of relation and clearness of form requiring powers of analysis and combination of no common order. Besides which, there is no small quantity of matter entirely original, that contributes an important addition to the great stock of human thought. In the Preface the author thus speaks of his own performance:—

"With all humility I acknowledge my indebtedness to the great thinkers who have preceded me. I have of course read as well as thought; and my thinking and reading are naturally blended together. With this acknowledgment, may I be permitted to go on with my work without stopping to note narrowly in my own mind, or to remark to my reader, when I am drawing from original, and when from other sources."—P. 4.

The book undoubtedly displays the spirit of eclecticism; not, however, forming an olla-podrida of all systems and writers, but extracting, often from confused masses, elements of truth wherever or by whomever they may happen to have been seized and clearly set forth, stripping them of their mystifying, profitless, fond accompaniments, and blending them into a harmonious whole, which has wonderfully the aspect of a perfect structure of truth, built up by the power of a single luminous mind. Even the very plan of the work indicates the nature of the author's aim, and exhibits him attempting to adapt together, and present in their mutual influence, operations of the human intellect which it has been the custom to consider independently. He calls his treatise one of Logic, using the word in a much more comprehensive sense than it usually bears, signifying, according to its literal interpretation, the science of the reason. Whatever may be the opinion of the correctness of such an application of the term, the book, of which it is the title, embraces a number of subjects naturally and necessarily connected, forming a most complete and satisfactory whole. Logic, as it is commonly understood, relates solely to that process of the reason called *deduction*, which carries the mind from premises to a conclusion. Its power depends entirely on the form of the reasoning, and not on the subjects to which it relates; hence its processes can all be exhibited upon algebraic symbols. The premises, in any instance of logical reasoning, may have been the conclusions derived from other premises; these again from previous premises, and so on. Such a chain, however, must have an end somewhere. There must be propositions with which all deductive processes commence; and the student of logic may well inquire, Whence do these come? A large proportion of them are the result of induction, or that process by means of which general principles and laws are derived from a multitude of facts and phenomena; and as this must be used often by the reasoner in his searches after truth, or in his demonstration of it to others, our author places before his treatise on Deductive Logic a very full exposition of the operations of the mind in the inductive process, and establishes philosophically the principles and rules by which it is conducted. To carry out this purpose fully, the author has found it necessary to examine the nature and laws of the reasoning faculty itself, which he has done in that part of the volume preceding the two just mentioned, under the title of A Preliminary View of the Reason.

All the propositions which become primary processes for deductive reasoning are by no means involved in induction. There are certain

judgments of the mind which it makes by intuition; at least this is the doctrine of Plato, of the German schools, and is adopted in the present work. Speaking of both these sources of propositions for the materials of deduction, in the Preface, the author says,—

"The Platonic philosophy really contains a logical development of the most original forms of human thought, springing out of the intuitive faculty. And the Novum Organum of Bacon contains a logical exposition of the method of establishing first principles through the observation of phenomena.

"Both Plato and Bacon have had many able disciples and expounders; and both are coming out into a broader and clearer light, not as opponents, but, to adopt the thought of Coleridge, as the opposite poles of one great and harmonious system."—P. 4.

In order, therefore, to lay open fully the ultimate grounds of thought upon which the logical processes are built up, the human mind itself, in its constitution, laws, and fields of operation, must undergo examination, and the *scientia scientiarum*, as it is justly termed, must, to some extent, be unfolded before the reader can have the complete chain of intellectual acts, which runs through every logical exercise of the mind, distinctly laid before him. For this purpose our author occupies the first hundred pages of his book with "An Introductory View of Philosophy in General." This we regard as the most able and interesting part of the work. It is clear, compact, and of a wonderful fullness, reminding one of the luminous and oracular character of some of the best writings of Bacon. The style is one of simple beauty, admirably adapted to the subject, and at times highly poetic. Many of the subjects introduced here are amplified in the subsequent parts of the work. If these amplifications, somewhat abridged, had been incorporated in this first part in immediate connection with the portions to which they relate, it would by itself have made one of the most perfect treatises which we recollect to have read.

In the present arrangement there is somewhat of a disjointed effect, unavoidable, perhaps, considering the objects which the author had in view, which necessarily rendered his first part subordinate in some respect and subservient to the others. The whole work closes with a book upon the "Doctrine of Evidence." It presents a synthetic arrangement of subjects in nearly the inverse order in which we had named them, and such as we have endeavored to show, by an analytic view, was required by their nature. It certainly comprises a great deal in a very small space, the whole being contained in an ordinary duodecimo volume. It might seem incredible, from the enumeration of subjects included in the work which we have given, that this should be the case. And yet we think

that it might with advantage have been shorter still; one of the faults of which we have to complain in certain parts being that of prolixity. Those portions of the work most remarkable for their brevity are the best.

The part devoted to deductive logic, for example, does not occupy the fifth of the space of the ordinary treatises upon this subject, and yet leaves nothing wanting. This is partly the result of the free use which is made of symbols, and partly of a method which may be briefly stated as follows. Precepts are given, and then the axioms or principles upon which they depend are subjoined in a single sentence, the truth of which is evident to the mind, which thus admits their validity, and is ready to go on to others with very little delay in demonstration. We give a specimen under the head of

"PROPOSITIONS CONSTRUCTED INTO SYLLOGISMS.

"A SYLLOGISM is the formula of the most direct and simple deduction possible.

"Let X is Y represent, as before, any proposition. If the agreement of X and Y is directly perceived, then intuition supersedes the necessity of deduction: but if it cannot be perceived directly, then we must inquire for a medium. Now, suppose this medium to be Z, and that we perceive, by intuition, or as the result of a previous deduction, that X and Y respectively agree with Z, then we *infer* that they agree with each other. We have thus the formula of positive conclusions:—

X is Z,
Y is Z,

therefore

X is Y.

"The axiom which determines this formula is the following: *If two terms agree with one and the same third term, they agree with each other.*"—P. 325.

And so at the close of this section, after a multitude of rules, he terminates with the following:—

"Now all this is evident; and the axiom which forms the basis of it, is the *Dictum de omni et nullo* of Aristotle, namely: *Whatever is affirmed or denied of any term distributed, (that is, taken universally,) is affirmed or denied of every particular comprehended under it.*"—P. 339.

This portion of the work seems better adapted, from its somewhat skeleton form, for a text book of instruction, than for a mere reading book. The larger work of Whately leads the mind of the reader, in a very interesting and popular manner, by the analytic method into a proper conception of the nature of the subject, and prepares the way for the full effect of a very entertaining disquisition upon the value of logic as a study, and the unreasonableness of the prejudices against it, proving them to arise from a miscon-

ception of its nature, and from confounding certain errors of the logicians with logic itself.

Aristotle is commonly regarded as the inventor of the syllogism. Of course it must be understood in its technical form, for the essence of the syllogism is shown to be involved in every instance of reasoning, and to be a necessary modus operandi for the mind. This would make him the father of logic, of which the syllogism is the basis. Whether he be entitled to all the credit of originality, it is impossible now to determine. That the syllogism was known long before his time, in India, is placed beyond a doubt by the discoveries which have been from time to time made through the indefatigable efforts of the able and learned men whom the British conquests in India have been the means of introducing into that country. One of the most admirable of the works which have issued from this source is a complete account of the old Indian philosophy by Colebrook, published originally in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society for 1824 to 1827. It gives a very full expose of the different schools of the ancient philosophy of India, one of which is called Niaya, the author of which is Gotama. The distinguishing characteristic of the Niaya system was a scrupulous adherence to the Vedas or sacred books of the Indians, while it pursued a bold system of dialectics which would seem somewhat inconsistent. It founded its right to do this, however, upon a passage of the Vedas themselves, which is as follows. There are three conditions of knowledge.

"1. It is necessary to employ the same terms in naming things employed by the Vedas themselves, the terms even being sacred and revealed.

"2. It is necessary to define things, that is, to seek their properties and characteristics.

"3. To examine whether the definition at which we have arrived be legitimate or not."

Setting out with this authority, the Niaya philosophy builds up a system by the aid of reasoning, quite independent of the Vedas, though professing for them great reverence, and seeming to make them the basis of all its doctrines.

Reasoning is its boast, as its name Niaya (argument or reasoning par excellence) imports. It is one of the most respectable of the multitude of old Indian philosophical sects.

Besides the method of induction, which plays a very conspicuous part in this philosophy under the name of inference, it has the syllogism in a very perfect form. It is stated as follows:—

A complete argument has five terms:—

1. The proposition—for example,		This mountain is burning.
2. The reason	" "	Because it smokes.
3. The example	" "	That which smokes burns.
4. The application to the case in question		This mountain smokes.
5. The conclusion		Therefore, this mountain is burning.

These five parts of an argument, according to the Niaya, contain the syllogism twice stated, first in the form of an enthymeme in the first two, and afterward in that of the regular syllogism in the last three.

Whether or not Aristotle, in the facilities which he enjoyed for getting access to the wisdom of other countries besides his own, had the benefit of this old Indian system to guide him in the formation of his syllogism, which for so many ages has been one of the great sources of his fame, we have not the means of ascertaining. It is possible, and indeed not improbable, that he may have arrived at it independently, for being the natural form of human thought in deduction, it is not surprising that it should be pointed out in India, and ages afterward again in Greece, without any intercourse between them.

The formal syllogistic mode of reasoning and the whole art of logic fell into disrepute after the rise of the Baconian philosophy, in consequence of the abuses of logic in the hands of schoolmen who were the professed students and followers of Aristotle. Whately very clearly points out the distinction to be made between logic as the science of deduction, and the Baconian method of induction, showing that instead of being rivals, they are both necessary and harmonious parts of the natural operations of the mind. Whately, by examining the mental processes in an analytic outline as he terms it, arrives at the syllogism. The only fault which we have to find with this performance is, that it is too much of a mere outline, or rather it embraces too small a portion of the subject to be of much service in lessening its difficulties. He afterward takes up the matter synthetically, and presents the whole art of logic in its present perfect state. In this part of his work, particularly in the handling of the modes and figures, he is less happy than the opening portion would warrant us in expecting, though it must be allowed that his task was one of no small difficulty. He has, however, been a good pioneer through the wilderness of the old writers. We regard our author's performance here as a great improvement

upon Whately. Let any reader compare their sections upon Hypothetical Reasoning, the Dilemma, and the Sorites, and he will be much struck with the difference between them. The minor excellence in the arrangement of this part of the work before us, is the distinct analysis of propositions and their relations to one another before a word is said about syllogisms. We have already observed that by the use of arbitrary symbols, the author keeps distinctly before the mind the fact that the force of logical reasoning is in the form. Whately mingles a good deal the matter with the form, which is certainly more entertaining for the reader, but less useful to the thorough student of logic, in consequence of the want of distinction in his mind between acquiescence, from a knowledge of the particular truth, and conviction, from a perception of the necessity of the result from the form. Hedge's logic is entirely upon this extreme, presenting throughout the matter, and nowhere separately, the form, which is like proving that the product of the sum and difference of two numbers is equal to the difference of their squares, not by writing $\overline{a+b} \times \overline{a-b} = a^2 - b^2$; but thus: 5 and 3 are 8, 3 from 5 leave 2, twice 8 is 16; the square of 5 is 25, of 3 is 9, 9 from 25 leave 16 again. Demonstrations of general principles, by particular examples, either burden and confuse the mind by requiring of it a double task, or else, by tempting it to rest in the easier of the two, become for it no demonstrations at all, but only the perception of a particular fact in the single case presented.

The great convenience of algebra, in investigating the laws of quantity, depends upon the employment of general symbolic representatives of quantity, without which the same processes of reasoning must be cumbrous in the extreme and almost impracticable. Logic, if a knowledge of that in which its essence consists be desired, requires the same use of symbols. The study, with this advantage, is not an easy one. Without it there may be a semblance of greater facility; but this arises from the fact that the student is not learning logic at all, but certain truths to which logic is applicable. As well might we say that an expert arithmetician had a knowledge of algebra, because he saw the truth of its principles when applied to a particular case, without having at the same time any apprehension of their general necessity; at least no positive proof, but only an unwarrantable inference from analogy.

The feature, therefore, which some probably would condemn in that portion of Professor Tappan's work which he calls Deductive Logic, we regard as a great excellence.

Plato, Aristotle, and Bacon, are the great expounders of three different phases of the reasoning faculty. Plato, of its functions in intuition; Aristotle, of its evolutions in deduction; and Bacon, of its acquisitions by induction. A partial study of the mind has set men, such as Locke, in opposition to Plato; others, among whom we may place Bacon himself, to Aristotle.

Too exclusive attention to the Baconian phase, without incorporating with it the Platonic, leads to materialism and pantheism, from which Bacon himself was saved by other influences under which he lived, rather than by his own system. This, we think, is shown by the tendency of a particular school of philosophy in France, whose leaders, such as Cabanis and De Tracy, are mostly medical men. The science of medicine being almost totally built up by induction, they have been led by their mental habits to set out with the phenomena of the sensitivity alone, and to arrive at the result that man is entirely constituted of nerves. The German schools, and the more religious portion of the French schools, run toward the extreme of idealism, an exaggeration and abuse of the Platonic doctrine of inherent principles and laws of thought exercising a controlling influence over our knowledge, whether obtained from without by perception, or within by reflection. Fichté, who may be considered as the representative of this extreme, resolves everything in the universe into the subject, the ego, the I. The literary wags placarded him in squibs, of one of which Coleridge gives us the following imitation in English. We repeat a portion of it as furnishing a very good popular notion of the system:—

"THE FICHTEAN EGOISMUS.

En! Dei vices gerens, ipse Divus,
(*Speak English, friend!*) The God imperativus,
Here on this market-cross aloud I cry:
I, I, I, I itself, I!
The form and the substance, the what and the why,
The when and the where, and the low and the high,
The inside and outside, the earth and the sky,
I, you, and he, and he, you, and I,
All souls and all bodies are I itself I!
All I itself I!" &c.

It would be curious if in America, practical, acute, sharp-sighted America, now that she has the means of profiting by the labors of all the thinkers of the old world, a more just and well-balanced philosophy should establish itself than any which has yet appeared.

We speak not of the examples which our country has produced

of this catholic spirit in philosophy, but of what is now rising up, and may be looked for in future. We could not certainly refer for any justification of such a hope to our almost sole metaphysical writer of by-gone years—Edwards. Never, probably, did man work in a narrower field. The close atmosphere of the metaphysics of Locke was not close enough; but he must be still further shut up by the barriers of the old New-England theology. Times, however, are changed, and great revolutions have taken place since Edwards wrote. Of a greater still we are, perhaps, now on the eve. All eyes are turned to this country in astonishment at its political progress. May we not venture to believe that its intellectual destiny is to be equally distinguished?

Whately, as we have said, endeavors to remove the misapprehensions which have prevailed with reference to Bacon and Aristotle, and to do away with any appearances of contradiction or opposition between them. Coleridge had striven, in his various and irregular productions, to engraft upon the English philosophy the ideal element. Cousin's volume, translated by Henry, was of a similar character—an attack upon the errors of Locke, which consisted chiefly in keeping this element out of sight, and attempting to explain the phenomena of mind without it. These performances answered exceedingly well for the time in which they appeared, and were necessary to prepare the way for a more complete exposition of the whole field of philosophy, in which each of these competitor systems, that have been trespassing upon one another, may, by some master spirit, be assigned to its due place, and all be compelled to act in harmony.

The work before us is an attempt, and, it seems to us, a most able and successful one, to meet this acknowledged mental want. Its author has exactly the right spirit, and no small share of the acquisition necessary for the undertaking. Bold, untrammeled, independent in thought, yet humble and docile as a child where anything is to be learned; despising no true source of knowledge; pure minded, devout, benevolent; just, liberal, discriminating; of a highly poetic imagination, and fully alive to all the power and beauty of art; imbued with a love of science, and making good use of his no mean acquaintance with its various branches; possessed of a style admirably adapted to his subject; it is rare to find so many qualifications uniting in one individual for such a task as has been here executed. Certainly no little temerity was requisite to venture such a work before the public. Our native talent, however, might for ever lie dormant if we all yielded to the discouraging considerations under which we have to do all that we have

the hardihood to undertake. A man, thoroughly furnished to write upon the scientia scientiarum, ought to be a majister scientiæ in all its departments. Poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, philology, history, government, jurisprudence, ethnology, mythology, theology, and the mathematical and physical sciences, should be as well known and familiar to him as household words.

It were vain to look for such a one, and we must be content with approximations. Still it were well for those who think to embark in a course of philosophy to aim at universality of culture; to be content to ripen slowly, if circumstances will permit that they may ripen perfectly. Milton spent a large portion of his life in preparing to write one poem; and a most philosophic creation it was. He deemed no art unworthy to be learned for this purpose; even navigation and fencing being included in his list. An extensive acquaintance with the mathematical and physical sciences it was which gave Kant such a vast superiority, and contributed no small share in placing him at the head of German thinkers. And yet, doubtless, an exclusive pursuit of these is most injurious and dangerous, as instances enough attest; while, on the other hand, a tolerable training in them would probably have saved many a learned enthusiast from being the dupe of his own credulity, or of the impositions of the designing. But we are digressing. We have spoken of the book before us with high praise. We must present our readers with some extracts, which will enable them to judge for themselves whether or not it is justly bestowed. After opening the subject, with great simplicity and clearness, the author proceeds to the following definition:—

"In defining philosophy, we may go on to say, that it is the *scientia scientiarum* —'the science of sciences; as its object is to explain the principles and causes of all things existing; and to supply the defects of inferior sciences, which do not demonstrate, or sufficiently explain, their principles.'* Or we may call it the 'science of the universal and the absolute.' But this is not enough. It would be like defining astronomy as the 'science of the heavens.' A definition may be just, and yet, by reason of its dry, general, technical, and elaborate form of expression, may fall short of the true end of all definition, viz., to lead the intelligence to a clearer insight and more perfect comprehension."—P. 4.

He gives next the literal meaning of the word, and then goes on to show that this enters largely into a full definition of the term:—

"Philosophy is a word formed from the Greek *Φιλοσοφία*. It primarily expresses a mental affection—a love of knowledge or of wisdom.

"It cannot be questioned that such an affection is inherent in the human mind. It appears in feeble infancy—it stimulates the activities of the busy, prattling child —it forms the wakeful earnestness and joy of youth—it stirs nobly in manhood—it decays not with the decay of age. It is a moving spirit even in savage life, and

* Ed. Ency.

shows man, when lowest, as still above the brute. The impulse TO KNOW, this restless CURIOSITY, is connected with the whole development of humanity, in science, arts, government, and religion. Coexistent with this feeling is the love of action, and by the two combined all the changes of the face of the world, from its primeval state, when man first appeared upon it, have been wrought. The forest is leveled, and cultivated fields appear; the mountain and the valley feel the touch of his hand and put on new appearances; he opens a way across rivers, and covers the ocean with fleets; where rivers are wanting he creates them; he digs into the crust of the earth and brings up minerals, and appropriates them; he calls into being a thousand useful arts; he scatters over the face of the earth convenient habitations, and crowds them together into cities. But not only does he change the face of the earth, and put to his uses its various materials—he also establishes government, administers law, and awards justice: he speaks eloquence into being; poetry, born in his heart, is expressed in flowing numbers; he perfects sound into music; he takes the chisel, and, from the marble quarry, spring up forms whose beauty is divine; and majestic temples, which seem born with them as their fit habitation: he takes the pencil, and, dipping it in the colors of heaven, imitates every form of life, and advances beyond nature herself; he affirms, reasons, and believes; draws out pure abstractions from his thought: advances into nature, and searches out laws for her phenomena; and thus builds up systems of science: he invents a method of analysis, and, in the laboratory, compels nature to reveal her more secret processes; and, not content with this world, the light of heaven, which has lighted him to his labors here, he seizes upon as his minister, and makes it reveal to him the worlds whence it has traveled. Still more—from these finite forms, he ascends up to the INFINITE; he is a worshiper of GOD, and an expectant of immortality."—Pp. 4–6.

This impulse TO KNOW and TO DO, however, though agreeable to the literal meaning of the word, is no part of philosophy, in the stricter sense. Recurring to the effects produced by the mind of man just noticed, he says:—

"In contemplating these developments and changes, what inquiry springs up, yea, irresistibly springs up in the mind? Do we not ask, *how* all this came to pass; *why* the developments and changes came up under these particular forms? Do we not ask, Why did man change the face of the earth? Why did he create government? Why did he give birth to science and art? Where and how did the development of his mind begin; and how did it proceed? What are the laws of his thought, the grounds of his knowledges and beliefs, the forms of his reasonings, and the methods of his investigations? What are the laws of his emotions and passions? What are the capacity and force, and what the laws of his will?

"Inquiries like these evince the workings of the philosophic spirit: they are found under some form, in some degree, in every human mind. Few indeed take in that whole field of inquiry which embraces the complete development of humanity: but whether in the child or in the adult, in the savage, or in cultivated man, you perceive questionings after the origin and reason of things—after efficient and final causes—an earnest prying of the mind into something beyond mere visible and tangible forms, you there perceive the workings of the philosophic impulse—the *Φιλοσοφία*. This is the DAWN OF PHILOSOPHY."—Pp. 7, 8.

That the author is not going to reject idealism from his system appears very soon. In making the distinction between the laws and principles within, acting spontaneously in the development of our being, and energizing, as a plastic power, from philosophy, as an expressed system, laid down in books, or in the lectures of the schools, he has the following passage:—

"In that early period of humanity to which we have adverted, it could not exist as a developed system: it was then in man as a light and a power, under which

he thought and acted, but upon which he did not reflect: thus the *idea of the useful* led him to change the face of nature and to originate the ordinary arts. The *idea of justice* led him to constitute government and law. The *idea of the beautiful* led him to creations of painting, sculpture, music, and poetry. The *inherent laws of his intelligence* guided him in his reasonings; he believed because he could not disbelieve, and faith appeared in him like a sublime and divine instinct. When he looked out upon the phenomena of the world, he assigned them causes, because he could not think of them without this relation; and from finite being, his mind necessarily rose up to the conception of the Infinite Being—he became a worshiper under the energy of a spontaneous and irresistible idea.

"At length reflection began—when it began we know not, but its beginning was the birth of philosophy, as a system developed and recognized. By the act of reflection, or self-consciousness, the mind turns back upon itself, and makes itself the object of its own contemplations. All the phenomena of the mind are presented in the field of its consciousness;—the sensations which are caused by the external world—the affirmations of the reason—the volitions—must all appear there in order to be known. There is an ordinary consciousness which belongs necessarily to every man; but reflection is a special and voluntary consciousness, and thence called a philosophic consciousness, which appears only when the mind becomes the object of its own observation by an act of self-determination.

"Now, in the exercise of this philosophic consciousness, the mind questions itself respecting the grounds of its knowledge and its faith—respecting the forms of its thinking, and the modes of its investigation—respecting the grounds of its decisions in arts, morals, government, and religion: it makes those very inquiries which we recognize in ourselves, when, reviewing the progressive development of humanity, we are struck with wonder and admiration at what man has accomplished, and at what man has himself become. The results of these inquiries form systematic philosophy."—Pp. 9, 10.

The summing up, at the end of this section, is admirable. We refer the reader to the book in order that he may feel its full force.

We pass over the section on the Distinction between the Phenomenal and the Metaphenomenal, and introduce the following important passage upon the reality of the metaphenomenal, which itself sufficiently explains at the same time the meaning of these terms:—

"The reality of the phenomenal is not questioned. That I have certain sensations, perceptions, emotions, passions, and volitions, this is immediate knowledge and consciousness: but whether the objects of these acts and experiences of my being have a real, positive, and independent existence, this may be, and has been, questioned, and even denied. The reality of the metaphenomenal has been questioned and denied.

"It will be readily granted by all that, by the imagination, we can create objects which are unreal; and that, in our actual perceptions, we are often mistaken, and seem to perceive what we afterward discover to have no reality, or to be a very different object from what we thought it to be. But, beyond all this, it has been contended that there is no objective reality whatever;—that the tree and the house which I now see, and which everybody sees, have no existence out of, and independently of, the perception of which I and everybody are immediately conscious; and the same of all objects, whether external things, or internal truths.

"It is undeniable that men generally believe in the reality of the metaphenomenal; nay, that only a few speculative philosophers have ever denied it.

"Now, the aim of philosophy is to explain the actual development of our being, of all that man has thought and done. Hence even the errors of man must be explained. If, therefore, men have erred in their belief in the reality of the metaphenomenal, it must be shown both that it cannot exist, and *how* men have come to entertain this universal but erroneous belief.

"The denial of the metaphenomenal had its origin in a mode of explaining the attainment of it. Its reality was at first assumed as unquestionable; but the explanation given finally developed the denial as a legitimate consequence.

"The cardinal principle of this mode was the assumption that the mind could perceive only by coming in contact with the object of perception, in accordance with a supposed axiom, *Nihil agit, nisi cum, et ubi est: Nothing can act except when and where it is.* This principle was suggested by an apparent law in physics, viz., that one body can act upon another only by actual contact. The truth of this law is now disputed, and even the impossibility of an actual contact between the particles of bodies firmly believed. But if the law were unquestionable in respect to physics, on what legitimate grounds can it be taken as a law of equal appropriateness and validity in explaining the perceptions of the mind? That the mind can perceive only by coming in contact with the objects of perception must be a mere assumption. Besides, by the physical analogy, the mind perceiving as well as the object perceived must be material.

"Having assumed the law, however, the great aim now naturally became to explain how the contact between mind and its objects takes place."—Pp. 16, 17.

The author then goes on to show the different theories which this aim produced, such as those of the Aristotelians, of Des Cartes, of Locke, of Berkeley, and Hume. This section concludes with the following paragraph:—

"The denial of the metaphenomenal appeared under two forms: first, that of idealism. Here the facts of immediate consciousness were taken as the only universe, 'the universe of the imagination.' Secondly, that of materialism. Here the representative images were merely considered as arising from material objects, and impinging upon material organs, and thence affecting the brain, or sensorium. What now is the soul which receives the next impression but a finer form of matter? and what are its sensations and ideas but a movement of the internal organism?

"There is a class of philosophers, and Reid may be placed at their head, who endeavor to dissipate the dogmas of both idealism and materialism by the stern voice of common sense. Every man believes in the metaphenomenal—in objective reality and truth; therefore, it exists for every man. Here common sense pauses: but the philosophical impulse still urges to the inquiry, Is there not reality in opposition to idealism and materialism? Is there not reality independently of a mere subjective persuasion? The first are forms of a philosophy which, on its received principles, demonstrates conclusions in opposition to general belief. And is the general belief incapable of explaining itself by demonstrating the reality of its objects? Must it merely doggedly affirm itself in opposition to the philosophical diagrams paraded before it? And shall the united efforts of the human mind end in the birth of two great parties, both occupying absurd positions—the one affirming, 'I prove, although I do not believe;' and the other, 'I believe, although I cannot prove?' May we not prove and believe, and believe and prove?"—Pp. 19, 20.

The next section relates to the *objective* and *subjective*, terms now pretty generally understood. We give the summing up:—

"To sum up the preceding distinctions, we have all possible forms of being embraced under the subjective and the objective, as follows:—

"1. The subjective simple, or *myself*;

"2. The subjective simple, taken as objective to myself;

"3. The objective general, or whatever is not myself;

"4. The objective general, divided into the subjective general and the pure objective;—the first comprising whatever is metaphenomenal—the second whatever is phenomenal.

"The distinctions made and explained above, give us the leading philosophical conception, and enable us clearly and succinctly to state the leading problems. The leading philosophical conception is that of explaining the development of my being. Now this development presents me,

"First, the phenomenal, or what appears to my immediate consciousness. This consciousness I can divide into the *exterior*, or that which contains mere sensations; and the *interior*, or that which contains the movements of my own faculties. Now,

all these phenomena, whether of the exterior or interior consciousness, constitute the pure *objective*,* because they lie before the reflective power.

"Secondly, I have the metaphenomenal, or that which lies beyond the phenomena: and this admits likewise of a twofold division. The metaphenomenal in the world without, which is to account for the sensations; and the metaphenomenal within, which is to account for the acts which take place upon the sensations. Now, the metaphenomenal, without and within, constitutes the subjective† general, because it lies under and sustains the phenomenal as the ground of its possibility.

"Hence we announce a main problem in philosophy, namely: To determine the validity and the forms of the subjective, and to show its relations to the objective.

"Again, in the development of my being, the earliest conviction at which I arrive is the *Ego sum*; I AM. Now, starting with this conviction, I find that all which I know, I know, not only in the field of my consciousness, but also in the determination and activity of my personality. I find thus, that I am a simple, unique subject, lying, in some sort, under all being whatever, determining the mode and extent of its cognizance, and even its reality.

"Hence we announce another problem in philosophy, no less important than the preceding, namely: To determine objective reality; or the reality of the objective general—of that which is not myself.

"The first problem is disputed by the sensualists, or those who derive the materials of all cognition from experience. The second is disputed by the idealists, or those who, like Berkeley and Hume, deny the possibility of knowing an external world.

"Once more: The subjective simple, which attempts to reach the objective general, attempts also to reach itself. This it can do only by making itself an object to itself. Hence arises a new and unique form of knowledge through the power of reflection, or self-consciousness; and thus we have the problem: To determine the faculties and laws of the simple subjective.

"These three problems cover the whole field of philosophy, as will be apparent when we come to consider its cardinal divisions."—Pp. 25–27.

The next section is entitled Reason and Sense; from which we quote the following. The last paragraph is a specimen of the poetic passages which frequently appear in the book:—

"In the present developed state of my faculties, I know myself as body and spirit. Spirit is the subjectivity within, which thinks, feels, and wills. The body, the material tabernacle of the spirit, is a part of the great system of external nature: it is the same, mechanically and chemically; and it lives and decays like all other living things. What is its relation to the spirit? It is the curious and wonderful mediator between matter and spirit. Through the nerves, distributed into five external senses, and through the muscular organism, sometimes called the 'sixth sense' and the sense of resistance, nature reaches the spirit. What is the product of this union? Sensations, and nothing more. No thought, no knowledge—simply an experience of sound, color, sapidness, fragrance, touch, and resistance. But the cognitive faculty within is not unfurnished. It is prepared to know the world, whence these sensations arise; and it is prepared to know itself. Sensation conditionates the reason in two ways:—

"First. In sensation, in common with all the subjective faculties, it wakes to self-conscious activity. It here begins to live its knowing and thoughtful life.

"Secondly. Sensation furnishes materials of cognition; or signs which the reason appropriates readily and familiarly, in reading the external world.

"The lower faculty, as it were, sings a joyful matin song under the window of the reason; then this glorious power awakes, and looking out, recognizes the reality, beauty, and laws of God's works, and the great Maker himself; and then, turning back upon itself, sees there the image of the divine wisdom and love."—Pp. 28, 29.

This section closes as follows:—

"As the body is thus the mediator through which the outer world reaches the spirit, so also it is the mediator and instrumentality through which the spirit reaches

* Ob and jacco. † Sub and jacco.

the external world and impresses itself upon it. One set of nerves obey nature, and give sensations to the spirit. Another set of nerves obey the spirit, and move the muscular organism. The tongue and the hand are the two great instruments by which the mind does its work without. The arts of industry and beauty—all the changes—all the improvements which the spirit hath made in the great field of nature, it hath made by the tongue and the hand.

"What, then, is humanity but spirit conditionated, on the one hand, in its insipient activity and in its knowledge of an external world by sensuous impressions? And conditionated, on the other hand, in the exertion of its causality and plastic power, by an apt material instrumentality?"—Pp. 28–30.

The next section is upon sensualism and transcendentalism. This last word is so much heard now-a-days, and so little understood, that we make no apology for a long extract, which explains its meaning in a very admirable manner:—

"We now arrive at the point of departure of two great systems of philosophy. Taken under the modern developments, Locke may be said to represent the one, and Kant the other.

"Sensualism, concentrating its thought in the sensuous conditions of knowledge, loses sight of the truth that they are merely conditions; and goes on to expound them as the primary and radical elements of knowledge itself. Hence the utmost development of the human intelligence presents us only the combination and expansion of these elements. The reason is absolutely incapable of arriving at any truth whose generating or constitutive elements have not first entered the senses. The senses thus become the sources and measure of all knowledge.

"Transcendentalism begins with sensation no less than sensualism. Kant opens his great work with the affirmation, 'That all our knowledge begins with experience, does not admit of a doubt.' But then transcendentalism does not make the sensations the radical, generating, and constitutive elements of knowledge; but conditions, under which the cognitive faculty begins to act, and suggestions, upon which, by its own force, and according to its own ideas and laws, it forms cognitions.

"The views which the two systems entertain respecting the primordial state of the mind, differ widely. Locke represents the state of mind before sensation takes place by a sheet of white paper, and Hobbes by a slate, in which there is no idea or element of knowledge, but merely a susceptibility of being written upon. To this view all the adherents of this system conform.

"Transcendentalism represents the mind as having the possibility, the scope, the law and the form of all knowledge within itself. Whatever the mind be, whatever its faculty of knowing, and with whatever elements it be primordially furnished, it is easily conceivable that in the act of knowing it brings this faculty and these elements to bear. Now, in order to determine the reach of the cognitive faculty, and whether the mind really have primordial elements of knowledge, we need only examine our actual knowledges. The sensations can easily be analyzed: and if they be the primary elements of knowledge, they will appear everywhere in the composition and deduction of thought: for every mere composition must preserve the original elements, and can show nothing absolutely new; and every deduction must keep within the measure and kind of the starting points.

"But if in our actual knowledges there be found elements which, so far from belonging to the sense, appear in their nature and characteristics to transcend the utmost capacity of the sense, then these elements unquestionably lay claim to a higher origin. And if these elements, when disintegrated from our complex knowledges and held up before the reason, are readily recognized and reaffirmed by this faculty as necessary, universal, and absolute, then may they legitimately be claimed as the product of this faculty alone.

"Now the sensations are those of the eye, consisting of light and color; of the ear, consisting of the various sounds; of smelling and tasting, consisting of odor and sapidness in their endless varieties; of touch, consisting of simple and uniform impressions upon the nerves wherever they are distributed; of muscular resistance, consisting of hardness and softness, smoothness and roughness; and, in the last place, the sensations of pleasure and pain, and of titillation.

"But our actual knowledges bring to view substance, cause, time, space, truth, justice, and many other ideas of similar characteristics—ideas which no analysis of the mere sensations can ever unfold. And while these ideas can be brought under the observation of the senses, even now that they are known, no more than they could at first be evolved out of them, to the reason itself they are intuitively true, universal, and necessary.

"When we speak, therefore, of transcendental truth in the just philosophical sense, we speak of nothing doubtful, but of that which both in itself is most certainly known, and in its relations makes all other knowledge possible.

"The application of the term *transcendental* is convenient and appropriate, because it is descriptive. It tells the simple fact, that the human mind, while it is susceptible of impressions from without by means of the organs of sense—impressions which conditionate its first development, and afford materials for an important department of its knowledge—nevertheless contains within itself those elements of truth, those forms of knowledge, those first principles of all thought and reasoning, which transcend the reach of the senses. The lower faculty is connected with that corporeal organism, through which spirit communes with nature. It occupies the sphere appropriated to it, and does its work well. The higher faculty of the pure reason has its sphere also; and is just as capable in its sphere of announcing primordial truths, the forms of perception, and the laws of reasoning, as the sense in its sphere is of giving forth sensations."—Pp. 31–34.

Our author having been compelled to oppose Locke, here atones by a tribute to his merit, a merit to which no prejudice could render a nature so generous and truthful insensible:—

"Locke is a great and venerable name; and no one may speak lightly of him. But an excessive veneration has led some who disclaim sensualism to claim for his doctrines certain saving clauses in those passages where he speaks of reflection as one of the sources of ideas.

"There is no school of philosophy that might not be ambitious of retaining as an authority such a man as Locke: and one cannot well conceive how anything less than a supreme and honest love of truth could influence any one to dispense with his authority.

"For my part, I can say from my heart that I admire and love Locke. His clear and penetrating intellect, his good sense and manly candor; his strong English heart, his pure English style; and his decided moral and religious principles, always quietly about him like the coat he wears, like the air he breathes, like the familiar tones of his common discourse, and the prevailing expression of his honest face,—altogether I admire and love him. And notwithstanding the errors of his system, I shall continue to read, and admire, and love him."—P. 34.

In the next section we have given the meaning of the term, IDEA, as used in the ancient Platonic and modern continental philosophy:—

"The word 'idea,' according to the usage of Locke, expresses whatever we are immediately conscious of. The word 'idea,' according to the usage of Plato, expresses what we cannot be immediately conscious of. In the usage of Plato, however, 'idea' does not express anything transcendental of consciousness in the external world, but only the metaphenomenal, lying in the mind itself. And here we see at once the fallacy of all that Locke has said respecting innate ideas. Taking the word in his usage, that ideas cannot be innate is a truism; for nothing is more evident, than that mere sensations and acts of the mind, that is, mere phenomena, cannot be innate—they exist only as they appear in the consciousness. His reasoning, therefore, does not reach the point in debate. On the other hand, 'ideas,' in the Platonic usage, cannot but be innate, since the word expresses those primordial laws of knowing, thinking, and reasoning, and those necessary and absolute elementary truths which are inseparable from the mind itself.

"In order to form a clear conception of ideas in the Platonic, or transcendental sense, let us recur to the distinction of the subjective and the objective. The *subjective simple*, or mind, is directly opposed to all supposed forms of being, lying out

of mind, and comprised in the phenomena of sensation, and whatever in the exterior world is connected with their production. It is the opposition of the *spiritual subjective*, myself, and the *unspiritual objective*, exterior to myself. Now, the true Platonist or transcendentalist views everything existing besides mind, as made by mind, after the laws of mind, and primarily for mind.

"It is a kindly doctrine, and to be heartily received, that one design of the great Creator, in forming the countless tribes of animals, was to multiply the forms of enjoyment. Every sensitive creature hath its sphere of life, its bountiful provisions, and its term of happiness. But irrational creatures comprehend neither the world in which they subsist, nor the curious workmanship of their own organism. The world, in its wise designs, its exact order, and its beautiful forms, is not made for them. It is made for them only in respect to the gratification of their mere animal wants. But under all these higher points of view, it is obviously made for rational beings. Our physical constitution, indeed, finds its fitting provisions and accommodations in the world; but we are not confined to these. To us, the world is a vast and sublime exhibition of design, skill, causative and regulative force, harmonious relations, and beautiful forms.

"We can conceive of a period when there was as yet no creation, and the Creator dwelt alone in the immensity of his being. Now we cannot but believe there was arrayed before his mind every possible form of being, every possible constitution of a universe, every possible variety of life; and there, also, lay the map of the worlds which were ordained actually to be. In his mind was all the science and art, according to which the universe was to be bodied forth; and there, too, was that creative energy, which had but to exert itself, and creation would stand forth in all its glory and magnificence. Now the preconceived laws, forms, and relations of the universe, as they lay in the divine mind, are a part of the divine ideas. Viewed in relation to the eternal reason, as giving the original thought and law, they are ideas simply. Viewed in relation to the divine imagination, as giving forth definite forms and relations, they become ideals, models, or archetypes. divine ideas as the originating thoughts and archetypes of worlds, cannot be exhausted in the actual creation, for God is infinite. Again, there must be in the Divine mind thoughts and conceptions which do not take their imbodiment in material forms. Such are those which relate to pure science and moral government. Whatever thus lies in the divine mind, constitutes the divine ideas.

"Suppose the infinite mind to constitute another mind like itself. This mind, of course, must be finite; but inasmuch as it is mind, it must have the same ideas, according to its measure, which are found in the divine original. These ideas, perhaps, could not be given in a fully-developed state, that is, drawn out into all their consequences and applications, for this would appear to border upon the infinite; but given in their elementary state, to be unfolded by the active and free thought of the being thus gloriously constituted. Such a being may be conceived of, as existing without a body and organs of sense—a pure spirit; and although thus without sensation, and supposed even to have no knowledge of a real world, in its pure thoughts and imaginations it might have, not only mental activity, but emotions of beauty and grandeur exquisitely delightful. For such emotions even now are awakened in our minds, without calling in the aid of immediate sensation, when, in dreams and esthetical efforts of the imagination, we are entertained with forms of greatness and beauty beyond the power of mere sense to reveal. But now, suppose this being to be introduced to the actual creation,—would not the possibility of its knowing and comprehending it arise from the correspondence between the outward reality and the ideas within? Would it not understand the real world, just so far as it had the preconceived law and archetype within? At least, to a being destitute of sensation, no other possible way could exist. Let us, then, make another supposition, namely:—That a being be constituted like the divine mind; but instead of existing as a pure spirit, that it be connected with a material body, with organs of sense—this body itself forming a part of the system of things without; and that its relations to this body are such that it cannot become conscious of existence, nor begin the play of its powers, until sensations are produced within, by corporeal impressions without. Shall the law of perception and the forms of knowledge now be changed, because sensuous conditions are demanded for their development? It is impossible and inconceivable. The originating power and law of thought must still remain in the spirit, to which they of necessity belong. This last new form of being, is new only in respect to the

conditions of its beginning to act, and the mode and conditions of its communication with the external world; while the possibility, and the determinate form of its knowing, still lie in its inherent spiritual faculties, and its necessary and constitutive ideas. The universe represents the divine thought; and now it cannot but represent the thought given likewise to this highly-endowed creature, whom we recognize as man himself.

"When man, therefore, was placed upon the smiling outspread earth, and beneath the bright starry heavens, he did not find himself a stranger and out of place. His mind and heart responded to the works of his Creator. His spirit drank in the living beauty of all things, because he was formed to know the beautiful. He saw the wise design of creation, because he himself was endowed with a designing mind. He searched and found out the order of the heavens and the earth, and the great and all-regulating laws, because the principles of science, the foundations of law, were laid in his own intelligence."—Pp. 39–43.

The following beautiful analysis is under the head of LAWS :—

"There is a period in the development of mind in relation to external nature, when observation and thought first awake. It is a period of spontaneous communication between the soul and nature, springing up from the relation between the ideas within and their imbodiment without. A voice from without calls to the soul within, and the soul joyfully answers back. In the very impressions made upon the sensitivity by nature, the occasion appears when the ideas are required, in order to know and comprehend. The reason is noticing carefully, and struggling to comprehend: in the very effort of earnest thought it perceives ideas, vaguely, perhaps, at first, and immediately carries them out to nature as a tentative law. The first efforts to assign laws to nature, and to expound her great system, may be crude and imperfect, wild and imaginative, because observation is limited, and reason only partially developed; but the process is the same in kind, at the dawn of science, and at its glorious noontide. It is the union of ideas and observation. This first period may be called the TIME OF AWAKENING.

"The second period is the TIME OF PROPHECY. The mind now realizes in clear and decided reflection what it wants. It proceeds, therefore, to make out the system of nature by mapping out the related bodies, their forms, magnitudes, and relations, and assigning them forces and laws. In this work the mind is prone to become intoxicated by its first glimpses of the grand mechanism of the world, and to imagine that the great discovery is completed: here, then, it pauses, and gives itself up to dogmatizing. In reality it has only arrived at a theory, or a tentative system of nature: it has made prophecies more or less clear, but nothing yet is established.

"The third period is THE TIME OF ELABORATE OBSERVATION, EXPERIMENT, AND CALCULATION. Dissatisfied with preceding results, and yet taking advantage of them, the mind now sets itself at work afresh. It endeavors to think more profoundly, to reason more logically, and thus to escape from empty conjectures and fallacies. Now it aims to observe more extensively and accurately, at the same time reducing its observations to an exact and convenient classification: and not content with the facts of nature as they present themselves of their own accord, by ingeniously-contrived experiments it forces out new and more curious facts from the hitherto silent and veiled bosom of nature. Now, too, it diligently cultivates pure science, that it may construct formulæ for the solution of the problems which come thronging in.

"The fourth period is the TIME OF DETERMINATE SCIENCE. Now imaginary conceptions, and the ideas of merely possible systems, are set aside, and the true idea finds its corresponding law.

"Thales belongs to the first period; Pythagoras and Ptolemy to the second; Copernicus, Kepler, and Tycho Brahe to the third; Newton and La Place to the fourth."—Pp. 44, 45.

One of the most difficult things to unfold clearly, in the current systems of philosophy, is the distinction between logical and chronological antecedence. Cousin exhausts upon this all his skill. It

is stripped of a good deal of the perplexity in which it is involved, by changing the names, as our author does, and substituting those of

"ANTECEDENCE IN TIME, AND IN NECESSARY EXISTENCE.

"The first is the antecedence of the primary phenomena; the second, the antecedence of ideas.

"The distinction here held up to view is very important, and really not difficult to comprehend. In the actual development of our being, the primary phenomena obviously must first appear in the order of time; for sensation is the first awakening of conscious existence, phenomena are the immediate objects of consciousness, and consciousness is the first form of knowledge. The knowledges to which we attain through the consciousness of phenomena are presented under the form of judgments or affirmations made by the reason. But these judgments, as acts of the reason, are phenomena of the interior consciousness; as phenomena they must rest upon something antecedent; but this something antecedent is not sensation, for sensation stands only in the relation of a condition, and does not contain the elements of the judgments. Upon analysis, these elements are found to be ideas. Ideas, then, must have the antecedence of necessary existence. Mere sensation, in a particular form of being, may exist without involving antecedent ideas in the sphere of that being; but judgments or knowledges formed upon the basis of ideas, necessarily involve their prior existence; and as ideas can be traced to nothing higher, their antecedence must be that of necessary existence.

"Sensations demand a previous necessary existence, only as all phenomena demand antecedent causality. But the phenomena of the interior consciousness, in addition to this, demand a constructive reason.

"Sensations are known before cause is known; and yet as without an antecedent cause they could not have existed, so neither could they have been known under the causal relation, without the antecedent idea of cause. Affirmations of the reason appear, before the reason and its ideas come into the field of reflection; and yet, had not these had a necessary prior existence, the affirmations would not have been possible.

"Experience is the conditionating starting point in the order of time. Ideas are the determining starting point in the order of rational judgments.

"Experience marks the time when the knowledges begin. Ideas alone make the knowledges possible. Experience is the dial-hand which tells the hour of the mind's morning when it awakes to thought. Ideas necessitate the movement of the dial-hand itself."—Pp. 49, 50.

We pass over the tenth section, which is entitled, *Ideas the Last Authority of all Judgments and Knowledges*, to the eleventh, which presents the "Divisions of Philosophy." A general division into two parts is first given:—

"In the most general conceptions which we form of the subjective and metaphenomenal, we have,

"First: SUBSTANCE, endowed with faculties or functions, and causes or forces.

"Secondly: LAWS, or that which determines and regulates the manifestations and movements of the first.

"Philosophy in relation to the first, in accordance with old usage, we shall call METAPHYSICS.*

"The second—if we may venture to frame a term—we shall call NOMOLOGY."†—P. 59.

We add the definition of

"METAPHYSICS.

"Metaphysics treats of that which, as actually existent and productive or creative, lies beyond the physical, or the merely phenomenal. I think, feel, and will.

* *Μετα Φυσικη*, i. e. beyond the physical.
† *Νομος λογος*, i. e. the doctrine of law.

What is that which thinks, feels, and wills? What is that which lies beyond the mere phenomena of the thoughts, feelings, and volitions? Again: through my senses, and my muscular organism, I attain to an exterior world, whose forms I call material. What lies under or beyond these primary and secondary qualities, and these various forces? What accounts for these changes—these perpetual modifications? In the development of my being, I am presented with the *physical* or *phenomenal*;—and the inquiry is, What is the *metaphysical* or the *metaphenomenal*, which is to account for my development in this direction?

"The answer to these inquiries is given by PSYCHOLOGY, DYNAMICS, ANTHROPOLOGY, and ONTOLOGY. These may be considered as the divisions of metaphysics, and subdivisions of philosophy."—Pp. 59, 60.

The following is the definition of

"PSYCHOLOGY.

"Psychology" is that part of metaphysics which accounts for all the phenomena of consciousness, in so far as they are modifications or manifestations of the subjective simple."—P. 60.

We omit the author's development of this definition for want of space. Again he says:—

"What is the psychological method? It is to examine the facts of consciousness, and by these to arrive at the faculties and compass of our being."—P. 63.

Brief, but accurate and comprehensive, definitions. We add that of

"DYNAMICS.

"Dynamic† philosophy treats of the life and working powers of nature. On every side we see the forms of a universal life—in the myriads of the animal and the vegetable tribes. Everywhere, also, powers and energies are at work, in large masses and in small, as presented in the vast forms of astronomy, in the winds and tides, in magnetism and electricity; and in the minute forms of chemical affinities. It is impossible for us to reflect upon the productive life of nature, and the forces at work in nature, without inquiring after their origin, their dependency, their centre. In this inquiry the mind is irresistibly led upward to the infinite and absolute life, and the infinite and absolute power. Dynamic philosophy ends its inquiry in God, who filleth all in all."—P. 62.

And a summary distinction:—

"We may sum up the whole by saying, that psychology respects the subjective faculties of the mind; dynamics respects the subjective powers of matter."—P. 63.

In defining ANTHROPOLOGY, the author says:—

"Anthropology‡ takes up man in the union of his spiritual and simple subjective being, with a physical and animal life and organism.

"View man in his mere animal nature and functions, and he appears different from all other animals. The spirit within, modifies, enlarges, and ennobles the animal without—he is the most glorious and interesting of all animals.

"This animal nature is also affected variously by the external world with which it is linked, and, indeed, of which it forms a part; climate, natural scenery, food, and employment, all act upon it. It is thus modified at the same time by the spirit within, and by influences from without.

"On the other hand, the animal thus closely communing with spirit, reacts upon the spiritual sphere. The most susceptible point of this reaction is the sensitivity, through which the emotions and passions become strikingly modified. In every theatre, therefore, of human passion—in social life, in government, in war, in commerce, in the arts of beauty, you may see the influences of the external nature. But inasmuch as man is a unity, this modifying action cannot be exerted

* Ψυχη λογος, the doctrine of the soul. † Δυναμις, energy or force.
‡ Ανθρωπος and λογος, the doctrine of humanity.

upon his sensitivity, without reaching in some form and degree his entire being; so that his thinking and reasoning, his free activity, and even his moral character, gain a tone from the objects which surround him, and show the complexion of the sun which shines, and the atmosphere which breathes upon him.

"Anthropology is thus a union of psychology and that part of dynamics which forms the science of physiology. Indeed, as actually cultivated, it is hardly a pure philosophy, but rather a mixture of philosophy, physiology, and natural history." —Pp. 63, 64.

Ontology, as the term imports, is the science of actual existences; that is, of things as they are, independently of the perceptions of our minds. How much and how little we can with truth pretend to know of these, in our present imperfect state, or even in our higher and better, so long as we remain finite beings, are questions of ontology. The distinction between it and psychology, or the phenomena and laws of our own minds, either as inherent or as the result in them of ontological phenomena without, is clear and broad. We subjoin our author's very accurate and philosophical mode of presenting this subject:—

"After having considered the life and forces belonging to the pure subjectivity of being, as distinguished from the phenomenal or the pure objective—we come next to consider the SUBSTANCE of being. The idea of substance, like the ideas of time and space, of cause, and of right and wrong, is intuitively given in the reason.

"Upon the observation of phenomena, we not only assign them *causes* and *laws*, we also assign them *substance*. Substance is therefore metaphenomenal, and belongs to subjectivity in general; and hence the consideration of substance forms a part of philosophical speculation.

"Metaphysics, as relating to substance, is ONTOLOGY.*

"To ontology belong such questions as the following:—What is substance? Is substance distinguishable from its properties? Do substance and properties necessarily imply each other? Is the relation between substance and properties to be distinguished from the relation between cause and effect? What are the distinctions and relations of spiritual and material substance? Is the soul material? Is God in his substance identified with the world, or is he extra-mundane? What are the relations between infinite and finite substance? Is space substance or attribute? Is it to be referred to matter or spirit, or is it independent of both? Does the omnipresence of God suppose his essence or substance to be diffused through all space?

"Questions of ontology do, undoubtedly, exist in the human mind; and because they exist, they require an answer. No question of the mind is to be arbitrarily set aside. If its aims be an impossibility, it must be proved to be so, but as long as a hope of its solution remains, it must remain as a question. Now, a great many vain and idle questions have come up in ontology, but it was philosophy itself that exposed them, and set them aside. On the other hand, many questions of the very last importance are presented here. Whether the soul be material or immaterial; whether God be identified with the world, or be extra-mundane, are not trifling questions, as the history of philosophy abundantly shows. If ontology could arrive at nothing positive, its negative decisions would for ever give it an important place in philosophy."—Pp. 64–66.

Having thus introduced the reader fairly into the book, we must forbear continuing with so much order. The following highly-poetic passage under the head of Esthetics sets forth, in a very

* Ὀντος and λογος, the doctrine of essential being.

practical and intelligible manner, the Platonic doctrine of ideal beauty:—

"Esthetics* may be briefly defined the '*philosophy of the beautiful.*' As the *morale* relates to the will, so this relates to the sensitivity. As the *morale* determines what *ought* to be done in the moral relations, so this determines what *ought* to please, or what is really agreeable to the sensitivity in its unperverted and rightly-developed condition.

"There is in some sort an interchange between the morale and esthetics. Esthetics lays down the rules of the fine arts to the executive will. The morale enjoins upon the sensitivity the proper moral emotions and desires.

"Esthetics comprises the principles and laws of the beautiful, or of the agreeable, or of taste, (for all this variety of designation has obtained,) not only in relation to the actual, but also in relation to the possible. That which *may be*, is known, and the influence of its beauty felt, as well as that which *is*.

"When man awakes to existence, his eye beholds the beautiful, the sublime, the graceful, the proportionate, the congruous; and his ear perceives melody and harmony, with the joy, the ecstasy of one recognizing the thoughts of his own spirit, the reflected forms of his own being. The splendors of the heavens above him—the scenery of the earth around him, are not strange to him; he knows them in himself, and he knows himself in them. But he cannot rest in these delightful contemplations. The fountains of his thought open and enlarge beyond the world which his senses have recognized. It would seem as if this world were presented to him to call out the activities of a being, of which it cannot be the measure.

"Hence, man creates: he creates in statuary, painting, music, architecture, gardening, poetry, and romance. He does not confine himself to imitations—he *creates*. His creations are not only of that which is possible in this world, but of that also which it requires a more perfect constitution, both physical and moral, to realize; and thus in his thought he knows other worlds. Salvator Rosa gives us nature as she is, with only finishing touches of the ideal; but Milton, in his 'delicious Paradise,' introduces us to a creation not indeed opposed to nature, but requiring nature under a more genial clime, in more glorious worlds.†

"In poetry, and in the fine arts, generally, the ideal mind is indeed never perfectly expressed. The poet and the artist labor to make visible the thought upon which they dwell in rapture; but they never satisfy their own earnest aspirations,—they have a vision which they cannot reveal to others; and they find that the world, as presented them, not only is not the measure of their being, but also that all the efforts of art cannot make its forms and materials even truly representative of that being; and the perfectly beautiful remains with them as a pure idea, of which they have only been enabled to give a dim reflection.

"In esthetics the human mind seeks to solve the mystery of the arts; it inquires after their origin, their laws, and their method; and seeks to comprehend their reach, and the grounds of their limitations.

"This is that beautiful philosophy which leads us far back into the spirit of man, there to find the true Castalian spring, and there to converse with the 'sacred nine' as living and real inspirations."—Pp. 69–71.

Under the head of Logic, we have a definition of logic in the enlarged sense in which our author uses the term:—

"But logic determines the legitimate processes and characteristics of ideas themselves. Again, wherever the reason acts, there must be laws to determine and regulate its action. Logic, therefore, is coextensive with these laws, for the province of logic is the laws of the reason. But as reason acts wherever there is intellection, it acts in every department of philosophy; and hence logic permeates the whole.

"Logic permeates, but does not absorb the whole. Logic is present to give laws to thought, investigation, and ratiocination; but these laws are universal and irre-

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* Αἰσθησις, perception or sensibility. † Doctrine of the Will, pp. 130, 131.

spective of the particular subjects. Each subject, therefore, still retains its distinctive position, characteristics, and aims. Psychology still aims to determine the faculties of the mind; dynamics, the forces of nature; anthropology, the union of man and nature; ontology, the reality and distinctions of substance; the morals, the laws of duty; esthetics, the laws of the beautiful; somatology, the laws of bodies. These do not sink into logic; but as reason is the universal organ of philosophical construction, logic is everywhere present as the light and atmosphere of thought."—Pp. 73, 74.

The distinction between science and philosophy is thus given:—

"Science begins with the phenomena, as the conditions of its development: and when the phenomena are reduced under common causes and laws, then the science is determined and fixed. But philosophy is taken to account for the phenomena in the general. First, by affirming that there must be causes and laws. Secondly, by laying down in logic the principles of induction, investigation, and deduction. Thirdly, by conceiving somatological causes and laws, and applying them tentatively to the phenomena.

"The subjective and the objective make up the sum of all knowledge, actual or possible. Philosophy finds its elements in the subjective, so that the determination of the subjective is the determination of philosophy. Science is conversant directly with the objective; but it proceeds by the aid of the subjective. Its aim is to distinguish and generalize the objective into particular spheres, under particular causes and laws."—Pp. 75, 76.

The nature of art and its connection with philosophy and science are explained as follows:—

"We have defined philosophy—we have defined science—and shown the relation of the former to the latter; but it remains to define art, and to show the relation which the first two hold to it.

"Art, in common usage, is confined to express the exertion of human causality for the modification of bodies according to principles and rules.

"The most enlarged idea of art is given in the work of creation itself, by the almighty and all-wise Creator. The creation everywhere exhibits design, law, and skill. We may, therefore, without any figure of speech, call God the first and great artist and mechanician. He created, arranged, and finished, according to principles and rules which his own exhaustless intelligence supplied. The variety, the number, the nice and elaborate perfection, the beauty, benignity, and glory of his works, exceed not only our actual knowledge, but the utmost flight of our imagination. From the glimpses which astronomy furnishes of the extent and the continual advance of creation, we are irresistibly led to the conviction, that the mind will find new objects to observe and admire, throughout its immortality.

"Human art is comparatively a feeble, yet a beautiful copy of the divine. God formed the substances together with their properties, upon which human skill is exercised. He fixed the laws under which this skill must accomplish its ends. We imitate the beauty of nature, or improve upon it, only by observing these properties and laws. If we attempt to do violence to them, we are not long waiting for a rebuke of our folly, and a demonstration of our weakness. But if we fall in with the suggestions of nature, and work according to the principles and rules on which she has been constituted, then the arts of utility and beauty will appear, rich and manifold, and the human will become both a co-worker with the divine, and an instrument of completing its projections.

"Now, in analyzing human art, we are led to perceive its connection with both philosophy and science.

"1. With philosophy. This appears in the *ideas* under which it works. There is, in the mechanical or useful arts, generally, the idea of utility itself—the idea of improving upon the actual forms and arrangements of nature, and of adapting them more perfectly to our wants, actual or fanciful. This idea is the forecasting thought, and the propelling energy of the reason itself, and hence is an element of pure philosophy.

"In the fine arts appear the ideas of proportion, grace, symmetry, congruity, and harmony—forming the complex idea of beauty. This idea leading to all improve-

ments upon the beauty of the existing forms of nature, as in landscape gardening, for example; and to the creation of new forms of beauty, as in statuary, architecture, painting, music, and poetry, has its origin also in the pure reason, and is, therefore, a philosophic element.

"2. With science. Science being the determination of the laws governing the relations of phenomena, as they spring forth in succession from causality, the artist, when he undertakes a work, either of imitation or creation, is bound, in the use of materials, and in the arrangement of parts, to observe these laws. He not only works under the inspiration of pure ideas, or, in other words, the conception of the *ideal*, but, working in the field of nature, he works in obedience to her material constitution—her fixed properties and laws. In architecture, he works under ideas of proportion, congruity, grace, and dignity; but, at the same time, he must regard the properties of his materials, and pay the utmost respect to mechanical laws. In musical composition, he is, indeed, led on by the ideas of melody and harmony; but, in producing and arranging the sounds which form the material of the art, he cannot dispense with physical laws. Similar illustrations may be given in relation to the other fine arts.

"That the mechanician, and the inventor of arts of utility, base their operations upon scientific laws, requires no illustrations.

"RULES OF ART are explicit specifications, expressed clearly in language, and by diagrams, and numbers, with respect to form, measure, proportion, combination, and adjustment. They lay down in simple terms *how* the causality must execute a given work. They direct the application of physical skill.

"An individual may be a crude philosopher, and raw and uninstructed in science; but still he may, by long practice, acquire the skill of obeying rules of art. The philosophy and the science implied in the rules, and from which the rules were deduced, he is incompetent to explain, and does not even comprehend; but skillfully and readily adjusting his physical instrumentality under the simple directions of the rules, he rears the stately temple, or fashions and arranges the curious machinery of the watch. Such men are mere *copyists* or *mechanics*."—Pp. 88–91.

We conclude our notice of this portion of the work with some detached extracts relative to the criteria of a true philosophy:—

"To one untaught in systematic philosophy, a very natural prejudice would spring up in favor of some philosophy named to him, if he were informed that it lay at the bottom of his warmest and noblest feelings and beliefs; but it is perfectly plain that this philosophy, if, in reality, lying at the bottom of these mental phenomena of the individual in question, would really be that which gave rise to these phenomena. This *individual* may be *satisfied* with it, from its supposed connection with his beliefs and sentiments; but it could never be legitimately determined by such *criteria*. We must determine independently of the individual, whether his beliefs have a true basis; that is, whether they are philosophical or unphilosophical: hence the proper criteria must be independent of the phenomenal of the individual mind."—P. 99.

Again:—

"Every man holds certain opinions in common with his nation, his family, his political party, or his religious sect. Are these opinions all based upon sound philosophy? No one would contend for such an absurdity. These opinions conflict with each other; they cannot, therefore, all be true. But if the mere strength of an opinion, and the zeal in advancing it, are to be taken as among the sure criteria of philosophy, then we shall establish a multitude of philosophies at war with each other, and all upon an equally secure basis. Philosophy is a word of such awful and momentous import and authority, that both he who advocates old opinions, and he who attempts to introduce new ones; both the venerator of unchanging institutions, and the reformer and revolutionist; both orthodoxy and heresy; both bigotry and liberalism, will be ambitious of its titles, and of marching under its banners.

"From this Babel-like confusion of tongues—from this light rendered murky by the dust and steam of furious conflicts, we must retire to a calm and elevated

region, where quiet thought has its home; and where the 'light' is 'dry' and pure.'"*

"For as God hath made the mind for the apprehension of truth, and hath set forth before it a world of glorious truths for it to apprehend, so we cannot but hope, nay, feel a strong confidence, that an ingenious spirit, looking out after the marks of truth, humbly, purely, and freely, as the eye, tired of the darkness, looks out for the morning light, will, according to the harmonious constitution given it, find her resplendent presence, and be accepted as her oracle, to make known her laws.

"It is worthy of remark, also, that a preparation of mind is necessary, as well for the study of philosophical principles announced, as for undertaking an announcement of them. A genuine philosophical spirit is the prerequisite of good learners, as well as of good teachers. The want of this, indeed, has been the great obstacle to the inculcation of truth in all ages of the world.

"There always have been men of ingenious and honest minds, and designed by Heaven to be the lights of their age, whose teachings, if the multitude had listened to, there would have been a wide diffusion of wholesome knowledge and pure morality. Thus would the philosophy and ethics of Socrates, as an example among the heathen, and the sublime revelations of prophets and apostles among the chosen people, have revolutionized society, by destroying old, stagnant errors, and bringing in rational and heavenly truths. But it hath ever been the folly of men, that although having eyes to see, and ears to hear, and understandings to perceive, they have chosen old traditions, and familiar errors, in preference to new instructions, simply because these instructions demand at the first an honest confession of ignorance, or impose new labors, or are opposed to dearly-cherished prejudices and passions. Bacon, in his great work, has exposed these enemies of new investigations, and revolutionizing truths, where they lie in the human heart. The 'idols of the tribe,' or those prejudices which belong to infirm human nature generally; the 'idols of the den,' or individual prejudices—the idiosyncracies of the man; the 'idols of the market-place,' or the prejudices connected with set forms of speech in the announcement of opinions and dogmas—where venerable phrases are mistaken for grave truths; the 'idols of the theatre,' or prejudices connected with wild and startling, but idle theories. When these 'idols' are worshiped by the philosopher, he can make no new discoveries, unless by accident, and then he will be prone to distort them. When they prevail among the people—that is, the reading people, those who are seeking for information in different ways, and with different degrees of interest—solid and rational truths can gain friends but slowly, and are liable to be silenced by the authority of public opinion, the rebukes of the church, or even by the force of civil law.

"It holds true in philosophy, as well as in religion, that the sower may go forth to sow, and sow none but good seed, and yet if the hearers be impracticable, the labor will be in vain, and the precious seed will be lost; and it is only in the good and honest heart that truth finds a proper soil, in whose rich depth she sends forth her roots, and springs up an immortal fruit."—Pp. 100-104.

As to the nature of these criteria, specimens of which we have been giving above, the author expresses himself as follows:—

"The criteria above given must speak for themselves. I believe a careful reflection will lead to their approval in the mind of every genuine and candid philosopher. If all who have engaged in the work of philosophical construction had governed themselves by these criteria, there would have been little difference among them; and the world, long ere this, would have witnessed philosophy taking her stand as the *scientia scientiarum*, and possessing at least all the clearness and exactness which are claimed by many sciences dependent upon her. But when men are determined to preserve their 'idols' at all events, they are prepared either to discard philosophy altogether, or to make her the mere *tire-woman* of their prejudices and accidental and floating opinions. A theory in physics, a dogma in speculation, a creed in religion, a name or a degree in a mutable world, are permitted to give the leading thought; and hence they seek not for philosophy herself, but only to *philosophize* ingeniously and speciously, in order to satisfy the forms of truth, while they preserve the body of error. They are willing to impose upon themselves—why, then, should they scruple to impose upon others?"—P. 169.

* "Lumen siccum."—Bacon.

Having quoted so largely from this first part of the work, we shall touch but sparingly upon the others. Passing over entirely the second part, the "Preliminary View of the Reason," and the first book of the third part, Primordial Logic, we shall content ourselves with little more than an enumeration of the titles under which the subjects contained in it are treated. These are: General Laws of the Evolution of Ideas; Metaphysical Ideas, comprehending Subject and Objective Exteriority, Time and Space, the Infinite and the Finite, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality; Nomological Ideas, comprehending Law, Matter and Spirit, Perfection, Right and Wrong, Freedom and Responsibility, Personal Identity, Immortality, the Beautiful, with its subdivisions, the Useful, Centralization and Diffusion, Affinity and Repulsion, Life, Polarity, Instinct, Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Symmetry, and Determinate Form, Identity, Difference, Resemblance, Design, Final Cause, Means and End, Truth, the Philosophical Idea, Intuition, Involution and Evolution, Analysis and Synthesis; Primary Sensuous Cognitions; Primary Subjective Cognitions; Axioms; Definition.

We extract only the following, under the head of

"POLARITY.

"Polarity, as thus far determined, is magnetic, electric, chemical, crystaline, and optical. It is the conception of disturbance, repulsion, and separation, produced by the attempted union of like kinds; and of harmony and repose, produced by the actual union of unlike kinds.

"That an idea lies behind all the observations which have been made respecting polarity, determining their processes and results, is manifest: and that the conception of polarity, as an attempted expression of the idea, has been the guiding star to the most eminent philosophers in their investigations in magnetism, electricity, chemistry, crystalization, and light, is abundantly attested: nevertheless, it does not yet appear, notwithstanding the confident assertion of Schelling, that the conception fully imbodies the idea, and leads it forth to the determination of a universal and necessary law. As yet, it is a theory, like a thin and almost transparent cloud, with the sun behind it."—P. 191.

The second book in this part takes up and treats in the space of seventy pages of the subject of induction. Its general nature is among educated men now pretty thoroughly understood, and recourse is had to it for establishing the truths of science with a degree of skill and success which shows a practical acquaintance at least with its laws and rules. A philosophical analysis, however, of this important process, and its relation to the other operations of mind, independently of its particular applications, is a valuable contribution to philosophy.

"The field of induction is that in which we find the secondary phenomena.

"The primary phenomena are simply the conditions of the primary cognitions. In these we attain objective reality. Then, the phenomena—thenceforward recognized as the phenomena of objective reality—become the materials of induction."—P. 242.

"The human mind is prepared to know a world which had its origin in mind. As an artist comprehends the works of art, so does the mind of man comprehend the works of God."—P. 252.

Not, however, in all cases, at once, but arrives at the more perfect comprehension by induction. But how is it guided in determining what to induct? Is it not by a certain forecast of the result existing necessarily in its constitution, and which it derives from its resemblance to the divine mind, in which all phenomena and their laws have origin?

"Then, inasmuch as ideas comprehend the constitution of the universe, just so far as in the presence of the conditionating and quickening reality they are developed, does there appear a prophetic power of the intellect preconceiving, suggesting, theorizing, and sometimes, as in the case of Newton, seeming to grasp at once the great system of things. It is impossible to express the extent to which the spontaneous inspiration of ideas carries the mind, or all the modes of their action. Like the formation and growth of a common language in masses of mind, like the development of music without rules of art in popular tunes, or the growth of poetry from rude ballads to the Iliad of Homer, like the spontaneous inventions and discoveries of man before he began to philosophize, from the results we feel assured there is law exact and beautiful: but still, as in the fine vibrations of the air, and in the more subtile oscillations of the ethereal medium of light, no representation is possible. The movement lies so far behind all ordinary and familiar forms, and is so much more delicate and subtile than anything we are accustomed to handle, to speak of, or to represent, that we can find nothing by which to convey it. In the germination and growth of plants, how many fine influences are at work of which the physiologist presents us no diagram, and which he can command by no formula; so likewise in mind, the germs of thought, their first springing forth, and their infinite and beautiful complexions in reasoning, invention, memory, imagination, and taste, while expressing in their result the commanding presence of law, surpass the finest skill of the analyzer.

"But ideas not only impel the philosopher to undertake investigation, and suggest the route he is to pursue, and foreshadow the results at which he is to arrive—they also determine the method of investigation."—Pp. 253, 254.

Into the full exposition of the method and its relation to the ideas of mind, which constitutes the main scope of this book, we have not space to enter. We add, however, one or two further extracts:—

"The great Francis Bacon, the first who labored at a full exposition of the inductive philosophy, himself signally failed in all his attempts to give an exemplification of its principles. The catalogues of facts which he has left are of little or no value. The reason is obvious—the facts are heterogeneous, mixed, scattered, casual, and often trivial. The observations appear to have been governed by no principle, no definite aim, no prophetic thought, in fine, by no idea. As the observation of facts and ideas are both demanded in a philosophy of nature, so the omission of one or the other must be fatal to any attempt to arrive at such a philosophy. Bacon exposed the errors of those who had attempted this work by ideas alone. He himself failed because he attempted it by observation alone.

"The point now distinctly before us is to ascertain the true logical grounds of deciding when phenomena have a real and fixed connection, as antecedent and consequent, so that we may affirm, as a general fact, that they are thus connected."

"The idea of law gives rise to the axioms of universal law and of the uniformity of nature. These axioms are like the voices of the idea, ever speaking to our thoughts as we search about and pry into the phenomena of nature."—Pp. 276, 277.

Some portions of this part of the work are of a very practical character:—

"Our object being to establish the fact of uniformity, it is necessary to settle, as a preliminary question, how many instances are demanded to this end. As nature is governed throughout by exact law, if it can be shown, in respect to any succession, that a given consequent does take place when a certain antecedent is present, all other antecedents being excluded, then, if there be only one instance, this one is sufficient to establish the fact of the sequence. Suppose, for example, that we exclude, in the combustion of a metal, all antecedents but oxygen gas, then it becomes certain, upon the axiom of the uniformity of nature, that the presence of oxygen is a condition of this phenomenon. But it does not appear from this that oxygen is a general condition of combustion. We may, therefore, proceed to observe and experiment other combinations, excluding oxygen, and if we find that, in all such instances, no combustion takes place, *then*, and not till then, we infer that oxygen is a general and indispensable condition of this phenomenon. Here one instance is not sufficient, since, although oxygen is a supporter, there may be other substances which act in the same way. When several instances concur, the conclusion becomes strong; and when all known observation and experiment give the same result, no doubt is any longer entertained, for the uniformity seems now fully developed. The case in which we determine that oxygen is a condition of combustion, and the case in which we determine that it is *a general* condition, are widely different, since one instance is sufficient for the first, whereas the induction must be extended in the second."*

"But it often happens that we cannot analyze the complex antecedent. For example, a certain remedy appears to be efficacious in a particular disease; now, if all the circumstances are precisely the same in any other case of the disease, the remedy may here be expected, on the general uniformity of nature, to be equally efficacious. But the complexity of the antecedents creates a twofold difficulty. Do we have such a perfect knowledge of the circumstances in the first case—the constitution of the individual, the influences of regimen, &c.; the nature of the disease itself, and the force of the recuperative power of nature—as to be confident to what extent, or even if at all, the remedy is to be taken as an antecedent to the recovery? And if all this were granted, is our knowledge of all the circumstances in the second case sufficiently minute and accurate to enable us to decide upon the identity of the two cases? Now, it is evident that where antecedents are thus complicated, observations and experiments need to be multiplied in order to arrive at a general expression in any degree satisfactory.

"It appears from the preceding remarks that the number of instances necessary to enable us to decide upon a prevailing uniformity, depends upon our success in eliminating all the antecedents and consequents foreign to the particular sequence we are contemplating. If, in the case of the treatment of disease, we can eliminate everything but the disease and the remedy, then we shall at once be in a condition to decide upon the sequence."—Pp. 278–281.

Under the head of Principles of Elimination a very admirable illustration is introduced in the theory of dew, from Herschell's Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy.

We conclude our quotations from this part of the work with a passage upon the logic of art:—

"Pure accident and empiricism reach art by mere felicities. But even where there is no science, there is often exhibited an ingenuity and skill which impress us as a manifestation of high and extraordinary powers. Men of this mold seem to invent by a sort of inspiration. They seem prepared for every difficulty, and arrive at results the most curious with wonderful ease and tact. These instances are found both in the mechanical and the fine arts. There must be here an exceedingly vigorous spontaneous development of ideas, together with a nice and quick observation, and a vivid imagination.

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* Oxygen, for some time, was considered the only supporter of combustion. This was the general fact until subsequent discoveries brought to light other supporters of combustion. In no *general* fact, therefore, do we attain the *necessary*—this belongs only to law.

"There is, therefore, a true inductive logic, leading virtually to important conclusions, although they be not stated in the form of distinct propositions. These conclusions really direct the hand of the mechanician and the artist. They are not reflected upon as universal principles, and, therefore, are not elaborated into a scientific system; they appear to the individual as something belonging to him, something that answers his special purpose, and with this he remains content. In his use they soon become reduced to mere rules of art. This natural and spontaneous logic plays an important part in the development of humanity; and that which we call genius, and which so proudly overcomes all obstacles, presenting us the unscientific but skillful mechanician and artist; or leading onward the untutored, as in the case of Ferguson and Corregio, and a multitude of others, to the loftiest eminence of science or art, is chiefly a natural logical power, lying in the proper union of ideas and external observations—a union of the ideal and sensuous. Unite with this the highest form of the imagination, and you have the most splendid form of genius: for it is the imagination which, from ideas, creates those ideal representations which constitute archetypes of all that man accomplishes of the great, the beautiful, and the sublime.

"Where all the lights of science are enjoyed, invention exhibits a chain of the nicest reasoning, both inductive and deductive. The latter form of reasoning appears indeed in the cases above mentioned; but more remarkably here, inasmuch as the invention sets out with principles already ascertained. In its progress it may have to make many inductions, and to exert that high prophetic power which gives birth to rational hypotheses. Indeed, the imagination is here also tasked in ideal representations of mechanism. The steam engine, from its conception to its present state, exhibits a constant series of scientific inventions springing from a rigid logic."—Pp. 308, 309.

The fourth and last book of the third part, Deductive Logic, constituting the third book, is upon the Doctrine of Evidence. Many practical treatises have been written upon this subject, most of them, however, contemplating it as forming an important branch of the study of municipal law. Philosophic investigations of the doctrine of evidence are more rare. They are valuable, however, even to the lawyer, as furnishing the ulterior grounds of many of the settled principles by which he is bound, lying further back, to be sure, than for the purposes of establishing the rules for his use it is necessary to go; but yet furnishing a perfect guide, where sometimes it is much wanted, to point him in the right path to the secondary principles on which these rules depend.

As an evidence of the truly philosophic character of this portion of the work we cite a passage upon the distinction between positive and moral, or probable, proof. It is presented in a manner different from any which we recollect to have seen, and appears to us quite original with the author. It is closely connected with his views of the will as an independent, self-determining power, which views are the only ones that appear consistent with any clear and intelligible explanation of the distinction in question:—

"To an omniscient being there are no degrees of knowledge. Such a being sees, with the utmost clearness, the necessary and contingent, the actual and the possible. To such a being all knowledge is certain.

"There are, then, to us three kinds of certainty, &c.

"First. *Absolute certainty.* This is based upon the necessary connection between the two terms. Our knowledge of ideas and axioms is absolutely certain. Our

knowledge of the connection between the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism is of the same nature: this is sometimes called logical certainty.

"Secondly. *Physical certainty.* This is the certainty which lies in the connection between established physical antecedents and sequents.

"Now, the reason does not conceive this connection as necessarily fixed, with an absolute certainty, because it ultimately depends upon the will of God; and the same will that ordained it can change, suspend, or even annihilate it.

"Thirdly. *Moral certainty.* This is the certainty which lies in the connection between motive and will.

"By will, we mean a self-conscious, intelligent, and sensitive cause, or a cause in a triunity with reason and sensitivity. It is, in the fullest sense, a cause *per se*; that is, it contains within itself proper efficiency, and determines its own direction. By *motives*, we mean the *reasons* and *inducements*, in view of which the will acts. In general all activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons, for they have essentially the same meaning; but in mere material masses, the law is not contemplated by the acting force; it is contemplated only by the intelligence which ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the contrary, the activity which we call will is self-conscious, and is connected with a perception and sense of the reasons and inducements, or ends, or motives of actions. These motives are of two kinds:

"First. Those found in the ideas of the practical reason, which decides what is fit and right. These are reasons of supreme authority.

"Secondly. Those found in the understanding and sensitivity: *i. e.* the immediately useful and expedient, and the gratification of the passions. These are right only when subordinate to the first.

"Now, these reasons and inducements are a light to the will, and serve to guide its activities. The human conscience, which is but the reason, under its practical function, in relation to the moral, has drawn up for the will explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations, which are called *ethics*, or *the rules*. And so, on the other hand, the understanding, by which we mean the reason, under its practical function, in relation to mere utility, has formed rules of prudence or expediency. The law of the sensitivity, taken in itself, is unique; it is simply, 'To do whatever is most agreeable or pleasing to itself.'

"These various rules the will is not compelled or necessitated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a power to do, or not to do.

"In the moral harmony and purity of the soul, the three kinds above named do not conflict with each other.

"Hence moral certainty, as to the actions of moral beings, can exist only where the harmony of the spiritual being is preserved in a perfect, or, at least, paramount degree, *e. g.* God, and good angels, and good men. In God, moral certainty is perfect.

"In the case of good angels and good men, the moral certainty is such as to be attended with no apprehension of a dereliction.

"In a particular case, where we are called upon to reason from the connection of motives with the will, it is evident we must determine the character of the individual as accurately as possible, in order to know the probable *resultant* of the opposite moral forces which we are likely to find.

"What is commonly called the *knowledge of human nature*, and esteemed of most importance in the affairs of human life, is not the knowledge of human nature as it *ought to be*, but as *it is* in its vast variety of good and evil. We gain this knowledge from consciousness, from observation, from history. What human nature ought to be, we learn from reason and revelation."—Pp. 411–415.

Under the head of Testimony we note a few sound rules:—

"If the witness has an interest in the facts to which he testifies, arising from pride, ambition, or the gratification of any desire, or the fulfillment of any selfish purpose which he is known to entertain, then will his testimony be in proportion invalidated."

"If the motives be such as, on principles of self-gratification, would lead the witness to testify contrary to his actual testimony, then is the testimony strong in proportion to the motives; *e. g.* A man testifying to facts at the expense of reputation, of worldly possessions and honors, or of life."

"Testimony, as evidence, relates merely to matters of fact. All, therefore, that a witness can testify to in relation to opinions, is the fact that he or some other person entertains such and such opinions. But the truth or falsity of the opinions must be determined on other grounds, and wholly independently of testimony." —Pp. 425, 426.

Every part of this short treatise upon the doctrine of evidence (it contains some sixty pages) is excellent.

Thus much will suffice to give our readers some tolerable notion of a book which is, we think, an honor to our country, and likely, if it meet with attentive readers, to exercise an important influence over intellectual culture. It presents in small space, and in simple and intelligible language, the most valuable results which philosophy, after many struggles and revolutions, has settled upon a sure basis. Many of them, it is true, have been known for ages, and remained unshaken, though often assailed; others are, at least in their present shape, of more recent origin; and the whole subject presents itself with a degree of completeness and symmetry highly grateful, especially to those who have not the time to read extensively, to investigate and think for themselves. One cannot go over its pages without feeling at every step that he is treading safely and truly, that he has a guide who has both read and thought well, who is free from idols, who has sifted and searched after and found truth amidst the various systems which, with different degrees of perfection and mixtures of error, have prevailed in the world, as nearly as is practicable in the present age: and that, for this purpose, he has enjoyed great advantages by bringing to the work an American mind, free from all those prejudices which it is impossible for any one born on the other side of the Atlantic wholly to shake off.

One feature of the work we cannot commend too highly. It is the pure and elevated religious tone which pervades the whole. The most lofty sentiments of piety, the most unbounded feelings of benevolence, the warmest expressions of charity, the most entire sympathy with the beautiful and the good, breathe in every page, with an unconscious freedom from all ostentation, bespeaking a great and a pure soul in the writer, and begetting, infallibly, some degree of grandeur and purity of soul in the reader. The moral influences of the book are, indeed, of the most ennobling kind; and no one can rise from its perusal without feeling himself not only a wiser, but a better, man.

Art. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic.*—3 vols, 8vo. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

Prescott's historical writings have, in the few years they have been before the public, gained an elevated standing among works of their class. In this case it is difficult to decide whether the author is more indebted to his subject, or the subject to the author. No period, which properly belongs to history, abounds in so great a degree with the true spirit of romance as that of the reign of the Catholic sovereigns of Castile and Arragon. It was then that Spain assumed her place among the nations of Europe. By the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella their hereditary dominions were united: Navarre was presently joined to them by the joint agencies of war and negotiations, while the sword of the conqueror expelled the Moors from the fruitful fields and gilded palaces of Grenada. In viewing these subjects in the clear light of history, one seems to realize the legends of romance and the fictions of poetry. This, too, was the age of great men in Spain. The military exploits of Gonsalvo were such as to justly entitle him to the style of the "Great Captain;" the fame of Cardinal Ximenes, the editor of the Complutensian Polyglott, and the father of the Inquisition, imparts no ordinary interest to the period of his active career; and the name of Columbus alone is enough to give unusual splendor to the history of his times. But this mine of literary gold and gems lay unexplored till opened by American writers. Irving gleaned the sparkling beauties that lay upon or near the surface, and filled two caskets—his Columbus and the Alhambra—with jewels of unequaled lustre; but Prescott has penetrated its depths, and brought forth an amount of literary wealth not unlike the acquisitions of his own heroes in Mexico and Peru. The labor of collecting the material for such a works is more than Herculean; yet strange to say, it was accomplished by him, for the most part of the time, in utter blindness. But it was well performed, as is sufficiently proved by the noble work now before us—and seldom has labor been better rewarded.

This new edition, by the Messrs. Harper—the tenth since the first issue, about eight years since—is unequaled by any recent publication of standard works. The typography is beautifully clear and correct; the paper of the very finest quality, and the binding in the publishers' best style. We commend these volumes to all who would combine pleasure with profit in reading, and heartily congratulate those who have yet to read them for the first time, on the pleasure that awaits them.

2. *A Practical Manual of Elocution; embracing Voice and Gesture. Designed for Schools, Academies, and Colleges, as well as for Private Learners.* By MERRITT CALDWELL, A. M., Professor of Metaphysics and Political Economy, and Teacher of Elocution in Dickinson College. 12mo., pp. 331. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. New-York: Huntingdon & Savage. Boston: Gould, Kendal & Lincoln. 1845.

THIS valuable and eminently-practical work supplies a want which has long existed in the American community, and especially in literary institutions of all grades. It is the only book we have seen which treats of both branches of the speaker's art, *utterance* and *action;* and though the size of the volume is moderate, these subjects are discussed and illustrated with sufficient fullness to meet the necessities of the learner, and with a scientific precision which shows the hand of a master. It is also equally adapted to the wants of the private learner, and of the student in a public seminary; and will be found as beneficial to him who wishes to *read* well, as to him who aspires to be an *orator*.

The work consists of two parts and an appendix. Part first treats of the *voice*. The author begins with an analysis of the vocal sounds of our language, and then proceeds to a full and perspicuous exposition of the functions of the human voice. In this chapter the learner will find all the information he may need on *articulation*, on the different kinds of *stress*, and on the *pitch*, *slides*, *waves*, *force*, *quality*, and *melodies* of the voice. The author next applies the principles which he has established to a great variety of practical examples, and treats of *accent*, *emphasis*, *drifts*, *expression*, *transition*, and *cadence*. The section on *Emphasis* is a precise and clear analysis of that important subject, with appropriate examples of its several kinds. The same may be said of the section on *Expression*, which teaches the application of the vocal principles to the language of sentiment and feeling. This subject is new in works of this kind, and is treated with the copiousness and accuracy which its importance demands. This portion of the book will be found none the less instructive because the author was compelled, in its preparation, to draw from the resources of his own mind, and to be guided by his own experience and judgment, more exclusively than in other parts of the volume.

In part second the author treats of *Gesture*. His object is not only to assist the learner in correcting the awkwardness of careless habits, and in acquiring such command over his muscles that he may take easy attitudes and make graceful movements; but also to teach him how to adapt his action to the illustration, embellishment, and enforcement of his subject, and to the significant expression of every species of emotion. This portion of the work contains numerous wood-cuts designed to

illustrate those attitudes and gestures which ought to be avoided, as well as those which are appropriate.

The appendix contains some excellent hints on the elocution adapted to the pulpit, and on the action suited to the imitative representation of human passions. The minister of the gospel who desires to be "a workman that needeth not to be ashamed," can hardly fail to derive benefits from the careful perusal of the first chapter of the appendix; and among these benefits, an inducement to study the entire work will not be the least valuable.

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3. *The History of Rome.* By B. G. Niebuhr. Translated by Julius Charles Hare, M. A., and Connop Thirlwall, M. A., Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge. Five vols. in two, 8vo., double columns. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1844.

This work is admitted to be one of the most successful efforts to penetrate and lay open the ancient history of Rome which has been made by the moderns. Though the daring and perseverance of the German scholars, in attempting to penetrate the mysteries of philosophy and history, are often fruitless or positively injurious, yet in other instances they are crowned with the most brilliant success and with the richest results. The present work is an instance of the latter class. The Edinburgh Review declares it to be "a work which, of all that have appeared in our age, is the best fitted to excite men of learning to intellectual activity; from which the most accomplished scholar may gather fresh stores of knowledge; to which the most experienced politician may resort for theoretical and practical instruction; and which no person can read, as it ought to be read, without feeling the better and more generous sentiments of his common human nature enlivened and strengthened." We would add, that this edition is well got up, and the first volume is ornamented with a fine map of "Ancient Italy."

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4. *The History of the Popes, their Church and State, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.* By Leopold Ranke. Translated from the last edition of the German, by Walter Keating Kelly, Esq., B. A., of Trinity College, Dublin. 8vo., pp. 648. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1844.

This work has been so often noticed and reviewed by the periodical press in this country, that it is scarcely necessary to speak of its character particularly. The author has selected a period when the political and ecclesiastical character and aspects of Romanism were fully

developed. He who wishes to know what Popery really is, and how it will act in this country, whenever it gets the opportunity, should read Ranke.

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5. *History of the Reformation in Germany.* By LEOPOLD RANKE, author of the History of the Popes. Translated from the last edition of the German, by SARAH AUSTIN. Complete in one volume. 8vo. Part I. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1844.

THIS work is "to be completed in about four parts, each part to contain one volume of the English edition." We are happy to see an American edition of this great work so promptly commenced and so well executed. The history of the Reformation, as it affected the governments of Europe—the civil causes which acted upon it, and the political results which followed it—are matters of great interest, and cannot be too well understood in this country. There are ecclesiastico-political demagogues in this land of freedom and Protestant institutions, who do not hesitate publicly to denounce the Reformation as an outbreak of fanaticism and corruption, and a disruption of all the social and moral ties by which society is held together; that it was a war against legitimate authority, against religion, against learning, and against civilization. We want such books as D'Aubigne's and Ranke's Histories scattered broadcast over the country. Their facts will "put to silence the ignorance of foolish men," and rebuke the impudence of Popish emissaries, who assume all forms and would fain "deceive the very elect."

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6. *The Works of the Rev. Sidney Smith.* Three volumes complete in one. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1844.

THIS volume is composed mostly of the author's contributions to the Edinburgh Review, between A. D. 1802 and 1819. The book contains some sound political doctrines, a small amount of literary criticism, a small spice of religion, and a great deal of wit. Having said thus much, we wish we might here leave the reverend gentleman without further notice; but this conscience forbids. His pages are everywhere marred with vulgarity, scandalous epithets, and the most melancholy evidence of recklessness, and the absence of all feelings of responsibility. We can conceive how a "Rev." of "the venerable Establishment" might write such papers in a Review in which the names of the writers do not appear; but how he could collect into a volume and father them, is to us a little singular. And how he could publish a certain series of "letters" as his, which he says he had "always denied," shows a strange obliquity of the moral sense. Perhaps this singular writer thought it a great credit to him to have

"always denied" some of his own publications. Just about as creditable are his foolish articles on "Methodism." A Rev. of the Establishment might in 1808 call the Methodists *fools*, *Bedlamites*, *vermin*, &c., &c., in an anonymous paper; but for the same man, after thirty years' experience and observation, not only to acknowledge the authorship of such rant, but to say gravely, as he does in his Preface, he "sees very little in them to alter or repent of," shows that he has not only lost all sense of decency, but that bigotry and malice have become with him settled habits. What a melancholy evidence of a want of piety in a church is it to hear its ministers abusing a "sect" because they believe in a particular providence, oppose theatres and dancing parties, and make a difference between the righteous and the wicked! And all this our "Rev." author does with a confidence and gravity which strongly indicate that for once at least he speaks his honest sentiments!

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7. *Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil, embracing Historical and Geographical Notices of the Empire and its several Provinces.* By Rev. DANIEL P. KIDDER, M. A. 2 vols., 12mo. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball. 1845.

IT will be known to most of our readers that Mr. Kidder was for some time a missionary in Brazil. His well-known industry, and his habits of observation, pre-eminently fit him for the task of describing the scenes in which he participated, and the country through which he traveled; and having ourselves seen the proof-sheets of a considerable portion of his "Sketches," we can the more confidently express our conviction that they will not disappoint public expectation.

Hitherto no work exclusively on Brazil has issued from the American press, and even in England information respecting that country is exceedingly limited, though the commercial relations between both countries and Brazil are of great and growing importance. Those who have written upon the subject have not, in any one instance, personally visited more than two or three of the eighteen provinces of the empire. An authentic modern history of Brazil—information obtained by personal observation of the internal government of the country, of its actual life as now existing, its morals, religion, customs, soil, products, commerce, &c.—is wanted to fill up the blank hitherto felt by all who prosecuted inquiry in relation to that portion of the world. Although Mr. Kidder faithfully and successfully discharged the duties of his high vocation, it will be found, when the work issues from the press, that he has collected a mass of facts and intelligence which will make his "Sketches" not only interesting to all who are concerned for the moral and religious welfare of the country, but of real importance and permanent value to the merchant, the politician, and the man of science. The work will, from its ample and well-arranged details, and the light now first thrown on many hitherto obscured portions of the empire and its history, necessarily

become a text-book for all future historians; and the numerous official documents scattered through the volumes prove that the author has had access to authentic sources of information. As, however, this is to be regarded rather as an announcement than a notice of the work, we will only add, reserving to ourselves the right of *review* hereafter, that in Mr. Kidder's volumes will be found valuable notices of the finances, the commerce, the botanical productions, and the climate of the great empire of Brazil.

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8. *The History of the Consulate and Empire under Napoleon.* By M. A. THIERS, late Prime Minister of France. Translated from the French by D. F. CAMPBELL and H. W. HERBERT. With Notes and Additions. Part I. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1845.

THIS work is "to be completed in ten parts, at twenty-five cents each." It has cost the distinguished author many years of labor, and the estimation in which it is held in France is seen in the fact that a company in Paris purchased the copy-right for *five hundred and twenty thousand francs*, or *one hundred thousand dollars*. The enterprising publishers of the translation are entitled to the gratitude of the public for this compact and cheap edition, and we hope will be rewarded by a large sale.

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9. *Cobb's School Books.*

WE observe that most of the leading journals of the country have expressed great satisfaction at the introduction of Cobb's School Books.

The Manuals hitherto used have been very deficient in many important particulars, such as the following: They do not give with accuracy the vowel and consonant sounds in the language. The classification of words is not so arranged that the *eye* and the *ear* may act in concert in learning the true orthography. The words themselves are not so placed that the scholar may proceed step by step from the easy to the more difficult.

Mr. Cobb's plan obviates all former difficulties. In his spelling-book the words are all classed by their terminations—by their single and double consonants—by their different diphthongs—by the separation of those peculiar consonant sounds, which might be easily mistaken for each other, or have a similarity of sound—by a separation of all the silent consonants—by a marking of verbal distinctions, as in differently-accented words, where they are different parts of speech—where they are differently pronounced—where two or more are pronounced alike, though having a different orthography—where the orthography changes—where the pronunciation varies in consequence of a change of the part of speech, or where the pronunciation is nearly alike. Part fourth of the spelling-book is particularly devoted to the explanation of these important differences.

With Mr. Cobb's books in hand, the pupil may ascend the ladder from the first combination of letters and sounds to the highest lessons in reading. The progress which he makes is apparent and intelligible,

and his reasoning powers are expanded and strengthened as he advances.

One vast advantage of this system must not be overlooked. As soon as the mind begins to be excited by what is read, it is also improved. The lessons for example in the North American Reader are selected with reference to the fact, that they are American youth who are to be taught. The instruction conveyed is of a high moral tendency, and the absurd fables and tales which fill so many reading books are properly excluded from those of Mr. Cobb.

We are of the class of persons who believe that education without moral training is positively injurious. The accomplished mechanic who uses his art to destroy the security and happiness of his fellow-men, forsakes the path of duty, and might much better have remained professionally ignorant. So those who use their attainments to destroy the peace of society, to weaken its moral relations, to unsettle belief, and to destroy individual responsibility, make but a poor use of their privileges, and become the scourges instead of the benefactors of their race.

Mr. Cobb, like a true Christian and profound philosopher, has regarded this principle in his works; and we heartily commend them, not only for the skill he has displayed in their composition, for the remedies he has furnished for former evils, but for the moral and religious tone which pervades his whole series.

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10. *Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life: designed particularly for the consideration of those who are seeking assurance of faith and perfect love.* By THOMAS C. UPHAM. Second edition; 12mo., pp. 520. Boston: White, Pierce & Company, No. 1 Cornhill. 1844.

THIS work has been before the public for some time, and has been favorably noticed by our editors generally. Having been pressed with reading upon other subjects, and receiving no intimations from those concerned in the former edition that they wished us to notice it, we have waived the reading and notice until the present. On receiving a copy of the "second edition," we commenced its perusal, and are now prepared to give our views of its character.

The work is composed of a series of papers upon the subject of "holiness," many of which had been published in the "Guide to Christian Perfection." These papers are arranged, according to their subjects, under appropriate heads. The style of the work is simple, pure, and perspicuous; the spirit is truly Christian, and the doctrine generally orthodox, according to the Wesleyan standards upon the subject. We are happy to say we have read this good book with great pleasure and profit, and can most cordially recommend it to our readers. It is a pleasing fact that God has raised up such a witness for perfect love, and called into this peculiar field of labor, from among the Congregationalists of New-England, so able a teacher as is Professor Upham. We hail him as a brother beloved, and wish him abundant success in sustaining the high ground he has taken among the supporters of the Bible truth of entire sanctification.

We are, however, compelled to notify the reader of one thing, which we conceive a blemish in this generally most excellent publication. We think he pushes out his doctrine of *disinterested love* too far. Our author tells us, though "God does not require and does not expect us to be willing, in the absolute and unconditional sense, to be cut off; nevertheless, in point of fact, if God should see fit to do it, we ought willingly to submit to it, and glorify his name in it."—P. 285. The case, he tells us, is merely stated "hypothetically," and not as a fact. Now, we would, in all courtesy and kindness, suggest that this "supposition" might much better never have been made. 1. Because it is supposing what does not and can-

not exist. We might equally as well say, if God should so change the principles of his government that holiness would be sin, and sin holiness, "we ought willingly to submit to it." 2. The supposition contains neither argument nor illustration. The utmost that is required of us is entire conformity to the will of God; and as God does not will our damnation, why need we bewilder ourselves and others with an artificial standard of holiness erected upon a supposition at war with fact? 3. There is a great practical difficulty in this theory of "disinterested love." Few minds are capable of distinguishing between the supposition and the fact. Most persons who read the section above quoted will ask themselves, "Am I willing to be damned?" They instinctively answer, *No!* Can I ever be willing to be damned? *Never!* Here then they either discard the theory or give up the pursuit of entire holiness as hopeless. An interesting case, in which the practical workings of this "hypothesis" developed itself, came under our own observation. We visited a most excellent and intelligent lady upon her death-bed, who when we entered the room had Professor Upham's book in her hand. She immediately commenced conversation upon the subject of entire sanctification, and proceeded to say that she had been much exercised upon the subject, and had been trying to lay herself upon the altar; but, if she understood the professor, there was yet too much *selfishness* in her heart. We were forced, after examining all her statements, to make an effort to relieve her mind by telling her that this was a mere hypothesis, nowhere authorized in the Scripture; and that, instead of troubling herself with such speculations, she should fix her attention upon what the will of God *really is*, and, by grace through faith, to have her own will swallowed up in the divine will, *as it is revealed*. We cannot enlarge. We submit these few remarks to the candor and wise judgment of the author; and, though we would not be obtrusive, we would suggest to him, that could the objectionable sentences referred to be left out of the future editions of his work, it would be an improvement, and make it more acceptable and useful to those who feel the greatest interest in the topic. But if this suggestion should not accord with the views of the excellent author, we shall still cleave to him with undiminished Christian affection, and bespeak a wide circulation for his generally excellent treatise.

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11. PUBLICATIONS OF OUR SUNDAY-SCHOOL UNION.

We promised in our last to furnish our readers with brief notices of the publications issued at the Book Concern, for the use of Sunday schools, under the supervision of brother Kidder, the judicious editor of our Sunday-school publications. We now redeem the pledge, and begin with

1. *The Jew among All Nations.* 18mo., pp. 178. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is a reprint from the list of the London Religious Tract Society. It describes the habits, customs, manners, and pursuits of the modern Jew in the different parts of the earth. It is rich in its facts, lively and vigorous in its style, and will be both a popular and useful book. Whoever reads it will be led, ever after, to regard the Jew as a living commentary on the truth of holy writ. It should be perused by every teacher and scholar in our schools.

2. *Learning to Think.* 2 vols. 18mo. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is also an English reprint. It is a book which is admirably adapted to awaken the attention of the juvenile reader, and is filled with useful information, conveyed in the most pleasing style. It is one of the best books for children which we have read for some time. It aims, and we think successfully, at once to please the mind and to develop its faculties.

3. *The Story of Ananias and Sapphira.* By William A. Alcott. 18mo. pp. 72. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This little book, which is an original work, contains a well-written account of the sin and death of Ananias and Sapphira, with some very useful reflections. It is an entertaining and a profitable work for children.

4. *The Forty-two Children at Mount Bethel.* By a SABBATH-SCHOOL TEACHER. 18mo. pp. 47. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS is also an original work, describing the sin and punishment of the children who mocked Elisha the prophet. It is written in good style, and will do good.

5. *No King in Israel, or the Importance of Discipline.* By a SUNDAY-SCHOOL TEACHER. 18mo. pp. 54. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS little book was also prepared expressly for our Sunday School Union. From the facts recorded in the book of Judges concerning the prevailing social disorders in Israel, when there was no king or head over them, the author has inferred some very useful truths. Simple in style and full of valuable sentiment, it is worthy of a place in our list.

6. *We are Seven, or the Little Mourner Comforted.* By ELIZABETH MARIA LLOYD. 18mo. pp. 51. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS is an English reprint. It is a prose version of Wordsworth's celebrated ballad "We are Seven;" it also contains the poem itself. It is a most touching narrative, and we predict that it will seldom lie idle on the shelf of the S. S. Library.

7. *Anna, the Prophetess.* By a SABBATH-SCHOOL TEACHER. 18mo. pp. 48. With frontispiece. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS little work tells the reader what is known of the character, employment, residence, condition, &c., of the pious Anna, with reflections which are at once pleasing and profitable. It is original.

8. *The Kingdom of Heaven among Children, or Twenty-five Narratives of a Religious Awakening in a School in Pomerania.* From the German. By CHARLOTTE CLARKE. 18mo. pp. 104. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

WE wish this deeply-interesting book could be read, not only by every child, but by every adult in our connection. It would produce a confidence in the reality and possibility of juvenile conversion not now felt. We think this is a book which, when known, will be much read, and we are sure it will be useful.

9. *Missionary Book for the Young. A First Book on Missions.* 18mo. pp. 200. With numerous cuts. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS truly-excellent book is a reprint from the list of the London Religious Tract Society, with some revisions. It was very popular in England, and we are much mistaken if it does not become equally so in America. It is filled with interesting exhibitions of heathen degradation and of missionary success. It is just the thing to form the minds of the tens of thousands of children committed to our spiritual care. We thank brother Kidder for placing it on his list.

10. *Scripture Characters: Letters on the Distinguishing Excellences of Remarkable Scripture Personages.* By the Rev. ROBERT HUSTON. 18mo. pp. 245. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THE peculiar characteristics of twenty-one of the principal persons mentioned in the Bible are very beautifully exhibited, in as many letters, by our author in this excellent book. It is an English reprint, and is admirably adapted to assist in forming the *moral* character of our youth. As a work of interest and utility we cordially recommend it.

11. *Memoir of Jonathan Saville of Halifax, Eng. Including his Autobiography.* By FRANCIS A. WEST. From the London edition. 18mo. pp. 90. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

THIS is the memoir of a poor little orphan boy, who, by ill-usage, became a cripple for life; and who subsequently was a Wesleyan local preacher of extensive usefulness. The greater part of the work is from his own pen. This book will attract the notice of readers of all ages, and we congratulate our friends on the opportunity thus afforded them of an acquaintance with Jonathan Saville.

12. The Nest, pp. 37: The Egg, pp. 38: The Feather, pp. 38: The Song Bird, pp. 34: The Tongue, pp. 44: The Ear, pp. 49: The Eye, pp. 88: The Hand, pp. 96: The Flower, pp. 38: The Fruit, pp. 39: The Seed, pp. 40: The Grass, pp. 67: The Coral Maker, pp. 39: The Fish, pp. 36: The Sea Star, pp. 36: The Lobster, pp. 36: The Animalcule, pp. 40: The Gall Insect, pp. 36: The Fly, pp. 41: The Honey Bee, pp. 40: The Ant, pp. 37: The Spider, pp. 39.

Such are the titles of a series of exceedingly-valuable books on birds, insects, fishes, plants, and the senses. They may be had separately or bound together in sizes suitable for the Sabbath-School Library. We are glad to see these volumes of useful and *necessary* information placed in our list of juvenile publications. They contain facts which children *ought* to know, and though some may object to them as being *dry*, yet we have no doubt that children will read them, especially if a little effort is made to excite a desire in their breasts to know something more of birds, insects, &c., than can be known without reading. It is time that we bestir ourselves to the effort of making *intelligent* as well as pious Methodists. These books, with their many beautiful engravings and their comparative simplicity of style, will certainly do their part in effecting this great object. We heartily recommend them.

13. *The M'Gregor Family.* By a Methodist Preacher. 18mo. pp. 119. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is an original work designed to explain and illustrate various points of morality, such as benevolence, selfishness, truth, &c. It is simple in its style, and is suitable for the younger classes of children.

14. *The Cottage on the Moor.* By a Methodist Preacher. 18mo. pp. 126. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is also an original work, and in simple narrative illustrates the evil of pride, and the beauty of humility. It is designed for the youngest class of readers.

15. *The Beloved Physician; or the Life and Travels of Luke the Evangelist.* By Wm. A. Alcott. 18mo. pp. 179. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is an original work, descriptive of the character and labors of Luke, the companion of Paul. The author deals, perhaps, somewhat too freely in probabilities and surmises, but has furnished a book simple in its style, and instructive in its contents.

16. *Kindness to Animals.* By Charlotte Elizabeth. 18mo. pp. 128. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

Of this excellent work we have only to say, that the name of its authoress is a sufficient guaranty of its worth.

17. *Miracles of Christ; with Explanatory Observations and Illustrations from Modern Travels, &c.* 18mo. pp. 205. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

We predict for this work a large share of popularity. It contains evangelical sentiments, with valuable information, and is written in a pleasing style. It is an English reprint.

18. *Ephraim Holding's Homely Hints to Sunday-School Teachers.* 18mo. pp. 213. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This is just such a book as every teacher needs. Its hints, if followed, will lead the teacher into a path of usefulness which will make his memory precious to the children of his care. It is an English reprint.

19. *Little Ann; or Familiar Conversations upon Interesting Subjects between a Child and her Parents.* 18mo. pp. 96. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

This little book is well adapted to promote serious thoughts in children, and to develop their moral feelings. It is an English reprint.

20. *The Patriarchs.* 18mo. pp. 240. New-York: Lane & Tippett.

The first of a valuable series of Biblical works. It is in fact a brief commentary on the Book of Genesis, although it is written in a narrative style. It abounds in illustrations.

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

Thos Wightman Pinx.t

T. F. E. Prud'homme, sc.

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THE

METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

ART. I.—*Life of Oliver Cromwell.* By ROBERT SOUTHEY, LL. D. New-York: D. Appleton. 1845.

No portion of English history is of more intense and perplexing interest than that of the "rebellion;" and among the prominent characters of that period none is so conspicuous as Oliver Cromwell. Histories of that age are numerous; but the world is not satisfied, and the press teems with discussions of its affairs, while biographies of that wonderful man are still produced and sought for with unabated avidity. But all histories of that period necessarily partake of a partisan character: for the contest then maintained was not for an accidental supremacy, nor were the parties the creatures of the occasion; that conflict was between the minions of tyranny and the advocates of the rights of man, in which every spectator is deeply interested, and therefore disqualified for impartial judgment. Time, however, is the great arbiter of human actions; and the light of truth, softened in its passage through two intervening centuries, enables the present generation readily to determine the merits of the affairs of those eventful times. Where there still exists difference of views and opinions relative to these matters, they originate not in any considerable discrepancies as to facts, but in different notions of the rights and privileges of persons. Affection often contributes largely to our opinions, so that we judge not less from prejudices than from facts. Few individuals have suffered so much in reputation, from this cause, as Cromwell. Hated alike by all the factions of his times, he was sustained by his own individual energies alone, while he lived, and when dead, his fame as well as his body was delivered over to his enemies. But, though without a party, he had for cotemporaries and fellow-countrymen a few persons too great, indeed, to be the partisans of any man, but possessed of the discernment to perceive, and of the honesty and courage to declare, the rectitude of his cause

and the excellence of his administration. To live at the same time and place with two such men as Milton and John Goodwin is no common privilege,—to enjoy their society is an honor greater than kings can confer; but to have them both for advocates, unbought and unsolicited, is the highest earthly favor. Yet these great men were Cromwell's friends, and the advocates of his cause, for which both have received the execrations of the sycophants of all succeeding times; though the poetical genius of the former has now fully rescued his fame from the malignity of his enemies, and for the latter, justice, though more tardy, is preparing a similar triumph.

The part acted by Cromwell in the convulsions of his times has placed his name conspicuously upon the page of his country's history, so that all who write of these affairs are compelled to animadvert upon his conduct and character. The result in each case is such as might be expected from the known sentiments of the writer. Hume's stands foremost among the popular histories of England, and has exercised a controlling influence in determining public opinion relative to the affairs of which he treats. But Hume was incapable of appreciating the motives and designs of Cromwell, and of course was wholly unable to portray his character. In politics, a royalist; in philosophy, a skeptic; a time-serving churchman and an infidel at heart; he could not fail to do injustice to his subject when descanting upon the life and actions of such a man as Cromwell. If any look further into English history, the writings of Lord Clarendon lie next in the way,—a writer of unquestionable ability, of a fair personal character, but a decided royalist, and a cotemporary and active enemy of Cromwell in all his public career, —who, himself, went into exile with banished royalty, and received a lordship for his fidelity to the fallen fortunes of his prince. Such a man could scarcely be expected to do justice to his personal enemy, however honest his intentions. But the records of that age are ample and well-authenticated, so that no one need remain in ignorance of the truth, nor indeed is there any necessity always to view it through the false medium of other men's prejudices. The collections of Rushworth, and the papers of Secretary Thurloe, are sufficient to set the whole subject right; and the Memoirs and other writings of many candid cotemporary authors—unhappily but little read—present the truth in the clearness of daylight.

Biographies of Cromwell are numerous, but like his history in more general treatises, they are discordant in tone, and contradictory as to matters of fact. In this particular, bad luck has attended the fame of the Protector, especially in this country; for of all his biographies, none so violently and unjustly asperses his

reputation as that of Russell, which, having found its way into that deservedly popular collection, Harper's Family Library, is read by thousands who never learn that the book they have read does not present the true character of its subject. Harris's "Historical and Critical Account of the Life of Oliver Cromwell" is a very fair work, in which facts are fearlessly stated and well sustained, and reflections made with an enlarged liberality of spirit. About the year 1820 a "Life of Cromwell" was offered to the public in London, from the pen of Oliver Cromwell, Esq., a descendant of the Protector; and soon after, another by Thomas Cromwell, not of the same family: both of which works are favorable to the fame of the Protector, and the former an elaborate vindication of the name of the author's illustrious ancestor. But these works are little known in this country. Noble's "Memoirs of the Protectorate House of Cromwell" is a valuable work, leaning indeed somewhat to the cause of the king and the church, but giving an honest statement of facts, with just and liberal reflections. Dr. Southey's book, whose title stands at the head of this article, is a small volume of one hundred and fifty-eight pages, lately reprinted by the Messrs. Appleton of this city, as one of a series called a "Library for my Young Countrymen." Not having kept a close watch of all the numerous offspring of the prolific pen of the late poet laureate, we were quite uninformed as to the trans-atlantic reputation of this work, and when we saw announced, a Life of Cromwell by Southey, though we expected but little in the way of facts or philosophy, we promised ourselves at least some amusement in tracing the extravagances and inconsistencies which must be produced by such an author, writing upon such a subject; for instead of this meager juvenile affair, we had figured to ourselves a portly octavo, stuffed with all sorts of things in general, and everything in particular. Though disappointed as to the amount of matter, its kind answers to our expectation. Here Cromwell is shown to have been at once a hypocrite and an honest man; good-hearted and blood-thirsty,—wanting only the benedictions of *the* church to become a saint, yet adjudged to perdition; requiring only the favor of royalty to raise his actions to the first grade of heroism, and only legitimacy to constitute him the best of rulers: still he is consigned to our contempt and execration, a fearful monument of the danger of laying unholy hands upon the persons of kings, and daring to touch the Lord's anointed! But we are most at a loss to understand the meaning of the American editor and publishers. If the editor is so entirely deficient in judgment as to select this book as a fit work to put into the hands of his "young countrymen," we advise the publishers, as

they value their profits, to inform him that they have no further need of his services. If this is a specimen of the series, we wish them no other harm than to remain unmolested upon the shelves of the publishers, a memorial of the madness of an attempt to force the exploded follies of English courts and hierarchies upon the American public. If Cromwell is condemned for the causes assigned by writers of the class to which Dr. Southey belongs, the leaders of the American revolution are still more deeply involved in the same condemnation; and we, instead of celebrating their deeds and honoring their memories, should repent of the sins in which they have involved us, by bequeathing to us the inheritance of rebels.

There is abundant cause to suspect that a strong anti-American movement is in progress beyond the Atlantic, and that its leaders have their allies among ourselves, who, with Jesuitical cunning, would seek to poison the sentiments of the young, that they may become the victims of their craft.

In the following pages we shall attempt to review some of the principal events of the life of that wonderful man, and endeavor to form a proper estimate of his character, availing ourselves of all the facilities within our reach; and, in passing, to pay just so much attention to the work before us as may aid us in that purpose.

The pedigree of distinguished persons is, among us, a subject of but little interest, and hence is frequently unknown; but where official dignity has, by long association, become conjoined with exalted birth and hereditary honors, whoever is possessed of the one is expected to assert his title by means of the other. In this particular, Cromwell could make a better showing than might have been expected of one who had attained his elevation with so little of this adventitious aid. He was descended by both his parents from some of the oldest families of British nobility. The line of his paternal ancestors reaches back into the eleventh century, when Glothian, lord of Powis, married Morveth, daughter and heir of Edwin ap Tydwell, lord of Cardigan, by which the two lordships of Powis and Cardigan were united. For four hundred years nothing remarkable is recorded of this long line of Welsh nobility, but in the fifteenth century we hear of William ap Yevan, in the service of Jasper, duke of Bedford, and subsequently in that of Henry VII., king of England. Morgan, his son and heir, (who, according to the custom of the age, retained his father's name, and was called Morgan William's,) married a sister of Thomas, Lord Cromwell, the celebrated vicar-general of Henry VIII. The children of Morgan William's took the surname of their maternal grandfather as well as that of their father, and were called Crom-

well alias William's, and at length the latter appellation was omitted. His intimacy and favor with Lord Cromwell gave Sir Richard Cromwell, son and heir of Morgan, an opportunity to enrich himself with the spoil of the suppressed monasteries, of which he largely availed himself, esteeming poverty more dreadful than dead men's curses. His son Henry succeeded to his estates, and was distinguished for wealth and hospitality. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth, and is said to have enjoyed in an unusal degree the favor of that imperious princess. His eldest son, Oliver, succeeded him in his patrimony, and was also made a knight, while his younger sons had fortunes of about three hundred pounds a year,—those of Robert, his second son, lying near the town of Huntington, having once belonged to the monastery of St. Mary's. Robert Cromwell married Elizabeth Steward of the city of Ely, whose family was derived from the same stock with the royal house of Scotland, then, by inheritance, possessed of the throne and kingdom of England. Though declining from the grade of his ancestors, as is the fate of the younger branches of the nobility, he was a gentleman of respectability,—was a member of one of Queen Elizabeth's parliaments, and also a justice of the peace. He had a large family, of whom the subject of this paper was the second son, and the only one that lived to man's estate.

The early life of Oliver, afterward Lord Protector of England, Scotland, and Ireland, was not distinguished by anything remarkable, though those who are fond of the marvelous can tell of many strange things. One of these apocryphal stories is so characteristic of the person, that, although unsupported by any adequate evidence, it may be repeated as a specimen of its class.

It is said that being on a certain occasion on a visit at the seat of his uncle, Sir Oliver, when the royal family of James I. rested there for a short time, little Oliver was brought to play with Prince Charles; but the play resulted in a fight, in which the future regicide, faithful to destiny, made his first essay at shedding royal blood. He attended the grammar-school of his native town, and at seventeen was removed to Cambridge, and entered commoner in Sydney-Sussex College. In the college register, where his name is entered, between his and the next entry is a remarkable interpolation, which, as it serves at once to identify the person intended, and to show the spirit in which his memory has been preserved, we insert in an English dress: "This was that grand impostor and graceless cutthroat, who, when the pious king Charles had been taken off by a vile murder, usurped the throne, and harassed the three kingdoms with indomitable tyranny for the space of five years, under the name

of Protector." He remained at Cambridge but one year, when the death of his father made his presence necessary at home. He is said to have been afterward student at Lincoln's Inn, though of this there is no certain evidence, nor is his name found upon the rolls, and he is known to have passed much of the three years between his leaving Cambridge and his marriage at his native town.

During this time it is generally granted that his habits were irregular, but to what degree of depravity he abandoned himself is not readily determined; not for want of testimony in the case, but on account of a sad deficiency of credibility in the witnesses, and of probability in their statements. Among the evidence adduced upon this point is a letter written by Cromwell himself relative to this time, in which he says that "he lived in and loved darkness and hated the light," and that he was "the chief of sinners." This is plainly a very narrow foundation for the broad conclusion that is made to rest upon it; for, as is well remarked by his biographer, Oliver Cromwell, Esq., "such would be the language of any person of the present day, who, after professing Christianity in the common loose way, and even preserving himself free from gross sins and immoralities, should become a convert to the stricter doctrines and precepts of the Scriptures, as held by those who are deemed to be the evangelical or orthodox believers of the times." Dr. Southey coincides with this conclusion, though from a very different view of the subject, and so avails himself of the occasion to give one of his characteristic strokes: "Mr. Cromwell is right," he remarks on the above; "the letter proves nothing, except that there is a good deal of the same kind of canting now that there was then, cant being a coin that always passes current. The language of an evangelical professor concerning his own wickedness is no more to be taken literally than that of an amorous sonnetteer, when he complains of flames and torments." This short extract is a key to Southey's heart; for, doubtless, he spoke from the heart, and it demonstrates his total ignorance of the subject he attempts to discuss.

Not long after his marriage, Cromwell's religious character underwent an entire change. Mr. Noble's statement is, that "from a debauched life, Oliver fell by degrees into the opposite extreme; the quickness of his transition from vice to virtue, and the rigidness of his manner, had recommended him to some sour and austere nonconformists, particularly their preachers, who weaned him from the Established Church. He now took to a stricter course of life, which he daily increased, till his mind seemed wholly bent on religious subjects; his house became the retreat of the persecuted

non-conformist teachers; and they show a building behind it, which, they say, he erected for a chapel, where many of the disaffected had their religious rites performed, and in which Mr. Cromwell himself sometimes gave them some very edifying sermons." It would be interesting to be informed of the agencies through which this reformation was effected, though we may reasonably presume that his new associates were somewhat instrumental in producing this, as well as the change in his feelings toward the Established Church. Indeed, after his change of character, there is no need to inquire further for causes of alienation, for the Spirit which produces sudden changes from vice to virtue was little known in the national church at that time, and when he was made partaker of that Spirit he would naturally seek for communion elsewhere. But by whatever means effected, the fact is certain: Cromwell became a Puritan, and that event occurring at such a time, with such a man, determined his future course. He thenceforward became the champion of liberty of conscience and the friend of the persecuted, till, in the end, in prosecuting this cause, he undermined the throne, and put his foot upon the neck of royalty itself.

External causes frequently have a controlling influence upon the characters and destinies of men. Had Cromwell lived at a time of public quiet, and under a government rightly administered, he probably would have been unknown, except as a plain country gentleman, and succeeding generations would not have heard his name. The state of public affairs when he entered upon his career of life was admirably adapted to the development of his peculiar genius, and to place him prominently before the world. Under the able conduct of the Tudors, England had taken rank with the first class of European kingdoms; the tyranny of Rome had been broken, and the people allowed to enjoy many of the blessings of good government. The ability of this dynasty was admirably calculated to advance the prerogative to a dangerous height, especially as hitherto it had been undefined. But while the prerogative was increasing, through the influence of wise counsels, and a strong hand upon the helm of government, the people were also advancing in all the attributes of humanity, and so becoming less fitted for subjects of despotism. Even during the lifetime of Queen Elizabeth there were, especially in the House of Commons, frequent indications of an increasing spirit of freedom, to control which required all her authority, and which became wholly unmanageable in the subsequent reigns.

The accession of the Stuarts brought with it all the high pretensions of the preceding dynasty, with very little of the ability by

which they had been sustained. James I., though not wholly destitute of personal excellences, possessed not a single royal virtue. Though without personal dignity, his vanity was unbounded; a tyrant at heart and in life, he could not surmount opposition; but when overawed by personal influence, his fawning was as disgusting as before his arrogance was intolerable. He had reduced duplicity and double-dealing to a system which he had dignified by the name of "king-craft." Charles I. was educated in a court where falsehood was esteemed a princely virtue, with which to gain and exercise power over the subjects, and with his crown he inherited the most extravagant notions of regal power and dignity. But the nation was not in temper to submit to a mere shadow of royalty, for they had learned to venerate princes for their personal qualities, and to judge of their actions by rules drawn from higher principles than the rights of kings. When Charles ascended the throne, the elements of mischief, which had long been fermenting, were ready to burst upon the kingdom. The parliament, called soon after his accession, was hastily dissolved, when they had been in session but a very short time, and before they had matured any of the business for which they were convened. Another, which was summoned the next year, proved still more refractory, and had a shorter existence. Three years then transpired before another parliament was assembled, and when they met, such was the mutual disgust of king and parliament, that Charles dissolved them soon after, and determined to govern alone.

Charles's maxims of government were the most despotic, such as are realized only in Oriental courts. He esteemed his a simple monarchy—held by divine right, and for which he was responsible to God alone. In ecclesiastical affairs he proceeded on the same principles. With a strong bias toward Romanism, he sacredly maintained the divine right of episcopacy, and, as the legal head of the church, claimed absolute control of the consciences of his subjects. But while he assumed such authority to himself as king, he was personally subject to his favorites, who usually became and continued such by humoring his fancies concerning his prerogatives. The duke of Buckingham, himself an impersonation of court profligacy, was the companion of his youth, and his chief minister after his accession, till, in the fourth year of his reign, the hand of the assassin delivered the kingdom from that scourge. His queen, a daughter of the king of France, to obtain whom he pawned his kingdom to the pope, and pledged his future offspring as hostages of his favor to the Romish faith, possessed his heart,

and ruled his actions with a power suited to his own notions of regality; and by her gayety, rapacity, recklessness, and hatred of the English, no doubt hastened and heightened the catastrophe of the king's affairs. After Buckingham, his chief ministers were his own creatures. In civil affairs the proud and imperious earl of Strafford was foremost, while the Romanizing prelate, Laud, acted the pope in the hierarchy. *Par nobile fratrum.*

The personal character of King Charles is a subject of glowing panegyric with his admirers. Dr. Southey's remarks on this subject, which we subjoin, are a fair specimen of their class: "In any other age," says he, "Charles would have been the best and most popular of kings. His unambitious and conscientious spirit would have preserved the kingdom in peace; his private life would have set an example of dignified virtue, such as had rarely been seen in courts; and his love of arts and letters would have conferred splendor upon his age, and secured for himself the grateful applause of after generations." If the age made Charles what he was, then "in any other age" he would have been a better king, for he could not readily have changed for the worse; but it is too plain to require proof, that, as things stood, it was not in him to be either a good or a popular prince. If he was unambitious, it was because he conceived that he had gained such an elevation, that there was nothing more to desire; and as for his conscientiousness, it only served to clothe his tyranny with the sacred robes of religion. He was, indeed, a great pretender to conscientiousness; but it is remarkable that his conscience always adapted itself to his maxims of government. It felt the bands of his coronation oath whenever the prerogatives or the hierarchy was in question; but when the people's rights were concerned, its ligaments were powerless as the green withes upon the strong man's hands. Though scrupulously devout, he had so thoroughly learned his father's science of "king-craft," that his most solemn asseverations could not be believed with safety. We cannot avoid the conviction, that when Charles had ascended the throne of England, one of two things was inevitable;—either the English people were to become slaves, or the king was to be deposed. Such a man could never be the ruler of a free people.

Few ages have been more fruitful of great men than that of this monarch: whether we should view this as one of the happy coincidences brought about by an all-wise Providence, or as the natural result of the occasion, which developed powers that would otherwise have remained latent, we shall not attempt to determine. The House of Commons, of 1628, was made up of a set of persons

seldom equaled in any deliberative assembly. Among them were Selden, Pym, Hampden, and Wentworth, yet uncorrupted by royal favors, and, above all, in long-tried senatorial wisdom, Sir Edward Coke, the illustrious expounder of English law. It is easy to imagine how Cromwell's spirit kindled at the glowing eloquence of these gifted men, and how his soul responded to the sentiments of liberty which they uttered. Here he took lessons in statesmanship, which gave form and expression to his political character. The position taken by that parliament was worthy of their exalted station as the peers of the realm and the representatives of English freemen. A correction of abuses was demanded by the state of public affairs, and faithfully insisted upon by parliament. The bill of rights was wrested from the king, though it availed but little while he had the power to violate it at his pleasure. Cromwell distinguished himself by his opposition to the temporizing clergy, who, for royal favor, had lent their ghostly influence to the cause of oppression, declaring "the royal will pre-eminent over all laws, and the king's proclamation binding on the conscience of the subjects on pain of damnation." In this movement of Cromwell we discover the Puritan no less than the friend of liberty, which are, indeed, kindred spirits, though, in some instances, found in separate existence.

The interval between this and the Long Parliament is among the most remarkable periods in the annals of England. For nearly eleven years the constitution lay in ruins; English liberty was at an end; arbitrary exactions took the place of the grants of the people through the Commons, and no man had any other guaranty for life or property than the king's good pleasure. Yet the nation was generally quiet, and a good degree of prosperity prevailed. Population and trade were steadily increasing; agriculture improved; the plague, which had desolated the country for several years, was greatly abated; and the mass of the common people were comparatively happy. But that was not the quiet of security; nor was the calm the effect of a settled atmosphere, but rather the fearful stillness that precedes and presages the coming tornado. Yet so long did it continue, that most concluded that it would be perpetual. The scene was a mournful one to the contemplation of the patriot. The spirit of freedom, compressed in the folds of despotism, seemed to have ceased to resist, and to have resigned itself to its fate. Discouraged at the prospect, multitudes forsook their native country, preferring freedom in a foreign land to the slavery and oppression which were continually increasing at home. It is well known that Lord Say and Seal, and Lord Brooke, took

preliminary measures for removing to America; and most writers on this subject also declare that Hazelrigge, Hampden, and Cromwell, had actually embarked for "the land of the Pilgrims," but were forbidden to proceed by an order of the king in council. If this was really the case, Dr. Southey may well say, "Few facts in history have so much the appearance of fatality as this."

It is impossible to imagine how far Charles would have gone in his madness had he not begun to reap its bitter fruits, and to experience the infelicity of his strange position. But his own necessities impelled him to his ruin. Extortion and violence failed to replenish his treasury, so that he was at once starved at his exchequer, and buffeted by rebellion. When all appearance of merit was taken away from the concession, on account of the stern necessity that compelled him to that course, the king yielded to the wishes of the nation and called a parliament, of whom, in not very courteous language, he demanded a large supply. The Short Parliament of 1640 is almost universally commended, although, for the most part, the same men composed the Long Parliament. Dr. Southey himself acknowledges that "the majority of that parliament consisted of men who knew their duty to their king and country; and in asserting the constitutional liberties of the people, would have sacredly preserved the rights of the crown." Doubtless, as the same author further states, there were some who contemplated fundamental changes, for they saw that as things then stood, the people's privileges were subject to the monarch's caprice; and they wisely determined to obtain greater security for the subjects' rights. With such a parliament, a wise and virtuous prince could not have failed to be happy; but as they presumed to do something else besides give him his demanded supplies, Charles prorogued them before they had perfected anything. Yet such was the desperate state of the king's affairs, that in less than six months another parliament was called, as the only safeguard against universal anarchy.

The members of the Long Parliament were chosen under the most unpropitious circumstances. The long time that the king had pertinaciously refused to assemble the great council of the nation, and then the sudden dissolution of the one lately called, had greatly exasperated the people, so that moderate counsels could hardly be expected to prevail among their representatives when thus called together. Still there was a good degree of moderation, at least in appearance, when they first entered upon the public business, though they proceeded vigorously to redress grievances and to prune the exuberances of the overgrown prerogative.

Cromwell was a member of this parliament for Cambridge. In Warwick's Memoirs we find the following description of his person, as he appeared in the beginning of its first session. "The first time," says he, "that I ever took notice of him was in the very beginning of the parliament held in November, 1640.... I came one morning into the house, and perceived a gentleman speaking, whom I knew not, very ordinarily apparelled, for it was a plain cloth suit, which seemed to have been made by an ill country tailor. His linen was plain, and not very clean;... his hat was without a hatband; his stature was of good size; his sword stuck close to his side; his countenance swollen and reddish; his voice sharp and untunable, and his eloquence full of fervor." Cromwell's course at this time will be judged of by different persons according to their affections to the parties of those times; there is no cause, however, to believe that at this time he or the party with which he acted intended harm to the king, the country, or the laws, but only designed to correct existing abuses, and protect all in the enjoyment of their respective privileges.

But however reasonable these demands may seem, they could not be extorted from the king and his ministers. Strafford hated and feared the liberal party, to which he had proved traitorous, and dreaded any accommodation between them and the king, lest he might be given up as a peace-offering, or left to the vengeance of his enemies; for he had not forgotten Pym's significant threat, that though he had left them, they would never leave him while his head was on his shoulders. He dared not assent to any terms that would meet the just demands of the parliament. The case with Laud was little better. A bigoted and persecuting prelate, he had advanced the affairs of the church to an odious spiritual despotism; had invaded Scotland with an army of his ecclesiastics, and, in attempting to force episcopacy upon that people, had excited the whole kingdom to rebellion. England was but little less agitated; the courts of the High Commission and Star Chamber had filled the land with terror, and rendered the church hateful among the people; for while they were perishing for lack of knowledge, many of their ablest and most faithful ministers were silenced and driven out to starve in retirement. With him bigotry united with self-interest to resist the demanded reformation, and no doubt he was prepared to maintain his position, or hazard all in the attempt. For awhile Charles yielded to the current of things; some of the most odious abuses were corrected, and ample promises given thenceforward to govern by the laws. The principal ministers of his tyranny were impeached, and a bill passed to per-

petuate the present parliament. When Charles had gone to a very considerable extent in his concessions, but had perfected nothing, he suddenly stopped short, and utterly refused to advance another step. Having proved himself false to his old friends by his concessions, he now proved himself equally so to the parliament and nation, by refusing to complete the necessary corrections. Had he not yielded anything, posterity might have praised his firmness and constancy, though exhibited in a bad cause; but as the facts are, all must hold him guilty of either degrading his royal dignities and sacrificing his faithful ministers, or of refusing to consummate a work which nothing but duty and stern necessity could justify him in beginning. The consequence of the king's new course was a rupture with the parliament, and accordingly, after having taken precautionary measures to secure important positions and military stores, he openly levied war against them.

The causes which led to this civil war should be carefully noticed, since the subsequent course of parties must be judged of by the character of their positions at its commencement. In all Charles's parliaments a decided opposition to his administration had been maintained, and in each case, when the united influence of menace and bribery had failed to subdue it, he had angrily dissolved them, and, for the greater portion of his reign, had conducted the affairs of the kingdom without the aid and concurrence of the co-ordinate branches of the government. This long-continued refusal to assemble a parliament was unquestionably treasonable, and properly subjected the advisers of the measure to impeachment and condign punishment. Had the parliament, however, been content with this, and not attempted also to guard against a recurrence of like abuses, there probably would not have been any violent rupture between themselves and the king; for the fate of Strafford proves but too plainly that Charles would not have hesitated to sacrifice his ministers in order to secure his darling despotism. The king's want of money put him in the power of the Commons, who were too cautious to make him independent of themselves before they had obtained indemnity against future acts of tyranny The king asked nothing but money; the parliament demanded a redress of grievances and security for the future. The king yielded, piece by piece, until many grievances were redressed and great reforms projected; but when to insure the execution of these reforms the parliament asked the control of the militia, the king pertinaciously refused to grant it. These concessions, had they been so made as to assure parliament and the nation that the king was, in good faith, intent upon reforming abuses, were such

as ought to have satisfied the popular party, for awhile at least, until a further opportunity should enable them to perfect what they had begun. But although the parliament was perpetuated by law, the king was still the sole sovereign; for with the sword in his own hand, and the dispensing power in full exercise, it would not have been difficult for him, at the first favorable change in his circumstances, to return to his former course. And why was he so much more tenacious of his right to the militia, than many other prerogatives hitherto claimed, but now conceded, unless he expected to have need of the strong arm of military power to awe the parliament and the people into obedience? This itself looks very suspicious; and with this before them, in addition to numerous other instances, in which the king's perfidy was manifested, the parliament had no right to trust at all to his promises.

While these things were in progress, several very unhappy affairs occurred, which greatly exasperated the people against their prince. The bishops were Charles's peculiar care, nor could he without great difficulty be persuaded to abridge their power, which was the principal obstacle in the House of Lords to the measures of the reformers; so, while their course made themselves and their office odious to the nation, this odium was naturally transferred to the court by which they were sustained. The massacre of the Irish Protestants by their Papist countrymen—a tragedy second in atrocity only to the slaughter of St. Bartholomew's day in France, of which horrible affair the court was suspected to be not wholly guiltless, and toward which, when enacted, it certainly manifested a criminal indifference—alarmed the Protestants of England, and greatly exasperated them against the Papists of their own country; who being harbored and protected at court, and favored throughout the kingdom above many Protestants, occasioned the government to be feared and hated also. That Charles tampered with the Irish rebels and murderers is certain, which, at this juncture, was as impolitic as in any case it would have been wicked; nor is it any breach of charity to believe that, had he been faithful to his Protestant subjects, the Irish Papists would never have risen against their countrymen to murder them by thousands. They knew their king, and acted accordingly. But the king's greatest blunder was his attempt to avenge himself upon some refractory members of parliament, by impeaching them in the House of Lords, and then going in person to arrest them in the Commons. Friends and enemies are equally at fault in their attempts to account for this strange movement. Had his father been guilty of such an act, we should at once charge

it upon his ignorance and vanity; but Charles was not so ignorant as not to be aware of the high-handed usurpation of his proceedings, nor so vain as to expect to overawe parliament in this manner. The only rational conclusion is, that he was so intoxicated with rage at what to him appeared to be the insufferable insolence of parliament, in presuming to think and act contrary to his known wishes, that for awhile a delirium was upon him, and his actions in the mean time were only the ravings of a madman. This is the most charitable construction that the case will bear. Failing to apprehend the devoted victims of his wrath, he, by this act, gave them all the glories of martyrdom while they yet lived, not only as before to oppose his tyranny, but from the relation to himself, which he had given them, to seek his personal ruin. The parliament, too, seeing its privileges invaded in the persons of its members, felt bound to espouse their quarrel, and protect them against the king's vengeance.

In this state of exasperated feelings the leaders of the disaffected party in the Commons determined to present to the king the mass of the complaints in a grand remonstrance. This able state paper contained an enumeration of the chief grievances suffered by the kingdom during the present reign, and a petition for remedies and preventives for the future, which, together, contemplated very considerable changes both in church and state. Though called "an humble remonstrance," it was in reality a stern demand, so intended by its movers, so viewed by its opponents, and so received by the king. To grant it would have reduced the government to a constitutional monarchy, with the supreme power lodged with the two houses of parliament, approaching rather nearer to a proper commonwealth than was done at the revolution, nearly half a century later. When brought forward in the House of Commons, the remonstrance encountered the most stubborn opposition. The whole court party stood in an unbroken phalanx to oppose it, and to them were also joined many who had hitherto acted with the opposition, but were now alarmed at the extent to which they were proceeding. Though brought in at an early hour, the debates were continued till late at night, and when the vote was taken, it prevailed by no more than eleven voices, in a house of about three hundred; and as a considerable number were absent on account of the lateness of the hour, it was very doubtful whether a majority favored its passage. Whitelock compares it to the verdict of a starved jury; and Clarendon, as usual, with holy horror, wonders how these men, who "having assumed their country's trust, but by their negligence betrayed it, have answered it to their conscience and to Him who

can discern the conscience." The fate of the remonstrance was considered a test vote, and so fully did many consider the affairs of the kingdom to be involved in this measure, that Cromwell declared the next day, that had the decision been otherwise, he would have immediately sold all and left the kingdom; and that many more were of the same determination. But the time had not yet come for England to bow to the yoke of despotism; tyrants were first to learn that there are bounds to human patience, and that tardy justice may even in this world overtake the proud oppressor in the arrogance of his power.

Among the concessions made by Charles to the parliament was the sacrifice of that faithful minister of his tyranny, the earl of Strafford. The fate of that nobleman is a melancholy evidence of the uncertainty of human greatness, and an instructive lesson upon the faithlessness of princes. We purposely omit any notice of the regularity or irregularity of the proceedings against him, since whatever may be thought of the case by a mere lawyer, its general merits are easily determined. Whether the statutes reached his case or not, is unimportant; of the treasonableness of the whole course of the king and council since Strafford's advancement to the council table, there can be no doubt. And though it may be impolitic, and dangerous to personal liberty, to go beyond the letter of the law in visiting punishment upon offenders, the guilty victims of such a process have no right to complain, though justice overtakes them by an unusual way. We have, therefore, no other sympathy for Strafford in the fact of his execution, than for any other victim of his own lawless self-seeking. But when we remember that not only did his enemies determine on his ruin, but also when the royal assent was necessary to the consummation of their purpose, though he had been solemnly assured by his prince that not a hair of his head should be touched, that even that was not withheld,—then he appears as a victim of royal perfidy. False and traitorous he had indeed been, but not to his king; perfidy and arrogance had marked his course,—to Charles alone he had been faithful and obedient. Wherein the earl of Strafford differed from Sir Thomas Wentworth, he was the creature of the king, and though he richly merited his fate, yet not from that hand. Strafford was evidently taken by surprise when he found that his master had abandoned him to his enemies; for however much a man may see falsehood displayed toward another, he is slow to believe that its author who professes nothing but favor, will also, when interest demands it, become false to himself.

This affair is a perplexing one to the admirers of Charles, "the

blessed martyr," and of his faithful minister, the earl of Strafford. If the earl deserved his fate, it was only for obeying the king, who was the principal guilty person; if not, the king, equally with the parliament, was guilty of innocent blood. The plea that Strafford offered himself a sacrifice to popular violence for the welfare of the king and country, does not help the case; for, assuming that he was sincere, if it was magnanimous in him to make the offer, it was, to a still greater degree, mean and faithless in Charles to accept it. But the king never believed that his minister had reached a point of self-abandonment, that made him willing to die to prepare the way for a restoration of public quiet. Both of them well knew that he was not the principal obstacle to such a purpose, and that his death could not permanently advance the king's cause. But Charles desired to amuse the parliament with seeming concessions, without surrendering his power to tyrannize over the kingdom, and Strafford, leaning upon a broken reed, with apparent disinterestedness offered his life to his master's service. The exclamation of horror with which he greeted the announcement of the royal assent to the bill of attainder, indicates his surprise and his indignation at his master's falseness.

The transfer of the seat of war from the forum to the field was altogether favorable to Cromwell's personal advancement. In a deliberative body, embracing such a mass of intellectual greatness and parliamentary ability as the Long Parliament, he must always have remained below the highest grade; but when called to act, rather than to deliberate, his genius at once shone forth. His more intimate friends had not failed to detect his latent strength, and Hampden, who knew him well, and also knew much of human nature, remarked to Lord Digby on one occasion—when Cromwell was speaking—"That sloven, if we should ever come to a breach with the king, will be the greatest man in England." Southey remarks: "The man who most contributed to the king's utter overthrow by his actions, and the only man who, from the beginning, perceived wherein the strength of the king lay, and by what principle it might be opposed with the surest prospect of success, was Cromwell. During the proceedings which provoked the war, Cromwell took no conspicuous part, but he was one of the members upon whose votes the leaders of the disaffected party could always rely. He was sincerely a Puritan in his religious notions, in that respect more sincere than many with whom he then acted; as for political speculations, he probably cared less, but being a resolute man and one whose purposes were straightforward, . . . when he drew the sword he threw away the scabbard." At the breaking

out of the civil war he received a captain's commission with leave to raise a troop of horse, which he did from among the freeholders and sons of freeholders of his own county,—all of them men thoroughly imbued with his own principles. This troop, composed almost exclusively of religious men of Puritanical principles, united in themselves the chivalry of the middle ages and the scrupulous conscientiousness of primitive times. Their leader had chosen them, says Baxter, in view of their religious characters, not only because thereby they would be more serviceable as soldiers, but also and principally for his esteem for religious men. This troop was the nucleus of that resistless army which, nominally under Fairfax, but really under Cromwell, subdued the royal forces, and brought the kingdom first under the parliament, and then wresting it from them, gave it to their own commander. From a captain, Cromwell was soon advanced to the command of a regiment modeled by himself, and composed of fourteen full troops of cavalry, and soon after he was appointed to act as lieutenant-general in the army. The better to effect the religious order of his regiment, they were organized into a church, and the celebrated Mr. Baxter chosen their minister; a fact, by the way, which indicates pretty clearly the nature of the fanaticism, so frequently spoken of to their reproach. Fanatical churches seek fanatical preachers, and as this "church" desired Baxter, their fanaticism must have been kindred to his own! Though he approved of their cause as soldiers, Baxter was too rigid a Presbyterian to become the pastor of an Independent church, and therefore declined their invitation. Failing in this purpose, they fell back upon the simple modes of primitive times, and each commanding officer, as the father of a household, mingled praying and preaching with his other duties. The conduct and success of this body were such as their character would warrant one to expect. Such was their discipline and order, that, wherever they moved, they were greeted alike by people of all parties as protectors of their persons and property; while the royal army scourged friends and enemies with indiscriminate rapine.

The war was conducted in so irresolute and undecided a manner by the earl of Essex, that the royal cause constantly gained ground. That nobleman evidently still entertained a high regard for the royal cause and the person of the king, and sincerely desired an accommodation on easy terms for his royal master, to which he was more strongly impelled by his distrust of his own party, and by a decided hostility to the democratic tendencies of certain leading characters. It would have been easy to seize the king

and his retinue at Nottingham; but he suffered him to remain unmolested, and to depart at his own pleasure. In retiring from Nottingham the king was permitted to occupy the important town of Shrewsbury, by means of which he could command all North Wales. At the battle of Edge-hill, Essex appeared no less careful of the royal forces than of his own; and after the battle, when it was doubtful which party had the victory, he pursued a course which, had it been so intended, could not have more effectually given the king the appearance of a triumph. At that time the nobility were so full of superstitious reverence for royalty, that had not Charles found sterner materials in another quarter, his triumph would have been certain and easy. The spirit of the revolutionists, though then in action, was felt only as a leavening principle in the parliament, though finally it leavened the whole body, or expelled what could not be so affected; and, in the same way, the spirit of Cromwell at length pervaded the whole army.

While Essex with the main army was dallying with the king, who was rapidly rising in military importance, Cromwell was subduing to the interests of the parliament, not only Cambridge, whither he was sent to stop the deportation of the plate from the university which the king had demanded, but also all the surrounding country, together with the neighboring counties of Suffolk and Norfolk, dispersing the confederacies of the royalists, and seizing their stores. At the relief of Gainsborough, (July 23, 1643,) where he served as a colonel, he first experienced, under Lord Willoughby, the realities of battle. Here his troops rode down the flying forces of the enemy, and made sad havoc upon their ranks. This was the salient point of his military renown, which proved in the end his fortune and his ruin. He was engaged again the same year, under the earl of Manchester, when part of Newcastle's army was defeated near Horncastle. Here his horse was killed under him, and himself knocked down as he attempted to rise; he was, however, soon remounted, and found himself unhurt. Toward the close of this year he took Hillsdon-house, alarmed Oxford, the royal quarters, and finally joined the main army at Gloucester. With the opening of the next year, Essex, goaded by the complaints of his friends, and probably alarmed at the growing reputation of Cromwell, began to act with greater decision, and the war assumed a more vigorous character. At length the hostile armies met at Marston Moor,—the royal forces led by the earl of Newcastle, those of the parliament by Manchester; Prince Rupert led the cavalry of the former, and Cromwell that of the latter. The royal infantry carried everything before them, and Prince Rupert

charged like an avalanche with his cavalry; but lacking coolness and discipline, his troops pursued their flying enemies off the field, or stopped to pillage their baggage; while Cromwell's troops, uniting equal impetuosity with perfect coolness and complete discipline, bore down everything in their way, charging and rallying as the fortunes of the battle required.

The result of this battle gave a new aspect to affairs. The tide of fortune was turned against the royal arms; of which change Cromwell was so manifestly the cause, that he became an object at once of admiration and of envy. The nobility and aristocracy who were engaged against the king had no notion of effecting such a revolution as would in any considerable degree advance the influence of the people; they fought for their own aggrandizement, and would sooner have sustained the king in his usurpations than evoked the power of the people to subdue him. They, therefore, were not much pleased with a victory, which, while it gave them the mastery over the king, discovered to all parties that they were indebted for it, not to themselves, but to a more fearful rival than he whom they had defeated. A new feeling toward the king's cause and person now showed itself in the army. Hitherto the unsophisticated soldiers had been puzzled with the contradiction which appeared in all the public professions respecting the cause and purpose of the war. They were fighting for the king, and yet against the king; the war was undertaken for the safety and defense of the king's person, and yet they were discharging their firearms upon forces which guarded the king, and were commanded by him in person. But Cromwell had from the beginning pursued a different course. When enlisting his first troop, he informed them that "he would not perplex them with pledges to fight for king and parliament, but if the king chanced to be in the body of the enemy he would as soon discharge his pistol upon him as upon any private man." This spirit had rapidly spread itself, first among his own troops, and by degrees through the whole army. He now presumed to advance a little further; and so presently afterward took occasion to express his mind pretty freely to Manchester, in which conversation he assured him that he hoped soon to see the day when there would not be a single lord in all England, and when Lord Manchester would be called nothing more than Mr. Montague. A state of things had now come, for which the nobility were not prepared, and which they had not anticipated. They had evoked the spirit of liberty against the tyrant prince; and now having broken his power, they would fain have laid it to sleep again, that tyrant lords might not be molested; but they were

not the first magicians that found themselves unable to lay the spirits they had raised.

The belligerent forces fought again at Newbury, in the autumn of this year, when, after the rout of the royalists, Cromwell wished to bring things to a decided issue, by charging the king's forces in their retreat, which, on pretence of prudence, but more probably from ill-will to Cromwell and dread of his growing power, the earl would not permit. This brought on a rupture, and the rival chieftains mutually accused each other in parliament; Cromwell charged Manchester with betraying their cause through cowardice, and Manchester, Cromwell, with a design to overawe parliament with the army. This was a very ugly state of things for the parliament, and it tended not a little to widen the differences of their factions and to cause a mutual loss of confidence. The quarrel was at length smothered, as both parties feared to agitate it further, but the breach was not healed. A conspiracy, headed by the earl of Essex, and aided by Hollis and Stapleton, with the Scotch commissioners, was formed for the purpose of taking off Cromwell, if possible, and, if necesary, by almost any means. There was no want of zeal in the prosecutors, nor, indeed, of weight in the charges prepared to be brought against him; nor is there cause to suspect that testimony of some sort to sustain them could not have been obtained. But the whole affair ended as did the council of the mice, who met to consult on the expediency of putting a bell on the cat. The same cause that rendered him an object of their enmity, made him formidable as an enemy.

The contentions of the principal officers of the army, the divided counsels of the two houses, and the discontents of the people at seeing the chief offices held by members of parliament, conspired to demand a thorough revision and reformation of affairs. Accordingly the famous "Self-denying Ordinance," by which it was decreed that no member of either house should hold any office, civil or military, under the parliament, was brought forward and adopted. Essex, Manchester, and Cromwell were thus deprived of their commissions, and they returned to their places in parliament, while the command of the army was given to Sir Thomas Fairfax, a man of moderate parts, though a good soldier, and a decided friend to Cromwell; to whom was also given the privilege of nominating his own subordinate officers. When Fairfax had assumed his command, feeling the want of experienced assistants, and especially of a skillful master of the horse, he requested that the Self-denying Ordinance might be dispensed with in the case of Oliver Cromwell, and that he might be appointed lieutenant-

general, and have command of the cavalry; and, strange to say, his request was granted, first for a limited time, and afterward indefinitely. This Self-denying Ordinance is among the most unaccountable affairs of that age of strange things. Who originated it? for what end was it devised? how were rival factions persuaded to unite in its support? why did selfish and ambitious men adopt a measure which had the appearance of self-denial, and which evidently proved such to most of them? These are questions which probably will never be satisfactorily answered. If we might venture a conjecture, we should guess that it originated with the levelers, who are known to have been fruitful of expedients, and were confident of their own powers; that Cromwell and his friends favored it, since, by the elevation of Fairfax, the army would be delivered from the vacillating policy of Essex and Manchester; and that the aristocratic faction gave it their support, either to ruin the army, and thus defeat their own cause against the king, or else to degrade Cromwell, and so rid the army of his influence. Cromwell may have also suspected, that he would be so loudly called for by the voice of the soldiers as well as by the state of affairs, that he would by some means soon find his way back to the army; for this was evidently the only situation that afforded any adequate prospect to the ambition which, doubtless, had now become a ruling principle with him. But if the adoption of the Self-denying Ordinance is unaccountable, much more so is its suspension in the case of Cromwell; and this itself proves that a majority of the parliament were already in his interests, and heartily tired of the undecided policy of the late noble commanders. The new-modeled army was like a perfectly-constructed machine, capable of powerful action, but in the absence of Cromwell inefficient, as wanting the *primum mobile;* but when he was placed so near its centre of motion as to direct all its movements, it excelled in efficiency the most sanguine hopes of its friends. His spirit seemed to burn in every breast, inspiring each with his own zeal, energy, and love of order. Their discipline was perfect, and their prowess irresistible. In the west, where hitherto the royal arms had uniformly triumphed, the tide of war was turned back, the king's forces defeated, and by the recovery of Shrewsbury, all Wales brought back to the cause of the parliament. They next marched into the north, where the king commanded in person, having about him the strength and flower of his army. The battle of Naseby decided the fortunes of the war; the king's forces were routed, and vast numbers made prisoners; the king himself narrowly escaped, leaving his cabinet a prize to the victors. This

was followed by a rapid and brilliant series of victories. Bristol, Devizes, Winchester, and many other places of greater or less importance, surrendered to Fairfax and Cromwell. Subsequently, Prince Charles and Lord Hopton were defeated at Torrington, and soon after the last hope of the royal cause was extinguished by the overthrow and death of Lord Astley. So fully sensible was that nobleman of the ruined condition of the king's affairs, that when he saw the battle was lost, he exclaimed, as though addressing the victors, "You have done your work, and may now go to play, unless you choose to fall out among yourselves." The result of the battle of Naseby satisfied Charles that his cause was hopeless in the field, and he soon began to think of other means of helping his falling fortunes. He would have renewed his negotiations with the parliament had he hoped to obtain from them terms that he could accept; but he chose rather to risk the loss of his crown than to wear it shorn of the prerogatives which had served as the shield of his tyranny. But when every other hope failed him, he was still comforted by his faith; for when Prince Rupert reminded him of the ruinous state of his affairs, and advised an accommodation with the parliament, he confessed that, as a mere soldier or statesman, he saw no probability of success; "but as a Christian," he added, "I must tell you that God will not suffer rebels to prosper, or his cause to be overthrown"—so *piously* did this proud tyrant trust in the divine protection in the midst of the evils into which he had thrown himself by his high-handed oppressions. There are few more striking instances of the fact stated in the proverb: Whom God would ruin, he first makes mad. As a last and forlorn hope, the king resolved to give himself up to the Scots army, then before Newark, which he did without any other pledge for his safety than their own loyalty. The Scots, alarmed at the possession of a prize so little expected, wrote a deprecatory letter to the parliament, declaring that they had given the king no cause to suspect their fidelity to the two houses, according to the "Solemn League and Covenant."

The sudden termination of the war left the affairs of the kingdom in an anomalous condition. The royal army was little better than annihilated,—the king himself a prisoner,—the Scots lay idle in their quarters, while the parliamentary army under Fairfax and Cromwell held the nation in quiet subjection. The Scots wished to return home, but two difficulties interposed,—their pay was in arrears, and they knew not how to dispose of their prisoner. As to the king, as the Scots were in the service of the parliament when he was taken, he seemed properly to belong to them; and,

therefore, should have been delivered up to them at once, especially as it was his expressed wish that that should be done. The Scots, however, resolved to retain him as a hostage until their arrears should be paid; he was, therefore, taken back with them and lodged at Edinburgh. It was at length agreed that the Scots should receive one-half of their arrears (£200,000) in cash, and the balance at a future time; and they, in return, gave up the king to the English parliament. This is the famous "*sale* of their king," with which the English court party have so vehemently reproached the Scots; and, indeed, it were worthy of all censure if they intended to betray their king into the hands of the enemies of the peace and welfare of the nation. But if their purpose was to compose the disorders of the kingdoms, which they presumed could best be effected by perfecting the designs of the parliament, it was right to aid them in so doing. Charles had become dangerous to the commonwealth, and was, therefore, to be treated as a common enemy, and when in the power of the friends of good order, was to be restrained from doing harm. The Scots did not *sell* the king, for they received nothing from the parliament but what was already due to them; at most they only made use of their power to bring the parliament to their duty. While at Holmby House, whither the commissioners (of whom Cromwell was one) conveyed their royal prisoner, he was treated with much deference, and allowed every privilege that he asked, except the presence and services of his chaplains. Bigotry was the ruling principle of both parties; the Puritans denied the king a privilege now esteemed sacred to even the worst of criminals, and he, in turn, would not permit the services of the Presbyterians, even in saying grace at meals. In this melancholy captivity all the strangely-contradictory elements of the king's character were brought into exercise. He considered himself a martyr in the cause of God—for such he esteemed that of his own tyranny—and was forcibly reminded of the likeness of his own case to his Saviour's, when betrayed and sold; and he expressed great self-abasement at the recollection of the comparative greatness of his own price. At the same time, with his usual faithlessness, he was treating with both the parliament and the army, and with each to the prejudice of the other; for even in these desperate circumstances he still hoped to regain his authority through the strifes of his enemies,—a hope which probably would have been realized but for the controlling influence of one master mind. Cromwell had not only read the king's character in all his actions, which proved him unworthy of confidence in any case, but by means of the capture of his cabinet at

the battle of Naseby, he was put in possession of letters and private papers which clearly discovered an extent of perfidy hitherto unsuspected. From that day there is cause to believe Cromwell no longer hoped for an accommodation with the king, and without his concurrence none could be effected. This conjecture will serve as a key to explain some other movements of that far-seeing politician.

When the parliament had no further use for the army, they desired to be rid of them, both to avoid the expense of their maintenance, and also to be freed from their dangerous power; but the army knew their own strength, and were not in haste to lose it. They required, before consenting to be disbanded, that their arrears should be paid, and that full provision should be made for liberty of conscience. The latter was with them a capital consideration, and very necessary to be secured while they had power to demand it; for they had but little ground to hope for liberality from the bigots who ruled in parliament. After the league with the Scots, the parliamentary party had gone entirely over to the Presbyterian interest, and soon became as intolerant in its favor as was Laud for his adored episcopacy. But in the army the spirit of independence prevailed, and religious enthusiasm, having been left unrestrained and without proper direction, first bred a fanaticism, which presently brought forth a multitude of sects. The Presbyterians were intent on uniformity, and insisted on the obligation of the magistrates to enforce it; the sects asked only the privilege of enjoying their own worship and religious faith. This gave rise to new parties, which again plunged the nation into a civil war; and in the end transferred the sovereign power from the parliament to the army. The parliament granted the arrears to the army, and commanded them to disband. Incensed at this proceeding, the army petitioned them to change their determination upon that matter; and as things then stood, a petition from the army was rather an ugly affair. The parliament, though alarmed, determined to assert their authority, and to humble the pride of the soldiery. During these occurrences Cromwell was in his seat in the House of Commons, and is said to have spoken against some things from the army. He was, however, suspected to be at the bottom of all these difficulties; and it was, therefore, secretly determined to commit him to the Tower; but he had information of the design, and on the very day when it was to have been carried into effect, he left London and returned to the army.

A second crisis was now come. The parliament had used the army to break the power of the king, and free the nation of his

tyranny; but when this was done, they began themselves to exercise scarcely less tyranny, not seeming to suspect that the same hand that had reduced the king, could at pleasure reduce them also. The same day that Cromwell left London, the king was taken from Holmby House, by a sergeant, and brought to the army. This abduction of the royal person is among the unexplained mysteries of the times. When the sergeant's warrant for the removal of the king was demanded by the keepers, he showed them his pistol, after which they did not question his authority. Cromwell has been supposed to be the instigator of this bold movement, and his daring and intriguing character would render such a supposition probable, were it not that no other proof of it has ever been discovered. There were, however, other daring spirits in the army, who had quite as little regard for the king's person as the lieutenant-general; but if he did not devise the plan, he readily availed himself of the advantages it afforded. Charles was pleased with the change; for, though still a prisoner, he was treated with great consideration, and allowed the services of his chaplains and servants; and here his sanguine spirit again found room for hope of better days. He commended the valor and gallantry of the soldiers, and expressed a wish that he might never want the support of such men, in such a peace as might be alike profitable to them and himself. Probably at this juncture Charles would have made a peace with the army on very favorable terms, and as they would have still had him in their power, they could have insured its observance; nor is it unlikely that, on such conditions, Cromwell would have willingly availed himself of the shadow of the regal power to sustain his own ambitious purposes; but there were others who not only distrusted the king, but also hated the very name of royalty.

The character of the negotiations between Cromwell and Ireton on the one part, and the king on the other, cannot now be determined. The demands, said to have been made for himself by Cromwell, to wit—the garter, the earldom of Essex, to be made vicar-general of the kingdom, and first captain of the guards—are worthy of the man; for evidently in such a state of things he would have been not only the first subject in the kingdom, but also the guardian of the king himself. No doubt, anything that might have been demanded for their personal aggrandizement would have been granted, if only to gain time and fitting opportunity to sacrifice them; but when to these were added demands for such reforms in church and state, as would secure the rights of conscience and the personal liberties of the people, Charles would not yield them;—

a tyrant at heart, he would not agree to be the king of freemen. Cromwell was ambitious, but his ambition was subservient to the public welfare; Charles loved his regal state, but he would not enjoy it dissevered from the power to oppress his subjects. The king by seeming concessions, and by promises, made to be broken, drew out the negotiations for several months, hoping that the strifes between the army and the parliament would enable him to become arbiter between them, and so give laws to both; and at the same time he was proposing terms and negotiating treaties with the parliament and the Scots. About this time a private letter from the king to the queen was intercepted, in which, writing about the proposed accommodation with the army, he assured her that she "need have no fears that he would concede too much, for in due time he would know how to deal with the rogues, who, instead of a *silken garter*, should be fitted with a *hempen cord*." This put an end to the negotiations; Cromwell withdrew his parole of honor from the king's person, and informed him that he could no longer be answerable for his safety.

It is very doubtful, had Charles entered heartily into the measures said to have been proposed by Cromwell and Ireton, whether they could have been consummated. The old nobility would have been offended at the sudden elevation to such pre-eminence of a family hitherto unknown at court, and that too as the price of successful rebellion; and probably many who had been steadfast in their adhesion to the royal cause would have gone over to the interests of the parliament. Such an event, however, would not have been much cause of alarm, had the army favored the measure; for against their united efforts all the kingdom could not make a successful stand. But it was in the army that the most violent opposition to such a course was found, nor could Cromwell with all his influence either have persuaded or coerced them into an adoption of such a measure. "His," says Southey, "was a revolutionary power, not transferable without great diminution. In the movements of the revolutionary sphere his star was rising, but it was not yet lord of the ascendant; and in raising himself to his present station, he had conjured up stronger spirits than he was able to control. Had he espoused the king's cause heartily and honestly, the very men upon whom his power rested would have turned against him, and pursued him with as murderous a hatred as that which Pym had avowed against Strafford, and had gratified in his blood."

When left alone at Hampton Court, Charles adopted a course worthy of his character; he fled panic-struck, disguised as a servant, with his hair cut off, having only two attendants, and wan-

dering about for some time, was at length lodged, in a character between prince and prisoner, in the Isle of Wight. The blame of this false step, as well as most others committed by that unhappy monarch, has been charged to Cromwell. It is somewhat strange how they who make these charges can still be so eloquent in praise of the king's prudence, courage, and personal greatness; for how could such a man be the continual sport of other men's fears and fancies? To these advocates of the king's reputation, Milton replies most justly: "Charles is persuaded; Charles is imposed on; Charles is deceived; fear is impressed on him; vain hope is set before him; Charles is hurried and carried about as if he were the common prey of all, both friends and enemies. But let them either blot these things out of their writings, or else give over their trumpeting up the sagacity of Charles." It is difficult to form an opinion upon a disputed subject occurring at this time. Such was the violence of party strifes—the depth of intrigue, and the prevalence of untruth—that even time has failed in many cases to unravel the tangled meshes of the web of truth and falsehood. There is nothing improbable in the supposition that Charles, alarmed without cause, or with real danger from the levelers of the army, fled panic-struck he knew not whither, and having gone to the Isle of Wight, hoping to escape thence out of the kingdom, was there made prisoner; and on the other hand, it is equally probable that Cromwell purposely promoted his fears, and directed the course of his flight, that he might quit the kingdom unharmed, and so save them the odious task of putting him to death. Both suppositions agree with the characters of the persons concerned, and both may be true.

The successful resistance of the army to the orders of parliament was not forgotten, and as Cromwell was now confessedly at the bottom of the whole difficulty, it was determined by his enemies to bring him to condign punishment. He was accordingly accused in the House of Lords of instigating the army to disobey and resist the parliament, and of conspiring to restore the king by the power of the soldiery. The truth or untruth of this charge is of little importance, either as a matter of history, or as a clew to the character and designs of Cromwell. But the charge came to nothing, for the sufficient reason that his party was then in the majority, and also, because the parliament had need of him to protect them against the royalists. The cavaliers were in arms in various parts of the kingdom, and the Scots had crossed the border to avenge the cause of their king, against whom they had fought, and whom they had delivered into the hands of the parliament. Cromwell was, therefore,

too much needed to be found guilty of any high crime, even had his friends been fewer than they were.

The success of the expedition that followed filled the measure of his military glory. The army first marched into Wales, and soon restored all to order in that direction. They then turned to the north to oppose the Scots and such royalists as had joined them since they had crossed the border; but Fairfax, whom Southey describes as having "a sort of piebald Presbyterian conscience, which strained at a gnat, after having bolted so many camels," refused to bear arms against his old allies. But Cromwell had no such scruples, for he both hated the Scots for their treachery and despised them for their pusillanimity; and so, having at his own command a force amounting to about one-third of that of the enemy, with these he marched onward to meet them. The result was as usual when he met his enemies in the field. The English royalists were overcome by superior skill and discipline, while the Scots fled, leaving them to their fate. But they did not escape with impunity, for the victors pursued them in their retreat, routing and cutting them in pieces, until they came to Edinburgh, where Cromwell was received with honors little short of those commonly paid to royalty.

A decisive issue to this campaign was not desired by the Presbyterian party in parliament. Had the cavaliers prevailed, they had nothing to expect but to die as traitors and rebels, and now that their own army had completely triumphed, they found themselves little better than prisoners. Dreading the power and spirit of the army, and judging that the king would now yield to their terms, they renewed their treaty with him, which was rapidly advancing to maturity, when the army, finding themselves disregarded in its provisions, interrupted its further progress. The "sects" found they had changed masters rather than obtained freedom; episcopacy was abolished to give place to the equally-insufferable tyranny of presbytery; the Common Prayer was taken away to be replaced by the Directory; and *jure divino*, which is only another name for an assumed right to tyrannize, was taken from a smaller and given to a larger number of vampyres. Another crisis in the revolutionary orbit had arrived, and it remained to be seen whether the hearts that had dared to resist the authority of the king, would now cower to a less legitimate but equally-oppressive tyranny. Though we approve of the course pursued by the parliament in resisting the king, it is not because it was legitimate, but because revolutionary measures were demanded to correct intolerable abuses; so we do not attempt to justify the army by any special pleading, or legal subtilties, but only say, that having found tyranny in new hands, it

was their duty there to resist it. The army was not merely a set of mercenaries who followed arms as a profession, and fought for their bread; they were English freemen, who had thoughts in their heads and feelings in their hearts, as well as sinews in their arms. They had taken up arms in defense of their rights,—they had fought for the enfranchisement of the nation. The same principles that attached them to the parliament against the king, now constrained them to turn against their former masters. As to the manner in which this was done, we have only to say, that it is much easier to find faults in the quiet of speculation, than in the tumults of political convulsions to avoid them. The facts in the case are known. The army took possession of the House of Commons, purged it of the obnoxious members, and compelled the rest to do and undo at their bidding.

It almost provokes a smile to listen to the lugubrious ravings of the disappointed Presbyterians, when they found that the army would not consent to be their slaves. "They now thunder upon us," says Hollis, "with remonstrances, declarations, letters, and messages every day, commanding one day one thing and the next day another, making us vote and unvote, do and undo; and when they had made us do some ugly thing, jeer us, and say that our doing justifies their desiring it." "All was dashed," he continues in another place; "instead of a generous resistance to the insolence of perfidious servants, vindicating the honor of the parliament, discharging the trust that lay upon them to preserve a poor people from being ruined and enslaved to a rebellious army, they deliver up themselves and kingdom to the will of their enemies, prostitute all to the lust of heady and violent men, and suffer Mr. Cromwell to saddle, ride, switch and spur them at his pleasure." The tables were now turned; for as the same writer remarks again, "Presbyterians were trumps no longer;" and had not their own condition been too low to admit of it, the royalists would have enjoyed the scene richly. Southey, who hated both the parliament and the army with unmitigated hatred, treats the poor Presbyterians in real cavalier style: "As the question stood between the parliament and the army," says he, "the army was right. Whatever arguments held good for resisting the king availed, *a fortiori*, for resisting the parliament; its little finger was heavier than his loins; and where the old authorities had used a whip, the parliament had scourged the nation with scorpions. New presbyter was old priest written large—and in blacker characters. Cromwell had force of reason as well as force of arms on his side."

But the supreme power proved a troublesome acquisition to its

new possessors, and a different disposition of affairs was demanded. Some were for maintaining the forms of monarchy, by retaining the king to be used as a puppet to a council appointed by his keepers, or else by proclaiming the young duke of Gloucester king; but others were in favor of a total extirpation of monarchy. In the turbulent counsels of the occasion the most violent prevailed. It was determined to bring the king to trial for treason, before a court created for the purpose; and accordingly he was tried, found guilty, condemned and executed.

The fact that these things were done under Cromwell's eye, and with his concurrence, is sufficient evidence that he was a principal agent in their accomplishment, though it does not prove that of his own judgment he approved of the course taken. At this time, he was a leader in whatever he undertook; but he had the skill to fall in with any current that became too strong to be resisted, and so to turn it to his own advantage. The king's death being resolved on, it required all his tact and management to effect that purpose: he rallied the timid, frowned upon the scrupulous, and by his own unshaken firmness confirmed the purposes of the wavering, and yet little more than one half of the judges named for the trial could be brought to sign the warrant for the king's execution. Much has been said about the horrible wickedness of this act of putting the king to death; but without making any pretensions to an acquaintance with the ethics of legalized murders and justifiable homicides, we confess we have no sympathy with the morbid sentimentalism which whines in lachrymose terms about the baseness of this act, but applauds to heaven with the same breath the men whose hands are stained with blood, shed tenfold more wickedly. We can see no particular atrocity in taking off a king's head, to effect a purpose for which it would be right to sacrifice the life of another man. Charles undoubtedly deserved all that he suffered, and therefore neither he nor his partisans had any right to complain that injustice was done to his person. But when we inquire for the authority by which the predominant faction acted, their case is not so clear. So far as the laws of the realm were concerned, every step they took in the premises was manifestly illegal. "The king can do no wrong," is a fundamental maxim of English law; and were this left unheeded, as in fact it is untrue, still there was no power to try him, while king: for the same law guaranties to every man a trial by his peers; and as the king had no peers, he could not be tried, for want of a competent tribunal. But waiving all these objections, which, indeed, are irrelevant in this case—for the established order of things was at an end, and only the original laws of society pre-

vailed—still, according to their own declarations, the dominant faction had no right to proceed as they did. If, as they declared, the people are the only source of power, and their representatives the only depositaries of governmental authority, their claims were invalid, since their constituents had never clothed them with the power they were exercising. The better course for them would be to say that it was a time of general confusion, when a portion of the House of Commons and the officers of the army, finding themselves the masters of the country, adopted measures which to them appeared most likely to settle the disorders of the nation, and to restore the public quiet. It is useless to speculate upon the legality or regularity of proceedings at such times: disorder is generally a necessary accompaniment of revolutions; indeed, the difference between a rebellion and a revolution consists wholly in the difference of their results. In all revolutions a faction first assumes the supreme power, and then, by subduing all opposing factions, it becomes the government *de facto*, which is a much safer and a more intelligible title than one *de jure*. So in this case, a faction began thus to prosecute its purposes, and to adopt means to secure the power it had assumed. All this may seem very irregular to a strict legitimatist, yet few governments can boast of a more legitimate origin.

There are many reasons why, as a matter of policy, the king's life should have been spared; and yet we cannot avoid the conviction that the cause of civil liberty is greatly indebted to the act of putting him to death. Among the reasons of policy against it, a principal one is the prejudice of the nation in favor of monarchy, and a greater still is found in their superstitious reverence for the royal person. In the army this sentiment had been extirpated; but it was still powerfully active among all classes of the people. With them the legal fiction that "the king can do no wrong," was a real sentiment, if not an opinion; and therefore they viewed his execution as a most atrocious crime, calling loudly for vengeance upon its perpetrators. It is but reasonable to suppose that the royal cause was strengthened in the affections of the nation, and that of the revolutionists proportionably weakened, by the execution of the king. Another difficulty was, that the death of Charles I. made the prince of Wales king of England, and transferred the allegiance of all loyal subjects from the father to the son. Instead of a prisoner in the hands of his victorious enemies, the regicides were at once called to oppose a king at liberty and beyond their reach. The faults of the father, which had alienated the affections of the nation from his government, died with him, and the son inherited the

crown without the blemishes that tarnished its lustre while upon the head of his father. These circumstances were evidently unpropitious to the cause of the army, and tended in no small degree to sink their interests among all ranks of persons.

But it should be remembered that Charles had always shown himself the most impracticable of princes; and that it is far from being certain that he could have been used as the mere instrument of other men's wills,—that Cromwell, and Ireton, and Ludlow, and their associates, could have had everything to their wishes, under the royal signet. Charles was too great a man, and of quite too obstinate a temper, to become a mere nominal king for the accommodation of his capital enemies. The intrinsic qualities of his mind were greater obstacles to such a course than his arbitrary maxims of government; and Cromwell, had he attempted it, would have found him an exceedingly perverse automaton. And had the case been otherwise, had the king become the supple tool of the leaders of the army, wherein would either Cromwell or the nation have profited by it? For himself he acquired all that his ambition aspired to, and though he failed to fix it firmly upon his family, he did quite as much toward that purpose as he could have done had Charles I. been the nominal king of England at his death; and for the nation he effected all the good they were susceptible of, and probably much more than he could have done in the name of the king. Had Charles succumbed to his dictation, Cromwell might have been the first lord in the kingdom, so long as his own power was sufficient to control the king; but whoever supposes that he could have transmitted his honors to his son, must be little acquainted with the characters of Charles I. and Richard Cromwell. The British nation was then unfit to appreciate or maintain such a government as the commonwealth-men required, and such as no doubt Cromwell purposed finally to establish. A generation, bred to the forms and sentiments of slaves and despots, needed to give place to one educated for freemen. He that is bred the subject of a despotic government, may hate the despotism that binds him, but he is still a slave at heart; and seldom does a change of circumstances effect a happy change in the man. Could Cromwell have outlived his own generation, and seen another reared under the happy influences of his own wise administration, to all human appearances, he would have left the nation the happiest and best-constituted commonwealth that ever was known. But such favors were not yet prepared for the three kingdoms; England was doomed for another generation to bear the curse of the most perverse and the most imbecile race of kings that ever disgraced the name since

Sardanapalus; and to be scourged by a vicious, purse-proud, intolerant hierarchy, till the Lord only knows when; and Scotland was again to throw herself into the arms of her kirk and her lairds; and Ireland, poor Ireland! had not sufficiently expiated the blood of the Protestants which still cried to heaven for vengeance, though the sword of the destroyer had become drunk with the slaughter of her children. No part of the British empire was so great a loser in the death of the Protector as Ireland; nowhere else were the beneficent influences of his administration so extensively manifested. While Cromwell lived there was no need of the shadow of regal power, which might have been cast by a prisoner-king; and dying as he did, before the happy effects of his measures were matured in the character of the people, no combination of existing circumstances could have saved the nation from relapsing into despotism.

But viewed in relation to the cause of civil liberty generally, the execution of Charles was a measure pregnant with much good. Crowned heads were to be taught that though their hearts may be of stone, their necks are not of iron;—that they are not a privileged order, whose offenses, however aggravated, enjoy a perfect immunity from punishment. It was necessary that this great truth should be legibly written and loudly proclaimed, and this could best be done with the blood of a king, and by the crashing fall of the institutions of royalty. The lesson has not been lost; England especially has profited by it. Though the restoration of the Stuarts brought back their madness, yet they found the spell of the enchanter broken, and kings reduced to "crowned men;" and though they themselves could not be made good kings, the remembrance of the father's death drove the guilty son from his throne and kingdom, and the nation reaped in the revolution the harvest that was sown in the rebellion.

We have not the room to pursue our subject through its subsequent course; nor need we, since what has been already noticed is sufficient to illustrate the nature of our theme. Cromwell's subsequent course was perfectly consistent with his past conduct. He reduced the malcontents of the army with the same fearless promptitude that had distinguished his proceedings against others, and while, by personal authority, he controlled the soldiery, by means of them he held the entire nation in obedience to his will. A provisional government was formed in which his own power seemed inconsiderable, but where, in fact, his influence was predominant, by which a good degree of quiet was restored to England.

The long-deferred purpose of chastising the rebels of Ireland, and

reducing that island to obedience, was now undertaken in good earnest. Such a service was precisely suited to the spirit of Cromwell, who was appointed lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and with the flower of his army departed to that devoted kingdom. The impotent malice of his enemies in and about the parliament is nowhere more fully manifest than in their haste to send him into Ireland, whither he went to certain victory, and whence he was sure to return with increased power to dictate terms to themselves. When he arrived, Dublin was the only place still held by the parliament's forces, and that had long suffered a close siege by the forces of the marquis of Ormond, but had just then been relieved by a brisk sally from the garrison. With his usual celerity Cromwell hastened to attack Drogheda, where a large garrison of the enemy's best troops lay. Disdaining the slow process of a siege, he advanced immediately to the assault, and though stubbornly resisted, took the place and put all within it to the sword. This severity was part and parcel of his system of politic calculations, rather than any ebullition of feeling. He had no pleasure in shedding blood, but could balance an account of lives with all the coolness that a merchant calculates his dollars and cents; and as he viewed the entire Irish nation as a set of outlaws justly meriting the severest punishments, he was at liberty to kill and spare as policy might dictate. He therefore selected this garrison as victims to public justice, that their fate might carry terror to other places, and so the conquest be effected at less expense of lives than could be done by other means. We confess our unfitness to enter into such a calculation, though we cannot see why this should be thought more inhuman than to kill many more in the usual way of carrying on the trade of murder. There are certain artificial rules of war, within which it is accounted honorable to kill, but beyond which killing is murder, which rules have no other authority than fashion; but Cromwell knew nothing of them, and when he fought it was not because war was his trade, but for victory, and peace the fruits of victory. The massacre at Drogheda accomplished its purpose. Little resistance was made to the progress of the conqueror, and in less than six months the whole island was reduced to obedience to the new government.

While Cromwell was employed in these transactions, the state of affairs in England demanded his return. After the death of the late king, the Scots had made a treaty with the prince of Wales, by which he had been received as their king. Charles II. was then with his Scottish subjects projecting an expedition against the English; but it was determined on the other part not to wait for

such a movement, but to carry the war into Scotland. Cromwell led his forces against them, and, by a rapid series of victories, completely ruined the young king's cause in both kingdoms. After the battle of Worcester, Charles wandered, an outcast and an outlaw, without means or friends, compelled, like Nebuchadnezzar, to feed and rest with the beasts of the field. In this forlorn condition he experienced such providential deliverances as prove that the Almighty is with them who know him not,—deliverances which might have taught the vagrant prince a lesson that he never learned; till at last he escaped from his country, a beggared exile, and took refuge in France. Cromwell styled this last victory "a *crowning* mercy," which Southey thinks he may have done using the expression in a sense between a "pun and a prophecy." It is highly probable that at that time his ambitious purposes were to a good degree matured, and that he began to feel that it was the intention of divine Providence to advance him to the throne, as David was made king over Israel. Here was Cromwell's capital blunder, in mistaking success for indubitable evidence of divine favor.

The battle of Worcester, by destroying the last hopes of his enemies, terminated Cromwell's military career; thenceforward he was occupied with endeavors to settle the affairs of the distracted commonwealth. The fragment of the House of Commons were his instruments, kept in their places while it suited him to have them there, and expelled at the point of the bayonet when no longer needed. In the struggle against royal and parliamentary usurpations, the pre-existing institutions of the country had been overthrown, so that now there remained no other organized government than the army, which circumstance placed the supreme power in the hands of the military commander. Cromwell conceived himself to be no more than the instrument of Providence, and interpreted the state things had assumed, as an indication of the will of Heaven that he should use the power given him in restoring peace and good government to his afflicted country. Such were his own professions, and there is no good grounds to doubt that his enthusiasm still had much to do with his ambition; he therefore assumed the direction of the affairs of the nation as a religious duty.

His administration was a continual exercise of arbitrary power, yet its energy, justice, and moderation commended it to all whose prejudices had not blinded their understandings. His provisional governments and councils of his own creation were but the forms in which he chose to put forth his power; nor were his parliaments other than advisory assemblies, whose power was derived from

himself and resumed by him again at his pleasure. All parties acknowledge the unequaled energy of his government, and few have been found to impeach its general equity, though there are some instances of violence, which his best friends attempt to excuse only by pleading the necessity of the times. At no other time has the British nation been so terrible in war, or so powerful in peace, as it was during the Protectorate; for though wars were carried on with the greatest maritime powers of Europe, no foreign foe trod British soil during that period, while Penn, Venables, and Blake spread the terror of the flag of the commonwealth over all seas. Nor was the glory of his own country the only care of the Protector. Though elevated to an equality of rank with the first monarchs of Europe, he was still a Protestant and a Puritan; and he who, when a private gentleman, had attended bishops' courts to see justice rendered to the persecuted, with singular consistency, still cared for those who were suffering from religious tyranny. A brutal persecution having been decreed and partly executed by the duke of Savoy against his Protestant subjects in the valley of Piedmont, Cromwell took vigorous measures to stay the hand of violence, and to relieve the victims of persecution. An ambassador was sent to the duke to express the Protector's wish that the persecution of the Vaudois might cease, and such was his authority even at that distance, that his wish was granted. A voluntary contribution was also made throughout the commonwealth, for the relief of those who had been driven from their homes before the persecution ceased, which amounted to nearly £40,000, of which Cromwell gave two thousand from his private estate.

In the domestic affairs of the government he played the king with admirable grace. His personal appearance had undergone a great change since he first appeared in the Long Parliament, so that he had become imposing in form, dignified in manner, and of a courtly address. His court combined a good degree of state and pomp with the strictest sobriety, temperance, and good order. His council embraced persons of distinguished learning and unimpeachable virtue; and the benches of the courts of justice were filled with individuals chosen for their wisdom and integrity, without respect to parties. The celebrated Matthew Hale, though an invincible royalist, was first invested with the ermine by the Protector, and in Scotland the father of Bishop Burnet was made a judge, on account of his personal fitness for the office, though he declined subscription and allegiance to Cromwell. He was also a great patron of learning, and both by private munificence and public favors greatly assisted in recovering the universities from their

lapsed condition. Learned men found in him a firm and steady friend and supporter, whatever might be their political affections. Toward the royalists, especially the nobility, his course was marked by kindness and a freedom which manifested at once his confidence in his own power, and his wish to conciliate their favor. In religious affairs he generally, though not always, pursued a like liberal course. He was not a bigot himself, and probably would have gladly granted a universal toleration; but such was the active hostility of the Episcopal party, especially the clergy, that he refused them that liberty which was granted to other sects. That most of them deserved all they received of Cromwell is probable; still it was both unjust and impolitic to make their religious profession a civil offense. The only mitigation of our censure of this unjust severity is drawn from a consideration of the spirit of the age and the malignity of the proscribed party.

The effects of Cromwell's administration at home were most happy. Notwithstanding the violence of faction, there were quiet and domestic prosperity throughout England, and a rapid advancement in the character and condition of the masses. In Scotland he ruled with a strong hand, but with equally-favorable effects. Even Clarendon is compelled to acknowledge the practical benefits of his government in that kingdom, and he declares of his lieutenant for the north, that, "as he was feared by the nobility and hated by the clergy, so he was not unloved by the common people, who received more justice and less oppression from him than they had been accustomed to under their own lords." The course pursued toward the Irish was more severe, but equally salutary in its consequences. They were an outlawed race, and probably as well worthy to be treated as such as any since the destruction of the Canaanites. But Cromwell punished to reform, and in this case his chastisements did not fail of their purpose. An enemy confesses, that "under the order which he established, if it had continued for another generation, the island would have been in a better state than any which its authentic history has yet recorded; for there, as in Scotland, a more equable administration was introduced, than that which had been destroyed."

But while the Protector was thus successfully employed in healing the wounds of a bleeding nation, he was not sustained by any of the factions of the times; for royalists, parliamentarians, republicans, and fifth-monarchy-men agreed only to hate and resist the existing government. Most of the people, however, cared less about who should rule, than that they might enjoy the blessings of peace and good government, and therefore acquiesced in the present arrange-

ment, and gave it their tacit support; meanwhile Cromwell's individual influence was more than a match for all the power of his enemies. But what was worst of all, he was ill-supported by his own family. His wife desired above all things an accommodation with the royal family, and his eldest son and one or two of his daughters are supposed to have been of the same sentiments. Ireton, and, after his death, Fleetwood, his sons-in-law, were staunch republicans, and acted with their father-in-law only as constrained by his controlling persuasions. In Henry Cromwell alone was seen his father's image and spirit, and he only gave a hearty and vigorous support to the Protector's administration; and to all human appearances, had the father lived ten years longer and that son been his successor, the three kingdoms would have been saved from the second plague of the Stuarts.

But while occupied with the perplexing affairs of an unsettled government, he was arrested by death in the midst of his plans and purposes. He died on the 3d of September, 1658, when he had held the supreme power less than five years, and before he had given that stability to his affairs that was necessary to insure their perpetuity. His death was far from being happy. In early life and among the shades of domestic privacy he had been made a subject of converting grace, but while asserting and defending his religious privileges he had rapidly risen in political consequence till he had reached the giddy height of absolute dominion. Few experienced Christians can endure preferment without spiritual loss, and Cromwell's case is not an exception to this general rule. His thoughts and prayers upon his death-bed related rather to the kingdom of the British Islands than to the kingdom of heaven, and evidently the presence of the celestial Comforter was no longer with him, as he found himself compelled to evoke the ghosts of departed joys to assure him of his title to eternal life. A short time before his death he asked his chaplain, Dr. Thomas Goodwin,* whether "a man could fall from grace;" and being answered that that was impossible, he replied, "Then I am safe, for I am sure *I was once in a state of grace.*" Such were the wretched opiates administered to his half-awakened conscience,—such the lurid lights that were to guide his departing spirit through the valley and shadow of death!

We will close this long article with a few general remarks upon

* In the little book before us this chaplain is said, in a note by the American editor, to have been *John* Goodwin; who was *not* one of Cromwell's chaplains, and being an Arminian, did not hold the doctrine there declared. This is another evidence of the incapacity of that literary pretender.

the character of its subject. Cromwell's religion was a distinguishing feature of his character, in which he was, doubtless, more sincere than Scriptural. Through all his changes of situation, and among all his cares and perplexities, he punctually attended to all the public and private duties of religion; retiring daily at appointed hours for reading the Scriptures and prayer. He was blameless in his manners and conversation, a strict observer of the sabbath, and so free from covetousness, that with all his opportunities to amass wealth, he left his family but little the richer for his elevation, while he distributed from his private purse forty thousand pounds a year in charities. But with all his piety he was an enthusiast. He sought in direct spiritual communications those directions which are to be obtained only from the written word, and sometimes mistook the creatures of his own fancy for manifestations of the will of God. He esteemed the issue of a battle a declaration of the designs of Providence, and when his last victory invested him with the supreme power, he persuaded himself that he was made the ruler of his country by the arm of the Almighty.

As a soldier and a statesman he deserves a place in the very first rank. He emulated and perhaps equaled the great Gustavus Adolphus, by prosecuting equally-glorious ends, with not inferior success. He possessed the indomitable spirit of Cortes, inflamed in like manner with religious enthusiasm, but without his cruelty. He had the ambition of Napoleon, but it was chastened by a care for the public good. He desired to be great, but not at the expense of the happiness of his fellow-men. Even Algernon Sydney commended him as one who had just notions of public liberty; nor is it more than sheer justice demands, to confess that so far as the state of things would permit, he scrupulously maintained the rights of the commonwealth.

The influences of the civil commotions in which he was a governing spirit have been highly favorable to the cause of civil liberty, and the gratitude of enfranchised nations is due to Oliver Cromwell. Though he did not establish republicanism in England, he gave a death-blow to monarchical tyranny. The restoration of the Stuarts was but the oscillation of the revolutionary sphere, while its progress toward liberty was not permanently retarded; and though the old tyranny was for a time resuscitated, it had received a mortal wound, and finally expired with the abdication of the Second James. For the blessings secured by the revolution, and confirmed by the settlement of the Hanoverian dynasty, the British Islands are indebted to the leaders of the great rebellion, and especially to those who accomplished the death of the faithless Charles.

Art. II.—*The Living Ministry.*

Various and multiplied are the means employed by God to lead men to heaven. The Scriptures, given by inspiration, are a lamp to our feet, and a light to our path. They reveal to us God, in his attributes of holiness and goodness, and direct us to the place of his abode. They give us the true history of our fall, and thus point out the cause of our wretchedness. And to escape the hell which they threaten on account of sin, they teach us, by faith, love, and obedience, to gain the heaven which they promise to all that comply with their requirements.

The great agency which God uses in propagating, explaining, and enforcing the commands and precepts of these Scriptures, *is the living ministry*—men of like passions with ourselves, interested personally in the message which they deliver, and expecting life and salvation only through that Jesus whom they preach. Man, renovated and saved by divine grace, persuades his guilty fellows to "taste that the Lord is gracious." Man is appointed to treat with man; and, duly authorized, he is the

> ——"great plenipotent of heaven,
> And representative of God on earth."

Says St. Paul, "A dispensation of the gospel is committed to me." 1 Cor. ix, 17. "God hath committed to us the word of reconciliation." 2 Cor. v, 19. "God hath in due times manifested his word through preaching, which is committed unto me according to the commandment of God our Saviour." Titus i, 3. "Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." 2 Cor. v, 20.

Such universally was the case from the days of Noah, "a preacher of righteousness," to the establishment of the Aaronic priesthood; and down through the seers and prophets to the commissioning and sending forth of the apostles by Jesus Christ. The ministry of the present glorious dispensation was established by the Head of the church; and it is so regarded as the great, indispensable instrumentality in the salvation of men, that inspiration even asks, "How shall they call on him whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and *how shall they hear without a preacher?*" Rom. x, 14. And it pleases God by the foolishness of *preaching to save them that believe.* Hence

the exclamation, "How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things!"

This ministry *is called of God.* Aaron was divinely designated for the priest's office and work. Samuel heard the voice of God; and Isaiah received his messages from his mouth. And in all the mutations of the Jewish nation under their former dispensation, God communicated with them through his chosen prophets. These were selected from the various walks and callings of life; and all of them bore the insignia and stamp of heaven.

That the apostles of our Lord were called in a very extraordinary manner to the work of the ministry, there can be no doubt. Their commission from Christ is couched in language the most emphatic and authoritative: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned. And lo I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Here is the institution of the Christian ministry; and those who believe the word of God as dispensed by this appointment shall be saved, and those who reject it, do so at their own peril—they shall be damned.

This is substantially the commission of every true minister of Christ: "No man taketh this honor unto himself, but he that is *called of God,* as was Aaron." Heb. v, 4. "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry." 1 Tim. i, 12. "Christ sent me to preach the gospel." 1 Cor. i, 17. "Yea, wo is unto me if I preach not the gospel." 1 Cor. ix, 16. And no one can enter into the service of the sanctuary unless he feel that necessity is laid upon him. He must, in the language of the ordination service for deacons, "be inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon him the office of the ministry in the church of Christ." It is from this consideration that the ambassadors of Christ have authority to treat with men. They are

> ——"*elect by God himself;*
> *Anointed by the Holy Ghost,* and set
> Apart to the great work of saving men;
> Instructed fully in the will divine;
> Supplied with grace in store as need might ask;
> And with the stamp and signature of heaven,
> Truth, mercy, patience, holiness, and love,
> Accredited." *Pollok.*

Divinely appointed, therefore, is the Christian ministry, and tremendous are its results. "We are unto God," says the apostle,

"a sweet savor of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to the one, the savor of death unto death; and to the other, the savor of life unto life." 2 Cor. ii, 15, 16.

There is perhaps little difference of opinion among the various branches of the church orthodox as to the *indispensableness* of the ministry itself. But there is a wide difference respecting the *call* of the ministry. It is made by some to consist in one thing, by others in another. One supposes that if a man has acquired a classical education, and has spent some three years in studying a prescribed course of theology, that he is qualified for the office, and called to the work, of the ministry; and, as his way shall open before him, he may enter upon the discharge of ministerial duties, "assuredly gathering" that God hath called him to preach. Others, the very opposite, suppose that any individual who is *pious*, if he feel a *desire* to save souls, is a fit person to engage in the work of the ministry; and, though without even elementary instruction, and, what is still worse, without much capacity for learning—"a scull that cannot teach and will not learn"—his desire for the salvation of men is regarded by himself, and by his friends, as evidence of a divine call, a "moving of the Holy Ghost," to preach the gospel. And lest, in opposing his wishes, they should seem to fight against God, who, we are reminded, chooses the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world, the things that are mighty, he is recommended as a fit person to preach, and forthwith he becomes a minister of the sanctuary. The results, as too frequently seen, are: by one *no* Christ is preached, and by the other he is *so* preached as to be wounded in the house of his friends. The one may deal in "words, words, words," while the other, though on a spiritual embassy, and claiming to be accredited by the court of heaven, gives painful evidence that he is only "*nature's* journeyman." Multiplied are the instances in which the pulpit has been degraded by an irreligious worldly wisdom, and a pious imbecility.

However extensively these views may be held, or to whatever extent they may have induced practice, we can but regard them both as erroneous. And we may ask of those who accept of insufficient evidence of a divine call to the work of the ministry, and who send when God has not sent, "By what authority do ye these things? or who gave you this authority?" Men run into error by taking, or trying to take, the work of God into their own hands. Christ is the Head of his church. He knows, as the great Bishop of souls, what instrumentality his work requires. And whom he calls for the performance of this work, he will, as he ever has done,

so qualify that it shall be manifest to the church that his call *is of God.*

To aid us in arriving at a correct conclusion in this matter, so important to the ministry, and important also to the well-being and prosperity of the church, there are a number of things to be considered. We think we may safely lay down this proposition, viz. *Those whom God calls to be his ministers are men of sound mind, discerning judgment, good colloquial powers, and ardent piety.* To substantiate this, we shall have respect to the history of the past, to the word of God, and to the propriety and fitness of things.

Whom did our Lord call to be his apostles and first preachers? Men of refined classical education, and who had acquired a literary reputation among the philosophers and wise men of their age? No; for then had the gospel seemed to stand in the wisdom of men, and not in the power of God. But he chose men who, from their connection with him, were deeply imbued with his Spirit, of strong minds, of physical strength, and of ready utterance. What propriety and fitness do we discover here! The arduous duties of these preachers, their travels, their privations, their ministrations in the open air, all made physical strength necessary. They were of strong, acquiring minds, that they might be able to grasp the powerful truths of the gospel, and from their constantly-increasing fund of religious knowledge, bring forth for the edification of their hearers "things new and old;" of good colloquial powers, that they might be able to present, in a forcible and persuasive manner, these blessed and sublime truths, and, by their winning, subduing eloquence, "compel" their fellow-men to come to God. And their history shows that all these powers were improved for the good of the rising church, and the glory of God.

If we look at the history of the Reformation, we see the same class of men, from the same walks of life, the actors on the stage—men of great strength and capacity of mind.* How eminently do these inhere in the apostle of the Reformation, in Melancthon, in Zuingle, in Calvin; and also in the noble band raised up by God to be their coadjutors in that fearful struggle! They showed them-

* "It is the method of God's providence to effect great results by inconsiderable means. This law, which pervades the kingdom of nature, is discerned also in the history of mankind. God chose the reformers of the church from the same condition and worldly circumstances from whence he had before taken the apostles. He chose them from the humble class, which, though not the lowest, can hardly be said to belong to the middle ranks. Everything was thus to make manifest to the world that the work was not of man, but of God."—*D'Aubigne's Hist. of Ref.*, vol. i, p. 118.

selves workmen that needed not to be ashamed; and, notwithstanding the lapse of three centuries, and the transcendentalism of the present age, these men are still the admiration of the Protestant world.

In the instance of our early preachers, both in England and America, we see the same policy pursued by God. The pioneers of Wesleyan and American Methodism stand out as a distinct and noble class of men. Their hearts were thoroughly imbued with the Spirit of their divine Master; and having the mind to acquire knowledge, and the faculty to teach, they were champions of the cross. The monument of their zeal is with us. We trust also that the Spirit by which they carried on their enterprise, and accomplished their efforts, is with their sons. So let it be!

What teaches the word of inspiration on this subject? Says St. Paul to Timothy and Titus, his own sons in the faith, "The servant of God must be *apt* to *teach*, so that with sound doctrine he may be able both to exhort and *convince* the gainsayers. God has not given us the spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of a *sound mind*." We remark upon this plain declaration of the apostle, that whatever may be the *desire* of an individual, however pious, or however classical in his attainments, nay, though he may have been "recommended," and even a bishop's hands placed upon his head, if he has not in some good degree aptness to teach and a sound mind, we have reason to fear that he has mistaken his call. He had better tarry longer at Jerusalem.

In those whom God selects as his ministers or ambassadors this sound mind should be looked for in connection with *deep and ardent piety:* for God will no more send a man to convert sinners who is destitute of piety, than he will commission one in idiocy to teach them the doctrines of his word. They are inseparably connected in God's ministers;* and the authorities of the church may not lay hands suddenly on any man who does not give satisfactory evidence of the possession of both.

* The following extract from the Discipline is directly to the point:—

"Quest. How shall we try those who profess to be moved by the Holy Ghost to preach?

"Ans. 1. Let the following questions be asked, viz. Do they know God as a *pardoning* God? Have they the *love of God abiding* in them? Do they desire nothing but God? And are they *holy* in all manner of conversation?

"2. Have they *gifts* for the work? Have they a *clear, sound understanding*, a *right judgment in the things of God*, a *just conception of salvation by faith*? And has God given them any degree of utterance? Do they speak *justly, readily, clearly*?"

Is not this in accordance with propriety and fitness? Can one teach successfully without capabilities for his vocation? Can the minister of Christ wisely distribute to the members of his flock without judgment? Can he feed them with that bread which cometh down from heaven when he has never eaten thereof himself? Can he speak words of comfort to his hearers when he has not experienced the consolation of religion? No; he might speak, but God would not be in the word. For the advancement of religion, the pulpit might as well be without Paul, as Paul destitute of evangelical piety.

Under the Jewish dispensation none were permitted to "approach to offer the bread of their God" who had any imperfection of person. Vide precept, Lev. xxi, 17-21.* And can we suppose, under the present dispensation, that imperfection of mind, imbecility of intellect, will oppose no bar to the ministry? Certainly not. If there were propriety and fitness in one, surely there must be in the other. The services of the Jewish temple were, as prescribed, a regular system of rites and ceremonies. Not so with the services in the Christian sanctuary. They are purely *intellectual* and *spiritual*. The priests and Levites had a multitude of offices to perform, which are done away in Christ. Punctilious exactness in the externals of religion was inculcated. The preaching of Christ and his apostles was directly to the heart and the understanding. The business of the Christian minister is to *disciple* men—to *teach* and *train*. This cannot be done without that discerning judgment, that soundness of mind, which we contend ought to be looked for in those who officiate at the altar.

This view of the subject is clearly set forth and maintained by the standard writers of our church. "Intellectual fitness is found in all those whom God selects as his instruments, and is the BASIS of this special gift which we are taught in the text to expect from the grace of Christ."—*Watson: Sermon on the Qualification for the Ministry.*

"Of a sound mind, *σωφρονισμου*, of self-possession and government, according to some. But a sound mind implies much more: it means a *clear understanding*, a *sound judgment*, a *rectified will*, holy passions, heavenly tempers; in a word, the whole soul *harmonized* in all its *powers* and *faculties;* and completely regulated and influenced so as to think, speak, and act aright in all things."—*Dr. A. Clarke: Note on 2 Tim.* i, 7.

* On this subject the reader's attention is invited to the notes of Dr. *A.* Clarke, *in loc.*

"To begin with those gifts which are from nature. Ought not a minister to have, first, a *good understanding*, a *clear apprehension*, a *sound judgment*, and a *capacity* of reasoning with some closeness? Is not this necessary in a high degree for the work of the ministry? Otherwise, how will he be able to understand the various states of those under his care; or to steer them, through a thousand difficulties and dangers, to the haven where they would be? Is not this necessary, with respect to the numerous enemies whom he has to encounter? Can a fool cope with all the men that know not God, and with all the spirits of darkness? Nay; he will neither be aware of the devices of Satan, nor the craftiness of his children."—*Wesley: Address to the Clergy.*

We close this part of our subject with an extract from that admirable work of the vicar of Madeley, the Portrait of St. Paul: "As it is a matter of the utmost importance to understand by what tokens this ordinary vocation to the holy ministry may be discovered, the following reflections upon so interesting a subject may not be altogether superfluous:—

"If a young man of virtuous manners is deeply penetrated with this humiliating truth, 'All have sinned and come short of the glory of God;' if, further, he is effectually convinced of this consolatory truth, 'God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life;' if his natural talents have been strengthened by a liberal education; if the pleasure of doing good is sweeter to him than all the pleasures of sense; if the hope of converting sinners from the error of their way occupies his mind more agreeably than the idea of acquiring all the advantages of fortune; if the honor of publishing the gospel is superior in his eyes to the honor of becoming the ambassador of an earthly prince; in short, if, by a desire which springs from the fear of God, the love of Christ, and the concern he takes in the salvation of his neighbor, he is led to consecrate himself to the holy ministry; if, in the order of Providence, outward circumstances concur with his own designs; and if he solicits the grace and assistance of God with greater eagerness than he seeks the outward vocation from his superiors in the church by the imposition of hands, he may then satisfy himself, that the great High Priest of the Christian profession has set him apart for the high office to which he aspires."

Having made these observations on the call of the ministry, we proceed to remark upon the obligations which that call imposes.

It is the duty of every man called to the work of the ministry to improve the "sound mind" which that call implies. "Study to

show thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." 2 Tim. ii, 15. There is now no room for hesitancy. Called of God, "as was Aaron," the minister of the sanctuary is to "search the Scriptures." He is, in the language of Mr. Wesley, *homo unius libri*, a man of one book—the Bible. Its languages and history, its evidences and doctrines, its institutions and morals, its poetry and style, are all to be studied and understood by him. It is his text-book from first to last. All that is necessary, both for faith and practice, is contained therein; and he should aim to be, like the eloquent Apollos, "mighty in the Scriptures."

"The minister would be justly condemned, and especially in the present day, who neglects the acquisition of knowledge; who does not, as St. Paul himself enjoins, 'give attendance to reading;' who contents himself with half-conceived and ill-arranged generalities; who has no intellectual stores from which to make that skillful distribution, and give that varied illustration of his subjects, which the different characters, states, and tastes of men require; who, though professedly a teacher of religion, neither defends it by well-chosen arguments, nor holds in his mind a just arrangement of its doctrines; and who, while in every public service, places himself before the people as an expounder of God's word, seems not aware of the diligent application to private study which that important office demands, nor avails himself of the labors of those eminent men who have devoted their learning and their spiritual discernment to elucidate the Holy Scriptures."—*Watson.*

On nothing have the views of Mr. Wesley been more perverted, both by friends and foes, than on the subject of education in the ministry. "His getting learning, good, but saving souls, better," has been a very fruitful theme. Those who but partially understand his views, and who cannot appreciate his circumstances, often speak of his employing unlearned men for his assistants, as though it were a matter of choice. Some very roundly affirm that he wished them to visit, and preach, and save souls without reference at all to their own intellectual culture. But, come this from where it may, we repel it with indignance. It is a *slander* upon the name of that learned, apostolic man. We venture to say that no man, occupying such a place, and sustaining such a relation to the church, over a branch of which God had made him overseer, ever marked out a higher standard, *morally* and *intellectually*, for ministers of Christ than he did. Mr. Wesley chose to have the ministry educated, and well educated. It could not be otherwise. He was a learned man himself, and the patron of learning. His

own productions make a library.* His helpers were enjoined to spend five hours a day in reading. And yet, say some, and some of them are called by his name, he chose ignorance in the ministry! It is too palpably absurd to be dwelt upon for a moment!

Hear him, in his Address to the Clergy: "Can he [the minister] take one step aright without first a competent share of knowledge? A knowledge, first, of his own office; of the high trust in which he stands; the important work to which he is called? Is there any hope that a man should discharge his office well, if he knows not what it is? that he should acquit himself faithfully of a trust, the very nature whereof he does not understand? Nay, if he knows not the work God has given him to do, he cannot finish it.

"No less necessary is a knowledge of the Scriptures, which teach us how to teach others; yea, a knowledge of all the Scriptures; seeing scripture interprets scripture; one part fixing the sense of another. So that, whether it be true or not that every good textuary is a good divine, it is certain none can be a good divine who is not a good textuary. None else can be mighty in the Scriptures; able both to instruct and to stop the mouths of gainsayers.

"In order to do this accurately, ought he not to know the literal meaning of every word, verse, and chapter; without which there can be no firm foundation on which the spiritual meaning can be built? Should he not likewise be able to deduce the proper corollaries, speculative and practical, from each text; to solve the difficulties which arise, and answer the objections which are or may be raised against it; and to make a suitable application of all to the consciences of his hearers?

"But can he do this in the most effectual manner without a knowledge of the original tongues? Without this will he not frequently be at a stand, even as to texts which regard practice only? But he will be under still greater difficulties, with respect to controverted scriptures. He will be ill able to rescue these out of the hands of any man of learning that would pervert them; for wherever an appeal is made to the original, his mouth is stopped at once.

"Is not a knowledge of profane history, likewise, of ancient customs, of chronology and geography, though not absolutely neces-

* "To some persons it may perhaps appear incredible, but it is, nevertheless, a fact, that independently of his own original works, which occupy fourteen large octavo volumes, Mr. John Wesley abridged, revised, and printed no fewer than *one hundred and seventeen* distinct publications, reckoning his Christian Library, his histories, and philosophy, as only one each."—*Dr. Jackson's Centenary of Wesleyan Methodism.*

sary, yet highly expedient, for him that would thoroughly understand the Scriptures; since the want even of this knowledge is but poorly supplied by reading the comments of other men?

"Some knowledge of the sciences, also, is, to say the least, equally expedient. Nay, may we not say, that the knowledge of one, (whether art or science,) although now quite unfashionable, is even necessary next, and in order to, the knowledge of the Scripture itself? I mean logic. For what is this, if rightly understood, but the art of good sense? of approaching things clearly, judging truly, and reasoning conclusively? What is it, viewed in another light, but the art of learning and teaching, whether by convincing or persuading? What is there, then, in the whole compass of science to be desired in comparison of it?

"Should not a minister be acquainted too with at least the general grounds of natural philosophy? Is not this a great help to the accurate understanding of several passages of Scripture? Assisted by this, he may himself comprehend, and, on proper occasions, explain to others, how the invisible things of God are seen from the creation of the world; how the 'heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork;' till they cry out, 'O Lord, how manifold are thy works? in wisdom hast thou made them all.'

"But how far can he go in this without some knowledge of geometry? which is likewise useful, not barely on this account, but to give clearness of apprehension, and a habit of thinking closely and connectedly."

We have given this long extract from Mr. Wesley as pertinent to the subject under consideration, and as an expression of his sentiments on a question vitally important to the church. It cannot be regarded, we think, as a plea for, or connivance at, ignorance in the ministry.

A theological training for the ministry is absolutely necessary—we do not say whether in or out of school. It does not matter with us where this knowledge is obtained, only so that it be acquired. It is a question, however, whether this training can be had *in the work*, as has formerly been the case. This was more than doubted, we think, by the lamented Dr. Fisk. It is an inquiry in the minds of many, whether it is not the duty of the church to take the incipient steps for the establishment and endowment of an institution where those called of God, and accepted by the church to be her ministers, may be more fully instructed for the work in which they are to engage. However this may be, it is the duty of the minister to be so instructed; and if he has not all the helps

that are desirable, and even necessary, he must use with more diligence such as he has. And let him not be discouraged by anything short of an impossibility. His call of God, if he is faithful to that call, is a pledge that he shall succeed. Christ is with him; and even this is among the "all things" which he "can do through Christ strengthening him."

It will be perceived that we do not urge this training in order to *make* ministers; but for those who are called of God to be ministers—who have already heard his voice, and, like the prophet, have his word in their hearts as a burning fire shut up in their bones—on whom necessity is laid—and who groan out, "Wo is unto me if I preach not the gospel!" But to educate theologically for the ministry, as a profession, is worse than vain. God will provide for himself; and the church may only train and use such as he shall furnish.

As Christ has given no express instructions to the church on this subject, we may follow his example. He selected his disciples, and then educated them for the work in which he designed them to engage. They were with him three years, going out and in before him; during which period they learned his doctrine and manner of life, and so far from being illiterate, as is often said, they were endowed by Heaven, and *thoroughly furnished* unto every good word and work. "It is worthy of notice, that those who were Christ's *apostles* were first his *disciples;* to intimate, that men must be first *taught* of God, before they are *sent* of God. Jesus Christ never made an *apostle* of any man who was not first his *scholar* or *disciple*."—*Dr. A. Clarke.*

We have said that a minister ought to study and understand the languages * of the Bible. This is set forth in a strong and clear light, in the foregoing extract from Mr. Wesley, as necessary. But what avails this necessity unless it can be met? And how can such as have not had the advantages of a classical education master the

* "I suppose the most necessary study of all is the acquiring an intimate acquaintance with both Testaments in their original languages, never losing sight of the Septuagint, which is the best interpreter of the Hebrew words, as well as of the Hellenistic dialect, which pervades the New Testament. This, I presume, should form part, and a considerable one, of the daily study of a young divine."—*Robert Hall.*

No one, however, will be so vain as to study the Hebrew and Greek without first acquiring a knowledge of the vernacular. He cannot understand them, and give the sense, unless he has a good knowledge of his own language. And for a minister to smatter in the former, and *murder* the latter, is *ridiculous*. See in this work for 1841, pp. 290-297.

Greek? and those who have not had the advantages of a theological seminary the Hebrew? Not so easily, we grant. And yet it can be done; and the importance of the knowledge, with the assurance that it can be acquired, ought to be sufficient to stimulate every *Methodist* preacher to its attainment. That it can be done on stations and circuits, hundreds of instances testify. And Mr. Wesley declares that the greatest master of Biblical knowledge he ever knew was Thomas Walsh, an *itinerant* preacher.

One would suppose that the pleasure derived from a knowledge of these languages would secure their careful study. What emotions will it excite to read the history of creation in the language of Moses—to ponder over the commandments as written by the finger of God—to sing the songs of David as penned by the sweet Psalmist of Israel—to catch the evangelical strains as they fall from Isaiah's hallowed lips—to *feel* the heart-rending lamentations as they are upheaved from Jeremiah's anxious heart, and to read the discourses of Him who "spake as never man spake," in the language in which they were pronounced! O it is all but inspiration reinspired!

Without a knowledge of the languages of the Bible, we are not so well prepared to understand and appreciate the notes of learned men on the text. The creed or fancy of commentators may lead them to gloss with error; and as all men are fallible, we should rather hear directly from his own mouth "what God the Lord will say." The place for the minister to *hear* this is the study; the place to *announce* it, the pulpit; and the manner of doing it is given by the prophet Nehemiah: "So they read in the book in the law of God distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused the people to understand the reading." They *distinctly read*, and *correctly translated*, and *powerfully enforced* the doctrines of God's word. There was necessity for this course; and the same necessity still exists, and ever must exist. "The sacred writings as they came from God are shut up in languages no longer vernacular."

What an argument is drawn from the above for the unremitting study of the Bible! And, taken in connection with the awful Apocalyptic warning, what fearfully-tremendous responsibility rests upon the minister of God's holy word! "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book." How shall he stand acquitted who, through negligence and inattention to study, has failed

to give his hearers the "*sense*" of God's word? who has added to, or taken from, the divine message?

It is supposed by some that our itinerancy is unfavorable to study. This, however, is not so, but right the reverse. And on the present arrangement of stations and circuits, our preachers may study if they will. Their moving, pastoral visiting, and short rides to their preaching appointments, are little more than sufficient to save them from the *ennui* of close mental application; certainly not more than are necessary for physical health and comfort. Their frequent visitations to the poor, sick, and dying, all tend to elevate the affections, expand the soul, and refine the moral feelings. We believe there is no class of men on earth who enjoy, in their calling, such advantages for acquiring various and important knowledge as the itinerant Methodist preachers. The Methodist preacher is not in the early part of his ministry settled down in some retired parish, where, scarcely ever passing its bourn, he spends his life: but the world is his parish. In the course of his itinerancy he ministers to thousands. He mingles with all classes of society, and studies men and things from actual observation. And a mere *dolt* must he be, who, with this field before him, and the Bible and the great English masters in his hand, does not become an adept in the science of human nature. And knowing the wants of men he will be greatly stimulated to meet them.

Paramount to all is the consideration that it is the *duty* of the minister to be a scribe well instructed in the kingdom of God. He should never dream of merely "getting along," of trusting to sketch books, skeletons, and the labors of others. He should prepare for the sanctuary the pure beaten oil himself. And he that does not do this loses confidence in himself, and forfeits, and that justly too, the respect and esteem of others. And besides, he is guilty of a theft denounced by God. When a minister enters the pulpit with the preparations of others for his people, we are reminded, not of David in the armor of Saul, but of the ass in the skin of the lion. The *roaring* out of the lion's *skin* will, after all, only be the braying from the *ass's throat!*

God's ministers must be "*apt to teach.*" They need, therefore, to learn the art of speaking well; call it eloquence, or power, or what you please. Their office is to *persuade* men. And both the matter and manner should be such as to accomplish this object. To do this the minister must *understand* the subject of his discourse. After all the definitions of eloquence, and the prescribed rules of oratory, nothing will aid the speaker like a thorough knowledge of the subject on which he dwells. If the subject be im-

portant, and the speaker understands himself, and has a thorough knowledge of his theme, he can hardly fail to be eloquent. Without this there may be a display of words and sounds, but there will be little or no power. "He who speaks of what he does not understand, speaks with no confidence in his own utterances, or with an unwarranted confidence; and in either case his discourse will want the characteristics of true power."—*Skinner's Aids to Preaching.*

The preacher has a fine opportunity for the exhibition of eloquence or power in speaking. His commission is from God. His message is to guilty men hastening to the great tribunal. His object is to persuade them to be reconciled to God. His arguments are drawn from the love of God, the death of Christ, the joys of heaven, and the unending miseries of hell. He dwells upon

"Life, death, bliss, and woe."

And when he considers that himself and hearers are standing on the verge of the tomb, that eternal realities are suspended on life's feeble string, that the great day of judgment will be awful beyond conception, he must be eloquent. But his will not be the eloquence of the statesman, not the eloquence of the actor, but the eloquence of a *minister of God!*

The ministers of Christ need to cultivate personal piety. Our church has hitherto looked well to this matter. Those who go out and in before the people as pastors and guides must be holy. From present indications we may yet have to contend with as much energy and zeal for experimental religion as did the fathers. To do this we shall need to be men of faith and prayer. Yes, we shall need to be filled with the Holy Ghost, and have an unction from above. "Three things,"* says Luther, "constitute the theologian; *meditation, prayer, and trial:* and three things are to be done by the minister of the word; to *unfold the Scriptures, to pray with earnestness,* and *always* to *remain* a *learner!* They are the best preachers to the common people who teach in a child-like, common, popular, and very simple manner."

It is very difficult to define or prescribe a given course of study for the minister. Something may be done in his earlier years in

* "Tria faciunt theologum, dixit: *meditatio, oratio, tentatio:* et tria verbi ministro facienda: *evolvere Biblia; orare seriò; et semper discipulum manere.* Optimi ad vulgus hi sunt concionatores: qui pueriliter, trivialiter, populariter, et simplicissimè docent."—*Melchior Adam's Life of the German Reformer, as quoted by Townley, Illustrations of Biblical Literature,* vol. ii, p. 7, note.

this way to fix the mind definitely on an object and concentrate its powers. But being set apart, he should be determined to know all that is to be known. Knowledge will never come amiss. Often it will seem to come up spontaneously to his relief in the study, and to his assistance in the pulpit. While much is required of the Christian minister, much is given. The youthful herald of the cross should be encouraged. God is the author of wisdom. If any man, and especially the minister, lack wisdom, let him ask of God. He giveth liberally. God will open his understanding, and cause him to see wondrous things out of his law. We can hardly conceive the incalculable benefits that will be derived from this source. God is light; and in communion with him light will be reflected into our own soul.

"What may greatly encourage those who give themselves up to the work, with regard to all these endowments, many of which cannot be attained without considerable labor, is this: they are assured of being assisted in all their labor by Him who teacheth man knowledge. And who teacheth like him? Who, like him, giveth wisdom to the simple? How easy is it for him, (if we desire it, and believe that he is both able and willing to do this,) by the powerful, though secret, influences of his Spirit, to open and enlarge our understanding; to strengthen all our faculties; to bring to our remembrance whatsoever things are needful, and to fix and sharpen our attention to them; so that we may profit above all who depend wholly on themselves, in whatever may qualify us for our Master's work!"—*Address to the Clergy.*

My younger brethren in the ministry, to whom only I presume to write, let us take courage. We have a great work to do, but He who commissioned us *will be with us.* Our fathers are rapidly passing off the stage. Important trusts are confided to us. The gospel is to be preached in all its purity and power. The missionary and educational interests of the church we must care for. What qualifications do we need for our vast and important work! It is not enough that we be *willing* to go into any part of the work, but, as God's ministers, we should be *qualified* for any part of it. "Who is sufficient for these things?" We have illustrious examples before us. Let us as sons be worthy of our sires. And not only shall the descending mantle of our ascending fathers fall upon us, but their upward flight will be more joyous, knowing that they have committed the gospel to able and faithful men.

We give the following recapitulation:—

I. The great instrumentality employed by God in calling men to repentance *is the living ministry.*

II. Those who compose this ministry *are called of God;* are "*moved*" to their office and work "*by the Holy Ghost.*"

III. Those whom God calls to be his ministers are men of *sound minds, discerning judgment, ready utterance, and ardent piety.*

IV. It is the *duty* of those thus called to be ministers of Christ to cultivate their minds by *careful* and *diligent study*—by the acquisition of *all knowledge* that will improve the *heart* and the *understanding.*

V. That, though much is required of the ministers of the gospel, and the labor which they are to perform is great, yet *much is given.* If faithful, their *call* to the ministry is a pledge that they shall succeed. Christ is with them; and God, who giveth liberally, *is the author of wisdom.*

A very important question is proposed in connection with this subject. When do the obligations of Christian ministers, as such, cease? We have supposed from the language of their commission, and from the nature and fitness of things, they could cease only with life. We cannot pretend to say how these obligations may be varied by the providence of God. For

> "There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough hew them how we will."

And ministers may, by sickness or casualty, be so disabled as to unfit them for the work of the sanctuary. In all such cases God does with his servants as he sees fit; and they must be resigned to his will.

But how persons called of God to enter into the service of the church, can in a few years leave that service and engage in secular callings, or enter the arena of political strife and aspire to offices of trust and emolument, we do not understand. Something undoubtedly is wrong. We fear that love of the world has supplanted the love of souls. Have not such forgotten their calling? If they still felt, wo is unto us if we preach not the gospel, would they do so? The apostles continued their work until death or martyrdom closed their career. It may be said of them emphatically,

> "*They ceased at once to work and live.*"

"No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." And may not the blood of souls be found in the skirts of those who desert the walls of Zion? Every minister should tremble at the thought of retiring from the work to which God has called him, without the divine sanction. This course has brought no little discredit upon the church.

Ministers leaving the pulpit for the forum, the sanctuary for the exchange, the cure of souls for some worldly avocation, are a spectacle to angels. Not a few such, with the loss of their spirituality, have lost also the respect and confidence of the church. Their last days have been imbittered, and their sun has set behind a cloud!

How must it be, also, with such ministers when they present themselves for final judgment at the bar of God? Here are we, Lord, and—what? The souls which thou hast given us, when these souls have been neglected for honor, wealth, or ease? when active years have been taken from the church and given to the world? Will God say to such, "Well done, good and faithful servants, ye have been faithful over a few things, I will make you rulers over many things: enter ye into the joy of your Lord?" We confess we fear. God save us from such a critical position!

God counted me faithful, says the apostle, putting me into the ministry. And next to the joy of heaven must be the joy of the man of God, who, *worn out* with labor, has a consciousness of unremitting fidelity to his Master; who, having stood long first and foremost in the ranks, doing battle with sin and Satan, is honorably scarred in the service of the church. The end of such a one is more than peaceful; *it is glorious! He* has fought a good fight, *he* has kept the faith, *he* has finished his course, *he* is now *ready* to be offered up, and there is laid up for *him* a crown of glory. Waiting for his discharge, a moment in ecstasy, he sings,—

> "Happy, if with my *latest breath*
> I may but *gasp* His name;
> Preach him to all, and cry in *death*,
> *Behold! Behold the Lamb!*"

He dies; and angels and men exclaim, "*Servant of God, well done!*" H.

Art. III.—*On the Sign of the Prophet Jonah.*

[*Translated from the German of M. Baumgarten, in Rudelbach und Guerike's Zeitschrift für die gesämmte Theologie.*]

The following is a translation from the German of an article published in Rudelbach and Guerike's Zeitschrift, &c., by M. Baumgarten. The author is a young theologian of great promise, and belongs to the rapidly-increasing Evangelical party in Germany. He is now publishing a Commentary on the Old Testament, which, though it may favor too much the allegorical method of interpretation, yet exhibits a thorough knowledge and regard for the spirit and sanctity of the Word of God, and, in this respect, is far superior to the writings of many who profess to belong to the Evangelical party:—

From the words of our Saviour, (Matt. xii, 39–41; xvi, 4; Luke xi, 29, 30, 32,) there can be no doubt but that there is something typical in the history of the prophet Jonah. In a type we first think of an outward sign, and properly, as is shown by the signification of the word. But in endeavoring to understand the types of the Scriptures, we are too apt to forget that we must look at more than the outward sign. For the outward sign, when it is rightly understood, has invariably an inner spiritual sense corresponding to it, and this universal law must be the more readily acknowledged to prevail in the Scriptures, since here the Spirit rules throughout. In the Scriptures, then, it is impossible that there can be any outward sign without something inner and spiritual corresponding to it; indeed, even where the idea of the outward sign first presents itself to us, we must remember that there is something inner which forms the ground of the outward, the substance of the external appearance. Accordingly, that we may understand a type as a whole, and in all its separate points, we must first of all give our attention to the thought which lies at the foundation, to the inner nature of that which appears as a type. Israel in Egypt and in the wilderness appears as a type of Jesus, first, since there is a parallelism in the outer or outward history of Jesus: but this outer parallelism could not be typical, if Israel had not an inner substantial connection with Jesus. Israel is the Son of Jehovah, and, therefore, begotten of the Holy Ghost, as Jesus is the Son of God. This inner relation between the two is that which has impressed itself in the parallelism of the outer history of both. When David, betrayed by Ahithophel, passes over the

brook Kidron, weeping and with his face covered, when he goes up the Mount of Olives, and there prays, he is a type of Jesus, who under similar circumstances went the same way. But this type has its signification only when we recognize the connection, the unity, of David and Jesus, of the Old Testament משיח and of the New Testament Χριστός. The question may be asked, Why, throughout the Biblical history, the inner parallels present themselves so multifariously outwardly as such, or why the persons or relations inwardly corresponding are exhibited in types? The reason is found in the divine economy of events, which in the world form the basis of salvation. There is, indeed, a connection between outer and inner, between appearance and substance; but just as well there must be conceded a contrast between the two, which is gradually removed as the development proceeds to its completion. The history of the plan of redemption differs in this from the common and natural province, that it now and then removes this contrast, while it places its completion in time.

Therefore, if we wish to understand the sign of the prophet Jonah, we must first of all seek to know his importance and his character from his history. Besides the book named after our prophet, we have only one notice of him in the Scriptures. But this is not unimportant. It is said that the restoration of the ancient borders, from Hamath to the Dead Sea, which was effected by Jeroboam the son of Joash, was promised by Jonah the son of Amittai, the servant of God. 2 Kings xiv, 25. Although we are not definitely informed as to the time of this prophecy, yet it can be fixed with probability. Hazael, the Syrian, was promised to Elijah as the avenger of the sins of Ahab. 1 Kings xix, 15; 2 Kings viii, 12. Hazael smote Joram the son of Ahab, (2 Kings viii, 28,) and he must be the one who moved forward the borders of Israel and Syria, for Benhadad must have restored them to Ahab, (1 Kings xx, 24,) since the chief blow was to fall, not on Ahab, but his son. 1 Kings xxi, 29. The anointing of Jehu, who was also promised to Elijah as an avenger, followed immediately the defeat of Joram. The anointing of Jehu was a sign of grace to Israel; for Jehu was given for a king to Israel as to the people of Jehovah, and after he had executed his first commission a special promise is given him. 2 Kings x, 30. Here also the promise of Jonah, that the borders changed by Hazael shall be restored, finds its natural occasion and place. And viewed in this light, the opinion of the Jews, that the young prophet charged by Elisha with the anointing of Jehu, was no other than Jonah, is not unlikely, though it goes too far in its definiteness. But if we wish

to separate the certain from the uncertain in any case, this much is sure, that Jonah had a message of mercy to carry to Israel, and that this was among the last of the gracious visitations of Israel in the time of the house of Jehu. For under Jeroboam appeared Hosea and Amos, who threatened speedy destruction to Israel. Jeroboam's son, Zechariah, the last branch of the house of Jehu, was killed, after a reign of six months, and then Israel, with rapid steps, rushed on to ruin.

This Jonah, the son of Amittai, who brought the last message of mercy to Israel, is he whose remaining history is given us in a separate book, which has been admitted among the prophetic writings. Before we proceed further, it is proper to notice that a book, which from beginning to end is nothing but history, is found in the collection of prophetic discourses: for that Jonah was a prophet, is not a sufficient reason for placing his history there in the canon. Elijah and Elisha also were prophets, but their history is interwoven in the books of the kings of Israel. The position of the book of Jonah can be accounted for only on the supposition that the history contained in it is related, not for its own sake, but because it has a prophetic sense. Our business, then, is to seek out this sense. And it is not difficult to find it; for the history of Jonah has a very clear middle point, around which everything else moves. Jonah was commissioned to go to the great city of Nineveh to make known the word of Jehovah. Accordingly, the book of Jonah begins and ends with the declaration of Jehovah, that he had compassion on Nineveh, that great city, in which there lived more than one hundred and twenty thousand human beings who did not know the difference between right and left, and besides much cattle. Therefore Jehovah has regard to Nineveh; this is the beginning, this is the end of the history, and this must, without doubt, be the main sense of the book. It may be urged as an objection, that Jonah, from the first, was commissioned only to threaten Nineveh with the judgments of Jehovah. So it certainly appears, since Jehovah grounds the commission with the words, "For their wickedness has come up before my face;" and, in like manner, in the preaching of Jonah, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh will be destroyed," appears to contain nothing else than a declaration of punishment. But by careful examination we see that it was not the purpose of Jehovah to destroy Nineveh, but much more to save it. Nineveh is mentioned as the great city, and in this designation there is evidently to be found the cause for the divine commission. This is rendered still more clear by Jonah iii, 3, where in the same connection it is said, that Nine-

veh was a great city before God. It has been well said, In great cities are great sins; and so in this designation is wont to be found a reference to the divine primitive justice. But this explanation, of itself quite too forced, is decidedly rejected by the conclusion of the book. Here, for instance, the greatness of Nineveh is very emphatically brought forward, and introduced by Jehovah as the ground of his compassion. Now that this explanation is not applicable in the two foregoing passages, cannot be denied with reason. But there is yet another reason why we suppose that the back-ground of the preaching of repentance was grace and compassion. Jonah says he fled to Tarshish, because he knew that Jehovah was compassionate, slow to anger, and of great grace, and would repent the evil, (Jonah iii, 2,) and he sees a confirmation of this thought in the reconciliation that has just now taken place. It was because Jonah believed that Jehovah, notwithstanding his threatenings, would of his compassion spare Nineveh, that the commission was too heavy for him, and accordingly he endeavored to escape it. But how could Jonah come to this opinion, if, in his commission, nothing was revealed but divine wrath. Was it so easy a matter for him, who saw the judgments of Jehovah bursting forth on Israel and Judah, to suppose that Jehovah, after he had threatened the heathen, would nevertheless be gracious to them? Was it natural to believe that Jehovah would exhibit the innermost, most secret portion of his nature, that which he revealed in the moment of greatest condescension to his servant Moses, (Exod. xxxiv, 6,) toward Nineveh, the city of Nimrod, (Gen. x, 11; Micah v, 5,) and the enemy of David? Psa. lxxxiii, 8. Jonah could never have permitted himself to believe this, if there had not been in the way and manner in which the commission to Nineveh was made known to him, something giving a definite assurance that, not the wrath, but the mercy of Jehovah sent him. This leads us finally to the name of the announcement with which the prophet was commissioned; it is not called משא, a burden, but a קריא, (Jonah iii, 2,) a *κήρυγμα*, a sermon. Now that this sermon begins with an exhortation to repentance, and a threatening of judgment, cannot militate against our view, since this itself is not excluded from the preaching of the apostles. Acts xvii, 30, 31.

And what was the success of this preaching of salvation by Jonah? The men of Nineveh *believed on God.* Jonah iii, 5. The mysterious depth of this expression, which in the Old Testament is intimated in the few and important passages where it appears, is revealed in the New. Abraham believed, and his faith is the subjective part of the covenant, from which salvation has come to

all the world. Gen. xv, 6. The natural Israel believed not, and on that account was cut down in the wilderness. Num. xiv, 11; Psa. lxxviii, 21, 31; cvi, 12, 23. Moses and Aaron, the representatives of the regal stand-point, believed not, and on this account could not enter the promised land. Num. xx, 12. From these passages, it is sufficiently evident how great weight there is in the conversion of the Ninevites. What is told of the sailors, is closely connected with the faith of the Ninevites. Upon these the confession and history of Jonah made such an impression, that they not only were seized with fear toward Jehovah, but made offerings and vows to him. Jonah i, 16. Jonah is sent to make known to the Ninevites a repentance to life and salvation; the Ninevites believe and repent; the Canaanitish sailors fear Jehovah, and sacrifice to him. What a history introduced into the midst of the Old Testament, in which is exhibited the strongest contrast between Israel, the son of Jehovah, and the heathen, who know not Jehovah, and rise up against him! Burdens and denunciations against the heathen are found abundantly in the Old Testament; to this, in fact, corresponds the actual relation subsisting between Israel and the heathen. Egypt, Amalek, Canaan, Syria, Assyria, Babylon, appear successively as the deadly enemies of Israel. True, with the severest threats, and most terrible imprecations, there are also found kind and comforting promises; and when the heart of the sacred singer of Israel overflowed with joy, he included in his jubilee the whole circle of the earth and the hosts of heaven, and the heathen also and the isles of the sea were to partake of the salvation of Jehovah. But these are prospects, in a great part, far off; and then David, and Solomon, and Isaiah, with their hopes and wishes for the heathen, remain in Jerusalem, and the ear of the heathen hears no sound of the good message of Jehovah to the nations. But here is Jonah, who must go out among the uncircumcised; here is an ancient city of heathens, who believe on God, and from their princes to their cattle cast themselves down on account of their sins; here is a company of rough sailors, who worship Jehovah. If there is a prophetic sense contained in our book, it must be here; and if we speak of a sign of Jonah, it must be this.

But do we understand this history as in the Old Testament, and yet without any Old Testament analogy? Is this the beginning of an actual repentance of the heathen? Impossible: then Jonah must be a different man; he, indeed, failed under the burden of his mission. Therefore he could not possibly be the beginner and the chief one in the conversion of the heathen; for this, one no less

than Paul was needed. And what resulted from the repentance and faith of the Ninevites? what from the worship of the sailors? No one knows what to say. Therefore the history of Jonah cannot be considered as an occurrence which forms an actual member in the history of the heavenly kingdom. The events of the book of Jonah are to be compared to the appearance of Melchizedek, who, stepping forth from the dark back-ground, appears as the priest of the Most High, and again entirely disappears; the worship of the magi, of whom no one knows whence they came or whither they went; and most of all with the wanderings of Jesus along the borders of Tyre and Sidon, and his intercourse with the city of the Samaritans. How are we to look on such events in the sacred history? They are the positive revelations of a divine purpose, whose historical realization belongs indeed to the future, but which, on account of its reality, cannot be confined in thoughts and words, but now and then must come forth to light and action. What idea is this now, which in this manner is revealed in the history of Jonah? Undoubtedly it is, that the heathen shall turn to their God. This thought has already its root in the *protevangelium*, where the victory is promised to the seed of the woman; this thought is found in the Noachitic covenant, which embraces all nations in the blessing of Noah, according to whom Japhet, by whom the many isles, when the chief power of heathenism is sealed, are peopled, shall be included in the blessing of them; this thought prevails in the enumeration of the nations, in which people and tongues are occasionally left out of the sacred history, to be afterward taken in again. In the covenant with Abraham, the blessing, which is to come on all nations, comes strongly to view. And when the Israelitish kingdom obtained its perfection in Solomon, the same thought developed itself in many ways. When, at last, the kingdom itself fell to pieces, and Israel rushed to his destruction, the hope was awakened that the heathen would one day worship Jehovah; especially powerful was it in the prophets. If ever an idea in the time of the preparative dispensation required some external exhibition, it was this. Jonah was selected as the bearer of this idea. But what a bearer! say they; Jonah, who fled from Jehovah, when he should have carried to Nineveh the message of salvation! Jonah, who in his indignation wished himself dead, because his preaching to the heathen had produced the finest fruit! this Jonah, the bearer of the idea of the conversion of the heathen! And notwithstanding, or much rather even in his weakness this call of the prophet shows itself. That Jonah was a man without faith and feeling is in itself improbable; and, be-

sides, in the history he is called a servant of Jehovah. That the servant of Jehovah exhibited weakness in his call, only proves that the call grasped what was beyond the present. What is expected of a prophet of the Old Testament? We should recollect that the wall of partition between Israel and the heathen was not erected by men, and that, therefore, no one could take it away but Him who could abolish the law with its ordinances. Eph. ii, 15. We should consider that the matter is not the acknowledgment of the hope of a conversion of the heathen; but Jonah is required, so to speak, to enter wholly into the thought of the present conversion of the heathen. Even after the appearing of Christ, all the apostles were not at once capable of this; Peter had to be prepared for a particular mission among the heathen by a special vision, and yet he remained the apostle of the circumcision. Paul only is the apostle of the heathen; in him, that which the history of Jonah intimated as future, has become the living and powerful present. But what was needed also to form a Paul? First of all the removal of the wall of division between Israel and the heathen must precede, effected by the cross of Christ. To this objective side there must be a corresponding subjective side: in him, who from his mother's womb was designed as the apostle to the heathen, (Gal. i, 15,) Judaism must come to such an extreme, that it should destroy itself. This happened to Paul; for through the law he was dead to the law. Gal. ii, 19. But this could not happen, until the law had the gospel no more in itself, as under the old covenant, (comp. Psa. i, xix, cxix,) but separate from it. Whoever, therefore, knows how to distinguish between the Old and New Testament will not wonder that Jonah was no Paul.

This point, which, as far as we know, has never yet been placed in its right light, and, therefore, given rise to many objections to the typical character of Jonah, is rendered still more clear by two analogous examples. Jonah was the bearer of the idea of the conversion of the heathen at a time when the glory of the theocracy was already gone, and destruction hovered over Israel. Israel's connection with the salvation of the heathen commenced not with the ruin of the house of David—it was closely connected with Israel by means of the covenant of Abraham. On this account, even before Jonah, there were occasionally exhibitions of this thought which were connected with particular persons. The history of the theocracy before its fall had two periods; the period of its formation and growth:—the time of the Judges, and the period of its bloom; the time of David and Solomon. Each of these periods had a representative of this idea; the first in Samson, the second

in Solomon. The typical character of Samson is but little acknowledged, but yet cannot be well doubted. On this point the incontrovertible opinion of Vitringo is decisive: "We are well persuaded that every unusual narrative in the sacred Scriptures, which is evidently narrated with care by the sacred writers, diligently and accurately, with all its circumstances, involves some important mystery." —*Typus Simsoni Obs.* ii, p. 552. The love of Samson, who was born in accordance with a solemn and divine announcement, and consecrated from his mother's womb to the Philistine's daughter at Timnath, which love was from Jehovah, (Judges xiv, 4,) forms the middle point of the whole history of Samson. The love of Samson to the daughter of the heathen and hostile Philistine, being of God, is the exhibition of the purpose to receive the heathen at some future time. The exhibition differs from that of Jonah, since the time was different. In the days of Samson, Israel is in the time of his blooming, manly youth; on this account the young man, with giant strength, is the representative of Israel; and heathenism is a young woman, who acknowledges him as her lord and husband. In the days of Jonah the manly power of Israel is already broken, and nothing is left but the word of Jehovah; therefore, the representative of Israel is the prophet, who has nothing else upon which to rely but the divine word. This is, therefore, released from all visible connection with the theocracy, and appears in the streets of Nineveh held only by the invisible hand of Jehovah. But in this again appears the similarity of the two, that Samson, not less than Jonah, sunk under the burden of his idea. The divine love of Samson to the Philistine's daughter changed into sensual desire, and this was the weakness of Samson. Just so is it in the history of Solomon, whose typical character in relation to the daughter of the king of Egypt and to the queen of Sheba is confessed. In the son of David, born king of Israel, is the perfection of the theocracy; therefore, while Samson must go to Timnath, the daughter of Pharaoh is brought to Solomon, and the queen of Sheba comes at his fame, and pays homage to his wisdom. But King Solomon sinks under the love of women not less than Samson.

We conclude, therefore, that so far from Jonah's resistance, and vexation at God's averting judgment from the heathen, being viewed as an objection to his typical character, that it much rather must be considered as something belonging to him from the necessity of the time. But it is important to remark that Jonah, notwithstanding his great weakness, yet accomplished his object; the sailors feared Jehovah, and offered to him, and Nineveh repented

in dust and ashes. Not the youthful strength of Samson, not the royal splendor of Solomon, was to gain the hearts of the heathen, but the invisible power of self-denial and of the divine word. For this reason Jonah was greater than Samson and Solomon, and his sign for the course of history more evident than the sign of them both. Now it is also clear why Jonah had to bring an ineffectual message of salvation to Israel, for the fall of Israel is the way which leads to the heathen. Rom. xi, 11. On every side, therefore, Jonah appears to us as the bearer of the idea of the conversion of the heathen, and, indeed, in precisely the form in which it received its historical beginning and actual existence. Is it now to be wondered at that his history has been received into the collection of prophetic writings? It is clear that it could have no other place.

Now that we have become acquainted with the inner nature of the prophet Jonah, we can easily understand his sign, mentioned in the gospel. The history of Jonah is an incidental exhibition of the history of Him who was sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, but, rejected by his own, became the apostle of salvation (Heb. iii, 1) to those afar off. Eph. ii, 17. This inner connection between Jonah and Jesus by an outer parallelism is made striking and significant: so, as the way of Jonah to Nineveh passed through a three days' burial in the belly of the sea monster, in like manner the way of Jesus to the heathen goes through a three days' burial in the bowels of the earth. That Jonah's remaining in the belly of the sea monster was against his will cannot destroy the parallelism, for this is only the outer accidental sign of an inner relation; so the flight of David before Absalom was a consequence of his sins, without removing the typical relation between the betrayed David and the betrayed Jesus. But notwithstanding the difference between Jonah and Jesus in the subjective position to their three days' burial, yet there is still even in this outer sign a unity. It was particularism which brought Jonah into the depths of the sea, in the belly of the sea monster these limits were violently broken through by him, as the prayer of the prophet proves; Jesus also was born in these particular (German, particularistische) limits, for he was made under the law; and it is its full strength, when he says, "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." Matt. xv, 14; comp. x, 5. Therefore these limits must be violently broken through by him; and this happened in the accomplishment of his death, in the three days' rest in the grave: first after this is it said, "Go into all the world and teach all nations." It is now clear why Christ refers to the sign of Jonah as to the last and threatening sign. Many signs had gone before, but the Son

of man had found no faith in Israel; for this reason only the sign of Jonah was left; but this is the sign that the gospel will be taken from the Jews and pass over to the heathen, who will bring forth its fruit. Matt. xxi, 43. Finally, it is not difficult to understand how other closely-approximating parallels might be connected with the middle point of this sign in the three days' burial. It belongs to the imperfection of the typical exhibition, subjected as it was to the law of the time, that the chief mission of Jonah should be to Nineveh; and, on the other hand, his mission to Israel should have a subordinate importance. But Jesus had first to bring to Israel the whole fullness of salvation. This is the reason why the sending of Jonah to the Ninevites is paralleled with the sending of the Son of man to Israel, (Luke xi, 30,) and, therefore, the repenting Ninevites are contrasted with the hardened Jews. Matt. xii, 41; xi, 32.

ART IV.—*A Companion to the Book of Genesis.* By SAMUEL H. TURNER, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Interpretation of Scripture in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and of the Hebrew Language and Literature in Columbia College, New-York. New-York & London: Wiley & Putnam. 1841. Also Stanford & Swords, New-York.

WHEN the numerous commentaries which have been elicited by the sacred text are arrayed before us, our first impressions, like those of the Indian, who saw the ponderous tomes in our libraries, are more apt to prejudice us against them, than to prepossess us in their favor. They seem to furnish an argument against that perspicuity which is justly claimed as an attribute of revelation; and did we allow our ignorance to be our guide, we should pass them by like the rude son of the forest, thinking that it must be a very uncertain religion that requires so much discussion.

It is important, then, to form just ideas of the perspicuity of revelation. The perspicuity of revelation may be one thing, and the perspicuity of Scripture another. The Scriptures contain the clearly-revealed knowledge of God and his will; but this revelation is given in the midst of much other matter more or less dependent on it, or connected with it, and so far illustrative of it; and inclosing it like an envelop, which it is necessary at times to unravel. Hence we may not improperly distinguish between the Scripture and its revelation. The latter may be, and is, a clear and

sufficient communication of the knowledge and will of God; the former may, and does, partake, in some degree, of the properties incident to records intended for the use or benefit of men. The one may be, and is, clear, because it consists of simple elementary truths; the other may be perspicuous also, but is necessarily more complex, and hence requires more of the apparatus of human learning to reduce the parts to their original elementary simplicity. Much that is in Scripture is clearly not so much a revelation in *form*, as a history of the revelation itself; and while the latter is clear and above all ambiguity, the former is necessarily mixed up with details, facts, or modes of delivery, which must not be confounded with the great elementary truths themselves. The one may be clear as the day, while the other may have its circumstantial obscurities; and these again, so far from being real obscurities, may be, as they are often found to be, but the vista through which the truth is seen, only the more beautiful for its length, and the range of objects through which it carries the eye.

Such we might exhibit as an abstract view of the subject, irrespective of any philological considerations. But to take another view, it seems a reasonable postulate that all Scripture was in all its parts perspicuous, as first delivered or communicated; that it was clearly intelligible to those who either first received or delivered it as the agents, and hence fully claimed the character of perspicuity in its original freshness and primitive relation. Thus, who can question that every part of revelation as it arose, or was developed to the successive generations, was at least clearly intelligible to the generation to whom it was immediately addressed? And if obscurity has been growing up around it by the lapse of ages, the defect lies not in the revealed truth itself, but in those who are to receive it. A revelation from God, besides its local and temporary perspicuity, the natural result or concomitant of its very origin, had also a perspicuity for that simplicity and uprightness of mind to which it was in all cases primarily addressed; and the want of which, besides any additional obstructions, must create its own peculiar difficulties in proportion as men have receded from the love and the practice of the truth. Here, then, are two natural causes not in the revelation of God, but in man himself. To obviate the former, by making revelation naturally as clear to one generation as another, implies a constant miracle: to obviate the latter, by making ungodly men as capable of receiving the truth as their contraries, would be more than a miracle; an anomaly greater than a miracle itself in the order of providence. Hence, whether by the natural changes of time, the revolutions of earth, and the mu-

tations incident to our race from one generation to another, or the degeneracy of men, the pure revelation of God must necessarily encounter the defects of the world, always glad to palliate its own blindness by alledging the obscurity of revelation.

A revelation, properly so called, unless we mean by the term every manifestation of the divine Being in his works, must necessarily be in human language; and as language is but the form in which the truth is enveloped, it is evident that this may be in a costume so different from that to which we are accustomed, as to make it difficult to recognize even familiar truth. Hence, in the very nature of things and from the diversity of minds, the difference of opportunities and culture, and the ten thousand causes which operate to elevate or depress, to enlighten or to keep in darkness, men must be more or less competent to receive even a revelation. To suppose any other case, is to suppose one that would supersede even revelation itself, a miracle on the minds of men constantly repeated in every individual case; a much greater miracle than even revelation itself.

But it is not our intention to write an apology for revelation: what has been done by so many able hands would be now, *Iliadem post Homerum.* Our object is rather to meet an objection to the perspicuity of revelation, from the professed friends of revelation itself; who, for purposes ostensibly catholic, are willing to sacrifice the perspicuity of the Bible, that they may the more securely hold their peculiar views of what they call catholic truth; and hence deprecate or approve every fresh effort to elucidate the sacred text, as an encroachment on true catholicity. It is for friends like these, too, that it may be necessary to add a word on the value of exegetical principles. Admitting the distinction stated above, between revelation and Scripture, we see that the former may be, as it is, sufficiently perspicuous for the express purposes of salvation, while the latter may be subject to the obscurities incident to every communication given in human language. The principles of interpretation are concerned chiefly with the latter. The former stands not independent, it is true, of the latter, but still sufficiently distinct and prominent to obviate confounding expressly-revealed truth with what may be called its accidents. Hence, every objection falls away that might probably arise from the necessary connection between Scripture and revelation. It is with the Scriptures, as Scriptures, that interpretation is busied; revelation itself remains untouched in the process of exegesis, unless it be to educe the truths of revelation that lie enveloped in Scripture, and which, so far from being affected injuriously by the latter, rather furnish the

great canon of interpretation itself, while the latter again may be received as but an expansion of the former.

The value of Biblical criticism to the studies of theological science can be appreciated only after some familiarity with this department, and the literary apparatus it demands. Not unfrequently it is underrated, as at best but secondary in its importance, as if theology were totally independent of Biblical criticism, and the latter had but little to do with divinity at all. Hence, the diligent study of the original languages is often slighted. Scholarship is estimated not so much by the studies that have an immediate bearing on the Biblical text, as by those that should be deemed only as its fruits, or at best but its auxiliaries.

That there are great leading principles to govern the mind in the important business of all interpretations, seems an obvious inference; and that these principles are common to all writings that are to convey ideas to men, is equally plain. The Scriptures do not claim for themselves any exemption from these principles, high and holy as their sanctions are. They speak unto men the same language that men use, and in this very fact they address themselves, on logical principles, to the same logical principles that have been everywhere recognized. They do not appeal to any new principle, as the very idea of such an appeal would imply a miracle not in the Scriptures, but in our very nature, and therefore to be repeated in every individual case. We, therefore, interpret Scripture by precisely the same helps as we do any book, ancient or modern. And that this is not treating the subject with less reverence than it deserves or claims, must be obvious from the simple consideration, that whatever reverence or sanctity we ascribe to anything human or divine, our reverence can never be diminished by increased intelligence, when this reverence is deserved. The Scriptures can never suffer by any principles of criticism, however rigid.

That there are difficulties in the faithful discharge of this duty, every Biblical critic has felt; and that, too, with so much force, that nothing, perhaps, has at first view appeared so likely to disturb the harmony of the church and to create schisms. And yet so far from this, we seem authorized to believe that nothing is so much calculated to produce the union of charity among pious and enlightened minds. Hence, whatever evils of division criticism may seem likely to create, like many apparent evils it bears its own remedy within it. Its very constituents are made up of the best principles of literary justice; and where such principles obtain, whatever difference in opinion may exist, still that harmony of mind which dispassionate research presumes, is of itself calculated to

preclude jarring collisions. What is said of the liberal arts may be emphatically said of this: *Apertæ Musarum januæ*—or what Plato says of Him to whom good men are assimilated: Αγαθος ην, αγαθῳ δε ουδεις ουδεποτε εγγιγνεται φθονος.

The work before us, that has led to these remarks, is so unpretending in its title, that in this respect as well as others it forms one of those honorable exceptions in our literature that perform more than they promise. In the inferior qualities of style it is a happy exemplification of the *æquabile et temperatum genus dicendi*; —such as Cicero selected for didactic and philosophical writing. Intended for the sober student of divine truth, it is clear and concise, exhibiting the natural yet chastened tone of the earnest and engaged instructor.

Dr. Turner has, at different times, done important service to the cause of theology by works original and translated, that have secured the thanks of the Biblical student; and we could wish these services had been repaid by some more substantial return than the mere good wishes and thanks of the reader. Our community is not sufficiently prepared to appreciate works like these. Dr. Turner, by his "Notes on the Epistle to the Romans," his translation of "Jahn's Introduction," performed in connection with Professor, now Bishop, Whittingham, his translation of "Planck's Introduction to Sacred Philology," and now by his "Companion to Genesis," has deserved the gratitude of the student, especially so much the more as the very nature of such works, in the present state of our community at least, seems to forbid the idea of any other advantage than the sole consciousness of doing good by serving the cause of sound theological study.

The work consists of three parts, and in the mode of handling these, as well as the division itself, chiefly consists the difference between it and the usual annotations on the text. Dr. Turner does not here profess to exhibit what might be called a running commentary that expands upon every word, a labor that seems superseded by the numerous works of the kind extant; but a bare inspection shows that the object is to furnish the reader with a manual that may facilitate the study of the entire book of Genesis, both as a whole and in its prominent parts, without entering into the meaning of every word as it occurs. We are not, therefore, here presented with remarks on every verse or paragraph in succession, but only such as seem to demand more particular discussion, and that seem to present difficulties, or the important bearing of which is spread before the student to awaken his own diligence, as well as furnish him with the necessary elucidation.

The first part is an Introduction to the Book of Genesis; the second, an Analysis of the Book; and the third contains the Notes on leading terms and passages, necessary to the understanding of the whole.

In the Introduction, after stating the two parts into which Genesis is naturally divided, Dr. Turner proceeds to the important question of its genuineness, and the general arguments in its favor; the unanimous consent of the church both Jewish and Christian, the consent of heretics, the voice of the fathers, conspiring to establish what indeed the church has ever held as beyond dispute.

And yet like all other truth, however well secured by proof, this, too, has had its adversaries. Whether from a love of novelty or singularity, even Jews have raised the voice of doubt on the entire genuineness of the book, and attempt to point out interpolations, if not to call in question the uncorrupted preservation of it. For an account of these we must refer the reader to the pages of the work.

It has ever been an important inquiry, what were the sources from which Moses derived his account of events recorded in Genesis? Immediate revelation, oral tradition, written documents, are all regarded as the fountains from which the book has been derived; but with regard to the composition, or the use made of these sources, attempts have been made at different times to establish its documentary and fragmentary character. Although such a view, could it be established, is not incompatible with its inspiration, or at least a special providence in the compilation, yet as there is no necessity for such a view, as is fully shown by Dr. Turner, so we may the more confidently, with some of the ablest critics, as, for example, Rosenmuller, decide on its rejection.

This part of the subject, however, is intimately connected with an interesting exhibition of the data supposed to be furnished by the very names applied in Genesis to designate the supreme God. The advocates of the fragmentary theory have laid great stress, in support of their views, on the exclusive use of the names Elohim, Jehovah, Jehovah Elohim, El, as characteristic of certain sections of Genesis, and in their opinion indicative of different authors. The history of this theory is given by Dr. Turner from Astruc down to its later advocates, Ilgen and Eichorn; which is followed by a review of different opinions held by eminent critics, Jewish and Christian, all calculated to awaken a deep interest, and imbodying an amount of research that can only be estimated by a perusal of the work, and a reference to the authorities.

The Analysis forms the second part of the work, and furnishes a lucid exhibition of the facts and events recorded in Genesis,

resolved into their natural divisions, so as to present a survey of the whole book in the usual historical connection of cause and effect; following up the order of events as they are developed, and their dependence. This analytical survey is admirably adapted both to interest the reader in the closer study of the text, and to show the intimate relation of the several parts. It partakes of history without its details, keeping in view the train of circumstances and events, but so exhibiting their evolution as to form a clew to the whole. While it sketches, it also fills up the occasional vacuum that seems to break the continuity in the text; and, more adapted to the student than the general reader, it is rather a help to the future expounder, than either paraphrase or history.

What we consider, however, the most important and interesting portion, is contained in the copious Notes forming the third part of the work. Although we may dissent from the learned author in some views there exhibited, and on others, our interest in the subject has led us to wish he had extended his discussions; yet it is particularly to these we would refer to appreciate the work. These Notes may be regarded as an appendix to the analytical part, where the reference may be found. Many of them are so many dissertations on the text or subjects, all of the first importance to the Biblical student. Were it compatible with our limits we should give copious extracts from these: but with a few references we shall leave the reader to form his opinions by examining for himself; simply premising, that as the work is particularly calculated for the student, its merit cannot be estimated by a superficial perusal.

The first ten words of the Bible open a subject of the deepest interest, and this is discussed in Note 3d. Whether "the beginning," there spoken of, is the beginning of the universe, the beginning of our solar system, or the beginning of our earth, has been a question often agitated. The term is obviously relative, and the immediate connection seems to refer to our solar system; yet so comprehensive is the expression, that we should have no hesitation to refer it to the universe. Another inquiry has often been raised on the precise import of the word בָּרָא, whether it mean, *to create*, or *give existence*, or, like עָשָׂה or יָצַר, simply *to form*, or make. The import of these words is discussed with suitable brevity, more particularly as the subject has been amply treated by Gataker in his "Adversaria," to whom Dr. Turner refers.

In Note 6th, the import of the expression, "God said," is referred to the simple manifestion of the divine will. And that this is a just view of the words seems evident on a moment's reflection. It

cannot be supposed that it implies *audible* articulate language, as it is not necessary even in common speech always to understand the phrase thus. The words, "He said," are as applicable to the language of signs employed by the deaf and dumb, as they are to those who literally articulate. An expression of the divine will, therefore, is all that is necessary to understand here. Nor does this militate against the ordinary sense in other parts. Dr. Turner has thus guarded the expression against the sneers of the sciolist, as well as the scruples of the weak.

On the word רָקִיעַ, Note 7th, Dr. Turner solves the apparent difficulty by a reference to the more or less comprehensive sense of the word. The Scriptures neither do, nor can, contradict a sound philosophy; nor, on the other hand, can the latter militate against the former. Some may see no difficulty in what, perhaps, may be very perplexing to others. The internal feeling of the former is not necessarily faith, neither is that of the latter necessarily skepticism. The one may be want of thought, as much as the other the excess of it. Seeing no difficulties, and making no effort to obviate them, is no proof of piety. The reply of Simonides to the Thessalonians, when they boasted of having been deceived by his poetry, might often apply to those who profess to see no difficulties in Scripture; and much more, perhaps, to those who see no necessity to obviate them, *αμαθεςεροι εςε*.

In Note 8th, Dr. Turner, on the creation of the sun and moon subsequent to the light, obviates the discrepancy by understanding the text as implying simply the first appearance of the heavenly bodies to a supposed spectator on the earth. The impression on such a spectator would be that this was the day of their creation; and it is, therefore, represented accordingly. The opinion is supported by good reasoning, and its coincidence with the opinions of some of the most learned fathers of the church, as well as many others, may well challenge our respect. Still to some there may be a difficulty in understanding the word *made* (Gen. i, 16) in any other than its literal primitive sense; and then the difficulty is how the light and the heavenly bodies could be said to be created on different days. This difficulty is grounded, of course, on the idea that the sun is the *source* of light to our planetary system. But if the discoveries of philosophy on the nature of light be true, it would seem that the sun is merely a mass in the centre of our planetary light, and not the source of it. Consequently, light being entirely independent of the sun, which is not a vast globe of fire, as was formerly taught, but a mass of matter subject itself to the influence of light, the objection to the literal meaning of the text necessarily

falls away. Although this sufficiently obviates the objections of a literalist, yet the view of Dr. Turner accords so well with what we understand of the nature of things, that it cannot fail to recommend itself to the sober judgment. As to the opinion that the heavenly bodies are *signs*, in any other sense than the natural phenomena of the current year, we have been equally surprised with the author that any such opinion should have been held.

Note 9. Much has been written on the meaning of the plural Elohim. Whether it is to be regarded simply as the name of the supreme God, as a *pluralis excellentiæ*, or designedly to convey the idea of plurality in unity, have been questions agitated upon it. The views of Rashi, given by Dr. Turner, are ingenious; but it would seem necessary to translate the word as a plural, if they were tenable.

In Note 10th there is a discussion on the nature of the divine image; and Dr. Turner justly reproves the opinion that Moses could have had ideas of a material image, as seems inferable from the words of Augustin, quoted in this note. The words of the father, however, in reference to the form of the body and its erect stature, may be regarded rather as a passing remark, inasmuch as he had already expressly said, *Neque tamen hoc secundum corpus, sed secundum intellectum, &c.*

In Note 12th the paradisiacal origin of the sabbath is clearly established. The error is properly rebuked, of its being a day of mere indolent repose; and the genuineness of Ex. xx, 11, and xxxi, 16, 17, and Deut. v, 15, 22, vindicated from the suspicions raised by Professor Palfrey. This writer, restricting the institution of the sabbath to the purposes of repose merely, also impugns its paradisiacal origin. Our limits do not permit us to spread the arguments on these pages, but the insufficiency of the professor's reasons will be the more apparent from the very fact that they materially affect, if not virtually destroy, our ideas of that special Providence under which Moses penned his account.

Another opponent on a more general topic occurs in the late work of Dr. P. J. Smith. The aim of Dr. Smith, ostensibly, is to reconcile Genesis with geology and physical science generally: but whether Dr. Smith does not indulge imagination too much, in regard to the meaning attached by the inspired writers to certain terms and their supposed ideas of certain phenomena, we must leave the reader to decide.

There are two classes of interpreters that have taken opposite grounds, not to say extremes; and it may be difficult to say which

of the two have been most injurious to sound Biblical interpretation. On the one hand, there are those who think that all revealed truth must be laid down with mathematical precision, in close logical definitions, axioms, and postulates, and who, on this presumption, interpret accordingly. On the other, some presume everything in Scripture to be given in vague and indeterminate language. We might well apply to both these classes of expounders what Eustathius says of the scholiasts on Homer. Some clip the wings of the poet so as to allow no power to soar; others swell his style with figures and allegories to such a degree that he seems to be telling us of naught but his dreams: *ὡςε εν ονειφοις ἡμιλειν δοκει.* The truth lies in the middle ground. Let the Scriptures be interpreted with all reasonable allowance for the imperfections of human language, and all its peculiarities, negative and positive, and we shall not fail to find them consistent with themselves. Dr. Smith endeavors to make it appear that the Hebrews understood by the word רָקִיעַ "a solid concave hemisphere." That this is altogether gratuitous is shown in the note, not to mention the inconsistencies which appear on the face of Dr. Smith's theory. Whatever be the signification of רקיע or its root, even should that be correctly expressed by *firmamentum*, or *ςερεωμα*, it no more follows that the sacred writers attached the idea of a solid concave surface, than it would from our word expanse or stratum, that we mean always that which is solid. Both of these words we know are in their derivatives applied to solids, and yet by the former we generally mean a simple *spreading out*, while we speak of strata of *air*, as well as strata of earth.

But the book of Genesis abounds with subjects of the greatest interest to the critic, the philosopher, and divine. As it furnishes the first ideas of religion, so it exhibits the first data of all science, without pretending to any but what relates to God and the welfare of man. Many of the notes in the "Companion" are ample and interesting discussions, exhibiting originality without affecting novelty, and independent thought, without disregarding the cautions of authority and ancient consent.

Besides the notes already referred to, we would invite particular attention to the following, the subjects of which we shall only mention. Note 19, on the serpent and the exposition of the fall. Note 27, on the nature of Abel's faith. Note 64, on the race of the Amalekites. Note 74, on the phrase עַל־פְּנֵי. Note 81, on the name אֲדֹנָי, as applied to one of the angels that appeared to Abraham. Note 97, on the offering up of Isaac. Note 104, on the expression אִישׁ תָּם, applied to Jacob. Note 107, on the decep-

tion practiced by Jacob. Note 129, on the term שָׁדַי. Note 141, on the Idumeans, descendants of Ishmael. Note 145, on the chronological difficulties of chapter xxxvii. Note 154, on the antipathy of the Egyptians to the Israelites. The notes on the forty-ninth chapter form an ample commentary, with some full dissertations on particular interesting passages. One of prominent interest is that on the celebrated prophecy of Jacob, page 371. The word Shiloh, on which so much has been written, is examined in a discussion of nine or ten pages, ample without being tedious. The version given by the author deviates from the received translation; and besides a more exact adherence to the original, exhibits the parallelism of its poetry to much greater advantage. This is one of the most valuable parts of the work.

There is one feature in the whole which we think cannot fail to commend itself to the good sense and the good feelings, if not the full approval, of all. It is characterized throughout by a tone of moderation, candor, and mildness, that smooths even the asperities of controversy. When we feel ourselves in the right, nothing is more natural than to think that we may treat the persons as well as opinions of others, who stand on opposite grounds, without ceremony. And even the cool and sober philosophy of criticism has often forgotten the common courtesy that is expected from liberal minds, and in place of decent argument has sometimes descended to the *odium theologicum*, as if it were a shorter way to accomplish its ends. It is gratifying to see men of eminent standing giving a better, not to say a more Christian and gentlemanly tone to such discussions. It is certainly the only course favorable to truth. Whatever temporary gratification the keen and caustic may give to parties in theology, it is at best but a weak expedient and worse substitute for the strength of argument. It may serve to stimulate a flagging appetite incapable of relishing sober truth; but as such an appetite, once indulged, requires new stimulants on every fresh occasion, the dose must be constantly increased or varied with every repetition, to prevent the languor of a sickly taste. All such artificial stimulants are thus to the mind what their prototypes are to the body. They mature the very disease they seem to prevent, not to mention the injury inflicted on those who are the more immediate objects of this pungency, the consequences of which may be a little exultation to the assailant, but bitterness and alienation from the truth in the assaulted. The roughness and rudeness of criticism in former days were a reproach to theology. The times might be offered as an apology for Luther, and even the supercilious Scaligers might be excused by the consideration;

but we have been led to believe that the spirit of Christian decorum is better understood, if not more generally practiced, at the present day than it was in theirs; and what, therefore, was some palliation then, can hardly be urged now. The *suaviter in modo* need not detract from the *fortiter in re*, whatever be the prominence of the latter.

There is another feature which cannot fail to be observed by the critic; we mean the judicious use made of the cognate literature in illustration of Genesis. Nothing would have been easier than, with scarcely a smattering of the sister languages of the Hebrew, to swell the pages of the work with a parade of quotations, intelligible, perhaps, to one or two in a multitude, but which would throw but little light on the text itself. All such auxiliaries Dr. Turner has evidently reserved for important and necessary cases, where a reference to the cognate languages is only introduced with the greater effect. Rabbinical and Oriental learning are thus made to yield opportunely their appropriate light; and while this contributes to recommend their study as valuable to the critic, the absence of display proves that learning is not necessarily pedantic.

Finally, we may notice the manly, yet moderate and deliberate manner in which the research contained in the work is presented. With a proper deference for all authority that has a just claim to be heard, the author applies himself to the nature of the subject itself, and from the result of individual research, which in this case is more than private interpretation, we think we have here seen the truth corroborated from the soundest sources of exposition. Whether the work has taken sides sufficiently to satisfy the demands of any party, we leave to the reader to decide: but the author certainly deserves the thanks of those who, with himself, can appreciate the difficulties of such a work amid the various tendencies of our day. Whether we call what we seek catholic truth or revealed truth, it is after all truth that we seek; and every effort, every approximation to it in this world of error deserves the thanks of reasonable men. One of the difficulties of the interpreter in these tomes is, that he may be compelled by his own convictions occasionally to give up what may be regarded by some as catholic truth; or to maintain ground apparently without the sanction of some venerable name: or else to ascribe a sense for which he sees no sanction in the sacred text. In such cases he can hardly expect a general acclamation, though he may console himself with saying, *Magis amica veritas*,—or respond with the old dramatist to the murmurs of the multitude:

Εγω δ' ακομψος εις οχλον δουναι λογον
Εις ἡλικας δε κώλιγους σοφωτερος.
Οἱ δ'εν σοφοις
Φαυλοι, παρ' οχλῳ μουσικωτεροι λεγειν.

The work cannot but be regarded as a valuable contribution to our expositions, and still more valuable as a manual for the student. It is calculated to excite and nourish that habitude of mind which should be among the prominent objects of all study, the proper and sober spirit of Biblical research as the only solid foundation of true theology—research based on what is already received as revealed to man; guarded on the one hand by a modest deference to the opinions of the wise and good, and yet free to try them by all the acknowledged standards of the church; whether the consistent voice of the fathers, the abstract voice of reason and its sober deductions, or the united voice of tradition and philology. Let each have a voice wherever practicable, that it may be seen that the church harmonizes with all that is in harmony with God,—reason, conscience, the voice of other days;—that she is at unity with herself, and demonstrates her high and holy origin no less by this unity and harmony, than by her very duration.

It is almost unnecessary to add, that the execution of the work is in the happiest style of the enterprising publishers; its exterior an ornament to the table or library, and its pages relieving the eye by a clear and well-selected type.

ART. V.—1. *Chironomia; or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery: comprehending many Precepts, both Ancient and Modern, for the Proper Regulation of the Voice, the Countenance, and Gesture. Together with an Investigation of the Elements of Gesture, and a New Method for the Notation thereof; illustrated by Many Figures.* By the Rev. GILBERT AUSTIN, A. M. Pp. 583. 4to. London: 1806.

2. *Elements of Rhetoric: Part IV, of Elocution.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1842.

THE qualifications of the orator are twofold—original and acquired. Neither of these, separated from the other, can produce any high degree of perfection in oratory; nor is the inquiry,—whether nature or cultivation contributes *most* to the perfection of

oratory,—of any great practical interest. Since, however, the inquiry is often put, it may not be amiss to give it a brief consideration, especially as this may throw some little light, at the very outset, on the views we intend to present in this paper. If a separation be supposed between natural and acquired talents, then it is obvious that the former may produce valuable results without the latter; while the latter can produce nothing without the former. Just as the fertile field can be to some extent productive without cultivation; while no degree of cultivation can perfect a crop on a soil absolutely barren. And if united, and in about equal degrees, that is, where some little cultivation only is superadded to the natural talents, more is undoubtedly to be referred to nature than to cultivation. But if we suppose the natural and acquired talents to unite in the highest proportions, so as to produce a finished orator, then, doubtless, he owes more to his acquired talents than to nature; as the vast crop gathered from the most fertile and most highly-improved fields is owing more to the cultivation than to the natural fertility of the soil. To change the figure, nature furnishes the Parian marble in the block; and this, though untouched by the chisel, may be more valuable, even, than the statue wrought from the rough granite; but cultivation is the art which polishes the block and adds to its original value, however great, a hundred fold. The practical inferences from this view are, that mere acquirements can never supply the place of natural endowments, and that there can be no natural endowments that may not be improved by cultivation.

That we may not be misunderstood, we will distinctly state what we mean by the *original* or *natural* talents, essential to perfection in oratory, as distinguished from the *acquired*. They are, *first*, good mental endowments. And among these may be enumerated such *intellectual* qualifications as are involved in the powers of reasoning, invention, memory, judgment, and observation;—such a development and balance of the *sensibilities* as shall enable the possessor to combine modesty and confidence—to feel all that he utters, and be suitably moved by the circumstances around him, at the same time that he can always preserve his presence of mind—losing the command of himself neither by fear nor excess of joy, neither by tumult and opposition, nor by applause;—and such an action of the *voluntary* power, as shall give promptness to the delivery, and a resolution which yields only to the dictation of the judgment or of conscience. *Second*, we may mention among the natural endowments, perfect vocal organs; meaning thereby the lungs, the bronchia, the trachea, and the larynx and its appendages.

On the structure of these depend the strength, sweetness, and flexibility of the voice. *Third*, perfect organs of speech; namely, the tongue, the palate, the nostrils, the lips, and the teeth—a slight malformation in any one of which may embarrass the articulation and enunciation of the orator. *Fourth*, a perfect body, free from any mutilation or defect: the stiffness of a single joint, or even the loss of a finger, will be sensibly felt. By a *perfect body*, however, is implied more than this—comeliness of person and a suitable proportion between all the parts. Thus, great corpulency, short arms, or a short and thick neck, are impediments to the exhibition of the highest graces of oratory. And, *fifth*, must be named—natural grace, which, as an original endowment, doubtless depends partly on the person and partly on the mind. "Some," says Austin, "are so happily formed in person, that all their motions are graceful; and some minds are so noble, that they impart genuine grace to the most uncouth forms."

All these are enumerated among the *natural* qualifications of the orator: first, because they are all so far dependent on the original constitution of the individual, that no rules or study can produce them, if entirely wanting; and, secondly, because they severally often exist and develop themselves in a very perfect manner, independent of education or culture. If all these should be concentrated in the same individual, and be developed under peculiarly favorable circumstances—the possessor being removed from the influence of bad examples and a perverted public taste, so that all his powers should be brought out by practice, under the guidance of his own good judgment; such a one might make an effective orator without attending specifically to the study of elocution,—might, perhaps, arrive at some degree of perfection in oratory, by the assistance of nature alone. Genius, where it exists, can create rules for itself; and, indeed, sometimes rise above the influence of false rules. But even in such a case, would not the man thus highly gifted find himself improved and perfected by the study of the principles laid down by the geniuses of other times? This would not divest him of any characteristic excellence; while it would at least give him a confidence that he was violating none of the principles of his art. What modern artist has ever attained either great excellence, or great confidence in his skill, who has not made the *chefdœuvres* of the ancient masters a study!

Nature, however, has perhaps never produced such a man. She distributes her favors among her sons, rarely heaping them prodigally upon the head of any one. He who is most richly gifted by nature, if he would become distinguished, must purchase his dis-

tinction by labor. If his powers are not educated by study, nor trained and brought under control by practice, though the favored individual may sometimes succeed, matter of fact says, that he will often fail. When the circumstances around him are all propitious, he may exhibit his powers to wonderful advantage; but they will not always be at his command: and thus his success will be unequal, frequently disappointing those who have heard of his fame. This is proverbially the character of that misnomer, *genius*, which never studies. The law is universal, that without study there can be no great excellence;—there can be none, either in oratory or any of the liberal arts.

In a former article,* we expressed our belief that the principles of elocution can be taught, and so taught as to become practically useful. The work at that time under review led us to remark more particularly on the *voice*, than on *gesture;* and we then promised, that if opportunity should offer, we would extend our remarks so as to cover the whole subject. It is to redeem the pledge then given, rather than to review in detail the works which we have placed at the head of our paper, that we have now taken our pen. To confirm the general view already presented, as well as to introduce some further thoughts on this subject, we will present the reader with one or two quotations from the Chironomia, which, though a foreign work, is scarcely the less valuable on that account; since, in everything pertaining to letters, the English and Americans remain *one* people.

"For the ordinary description of men, that is, for the great majority, rules are not only useful, but perhaps indispensable, the better to bring forward and improve the talents which they may possess, and to afford the necessary support, and supply the necessary confidence to the diffident and reserved. And the total want of any regular system of such rules for rhetorical delivery appears to me to be the chief cause of the reproach of frigid indifference which is charged against our public speakers. If other more lively nations contrive to dispense with them altogether, and gesticulate naturally, if not with perfect grace, at least with sufficient expression, the speakers of our islands, as is evinced by fact, cannot with advantage depend solely on nature. But though in our temperate climate the people are less disposed to vivacity of manner, and are not easily excited, yet the cool, the solid, and the cultivated understanding of the British speaker, under the direction of rational principles, and roused into energy on great and interesting occasions, is capable, as well in action as in composition, of all that is graceful and persuasive, and even of all the energetic and irresistible powers of delivery."—*Preface*, pp. x, xi.

* Third Series: vol i, July, 1841.

"There may, possibly, be nations whose livelier feelings incline them more to gesticulation than is common among us, as there are also countries in which plants, of excellent use to man, grow spontaneously: these, by care and culture, are found to thrive also in colder countries, and by a little study we shall equal the most favored nations. With respect to the delivery of an orator, in all its refinement and necessary circumstances, the fact appears to be, that it belongs to no particular people to the exclusion of others; and that it is not the gift of nature more than other high acquirements; but that it is the reward of arduous labor, under the guidance of consummate art. We admit the French to have more facility in learning this art than ourselves, the French allow the same superiority to the Italians, the Italians to the Greeks; but in truth the gift is not gratuitous to any people. Gracchus labored incessantly, Cicero labored incessantly, Hortensius labored, Demosthenes, Æschines, Isocrates, labored; which of all the celebrated orators has not labored? or which of them can be said to owe his fame merely to the gift of nature, as the indigenous soil from which he sprung? If a standard of comparison could be found, hardly would the British actors, whose excellence is chiefly confined to this one branch of eloquence, delivery, lose in comparison with either moderns or ancients of other nations; and what the talents, the industry, and the professional acquirements of our actors have accomplished, can we doubt would be accomplished with equal success by our orators, if they brought into action equal industry and equal professional learning? It is not because the British orators are incapable of the most consummate perfection in the art of delivery, that this perfection is hardly to be seen among them; but because perfection in this, as in all other arts, is a work of labor and of time."—*Introduction*, pp. 11, 12.

We believe the views here presented are in consonance with those of Addison, Sheridan, and the English writers generally, so far as they intimate, that nature has not been partial to the British islanders in the bestowment of the powers of eloquence; nor have we any evidence that there has been any special provision in favor of their descendants in America. Few, among our best-educated men, exhibit any very extraordinary spontaneous powers of eloquence. We are not, however, among those who believe, that there are wanting in this branch of the Anglo-Saxon race any of the essential requisites to a perfect oratory; nor are we at all certain, that these have ever been possessed in a higher degree by any people. Labor is the price to be paid for this divine power; and this price we have, heretofore, with few exceptions, been unwilling to pay. The fact is, *the best natural qualifications for oratory may exist, and yet no excellence be attained.* To this proposition we will give one moment's attention.

The voice of antiquity on this question is, "that eloquence [oral eloquence] is unattainable *but by art;* that it requires study, prac-

tice, and imitation." "The longest life," adds Quintilian, "is short enough to acquire it." But whence originated this idea? We naturally and very properly revert to the history of eloquence, as acquired and practiced by the great masters, for the answer. And on this subject, the name of Demosthenes can never become hackneyed. "Let us, then," exclaims Cicero, "imitate Demosthenes. Gracious gods! what else, I beseech you, do we attempt, or what more do we wish? Yet still we shall never reach his perfection." And Rollin says, "Demosthenes, among orators, is the standard which every one must necessarily follow who aspires to true eloquence." Demosthenes, by nature, had the *intellectual* endowments essential to perfection in oratory; and for aught we know, he may have possessed, in some degree, comeliness of person. As regards *natural* qualifications, we shall see that little more than these can be claimed for him. After one of his early failures, Eunomus, the Thrasian, found him wandering in a dejected condition in the Piræus, and addressing him, said, "You have a manner of speaking very much like that of Pericles, and yet you lose yourself out of mere timidity and cowardice;" and it was long before he acquired a confidence which would sustain him amidst a popular tumult. "When he happened," says Plutarch, "to be put in disorder by the tumultuous behavior of the people, Demades often rose up to support him in an extempore address." He suffered great weakness of voice, had a marked hesitation and stammering in his speech, and, by a "natural impediment," pronounced L instead of R. The graces of gesture, according to Lucian, he learned at a late period of life; and his ancient biographers agree in saying, "he had by nature no facility in acquiring these." So great and numerous, indeed, were his natural defects, that though in very early life he set his heart on becoming an orator, at the age of thirty-two "he had acquired no name or power in the administration." To overcome these defects, as well as to acquire the positive excellences of delivery, he built himself a subterranean study. "Thither," says Plutarch, "he repaired every day to form his action, and exercise his voice; and he would often stay there for two or three months together,—shaving one side of his head, that, if he should happen to be ever so desirous of going abroad, the shame of appearing in that condition might keep him in." The final results proved that Demosthenes was wanting in none of the essential elements necessary to render him the standard and model of all who aspire to true eloquence. And yet, if at any time prior to the age of thirty-two, he had, with the thousands who have succeeded him, become discouraged, and abandoned the pursuits of oratory, or, with thou-

sands more, though following these pursuits, had become content with an inglorious mediocrity of fame, who of our readers would ever have heard of *Demosthenes!*

It was much the same with the great Roman orator. He early studied elocution under Philo, the most distinguished of the Romans for his eloquence. When he came to the bar, however, he learned by experience, that even then his voice had not been sufficiently trained; it was "harsh and unformed," and as he became excited in pleading, it always rose to too high a pitch, so as to endanger his health. He, therefore, laid aside the business of his profession and traveled into Asia, and visited the island of Rhodes, for the express purpose of perfecting his vocal powers, and bringing his voice to a pitch which his constitution would bear. At Rhodes he studied under the rhetorician Apollonius; and among the rhetoricians of Asia he availed himself of the instructions of Xenocles, Dionysius, and Menippus. So intent was he on his purpose, that, according to Plutarch, "he suffered not a day to pass without either declaiming, or attending the most celebrated orators." As to natural grace in gesture, the same biographer says, "that his turn for *action* was naturally as defective as that of Demosthenes, and therefore he took all the advantage he could from the instruction of Roscius, who excelled in comedy, and of Æsop, whose talents lay in tragedy." Thus Cicero labored to improve and educate his natural powers. It remains only to remark, that though possessing, as he must have done, all the substantial natural requisites to a perfect orator, yet had Cicero done, as do thousands of young orators of our day, whose voices prove inadequate to the business of public speaking,—had he continued his public efforts, neglecting his private practice, he might have died ingloriously, as they die, and the only record of him would perhaps be, "that Cicero, a young man of some promise, applying himself too assiduously to the business of his profession, came to an untimely end. His voice failing him, he retired to a quiet country-seat, where his powers both of mind and body wasted away, till he died at the age of ——." And this would have served as the epitaph for numbers who annually go down from public life, in silence, to the grave; but who, had they followed his example, might have been, for aught any one knows or can know to the contrary, the Ciceros of their age.

The position, that the best natural qualifications are insufficient of themselves to insure excellence in oratory, is then established by the experience of two of the greatest orators that have ever appeared among men; and it need only be added, that *a single* deficiency, as, for example, weakness of vocal powers, or a bad

articulation, may prove sufficient, if left uncorrected, to counteract the effect of the best natural endowments.* Other defects, also, than those which are natural, may prove thus detrimental. Those which we have noticed in the two great orators of antiquity were not *all* of them, perhaps, natural. Faults, fatal to the effect of delivery, may have their origin in mere inattention, or in the imitation of some bad model. Faults of action, and even of intonation, may arise from diffidence and consequent embarrassment; and may go on to a destructive length, for the want of the judicious suggestions of some critical friend. Few speakers can perceive their own faults, till they are pointed out by another. Even weakness of the vocal organs may be superinduced, where there is no natural deficiency, by the sedentary habits and the close confinement of the scholar. Is it a matter of wonder, then, that with so total a neglect of this branch of education as now almost universally prevails, many go out from our colleges, our law schools, and our theological seminaries, but to meet *disappointment* in their earlier efforts, and final failure of the hopes both of themselves and their friends!

Excellence in oratory, then, is to be the result of *education*. The great objects of all education are, first, to direct the development of those powers which nature has liberally bestowed: second, to draw out and train with peculiar care those which are naturally weak: and, third, to guard against all irregular action in these powers, and to correct all acquired faults. These are the principles on which the education of the orator should be conducted. The general education has, for its main object, to develop the mental powers—to train the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will; while it is reserved, as the appropriate office of elocution, to train the voice, the speech, and the action. To this last-named training, if the slightest confidence can be placed in their own representations, or in those of their contemporaries, did the distinguished orators of both Greece and Rome owe all their fame. How much, as regards the quality, the intonations, the compass and the flexibility of the voice, depends on education! Distinctness of articulation, and a clear and perfect enunciation, can rarely be said to depend

* "One thing I must premise; that, without the assistance of natural capacity, rules and precepts are of no efficacy. Therefore, this treatise [on delivery] is no more intended for those who are entirely wanting in capacity, than a treatise upon the improvement of lands is applicable to barren grounds. Besides, nature throws in other aids, voice, strength of lungs, health, resolution, comeliness; *all of which are improvable by art, if nature contributes to them but a little: though they are sometimes so defective, that they spoil even what is valuable in genius, and in application.*"—*Quint. Inst. of El.—Int.*

at all on nature; so entirely are they the results of education. And, as to action, whatever of natural grace may in rare cases be possessed, all the grace which either Demosthenes or Cicero ever exhibited was the result of education. These are called the *external graces* of oratory; and by the ancients they are frequently all embraced under the term *action*, which is, therefore, equivalent to the word *delivery*, as used by modern writers on elocution.

When an acquisition is to be made for which a price must be paid—the price of time and of labor—the *value* of the acquisition is the most important consideration. What value, then, is to be attached to these external graces—to this "action?" To settle this question, we must call up the testimony of men competent to judge, and let them speak for themselves. When Demosthenes was asked, what was the *first* requisite in speaking, he answered, "Action;" and when asked, what was the *second* and the *third*, he answered as before.* It has been suggested that his failure, before he cultivated delivery as an art, and his extraordinary success afterward, led him to overvalue this; and yet we shall scarcely find this judgment reversed by any one among all who have either cultivated eloquence, or who have written on the subject of elocution. Cicero, after enumerating the parts of oratorical composition, says:—"But all these things have their effect, just in proportion as they are delivered. Action, I say, bears absolute sway in oratory."† Quintilian says:—"To premeditate a set of sentiments and words, is of less consequence than the manner of their being delivered." And again:—"I will venture to say, that even an indifferent pleading, when enforced by the powers of action, will have more success than the very best composition, if destitute of that recommendation."‡ This he confirms by referring to Hortensius, who was the rival of Cicero, and was never accounted to be inferior to any but him; and yet whose compositions do not at all answer to such a reputation. "From this circumstance," he remarks, "we must think a great deal of his merit lay in his action, because we cannot find it in his works." About the period of the revival of letters, many valuable works appeared on this subject. Cressollius, a Jesuit of Britany, wrote a treatise upon the perfect action and pronunciation of an orator, published at Paris in 1620. Caussinus, also of the order of Jesuits, wrote about the same time. The latter says:—"It has always been observed, that those speakers who excelled in action, carried (as they say) their point. And therefore it was

* See Cic. de Orat., l. iii, c. 56. † Ibid.
‡ Inst. of El., l. xi, c. 3.

not without reason that Demosthenes recognized it as the first, if not the single, excellence in oratory."* Nor has the testimony of modern times been less conclusive. The Abbé Maury, one of the most distinguished members of the National Assembly of France, at the period of the Revolution, wrote a lucid treatise on eloquence. "After a sermon has been composed," says he, "and even committed to memory, much still remains for the orator to execute; for the success of the composition depends upon the manner of delivery." And after discussing the elements of a good delivery to a considerable extent, he adds:—"Such are the innocent artifices which a Christian orator may render subservient to the success of his ministry."† Addison says:—"It is certain, that proper gestures and vehement exertions of the voice cannot be too much studied by a public orator."‡ Rollin says:—"We often observe that an indifferent discourse, supported by all the force and by all the graces of action, produces greater effect than the most excellent composition which is stripped of these ornaments."§ Chesterfield, writing to his son, says:—"Your fate [as a member of parliament] depends on your success as a speaker; and, take my word for it, that success turns much more upon manner than matter. Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Murray, the solicitor general, are beyond comparison the best speakers. Why? only because they are the best orators." And again he remarks:—"Ornaments are at present your only objects."‖ Walker says of action:—"Its power is much greater than that of words."¶ Bayle says:—"An indifferent harangue, being recited by an excellent orator, may charm the hearers. *Action is almost all.*"** An expression of our own Wirt, when attempting to set forth the wonderful oratorical powers of Patrick Henry, tends to the same conclusion. "If," says he, "we are to consider as really and entirely his, those speeches which have been already given in his name to the public, or are now prepared for them, there can be no difficulty in deciding, that his power must have consisted principally in his delivery. We know what extraordinary effects have been produced by the mere manner of an orator, without any uncommon weight or worth of matter."†† Dr. Potter says:—"With these gifts, [the powers of thought and feeling,] which raise men far above the brute creation, God has coupled

* Caussinus, l. ix, Proem.
† Principles of Eloquence, sec. lix.
‡ Spectator, No. 407.
§ Rollin, Belles Lettres, vol. ii, p. 628.
‖ Chesterfield's Letters by Gregory, pp. 294, 309.
¶ Elements of Elocution: Philadelphia, 1811, p. 361.
** Dictionary: Art. "Pericles."
†† Sketches of the Life of Henry, pp. 423, 424.

powers of expression which are equally pre-eminent, and without which, those gifts would have been all but useless. But such gifts and powers, as bestowed by nature, are by no means perfect. Until duly trained, they are crude, irregular, and impulsive. It is the object of culture to unfold them, to give them expansion and vigor, and to subject them to the perfect dominion of the will."* And Dr. Porter, than whom few in our country have been better qualified to judge, has said:—"The importance of delivery, in professions where it is the chief instrument by which one mind acts on others, is so obvious as to have given currency to the maxim, that an indifferent composition, well-delivered, is better received in any popular assembly, than a superior one delivered badly. In no point is public sentiment more united than in this, that the usefulness of one, whose main business is public speaking, depends greatly on an impressive elocution. This taste is not peculiar to the learned or the ignorant; it is the taste of all men."† To these authorities, we will add the single consideration, that to their voice and gesture alone, Garrick, Mrs. Siddons, and the other eminent theatrical performers, owe all their fame. On the stage, *the manner is* ALL.

These external graces, then, are essential to the finished orator; and, according to Cicero, if possessed at all by any one, they must be *acquired*. "No man," says he, "is an orator, who has not learned to be so." In full accordance with this, Dr. Porter writes to a professor in a theological seminary, who had addressed him on this subject:—"Upon the whole, I have become fully satisfied, as the result of experience, that no man becomes possessed of an interesting and impressive delivery, except as the result of pains and patience in preparatory discipline."‡ By the quotations we have just made, some idea may be formed as to what he loses of usefulness and of fame, who enters on the business of public speaking without this "preparatory discipline." This can best overcome the restraints arising from bashfulness or timidity, and can alone give to the speaker a well-founded confidence in himself. This alone can bring out his natural powers, and place them fully under his control, or teach him to conceal unconquerable defects. Especially is this discipline needed to bring the sensibilities of the speaker under his command, so that his feelings shall rise or fall at his bidding. This alone can give him the discrimination necessary to prevent the formation of bad habits connected with his voice, his person or his action; or to correct them, if already acquired. The

* Introduction to *Maury's Principles of Eloquence.*

† Analysis of Delivery, chap. i.

‡ Letter iv, appended to Lectures on Homiletics, &c.

graces which this preparatory discipline gives, and which are exhibited in every movement of the speaker, of themselves conciliate the favor and bespeak the attention of an audience; and the confidence which it inspires can alone prevent the embarrassment of feeling which the untrained speaker must often experience. These graces add a charm to the most intellectual performances, and often furnish the only means of impressing the weightiest and most sublime thoughts upon the minds of the unthinking. And, what concerns the great majority of speakers more than this, where the highest mental qualifications are wanting, the graces of delivery serve as a very effective substitute;—men of feebler intellects often producing a stronger impression by the powers of their eloquence, than the best-endowed minds could do without the advantages of a perfect elocution.

These views concerning the *value* of a good delivery, as also concerning the practicability of acquiring a good elocution, are set forth and sustained with great ability in the work of Mr. Austin, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article. This is probably the best treatise on delivery that has ever appeared in any language. He has borrowed sufficiently from the ancients to put the mere English reader very fully in possession of their views and principles; and by his own valuable comments, and the entire chapters of original matter which he has introduced, has made the work strictly English, and suited it to the age and the state of eloquence at the time it was written. This was forty years ago; and though some improvement has since been made in oral eloquence, yet so much remains to be done, that the work under notice is as well adapted to our own day as to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Were it not for its scarcity, we would commend it to the perusal of all who would acquire a thorough knowledge of the subject.

In one respect, at least, Bishop Whately's views, in regard to the subject we have under examination, obviously do not differ from those of Mr. Austin;—that is, as regards the importance of a good delivery. He opens the discussion thus:—

"On the importance of this branch, [elocution,] it is hardly necessary to offer any remark. Few need to be told that the effect of the most perfect composition may be entirely destroyed, even by a delivery which does not render it unintelligible;—that one, which is inferior both in matter and style, may produce, if better spoken, a more powerful effect than another which surpasses it in both these points; and that even such an elocution as does not spoil the effect of what is said, may yet fall far short of doing justice to it."—P. 254.

As regards the practicability of acquiring a good delivery by study, his views are not so clear. Indeed, we believe that most readers would rise from the examination of that part of his work devoted to "elocution" with the impression, that the study of elocution, according to any existing system, is worse than useless; and it is to do what we can to counteract such an impression, that we propose to give this part of the work a brief notice. This work is now extensively introduced into the course of study for the junior members of our conferences; and the impression, that the elocution cannot be improved by study and private practice, taking hold upon the minds of our young preachers just at the time when their habits of delivery are forming, or becoming confirmed, would, in our judgment, do them incalculably more injury than all the good to be derived from the other parts of the book, excellent though they are.

This author commences the discussion of this subject by considering all elocution as *natural* or *artificial*. The natural style he defines and commends; at the same time that he protests against all other styles or systems, under the designation of artificial. The principle on which this natural style is founded is this:—

"Impress but the mind fully with the sentiments, &c., to be uttered; withdraw the attention from the sound, and fix it on the sense; and nature, or habit, will spontaneously suggest the proper delivery."—Pp. 267, 268.

Then comes the "rule" for the acquisition of this style:—

"The practical rule then to be adopted, in conformity with this principle, is, not only to pay no studied attention to the voice, but studiously to *withdraw* the thoughts from it, and to dwell as intently as possible on the sense; trusting to nature to suggest spontaneously the proper emphases and tones."—P. 269.

To this passage there is a marginal note, which remarks, that "a reader is sure to pay *too much* attention to his voice, not only if he pays *any at all*, but if he does not strenuously *labor to withdraw* his attention from it altogether." Subsequently, (p. 305,) the author says:—"It need only be observed, that, in conformity with the principles maintained throughout this book, no *care* should, in any case, be taken to use graceful or appropriate action." *Such* is the system of elocution, as regards both voice and gesture, which is set forth by Dr. Whately, and which is to be studied by him who would acquire the natural style of delivery which he recommends.

Now, most obviously, this is not the mode of arriving at excel-

lence in oratory employed by the ancients, or recommended by us in the former part of this article; and inasmuch as he condemns *all other* systems of elocution and styles of delivery, it would seem as though our system, in view of this, would meet only with unqualified condemnation. The details of the discussion do not, however, authorize this conclusion; but, on the mind of the careful reader, leave the impression, either that the author had never seen so perfect systems of practical instruction in elocution as America has now produced, or else that he had less carefully matured this part of his work, than the portions more expressly devoted to rhetoric.

The system of study and practice, to set it forth a little in detail, which our best elementary works present, is this. The articulation and enunciation are first perfected by a set of exercises commencing with the elementary sounds of the language, and going on to include all their various combinations into syllables, words, sentences, and discourse. Then the voice is to be subjected to a regular system of exercise and training to improve its flexibility, compass, force, and quality. After this, the learner may be introduced successively to the various elements of expression, and be made practically familiar with every variety of intonation heard in the delivery of the most perfect orators. He may now be introduced to the elements of rhetorical action, and be made perfectly and practically familiar with all the graces of gesture, as employed by the best orators. Finally, his mind must be deeply imbued with the principles on which the elements both of vocal expression and of action are to be employed. This must be done by study, and by the reading and recitation of multiplied examples of every variety of sentiment; and all this should be followed by the application of the same principles to the delivery of original compositions before an audience, in the presence of a teacher, and for the purpose of subsequent criticism and correction. All this, so far as possible, is to constitute a part of the elementary education; and the practice, as in the other departments of study, is to be considered as *preparatory* to the business of life. Still, it is believed, though not properly a part of the system, that the private daily practice of all these lessons may also become a source of incalculable advantage to those who have entered on public life without the previous elementary training.*

* The best method, in all respects, for acquiring a finished rhetorical delivery, is the private practice of declamation; which is supported on the authority of the great masters and models of oratory, Demosthenes and Cicero.—*Chirosomia*, p. 548.

According to our best systems of elocution, then, it is proposed, as far as practicable, to make the training of the orator private and preparatory; it must consist in the practice of attitude and action, and in the training of the voice by various elementary exercises, and then by loud reading and declamation, till all the graces of gesture and the elements of vocal expression are reduced to *habits*. The natural style of Dr. Whately, on the contrary, is to be acquired in the actual business of speaking in public, and precludes all preparatory training, and whatever is designed merely as exercise. (See particularly chap. iv, § 2.) Concerning this system we have a few remarks to make.

First. This plan of acquiring a good elocution can be successfully practiced, even on the author's principles, by *few*, if, indeed, by any.

"If," says he, "any one spontaneously falls into any gestures that are unbecoming, care should *then* be taken to break the habit; and that, not only in public speaking, but on all occasions. The case, indeed, is the same with utterance; if any one has, in common discourse, an indistinct, hesitating, dialectic, or otherwise faulty, delivery, *his* natural manner certainly is not what he should adopt in public speaking; but he should endeavor, by care, to remedy the defect, not in public speaking only, but in ordinary conversation also. And so, also, with respect to attitudes and gestures."—P. 306.

All, then, who exhibit "in their common discourse" any defects of vocal utterance, or who "spontaneously fall into any gestures that are unbecoming," are, at least, at liberty to attend to elocution "on all occasions;"—that is, are at liberty to adopt our system of private discipline. Here, then, are *two* classes to whose wants our system is adapted. And what shall we say of those who may not, "in common discourse," exhibit any particular defects of delivery, and yet whose elocution becomes defective in some particular, for want, perhaps, of strength or compass of voice, the moment they undertake to address a large assembly? It seems to us, that these at least ought to constitute a *third* class, to whom our system may be beneficial; and we think that the number of young men who would fall into neither of these classes would be very small. We ought, perhaps, however, to inquire in passing, how, since all preparatory study is denied, one is to learn whether his action is always graceful and his vocal expression is as it should be? It seems to us, that this can be best known by a thorough familiarity with the subject.

But if it is important to labor "to break a habit" of unbecoming gesture, or "to remedy the defect" of utterance which may have

developed itself in the practice of speaking; why may it not be as well, by proper discipline, *to prevent the habit*, in the one case, and *to remove the cause of the defect*, in the other? Of what use was it to Demosthenes, that he ever formed the awkward habit of shrugging up his shoulders? or to Cicero, that his weakness and inflexibility of voice remained to be corrected by him after he entered upon the practice of his profession? Till these questions can be answered, who shall say, that our system of preparatory training is not suited to *all* who are candidates for public life?

Second. The objections to the system, called by our author *artificial*, do not lie against the system which we adopt. Having thrown together, as constituting the artificial systems of speech, everything which is either opposed to his natural system, or which transcends it, of course, he could not but find much to condemn. He, with some justice, objects to the mode adopted by Sheridan to teach the reading of the church service, as too artificial, and as tending to substitute mere art instead of real feeling. He very justly objects to the teaching of elocution by the recitation of Greek or Latin extracts, or of anything else which the learner does not fully comprehend, or which he commits and recites as a mere task. These specifications might have been carried on to almost any extent, and we might most heartily have united with him in his condemnations. But why point out specific defects, when the whole system is in his estimation radically wrong?

Our author, first, in very general terms, objects to "every system of instruction that has appeared," on the broad ground that all have proved "entirely unsuccessful;" in no instance having produced "a really good delivery." P. 255. Were the greatest orators of antiquity produced on his natural system? If not, they must have been produced on some other; and there is no question on which the world is better agreed, than that theirs was "a really good delivery." And the system on which they practiced is the basis of the one we advocate. Have the celebrated actors of modern times been produced by this natural system? Surely not, since its distinguished author claims for it the attribute of "novelty." They have been formed, then, on some other system—some of our author's "artificial systems." *Acting*, it is true, is not *oratory;* but the wonderful success of Sheridan, who came into the British parliament with the elocution of the stage, which he had learned from his father, as his chief qualification, proves that the actor and the orator are closely related. If Sheridan's was not "a really good delivery," we are not aware that it

has been surpassed by that of any orator yet formed on our author's *new* system.*

Another objection to the artificial system rests on the principle which, he says, "runs through all its precepts:"—

"The principle I mean, is, that in order to acquire the best style of delivery, it is requisite to study analytically the emphases, tones, pauses, degrees of loudness, &c., which give the proper effect to each passage that is well-delivered; to frame *rules* founded on the observation of these, and then, in practice, deliberately and carefully to conform the utterance to these rules, so as to form a complete artificial system of elocution."—P. 260.

Even admitting that our system does require him who practices it "deliberately and carefully to conform to its rules," we do not readily see that this would be more objectionable than the requirement of the new system,—that the speaker should "strenuously *labor to withdraw* his attention from his voice altogether." If it be replied, that this "strenuous labor" is expected to produce a habit of entire inattention to the voice, we answer, that this "deliberate and careful conformity to our rules," would, on the same principle, lead to their ready and easy application. But the objection, as it seems to us, totally fails in its application to our system, when it is understood that the practice which we recommend is mainly *preparatory*, and is to be a constituent part of the education; while it would come with a peculiarly ill grace from the author and advocate of a system, which, eschewing all preparatory discipline, requires even of the public speaker this "strenuous labor" to perform—perhaps, a hopeless task. For how could the speaker be expected "to withdraw his attention from his voice altogether," if, as would often be the case, the voice, for the want of this preparatory training, should be found to be weak, harsh, or unmanageable? Our whole system is based upon the law of habit, so well expressed in the maxim,—*Use is a second nature.* The speaker, then, "deliberately and carefully" conforms to the other

* The Historical Society of the University of Dublin, formed long since, is represented as having for its chief object exercises in declamation. Of this society, Austin says:—"It owed its existence originally to the spirit of a few of the students, one of whom is now at the head of the university. Perhaps the fashion of the day influenced them; but the fostering care and discerning judgment of the heads of the university cherished and encouraged the institution, and about the year 1770 they gave them laws and regulations, and appropriated, within the walls for their meetings, elegant and commodious apartments fitted up like a little senate-house. *From hence have issued the greater number of all the eloquent men who have since that period adorned our courts of law, our pulpits, and our parliament.*"—*Chironomia*, pp. 212, 213.

rules of his art, only as he imperceptibly, and without thought, may conform to the rules of a perfectly distinct enunciation; and only as the skillful penman, or performer on the musical instrument, moves his fingers according to the nicest rules of art, but confessedly without any attention which can even become a matter of recollection, much less of embarrassment.

The incidental objection, that the application of our rules, on the part of the speaker, "will hardly ever fail to betray his attention to them," (p. 261,) is also lost in the fact, that the practice we propose is expected to produce *habits* of correct speaking; so that there will be in the actual business of speaking little "attention" required—certainly something less than the "strenuous labor" required by the new system. And then, it would be little less than absurd—it would certainly be unfair—to refer the attention which the speaker, on our system, gives to training his voice and gesture, to the desire merely of "gaining approbation," or of "avoiding censure," as distinguished from the "moral excellence implied in the renunciation of all effort after display." Pp. 282, 283. Is it not entirely supposable, that many consider the voice, and the power of oratorical action, as "talents" committed to their care, not for "display," but for improvement; and who thus consider themselves not at liberty to "bury them in the earth?" So we believe they should be considered; and that the studied neglect of them is the *last* thing to be recommended. It would be equally unfair to characterize the elocution acquired by patient industry, as "a very fine elocution," in contradistinction to a forcible and manly delivery. After speaking of the natural manner, he remarks:—"The credit, on the contrary, of having a very fine elocution, is to be obtained at the expense of a very moderate share of pains; though at the expense also, inevitably, of much of the force of what is said." P. 283. When Æschines, at the request of the Rhodians, recited one of the orations of Demosthenes, his rival in oratory, before them, he replied to their expressions of admiration, "What would you have said if you had heard *him* deliver it?" This reply would scarcely seem to indicate that Demosthenes had, by all his study, acquired merely "a fine elocution," or that the oration, as pronounced by its author, was wanting in "force." We find it equally difficult to believe that Sheridan, as he shook the British parliament by the thunders of his eloquence, exhibited only "a fine elocution," which he had acquired at the expense of force or energy of expression. For ourselves, we see no tendency in the study of elocution, as we recommend it, either to deprave the taste or to unsettle the moral feelings; both of which effects would seem to

be implied in the disposition to sacrifice force or propriety for the gratification of temporary applause.

The objection of our author, that the artificial system is but a circuitous way of effecting what nature spontaneously prompts, (pp. 267, 268,) likewise admits of a very brief reply. This objection, and the natural system throughout, seems to assume as an axiom, that nature has endowed every man with all the elements of a perfect oratory, and that all the speaker has to do is to give spontaneous expression to what nature thus prompts. Our system is established on no such assumption; and therefore the objection is not applicable to it. On the contrary, we believe, first, that all the elements of a perfect delivery are rarely, if ever, suggested by nature to any one individual: and, secondly, that in their state of perfect development, they are as rarely, considered even singly, the products of nature alone. It is with orators as with singers: there are very few even of those who become skilled in vocal music, for whom nature has done so much, that we ever call them *natural* singers; and even among those who are thus called, what one has ever been so perfect by nature as to require no discipline? The experience of the world has been, that those who are most gifted by nature, whether as orators or singers, have had many things to *acquire;* and even then, much to do to perfect their more natural endowments. The perfect orator, then, would have to concentrate in himself all the excellences which nature has given singly to her favored sons. Who, therefore, that aspires even to an approximation to perfection, but will see a vast field of improvement before him?—a field, however, waving with the richest harvest, of which he who bears away but a single sheaf will find in it an ample reward for his toil.

Third. The preparatory discipline which we recommend would greatly aid the actual speaker in acquiring the natural style of our author. What are the principal requisites to the practical carrying out of our author's system? First, as it seems to us, that the speaker should always be able to feel as he ought: and, secondly, that he should always be able to give an easy, natural expression to such feeling: for a defect in either of these particulars would, doubtless, tend to embarrass him, and to withdraw his mind from the subject matter of his discourse. The familiarity with the various elements of expression, produced by a system of private practice, would promote both these objects, by giving him the ready command of the tones and gestures suited to every kind and every degree of feeling. It would further promote these objects, by giving him a confidence that he is violating none of the principles

of good taste, and by enabling him to speak with perfect ease to himself. When the speaker uses his vocal organs with entire ease, and his voice yields flexibly to the expression of every sentiment he utters, why should he think of his voice? And when he knows that he has by practice acquired habits of graceful action, why should he think of his gestures? In such a case, it would seem to require no "strenuous labor to withdraw his attention from them." But, on the contrary, let him speak with difficulty to himself, or let his voice refuse to give an easy and natural expression to his sentiments, or let it fail him when he wishes to apply force to some word or sentence, however "strenuously he may labor" to do it, his attention will again and again be diverted by it. The same with his gestures. If he has never studied the principles of gesture, so as to know what constitutes graceful action, he will often use gestures which he will at least suspect as being wanting in grace; and this will divert his attention and embarrass his feelings, however "strenuously he may labor" to avoid it. Even after all this private drilling, when he enters on the business of public speaking, the young man will find enough to do to overcome the natural flutter of his spirits, and to rise above the embarrassing influence of the circumstances around him.

We conclude, then, that the system which we propose has at least some elements which even our author would approve. Indeed, we decline to class it among the *artificial* systems, notwithstanding his classification. We believe that Demosthenes, and Cicero, and Sheridan, as well as the most celebrated actors, have employed neither the natural nor the artificial style of our author; but *the style of nature improved by art.**

* In accordance with this view, Quintilian, in his great work, the *Institutes of Eloquence*, says:—"I am sensible it has been matter of dispute, whether eloquence owes most to genius or to learning; but this is a dispute foreign to my subject, because I lay it down as a maxim, that a complete orator cannot be found but by both." L. ii, c. 20. And again:—"Let them enjoy their persuasion, who think that to be born, is sufficient to make a man an orator: they will pardon our labor who think nothing can arrive at perfection, unless when nature is assisted by careful cultivation." L. xi, c. 3.

Aristotle, however, says:—"The talent for theatrical delivery is a gift of nature, and belongs little to art."—*Rhet.*, l. iii, c. 1. He was contemporary with Demosthenes; and is said to have written his Rhetoric under a feeling of jealousy of the glory of that great orator. For modern rhetoricians to copy this sentiment of his, savors just as much of good sense, as it would for them, through his example, to drown themselves in the sea, as he has been said to have done, because he could not explain the tides. As much light has been thrown on the one subject as on the other, since he lived and wrote.

The style of elocution here introduced to the reader consists, so far as mere *manner* is concerned, first, in acquiring the ready command of every element of oratorical expression; secondly, in becoming perfectly familiar with the principles which direct their application to practice; and, thirdly, in becoming deeply interested, when about to make this application in the actual business of speaking, in the subject and the occasion.* And matter of fact, as well as theory, shows that the last is not inconsistent with the former. Quintilian mentions having seen actors, who, after performing pathetic characters, wept and sobbed for a long time after they had laid aside their masks. And of Mrs. Siddons, the Encyclopedia Brittanica remarks:—"The scenes in which she acted were to her far from being a mere mimic show; so powerfully did her imagination conjure up the reality, that the tears which she shed were those of bitterness felt at the moment." These were but theatrical performances, and the actors were representing only fictions; and shall not the real orator, as he stands up in support of right, and truth, and justice, in the senate or at the bar, especially the Christian orator, as he rises to deliver the message of God to his fellow-men, be able to forget himself and to become absorbed in the subject? If not, alas for the cause of right, of truth, of justice! alas for the interests of religion! alas for the world!

The example of our own Patrick Henry is sometimes referred to as at variance with the system we have presented. In order, however, to conflict with this system, it must be shown, first, that he became a very perfect orator without study; and then, further, that study would have made him no more perfect than he was. Can *either* of these points be established? What were the elements in Henry's character, considered as an orator, that constituted the basis of his eloquence? We believe the most careful analysis presents but these:—1st, his susceptibility of becoming strongly and powerfully excited on important occasions: 2d, his entire self-possession, even in the midst of the most exciting scenes: and 3d,

* "A public speaker sometimes delivers his sentiments from the impression of the moment; when these are ardent and generous, nothing further is to be wished, *than that he may have been well practiced and instructed beforehand in all the powers of language, as well as in all the external arts of eloquence.* Words of fire will then be supplied, and lightnings will flash as splendid as irresistible; and voice, and countenance, and gesture, will be such as expression, force, and gracefulness demand."—*Chironomia*, p. 443. Without the appropriate instruction, it would be as idle to expect the voice and the gesture to be free, expressive, and graceful, in such a case, as that "words of fire" would be supplied, without any previous knowledge of the powers of language.

his profound and wide-reaching knowledge of human nature. Only the first two of these can by any proper construction be considered as natural endowments; and how much of self-control he might have *acquired* by his habits of life up to the age of twenty-seven, it may not be entirely easy to determine. The third qualification, and that which had most agency in giving effect to his oratory, must have been *wholly acquired*. That much of his influence did actually depend on this, his eloquent and distinguished biographer everywhere admits. "Mr. Henry's book," says he, in one place, "was the great volume of human nature. In this, he was more deeply read than any of his countrymen. He knew *men* thoroughly; and hence arose his great power of persuasion."* Even the first position, then, is not sustained.

As to the external graces of oratory, Henry never properly had them at command. "The eloquence of the uncultivated," says Dr. Potter, "is elicited by occasions and emergencies. It is not at command. The speaker does not master his powers, but is mastered by them. When wanted, they are not always at hand."† Such was precisely the eloquence of Henry. It is known that he never gave the slightest indications of his oratorical powers till the age of twenty-seven, when they were called out by an important occasion; that his speaking was always unequal, never worthy of his powers except when called out by some grand subject or pressing exigency; that in his exordium, he always appeared embarrassed, his action being awkward, and the tones of his voice sometimes "almost disagreeable." So far from contributing to the perfection of his oratory, these must always be pronounced defects. To these, he owes none of his fame; but such were some of his mental qualifications, that he became one of the most distinguished orators of the world, *in spite* of his defects. While, therefore, we have ever joined with our fellow-countrymen in admiring the powers of eloquence which Henry exhibited on numerous occasions, we have never failed to contrast him as he *was* with what he *might have been*.

We do not perceive, therefore, that Henry forms an exception to the principles we have advocated. We believe, that had he possessed the polish and gracefulness of action of his honored competitor, Richard Henry Lee, and had he possessed the full command of his vocal intonations, he would not only have been deemed worthy of being compared with Demosthenes, but from him would have been dated a *new era* in human eloquence.

* Wirt's Life of Patrick Henry, p. 406. See also pp. 251–253.

† Introduction to Maury's *Principles of Eloquence*.

One of the most important practical inferences from all that we have said, is, though there are no mental endowments or acquirements which may not be made to contribute to perfection in oratory, yet that great strength of intellect, or any extraordinary power of language, is not indispensable to a very effective delivery. If we turn from the great field of secular eloquence to the pulpit, we are not aware that any one of the preachers who have produced the greatest effects by their oral eloquence has ever been specially distinguished for intellectual power. Bayle says:—"Friar Narni, a Capuchin, was so remarkable for his eloquence, that his hearers, after a sermon, cried out mercy in the streets as he passed home; and thirty bishops, starting up under a discourse, hurried home to their respective dioceses; yet, when his sermons came to be published, they were thought to be unworthy of his reputation; which shows," he adds, "how much depends on action, and how correct the saying of Demosthenes was on that subject."* The same thing has been thought and said of the sermons of Whitefield; and some of the most effective pulpit orators of our country have published few or none of their sermons, nor left them for publication.

We write not for those whose habits have become fixed, but for *the young*. And laying aside all further consideration of the *voice*, as a matter of primary attention, we must refer a moment to the *action* suited to oratory. It should at all times be entirely free and graceful; and though it should generally be characterized by moderation, yet pulpit oratory, in particular, sometimes furnishes occasions for the exhibition of action in all its boldness and magnificence. Freedom and energy of gesture will contribute even to freedom of vocal expression; and these, whether employed singly or together, have a sort of magical influence on the *feelings* of him who uses them. He whose action or whose vocal expression is constrained, can scarcely be expected to *feel:* some, who know that they cannot give proper expression to their emotions, *dare* not feel. Action also improves the style. Who, that has little or no gesture, would ever think of preparing a sermon as though it were to be delivered with the enforcement which action would give it? What greater farce could be conceived, than the delivery of one of the sermons of Bridaine, unaccompanied by *action*, as well as the boldest elements of vocal expression?† It is not a trifling consideration, that action, on the part of the speaker,

* Dictionary: Article, "Narni."

† For a specimen of Bridaine's style of eloquence, see Maury's *Principles of Eloquence*, sec. xviii.

also inspires in his hearers the idea of his earnestness and sincerity; thus bespeaking for his sentiments a favorable reception. Nor need the pulpit orator of well-disciplined sensibilities ever fear the charge of being "theatrical," so long as his gestures are characterized by propriety and grace, and he makes them only tributary to the expression of real feeling;—never substituting them for it, never permitting them to take the lead of it. Nothing but a genuine Christian sensibility can ever serve as a basis for effective pulpit oratory; and second in importance *only* to this, is the possession, on the part of the Christian minister, of power to give such sensibility an adequate and attractive expression.

A field of oratory is open to the preacher more comprehensive and more interesting than any in which the secular orator ever expatiated. What secular orator ever, year after year, had *such* subjects to discuss—embracing as they do all the highest interests of man? or *such* assemblies to address—each individual being personally interested in his appeal? or *such* a ground for pressing his appeals—the action required being *immediate* action?* Or what one of all the orators of Greece or of Rome, or of all who have graced the parliaments, the legislative bodies, or the halls of justice of our world, has ever been authorized to declare himself the delegated expounder of the word and truth of God? The great Founder of the Christian system *spake as never man spake;* surely the preachers of Christianity should speak as other men have never spoken! Paul preached with authority when he made even the Roman governor tremble; but the preacher of our day has an advantage even over Paul. Millions, who hear the gospel now, need no instruction; they need only to be moved. Logic, which in many situations is the very basis and foundation of eloquence, would be lost on them; and mere rhetoric would but tickle the ear. The demand now is for the eloquence of feeling. This alone of human agencies can move their sensibilities—this alone can make them *act*. Yet the vast majority of preachers still neglect all the graces of oral eloquence, and leave them to those whose highest aim is merely to please, and who are actually but too often employed in seducing those who listen from the paths of virtue and truth. When true eloquence can be heard and *felt* by attending the church, men congregate there, not less than elsewhere; but because it is rarely to be found there, those who are not predisposed to religion prefer the theatre. It is our deliberate conviction, that when the

* An eminent orator and statesman once said:—"No man can be eloquent in congress. Who can be eloquent," said he, "when a month may elapse before the question will be taken?"

learning, the genius, the manly judgment, and the finished taste, which now abound among the ministers of religion, shall be combined with a strong and effective *elocution*, truth shall enjoy a triumph throughout Christendom, which the world has never yet seen. We consider it a matter of gratulation, that this subject is claiming more of the public attention than heretofore. Within a few months, not less than *three* practical works on elocution have been presented to the American public. This, while it furnishes evidence of increased attention to the subject, also affords new facilities to the learner. The absence of these facilities has heretofore, doubtless, contributed largely to the present depressed state of pulpit eloquence among us.

To return to the works whose titles stand at the head of our article,—we would rejoice to see such a state of feeling as would authorize the publication of the Chironomia in America. It is altogether a manly and able discussion of a most important subject. Nor do we think the wants of the American scholar less demand an edition of Whately's Rhetoric, from which the last part, *on elocution*, should be expunged. Even this part contains some good things; but not enough, in our judgment, to redeem its defects and errors.

Dickinson College, April 1st, 1845.

ART. VI.—*Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil, embracing Historical and Geographical Notices of the Empire and its Several Provinces.* By DANIEL P. KIDDER. In two volumes, with illustrations. London: Wiley & Putnam. Philadelphia: Sorin & Ball.

THE empire of Brazil, stretching over nearly two-thirds of the eastern coast of the South American continent, occupies an area variously estimated at from two to three millions of square miles. Possessing great natural advantages—a fertile soil, mines of precious metals and gems, an extensive sea-board, and at least two of the finest harbors in the world; and, above all, favored with a most genial and salubrious climate—it is destined to become one of the most important nations of the earth. Yet, until within the last fifteen years, its progress in commerce, in population, in the arts and in education, has been slow, and far from commensurate with its resources. Advantages which have impelled other countries

with rapid strides to eminence in all that constitutes national greatness and glory, have failed, until very recently, to give impetus and a corresponding importance and influence to Brazil. Though discovered and colonized at the very commencement of the sixteenth century, and early revealing the treasures hidden within its soil, the population even now probably little exceeds four millions; the printing-press has been established but a quarter of a century; and the country is, as yet, comparatively unknown beyond the immediate localities of its mines and its sea-board cities. This peculiar feature in the history of Brazil is, doubtless, owing mainly to the narrow policy of the Portuguese government, the restrictions imposed upon trade, the rigid exclusion of foreigners, the frequent changes of the local authorities—the governors-general and vice-roys, each of whom exercised an absolute and often tyrannical sway —the alternate fluctuations of peace and war, and, more than all, the ignorance of the Portuguese, and their inferiority, in respect of science and the arts, to nearly every other European nation. As a necessary consequence, writers upon the history of Brazil have been few, and the sources of their information limited and unsatisfactory. It is remarkable that, until the appearance of these volumes, there has not issued from the American press a single work exclusively upon Brazil. Even in England there is none of recent date; nor is there one, the writer of which visited more than two or three of the eighteen provinces of the empire. The press thus failing to awaken public interest, the general importance of Brazil, either as an importing or exporting country, remained long unknown, save to comparatively few of the favored sons of commerce, who, compassing continents and sweeping oceans in search of new openings for enterprise, found there a profitable market. But beyond the pecuniary benefit, the profit and loss question, they of course had no thought or care, save that of keeping their discovery, as much as possible, to themselves. The declaration and recognition of the independence of Brazil, and the subsequent treaty with England in 1827, opened the eyes of the world to the subject, and Brazil is now rapidly acquiring that position among nations to which its importance entitles it; and which, if we have understood Mr. Kidder's volumes, the Brazilian character, where its better impulses are no longer kept in abeyance, is well able to sustain.

Mr. Kidder's work is most seasonable, and to him must be awarded the merit of giving to the world the first connected and reliable *history* of Brazil—his unassuming title-page to the contrary notwithstanding. The book is another proof, as palpable as any

yet furnished, of the world's indebtedness to missionary operations, and that in the most extended sense of the term. The world is under as deep an obligation to the *missionary* as is the church, and is as much interested in the success of the mission work. Not only is the herald of the cross the true philanthropist, casting the salt of a pure morality into the tainted waters of a universal depravity, and thereby promoting the general good, but he is the pioneer of civilization; he reopens new channels for commerce, by recovering men from barbarous and indecent usages, and teaching them the requirements, duties, and wants of civilized life. It is the missionary that travels into "the region beyond," whereunto avarice cannot impel, nor cupidity tempt, its votaries; and, laying his friendly hand upon the untutored savage, entices him from his rude customs, teaches him the use of implements of husbandry, and invites him to participate in the fruits of industry and the blessings of civilization. It is he who first marks upon the map of general knowledge the inhabited spots in the dark places of the earth—that penetrates the shadowy forests to awaken new aspirations in the savage breast, and then emerging from the gloom, beckons on the eager merchant and the child of science, and bids the one behold a new consumer for his merchandise, the other find a new field for his researches.

This common benefit of the missionary's labors—no less real because ungratefully forgotten, or but partially acknowledged—has been forced upon us by a perusal of these volumes. Mr. Kidder's visit to Brazil was primarily and supremely of a missionary character; and that character, as we have occasion to know, was uniformly and zealously sustained during his sojourn in that country. Indeed, had he been otherwise than "in labors more abundant," these volumes of "incidents and travels" had presented much less information. They are the records of his industry, the witnesses of his fidelity in the great work whereunto he was called, and in every good work; they show that he carried about with him the *habit of observation*. This may be inferred from the modest language of his preface, where our author says of himself, that

"his attention, while there, was primarily directed to the important subjects of morality, education, and religion, which, as a Christian missionary, it was his business to investigate fully. Having spent some time in each of the principal maritime cities and provinces, he necessarily became acquainted with the present state of things in Brazil, such as it has become since the repeated and extreme changes of government through which that country has passed within the last thirty years.

"This state of things he has endeavored to portray in his narrative, introducing at the same time those facts from the past history of Brazil which are instructive with reference to its present condition."—Pp. iii, iv.

And the result is a work which, we doubt not, will prove a *treasure* to the merchant, and will subserve the interests of literature and the cause of Christianity.

It will excite no surprise that *we* turn first to the religious condition of Brazil. The work supplies us with much valuable information on this subject. The author, with a judicious regard to the *general* acceptability of his book, has, however, scattered it through the volumes, so that the reader cannot turn over a score of pages at once on the plea that they are "all about religion." The arrangement is a happy one;—a very successful attempt at "circumventing" such readers as "care for none of these things" —an innocent manœuvre that displays a considerable knowledge of human nature, while it secures to perfection the author's object, the *diffusion* of religious information respecting Brazil among all classes, and in *connection* with its general history. The topic, however, is never allowed to stand long in the background: whether the reader is threading the streets of the crowded city, or musing in the sequestered glade, or sailing on the limpid stream, in every chapter it beams forth from the pleasant page, and always unobtrusively and in season.

But what is the religious condition of Brazil? We need scarcely say that the recognized religion is now, and from the beginning has been, Roman Catholicism—Popery uncontrolled by the influences with which, in Europe, it has had to contend since the Reformation. Our author says,—

"It was introduced contemporaneously with the first settlement of Brazil as a colony; and for three hundred years has been left to a perfectly free and untrammeled course. It has had the opportunity of exerting its very best influences on the minds of the people, and of arriving at its highest degree of perfection; and, in fact, it has been intimated by an educated Brazilian, who had traveled in Italy, that the religious ceremonies of Rio de Janeiro differ but little, in pomp and parade, from those of Rome herself."—Vol. i, p. 142.

Yet he expresses, with a candor which adds force to his delineations of the system, his

"firm conviction, that there is not a Roman Catholic country on the globe where there prevails a greater degree of toleration, or a greater liberality of feeling, toward Protestants."

And he adds,—

"I will here state, that in all my residence and travels in Brazil, in the character of a Protestant missionary, I never received the slightest opposition or indignity from the people. As might have been expected, a few of the priests made all the opposition they could, but the circumstance that these were unable to excite the people, showed how little influence they possessed. On the other hand, perhaps quite as many of the clergy, and those of the most respectable in the empire, manifested toward us and our work both favor and friendship."—Vol. i, p. 143.

The same inquiry will, doubtless, suggest itself to others that has occurred to ourselves:—How is this to be accounted for? or how is it to be reconciled with the universally intolerant spirit of Popery? The solution of this enigma is, we suspect, of a two-fold character. The circumstance that mainly contributes to this mild character of Brazilian Popery, is the very slender tie by which the pope retains this portion of his dominions—authority, in the premises, he can scarcely be said to possess. The proposition to make the Brazilian church independent of the Papal see has more than once been started, and as often found increased favor with the people. The effect of this, and perhaps the proximate cause of the state of feeling attributed to the Romish priesthood of Brazil by Mr. Kidder, is, that Popery has dwindled into a burlesque of all religion, and exhibits, in its dotage, only the shrunken and shriveled features of an imbecile infidelity;—collapse has followed repletion. Of this there is abundant and melancholy evidence in the volumes before us. There remains little in the system, or about it, that wears even the semblance of Christianity; but everything is diverse from the principles, spirit, and design of the gospel. Popery, at present, in Brazil, is, to all intents and purposes, nothing more and nothing less than a piece of foolery—a mere exhibition, kept up for pastime and gayety, and pretending to nothing else; one of the Protean forms of the "man of sin," showing how silly, how inane a thing Popery can become to meet the tastes of a people fond of display. Mr. Kidder shall furnish evidence of this. The following instance is one among many of the same nature. In 1595, a fleet, under the direction of some Lutherans, sailed from France with the intention of capturing Bahia. On their way they attacked Argoim, a small island on the coast of Africa, belonging to the Portuguese, and carried off, among other sacred things, an image of St. Anthony. At sea the fleet was attacked with storms, which sunk several of the vessels. Those that escaped this fate were assaulted with a pestilence, during which, through pure spite toward the Catholic religion, the image was thrown overboard, having been first hacked with cutlasses. The vessel that carried

it put into a port of Sergipe, and all on board were taken prisoners. These men were sent to Bahia, and the first object they saw on the praya was the very same image they had so maltreated. It had been cast up by the waters to confront them!

This image was procured by the priests, subsequently changed for a gaudier one which was christened by its name, and presumed to be the inheritor of its virtues. Having thus been introduced to the citizens of Bahia, St. Anthony was now enlisted as a soldier in the fortress near the barra bearing his name. In this capacity he received regular pay until he was promoted to the rank of captain by the governor, Rodrigo da Costa. In the official order for his promotion, the governor says:—

"Wherefore, and because we now more than ever need the favors of the aforementioned saint, both on account of the present wars in Portugal and of those which may yet happen in Bahia, the said chamber has besought me, in commemoration of the aforementioned vow, to assign to the said glorious St. Anthony the rank and pay of a captain in the fortress where he has hitherto only received the pay of a common soldier.

"In obedience to this request, and subject to the approval of the king, I therefore assign to the glorious St. Anthony the rank of captain in the said fortress, and order that the solicitor of the *Franciscan Convent* be authorized to draw, in his behalf, the regular amount of a captain's pay.

"Rodrigo da Costa."

This saint has since received still higher promotion in Brazil. In 1835 he held, in Rio de Janeiro, the rank of colonel in the army, and received his pay as such, through the hands of his terrestrial delegates, the Franciscan monks.

Such announcements as the following are made very frequently in the public prints:—

"The president and board of the Brotherhood of the Most Holy Sacrament of the parish of Santa Rita design to celebrate a festival on the 22d of March, in honor of the Most Holy Virgin our Lady of Grief, who for the first time is located in the church. This *festa* is to be celebrated with high mass and a sermon, at the expense of the devotees of the said Virgin, the Most Holy Mother of Grief, who are all invited by the board to add to the *splendor* of the occasion by their presence; since they will receive from the above-named lady due reward."

"The Brotherhood of the Most Holy Sacrament of the parish of St. John the Baptist, in Botafogo, design to celebrate their festival on the 12th of July with all possible pomp, by means of high mass, a sermon, procession, and Te Deum in the afternoon, and artificial fireworks at night. Wherefore, they invite all their brethren, and all their

fellow-parishioners and devotees to attend, and by their presence to render as brilliant as possible this act of our religion."—Vol. i, p. 145.

Speaking of the festivals in honor of the saints, our author says:—

"Sometimes, on the occasion of these festivals, a stage is erected in the church, or in the open air near by, and a species of dramatic representation is enacted for the amusement of the spectators. At other times an auction is held, at which a great variety of objects, that have been provided for the occasion by purchase or gift, are sold to the highest bidder. The auctioneer generally manages to keep the crowd around him in a roar of laughter, and, it is presumed, gets paid in proportion to the interest of his entertainment."—Vol. i, p. 146.

We doubt whether the following was ever exceeded by a political procession in New-York. It affords lamentable proof of the view we have taken of Brazilian Popery; it tells of the total absence of all hallowed associations, and plainly enough indicates that the Roman Catholic priesthood, and their levity-smitten followers, have no desire to

——"Bid the world of noise and show,
With all its glittering *toys*, adieu."

"The first procession which I specially observed was that of Ash-Wednesday. It was conducted by the third order of Franciscans, from the chapel of the Misericordia, through the principal streets of the city, to the convent of St. Antonio. Not less than from twenty to thirty stands of images were borne along on the shoulders of men. Some of these images were single, others were in groups, intended to illustrate various events of Scriptural history or Catholic mythology. The dress and ornaments of these effigies were of the most gaudy kind. The platforms upon which they were placed were often quite heavy, requiring four, six, and eight men to carry them; nor could all these endure the burden for a long time. They required to be alternated by as many others, who walked by their side like extra pall-bearers at a funeral. The streets were thronged with thousands of people, among whom were numbers of slaves, who seemed highly amused to see their masters for once engaged in hard labor. They indeed toiled under their loads, till the sweat ran down their faces like water. The images passed in the middle of the street, with single files of men on either side, each one bearing a lighted torch or wax candle several feet in length. Before each group of images marched an angel (*anjo*,) led by a priest, scattering rose-leaves and flowers upon the path.

"As the reader may be anxious to know what kind of angels take part in these spectacles, I must explain that they are a class created for the occasion, to act as tutelary to the saints exhibited. Little girls, from eight to ten years old, are generally chosen to serve in this capacity, for which they are fitted out by a most fantastic dress. Its leading design seems to be to exhibit a body and wings, wherefore the skirt and sleeves are expanded to enormous dimensions, by means of hoops and cane frame-work, over which flaunt silks, gauzes, ribbons, laces, tinsels, and plumes of diverse colors. On their head is placed a spe-

cies of tiara. Their hair hangs in ringlets down their faces and necks, and the triumphal air with which they march along, shows that they fully comprehend the honor they enjoy of being the principal objects of admiration.

"In strange contrast with the gayety of their appearance on this occasion, was the servility of another character quite essential to them, namely, the coarsely-dressed slave who walked near by with a basket or box on his head, from which, at every halt, flowers were transferred to the silver salvers, from which the angel might scatter them on the ground.... In fact, there seemed but little solemnity connected with the scene, and most of that was shared by the poor brethren who were tugging and sweating under the platforms; even they occasionally endeavored to enliven each other's spirits by entering into conversation and pleasantry, when relieved by their alternates.

"When the host is carried out on these occasions, but a small portion of the people are seen to kneel as it passes, and no compulsion is used when any are disinclined to manifest that degree of reverence.

"No class enter into the spirit of these holyday parades with more zeal than the people of color. They are, moreover, specially complimented from time to time, by the appearance of a colored saint, or of Nossa Senhora under an ebony skin. "*Lá vem o meu parente*," "There comes my kindred," exclaimed an old negro standing near me, as a colored effigy, with woolly hair and thick lips, came in sight; and in the overflow of his joy, the old man had expressed the precise sentiment that is addressed by such appeals to the senses and feelings of the Africans."—Vol. i, pp. 148–150.

We might deepen the shades of this sad picture yet a hundred fold from Mr. Kidder's volumes, but our own inclination and the space at our disposal forbid it. The policy of Rome is "exceeding deep, who can find it out?" It will tyrannize where tyranny is safe, and cajole where it cannot tyrannize; the one awakens the freeman's indignation, the other his contempt, while he weeps in secret that thus they have perverted the way of the Lord. "Surely the people accustomed to these exhibitions as acts of religious commemoration, ought to prize the Bible, since a half hour's perusal of either of the Gospels would impart more correct information and more solemn impressions in relation to the death and sufferings of Christ, than could be gathered from all the protracted and expensive ceremonies of holy week, during all the years of a long life." And this leads us to a more agreeable feature in Mr. Kidder's "Sketches."

The circulation of the Bible in the vernacular language was a primary object of our author's mission to Brazil. Hitherto there had been no systematic effort for this object. Several hundreds of copies of the word of life had been sent out by the British and American Bible Societies, and their circulation had been confided

to resident merchants in the principal cities; but these gentlemen had other occupations, or perhaps felt but little interest in the matter; and though the sacred volume was not otherwise proscribed than in the usual regulations of the Romish Church, yet so far as the vulgar tongue was concerned, it was an effectually-excluded and unknown book. On their political disenthralment, the Brazilians adopted a liberal and tolerant constitution, and Mr. Kidder found no serious obstacles to the sale or gratuitous distribution of the Scriptures. Indeed, the people, sick at heart of the empty and senseless mockery of religion, and long unsatisfied with "that which was not bread," "received the word with gladness." They were prepared to hail with gratitude any movement which promised to supply them with that bread of life which had so long been systematically withheld.

"At the mission-house many copies were distributed gratuitously; and on several occasions there was what might be called a rush of applicants for the sacred volume. One of these occurred soon after my arrival. It was known that a supply of books had been received, and our house was literally thronged with persons of all ages and conditions of life,—from the gray-headed man to the prattling child,—from the gentleman in high life to the poor slave. Most of the children and servants came as messengers, bringing notes from their parents or masters. These notes were invariably couched in respectful, and often in beseeching language. Several were from poor widows, who had no money to buy books for their children, but who desired Testaments for them to read at school. Another was from one of the ministers of the imperial government, asking for a supply for an entire school out of the city.

"Among the gentlemen who called in person, were several principals and proprietors of collegios, and many students of different grades. Versions in French, and also in English as well as Portuguese, were sometimes desired by amateur linguists. We dealt out the precious volumes, according to our best judgment, with joy and with trembling. This being the first general movement of the kind, we were at times inclined to fear that some plan had been concerted for getting the books destroyed, or for involving us in some species of difficulty. These apprehensions were contradicted, however, by all the circumstances within our observation; and all who came, made their errand on the ground of its intrinsic importance, and listened with deep attention to whatever we had time or ability to address to them concerning Christ and the Bible.

"It was not to be presumed, however, that so great an amount of Scriptural truth could at once be scattered among the people, without exciting great jealousy and commotion among certain of the padres. Nevertheless, others of this class were among the applicants themselves. One aged priest, who called in person, and received by special request copies in Portuguese, French, and English, on retiring said,

'The like was never before done in this country.' Another sent a note in French, asking for *L'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament.* In three days two hundred copies were distributed and our stock was exhausted, but applicants continued to come, till it was estimated that four times that number had been called for. All we could respond to these persons was to inform them where Bibles were kept on sale, and that we anticipated a fresh supply at some future day."—Vol. i, pp. 138, 139.

Copies of several of the written applications referred to in the above extract are given in the Appendix. They exhibit a truthful earnestness of desire for the unadulterated Word, a lively gratitude for the hope of possessing it, and are couched in terms that must have greatly encouraged Mr. Kidder in his arduous duties. Nor less so, the following interview and conversation with an aged pilgrim at Maceio, in the province of Alagoas :—

"On my first visit to the shore, having become thirsty during a fatiguing walk over the beach, I desired the simple but very suitable beverage of a draft of fresh cocoa-nut water. I was directed to a snug little house near the sea-shore, which stood imbowered in a grove of thriving coqueiros. A man about fifty years old, a Portuguese by birth, received me at the door with due civility, and urged me to walk into the house and wait the arrival of a negro, who would be able to climb one of the trees and pluck the fruit. The domicil was neat and comfortable, and a table in the parlor exhibited two or three books. One of them I judged from its appearance to be a Portuguese Bible, of the British and Foreign Bible Society's publication. To find that book in such a situation was a circumstance as rare as it was interesting. I immediately directed attention to the volume.

"'What book is that?'

"'It is the Bible.'

"'How long have you had it?'

"'Eight or nine years,' was the reply.

"'How did you become possessed of it?'

"'It was given me by a sailor in Bahia.'

"'It seems to have been used a great deal?'

"'O yes, I am very fond of reading it, it is so instructive and consoling; but the mischief is, I cannot keep it at home. My neighbors love to read it too, and they are continually borrowing it from me. I have loaned it to go great distances, in almost every direction; but now it is at home, and I think I shall not let it go any more.'

"'What, are there no other copies of it to be found?'

"'I do not know of any, and most people that borrow it have never seen such a book before.'

"'Well, I suppose you would have no objections to lend that copy, if you had another one perfectly clean and new?'

"'Certainly not.'

"'Then I will send one I have on board the steamer for your own use.'

"'Will you?'

" 'Yes, cheerfully, and along with it a quantity of Testaments and tracts, which you shall be at liberty to distribute among those friends of yours, far and near, who have become fond of reading the old Bible.'

" 'O, I shall be extremely thankful! I will distribute them faithfully, and when you return down the coast I will show you a list of those persons to whom I shall have given them.'

"The reader may imagine that after such a conversation the fresh cocoa-nuts were opened with no ordinary satisfaction on both sides."—Vol. ii, pp. 103–105.

It was not to be expected that a people who had so long "the substance in the shadow lost," should be easily or speedily rescued from their "vain imaginations." Indeed, Mr. Kidder's plan seems to have been to journey through the land and sow the precious seed in the willing soil, harrowing it by pious exhortations and much prayer; and the fruit will doubtless be "seen after many days." On his return from the tour of the provinces, he was about to establish, in conjunction with Mr. Spaulding, a Protestant ministry at Rio de Janeiro, that he might watch the upshootings of the imperishable seed that he had watered with his tears, and be prepared to put in the sickle when the "full corn in the ear" should be matured by heavenly dews and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Otherwise did Providence ordain; and in wisdom, inscrutable but unerring, suddenly removed from earth to heaven the "lover and friend" who had shared his missionary toil, and cheered him by her sympathy; and Mr. K. returned to his native land. He has said little of his success in "the work whereunto he was sent," but others have testified that his labor has not been in vain in the Lord.

But there are more general features in these interesting volumes which must not be passed over without notice. As a contribution to the literature of our age and country, the work is deserving of a cordial reception. It is a book that will live longer than its author. It is written with much care and judgment, and in excellent taste. The subjects treated of, *and their name is "legion,"* are evidently understood by the writer, and are given to the world for the sake of communicating information rather than for the pleasure of writing a book. We have already said that Mr. Kidder visited all the maritime cities and provinces. These "Sketches" are a continuous account of his tour; and following in the luminous track he has marked, we find ourselves lingering over historical associations, tracing clearly-defined geographical landmarks, taking mental measurement of distinguished men, listening to "incidents" pleasantly related, gazing upon the beautiful and sublime, the

grand and picturesque in nature, as they are spread before us in glowing but chaste description, and anon receiving episodical, way-side lessons in botany and other branches of natural science. A most pleasant companion is our author, and instructive too, as all will find who make acquaintance with his volumes. There is a fidelity about his descriptions, both of places and scenery, which familiarizes us at once with the spot he visits; and few are the scenes that are not made to pay some tribute to the reader's gratification. Take, as an instance, the following view of Olinda, as seen from the broad bay of Pernambuco:—

"Olinda, seen from this distance, must attract the attention and the admiration of every one. Of this city, set upon a hill, one is at a loss whether to admire most the whitened houses and massive temples, or the luxuriant foliage interspersed among them, and in which those edifices on the hill-side seem to be partially buried. From this point a line of highlands sweeps inward with a tolerably-regular arc, terminating at Cape St. Augustine, and forming a semilunar reconcave, analogous to that of Bahia. The entire summit of these highlands is crowned with green forests and foliage. Indeed, from the outermost range of vision to the very precincts of the city, throughout the extended plain, circumscribed by five-sixths of the imagined arc, scarcely an opening appears to the eye, although in fact the country overlooked is populous and cultivated. Numbers of buildings also, within the suburbs of the city, are overtowered and wholly or partially hid by lofty palms, mangueiras, cajueiros, and other trees. The interval between Recife and Olinda is in striking contrast to this appearance. It is a perfectly barren bank of sand, a narrow beach, upon one side of which the ocean breaks, while, on the other side, only a few rods distant and nearly parallel, runs a branch of the Beberibe River. This stream is navigable to boats as far as Olinda, and forms the principal channel of communication with that place, although the beach may be considered a species of turnpike.

"At a distance, varying from one-fourth to half a mile from the shore, runs the bank of rocks already mentioned as extending along the greater portion of the northern coast of Brazil. Its top is scarcely visible at high tide, being covered with the surf, which dashes over it in sheets of foam. At low water it is left dry, and stands like an artificial wall, with a surface sufficiently even to form a beautiful promenade in the very midst of the sea. This natural parapet is approached by the aid of boats. It is found to be from two to five rods in thickness. Its edges are a little worn and fractured, but both its sides are perpendicular to a great depth. The rock, in its external appearance, is of a dark brown color. When broken, it is found to be composed of a very hard species of sandstone of a yellow complexion, in which numerous bivalves are imbedded in a state of complete preservation. Various species of small sea-shells may be collected in the water-worn cavities of the surface. At several points deep winding fissures extend through a portion of the reef, but in general its appearance is quite

regular, much more so doubtless than any artificial wall could be after hundreds of years' exposure to the wearing of the ocean waves. The abrupt opening in this reef, by which an entrance is offered to vessels, is scarcely less remarkable than the protection which is secured to them when once behind this rocky bulwark."—Vol. ii, pp. 122, 123.

The following passages are from a description of the scenery on the island of Itamaracá:—

"Nothing could be at once more useful and ornamental than these magnificent palms. They are planted in regular lines, and grow to a nearly uniform height. Their trunks are slender and limbless, marked only by regular scars left in their growth, as one set of deciduous leaves falls off, yielding the precedence to another. Quite in their lofty top the fruit is clustered. The leaves, though simple and plume-like in form, are majestic in size. They stretch in various curves from the common centre of each tree-top, so as to unite their extremities, and form an umbrageous canopy so dense as to be scarcely penetrated by the rays of a vertical sun. These bowers are ever green, and whether illuminated by sun, moon, or star-light, they shed down, by varying reflections, a sombre brilliancy calculated to chasten the feelings and soothe the heart. Throughout all this vast arena the grass grows wild, and the turf is intersected by narrow, winding paths, exhibiting a white sandy bottom beneath. Here the mild air of the grove is freshened by an almost unceasing breeze from the sea, while he who enjoys it can look out upon a boundless expanse of the ocean, heaving its restless tide and breaking into foam over the coral reefs which girt the island. The strip of the shore, planted with coqueiros, varies from forty to one hundred rods in width. Beyond this, the prevailing tree is the *cajueiro* or cashew, which, together with the vine, the mangueira, and other trees, produces fruit in great abundance and perfection."—Vol. ii, pp. 167, 168.

In Mr. Kidder's relation of the various incidents which befell him, there is sometimes a vein of quiet humor that is exceedingly pleasant and refreshing:—

"It was nearly dark, and very foggy, when we were obliged to resume our route, without any certainty of meeting with a better reception further along. I was inclined to push forward to a Freguezia some miles ahead, where I had been told was an inn. But, as it soon became dark, my companion determined to apply at every dwelling until he should find some stopping place. After repeated refusals, he at length received an affirmative answer, and we reined up to a small domicil which appeared full of its own inmates. A woman, about forty years old, seemed to be principal of the domestic arrangements. She promised an excellent pasture for our horses, and sent to a neighbor, by the light of a fire-brand, to procure them corn. Her kindness did not stop short of offering us the very beds of the family, and she had no others, on which we might rest. A variety of considerations induced us to decline this, and other equally-obliging offers.

"On especial application, permission was granted us to occupy a small shed adjoining the house, and opening toward the road. A mat was provided, to spread between us and the ground, upon which, with portmanteau at the head and saddles at the feet, we became in due time extended. A wax taper had been stuck upon the side of the wall, to illuminate a portion of our darkness for a short time. After its expiration we had a protracted season for meditation; for between the noise of the people in the house and of a pack of puppies, which we in the morning ascertained to have been fellow-occupants of the same apartment with us, sleep sparingly visited our eyelids. Daylight at length appeared, and with it not a little alarm lest our horses were gone; for, on looking at a pasture where they had been turned through a pair of bars, we neither saw them nor any hedge, (cerca,) respecting which we had been assured there was an excellent one. Our apprehensions were at length quieted by finding the horses—learning, at the same time, that the word meaning hedge, was also used to signify a ditch!"—Vol. i, pp. 217, 218.

And now of those more general features of the book before us, that constitute its real and permanent value as an historical work upon Brazil.

The continent of South America was discovered A. D. 1500. In January of that year, Vincent Yanez Pinzon, a companion of Columbus, and the first Spaniard who crossed the equator, landed at Cape St. Augustine, and thence followed the coast northward as far as the mouth of the Oronoco. In April of the same year, Pedro Alvarez Cabral, commander of the second Portuguese fleet that doubled the Cape of Good Hope, discovered that portion of the Brazilian coast now called Espirito Santo. In 1530 the unexplored territory of Brazil was divided into captancies by the king of Portugal, and these were occupied by their several *donataries* in 1534–5; and in 1572 the government of the colony was divided between two captains-general, resident severally at St. Salvador and Rio de Janeiro. Four years later, the government was reduced to the *jurisprudence* of one captain-general, residing at Bahia. In 1580, Brazil, in connection with Portugal, came under the dominion of Spain, but was freed therefrom in 1640; and in 1661 the Dutch, who had invaded and taken possession of the whole coast, but had been defeated and expelled from Pernambuco, abandoned, by negotiation, all claim to the country. In 1693 regular mining for gold commenced, and in 1729 the diamond mines in Serro Frio were discovered. In 1815 Brazil was elevated to the rank of a kingdom, and in 1818 the crown was placed on the head of Don John VI., who, three years later, returned to Portugal, leaving his son, Don Pedro, regent. Don Pedro was twenty-three years of age when he assumed the regency, and his position was

embarrassing. He left Portugal at a very early age, and his highest ambition was connected with the land of his adoption. Suspicion that such a feeling existed on his part, or a petty jealousy of his position at Brazil, induced the cortes of Portugal to order his return to Europe; and the decree was accompanied by an ordinance abolishing the royal tribunals at Rio. Continued arbitrary decrees on the part of Portugal goaded the Brazilians into a declaration of independence. On the 12th of October, 1822, Don Pedro, yielding to frequent solicitation, consented to be proclaimed emperor and perpetual defender of Brazil. On the 1st of the following December he was crowned as Don Pedro I., and a session of the Assembly convoked to draft a constitution. The constitution framed by them was accepted by the emperor, and sworn to throughout the empire on the 24th of March, 1824. The recognition of Brazilian independence was formally made by Portugal on the 29th of August, 1825.

To the defective character of Don Pedro may be attributed whatever subsequently occurred to unsettle the new order of things in Brazil. Seldom, if indeed ever, was a throne ascended under more favorable auspices. The revolution was the full, ripe fruit of a universal dissatisfaction, planted in the hearts of a generous and confiding people by the arbitrary measures of the parent government; and it was effected without carnage or the horrors of a protracted war. With ordinary prudence on the part of Don Pedro I., his authority might have been firmly established. By a wise, liberal, and uniform policy, he might have concentrated the energies of his subjects on improving the resources of the country, and have placed Brazil at once in advantageous relationship with European nations and the republics of America; and he might thus have increased the wealth and the intelligence of his people. Yet scarcely had ten years passed before Don Pedro I. had forfeited the confidence of the people, who were certainly disposed to yield a hearty support to the new dynasty. Not that he was tyrannical, but that he was imprudent; he seems to have possessed firmness without principle, energy without perseverance—an admirer of the representative form of government, he yet hesitated in its practical enforcement. At the time of the revolution he joined in the feelings of nationality; but his subsequent employment of a foreign force, his continued interference in the affairs of Portugal, and his appointment of naturalized Portuguese to the highest offices of state to the exclusion of natives of the soil, awakened a universal suspicion that he was still a Portuguese at heart. Indications of dissatisfaction were manifested, and were

met by more offensive measures, until finally Don Pedro, after ineffectual efforts to suppress the rising spirit of rebellion in various parts of the empire, abdicated on the 7th of April, 1831, in favor of his son, Don Pedro de Alcantara, then only six years of age. A triple regency followed, which soon dwindled into individual usurpation of power. In 1834 important changes were made in the constitution of the empire; annual provincial assemblies were provided for in the place of the general council hitherto held; the regency was made to devolve upon a single individual, to be elected every four years; and on the 12th of October, 1835, Diogo Antonio Feijo, of San Paulo, was duly elected to that office. The question of the regency being now disposed of, the affairs of the country assumed a more settled aspect. Feijo's administration, however, proved unpopular, and he abdicated on the 17th of September, 1837, and the regency, by virtue of a provision in the constitution, devolved upon Pedro Araujo Lima, then minister of the empire. About this time our author's acquaintance with Brazil commenced.

The fourth chapter of the first volume opens with a pleasant description of Rio de Janeiro, where our author resided for some time after his arrival in Brazil. The description of the capital is continued through several succeeding chapters, and embraces full accounts of the monastic institutions and orders, public buildings, domestic customs, and other leading features of the capital, interspersed with several excellent drawings. Admitted thus into the very homestead of Brazilian life, we are prepared for many singular incidents subsequently detailed in the narrative. Our author's first expedition was in company with his colleague to the villages situated on the upper borders of the bay of Rio de Janeiro. They sailed up the Macacú River to the village of that name, and, returning, entered the Rio do Porto das Caixas. This latter river was so narrow and crooked, that oars were useless, and they had to employ setting poles. Porto das Caixas itself stands on a small eminence above the river, and is the general rendezvous for the troops of mules which bring coffee and sugars from the Swiss colonies of Novo Friburgo and Canto-Gallo, and a large section of the neighboring country. Here, also, are debarked the goods which return from the capital in exchange for produce. It is a thriving place, and, like Macacú, furnished our travelers with several incidents.

On the 15th of January, 1839, he embarked on board a steamboat for Santos, the principal port of the province of San Paulo, and distant from Rio, in direct course, about two hundred and twenty-five miles. Neither vessel, commander, nor crew, seems to

have been at all in advance of the age. On the morning after his arrival at the place of his destination, our author joined a party who were about to visit the interior. After waiting two hours for his traveling companions, and sundry mishaps in the preparations for the journey, they at length start on the highway to Cubatão. The company are thus described:—

"The first characters that engaged my attention were the two tropeiros, or conductors of the troop. They were not mounted, but preferred going on foot, in order to give proper attention to their animals and baggage. The latter being mostly of an inconvenient form, and not easily balanced, gave them great annoyance from its propensity to get loose and fall off. The principal was a very tall, athletic man, apparently about thirty years of age. His features were coarse in the extreme, and a hair-lip rendered his speech indistinct. His arms, feet, and legs to his knees were bare, and soon after starting, off came his shirt, exhibiting a tawny and properly yellow skin. His companion, and probably younger brother, was not so large, but appeared to have equal nerve. He was better dressed, and walked with his shoulders inclined forward. His jet black hair was long, and hung in ringlets upon his neck. His eyes were dark and flashing, and his countenance not dissimilar to that of a North American Indian. These persons were a specimen of the Paulista tropeiros, who, as a class, differ very much from the Mineiros and conductors that visit Rio de Janeiro. They have a certain wildness in their look, which, mingled with intelligence and sometimes benignity, gives to their countenance altogether a peculiar expression. They universally wear a large pointed knife, twisted into their girdle behind. This faca de ponta is perhaps more essential to them than the knife of the sailor is to him. It serves to cut wood, to mend harnesses, to kill and dress an animal, to carve food, and, in case of necessity, to defend or to assault. Its blade has a curve peculiar to itself, and, in order to be approved, must have a temper that will enable it to be struck through a thick piece of copper without bending or breaking. This, being a favorite companion, is often mounted with a silver handle, and sometimes encased in a silver sheath, although it is generally worn naked.

"As to the travelers, we represented at least six different nations of the old and new worlds, presenting no small variety, both in character and costume. Mons. G., physically the greatest man among us, was mounted upon the smallest mule; and, not being accustomed to riding in this style, often consoled himself with the reflection that if he fell, neither the distance nor the danger would be great, as his feet almost touched the ground. This gentleman holds a distinguished place in the botanical department of the Museum of Natural History in Paris, and was at that time sent out by the French government on a special scientific mission to Brazil.

"Having not only had the pleasure of his company as *companion de voyage*, but also as a fellow-boarder for several weeks at S. Paulo, and in repeated excursions in the neighborhood of that city, I must be allowed to mention several of those qualities which rendered his society

agreeable. His sociability was only equaled by his cheerfulness of disposition. His fund of enlivening anecdote was almost inexhaustible, being drawn from a strangely-diversified personal history, and from extensive acquaintance with learned men. His conversation, always interesting, was pre-eminently so when inspired by his enthusiasm in botanical pursuits. Hence *les fleurs magnifiques* which adorned *notre belle route* imparted a double gratification.

"The individual next to be noticed was Doctor I., a Brazilian physician, educated in France; whose devotedness to the cause of science, equally with his noble and generous disposition, led him to make this entire journey for the sake of introducing Mons. G. at S. Paulo, and of making the sojourn of that gentleman in Brazil as pleasant as possible. Such attentions were the more desirable to Mons. G., as he was entirely unacquainted with the language and customs of the country, and they were amply realized in the spirited manner in which the doctor discharged his office as general manager to the party.

"Mons. B., a subject of the king of Sardinia, was a painter by profession. Senhor P., a young Fluminense, had spent several years in Paris, and was now going to take his course as a student at law in the University at S. Paulo. He, and a young Parisian associated with Mons. G., kept the road alive with their merriment, singing at the top of their voices. In addition to these might be mentioned Mynheer F., son to the secretary of the Rhenish Missionary Society at Elberfeldt; a third Brazilian, a third Frenchman, and a Portuguese. Respecting the only North American in the group, it is perhaps unnecessary to remark at present, unless that his paulista boots and other riding accoutrements must have assimilated his appearance to that of a genuine tropeiro—unprovided, of course, with either long knife or pistols."—Vol. i, pp. 207–209.

The party ascended, by a well-paved road, the Serra do Mar, or Ocean Cordillera. The ascent, however, was of a somewhat perilous character, as they met with many deep gulleys formed by slides of earth. Ere they reached its summit, they were overtaken by a dense fog and a heavy shower of rain, so that we lose the description of the immediate surrounding country. The travelers' accommodations during this journey, and even at the ancient city of San Paulo, appear not to have been of the most comfortable kind. The Jesuits figure largely in the early history of this city, and it is also distinguished as the birth-place of the Brazilian revolution of independence, as it was on the banks of the rivulet, Ypiranga, that Don Pedro first made the declaration, "Independencia ou morte." The city is situated on an elevated piece of ground, between two small streams. The suburbs and the vicinity are remarkably pleasant. Mr. Kidder was present at the religious festival of St. Paul, the tutelar guardian of the town and province, of which a most interesting account will be found on pages 232–285 of the first volume.

While at San Paulo, our author visited a large plantation, and appears to have seen with an observing eye the various processes through which the products of the country passed in their preparation for consumption. The most remarkable of these was the manufacture of mandioc flour. This vegetable (*Jatropha manihot, L.*) is the principal farinaceous product of Brazil. It is indigenous to the country, and has the peculiar property of combining a deadly poison with highly-nutritive qualities. It was known to the Indians long before the discovery of Brazil, who, with that intuitive perception peculiar to savage life—or rather with that wise provision of a beneficent Providence, which so largely supplies the lack of man's many inventions—had learned to separate "the evil from the good," and made important uses of this singular herb. For an interesting account of the mode in which the natives prepared the flour, and the improved method in use at the present day, we must refer the reader to the first volume of the "Sketches," while we follow the author in his instructive tour. The next place visited was the locality of the gold washing. We give the author's description of this process :—

"Our examination of the gold washing occurred early one morning, before the rays of the sun had acquired sufficient power to cause inconvenience. It was situated in the alluvial soil at the foot of the mountain. Very little of the precious metal is here found in combination with rocks; but, on the contrary, it exists in particles varying in size from the finest dust to the magnitude of a buckshot or pea. The soil is red or ferruginous, and the gold is sometimes found near the surface, but principally mingled with a stratum of gravel and rounded pebbles, like that in which diamonds are found, and like that, also, denominated cascalhão. The method of searching out the hidden treasure is very simple. The first requisite is a stream of water, of sufficiently high level to be brought by channels or pipes to the summit of an excavation. The earth is then cut into steps, each twenty or thirty feet wide, two or three broad, and about one deep. Near the bottom a trench is cut to the depth of two or three feet. On each step stand six or eight negroes, who, as the water flows gently from above, keep the earth continually in motion with shovels, until the whole is reduced to liquid mud, and washed below. The particles of gold contained in this earth descend to the trench, where, by reason of their specific gravity, they quickly precipitate. Workmen are continually employed at the trench to remove the stones, and clear away the surface, which operation is much assisted by the current of water which falls into it. After five days' washing, the precipitation in the trench is carried to some convenient stream to undergo a second clearance. For this purpose wooden bowls are provided, of a funnel shape, about two feet at the mouth, and five or six inches deep, called *gamellas*. Each workman, standing in the stream, takes into his bowl five or six pounds of the

sediment, which generally consists of heavy matter, such as granular oxide of iron, pyrites, ferruginous quartz, and often more precious stones. They admit certain quantities of water into the bowls, which they move about so dexterously, that the precious metal, separating from the inferior and lighter substances, settles to the bottom and sides of the vessel. They then rinse their bowls in a larger vessel of clean water, leaving the gold in that, and begin again.

"The washing of each bowlful occupies from five to eight or nine minutes. The gold produced is extremely variable in quality, and in the size of its particles. The operation is superintended by overseers, the result being important. When the whole is finished, the gold is placed upon a brass pan, over a slow fire, to be dried, and at a convenient time is taken to the permutation office, where it is weighed, and a fifth reserved for the government. The remainder is smelted with muriate of mercury, then cast into ingots, assayed, and stamped according to its intrinsic value.

"Bars of uncoined gold were formerly common in the circulating medium of Brazil. But at present specie of all kinds, except copper, is scarce, and seldom met with, except at exchange offices.

"Nothing was doing at these mines when I visited them. The aspect of the place was solitary but magnificent. The wide and deep excavations, the empty channels of the deserted water-courses, and the huge heaps of cascalhão, all stood silent yet speaking monuments of that *sacra auri fames*, which in every age and place has found a lodgment in the human breast. The very earth seemed to mourn the desolations inflicted upon its fair bosom, robbed of verdure as it was for ages, if not for ever—in thankless return for the rifled treasure.

"A few hours' search among the strata developed by the excavations, and among the rocks cast up as débris from the washings, rewarded us with as large a quantity of geological specimens as we were disposed to export. In the loose soil bordering upon the washings, we met with beautiful specimens of the black oxyd of manganese."—Vol. i, pp. 247–249.

After visiting other remarkable places in and about the city of San Paulo, among which was the Academy of Laws, a large and meritorious institution, established in a convent, where, amid numerous books on science and theology, there was not a single copy of the Bible—a deficiency which Mr. Kidder supplied—he proceeded into the interior. Passing over, though reluctantly, numerous "incidents of travel," narrated in a most pleasing style, we are introduced to the district of Itu, where there is a dense population, numerous schools and churches, and members of the "learned professions." In the town of Itu our author is domiciled in the house of a German physician, to whom he had letters of introduction. This gentleman was conversant with the German, English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and Russian tongues; and his society was a pleasant interlude to the discomforts attend-

ant upon a stranger in a strange land. Strong as was the temptation, Mr. Kidder remitted not his journeyings and his labor; and we soon find him again advancing, scattering the "good seed of the kingdom," and gathering information for the benefit of his countrymen, who either as missionaries or traders may hereafter visit the Brazilian provinces. Indeed, he is fast becoming a positive utilitarian; nothing seems to escape his notice, and many details are scattered through his volumes of so thoroughly practical and domestic a character, and so generally passed by unheeded of the tourist,—but which greatly enhance the interest and value of his volumes,—that we are often surprised at the sources and extent of his information. Any man, with a tolerable capacity for accommodating himself to circumstances, might, with these volumes at his fingers' end, pass through the country as a Brazilian citizen, without much fear of naturalization laws.

We next pass over the southern boundaries of the province of San Paulo into the provinces of Santa Catharina and Rio Grande do Sul—the former as to territory the smallest in Brazil, comprehending the island from which it takes its name, and about two hundred miles along the coast. The climate is salubrious and temperate, as is also that of Rio Grande do Sul. The latter has great natural advantages, but has been so long involved in rebellion against the imperial government, that its prosperity is on the wane. We omitted to mention, by the way, that our author has given some admirable sketches—excellent specimens of condensed biography—of most of the leading personages of San Paulo, and especially of Feijo, the author of the celebrated "Demonstration of the Necessity of Abolishing Clerical Celibacy;"—for an able translation of which the Protestant world is already indebted to Mr. Kidder. While at San Paulo, he also visited the Hospital da Misericordia, the Hospital dos Lazaros, and the principal elementary schools. We may here mention, also, what ought to have been referred to in another place, as a triumph of Protestant labors, unequaled in any Roman Catholic country since the establishment of "his holiness"(?) upon the Papal throne, that acting under the advice and counsel of his Brazilian friends, Mr. Kidder submitted the following proposition to the provincial Assembly of San Paulo, with the success mentioned in the sequel:—

"*Proposition to the Honorable Legislature, the Provincial Assembly of the Imperial Province of San Paulo.*

"Whereas, having visited this province as a stranger, and having received high satisfaction, not only in the observation of those natural

advantages of climate, soil, and productions, with which a benignant Providence has so eminently distinguished it; but also in the generous hospitality and esteemed acquaintance of various citizens; and,

"Whereas, in making some inquiries upon the subject of education, having been repeatedly informed of a great want of reading books in the primary schools, especially in the interior; and,

"Whereas, having relations with the American Bible Society, located in New-York, the fundamental object of which is to distribute the word of God, without note or comment, in different parts of the world; and, whereas, the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is a choice specimen of style, as well on subjects historical as moral and religious, in addition to imbodying the pure and sacred truths of our holy Christianity, the knowledge of which is of so high importance to every individual, both as a human being and as a member of society; and,

"Whereas, having the most unlimited confidence in the philanthropic benevolence of said society, and in its willingness to co-operate for the good of this country in common with all others, and especially in view of the happy relations existing between two prominent nations of the new world: therefore, I propose to guaranty on the part of the said American Bible Society the free donation of copies of the New Testament, translated into Portuguese by the Padre Antonio Pereira de Figueiredo, in sufficient number to furnish every primary school in the province with a library of one dozen; on the simple condition, that said copies shall be received as delivered at the Alfandega (Custom-house) of Rio de Janeiro, and caused to be distributed among, preserved in, and used by the said several schools, as books of general reading and instruction for the pupils of the same.

"With the most sincere desires for the moral and civil prosperity of the imperial province of San Paulo, the above proposition is humbly and respectfully submitted. D. P. KIDDER.

"*City of San Paulo, Feb.* 15, 1839."

"The same day I received a verbal message, saying that the Assembly had received the proposition with peculiar satisfaction, and referred it to the two committees on ecclesiastical affairs and on public instruction. The following official communication was subsequently received.

[TRANSLATION.]

"To MR. KIDDER,—I inform you that the Legislative Assembly has received with especial satisfaction your offer of copies of the New Testament, translated by the Padre Antonio Pereira de Figueiredo, and that the Legislature will enter into a deliberation upon the subject, the result of which will be communicated to you.

"God preserve you!

"MIGUEL EUFRAZIO DE AZEVEDO MARQUEZ, *Sec.*

"*Palace of the Provincial Assembly, S. Paulo, Feb.*, 1839."

. . . . "The last direct intelligence I had upon the subject, was received in conversation with the president of the Assembly. I met this gentleman on his subsequent arrival at Rio de Janeiro to discharge his duties as a member of the House of Deputies. He informed me that such were the political animosities existing between the two parties into which the Assembly was divided, that very little business of any kind had been done during the session. The minority as a party, and individuals of the majority, favored the project, but, under the circumstances, did not wish to urge immediate action upon it. Meantime, through some slanders circulated by an English Catholic priest residing at Rio, the suspicions of the old bishop were excited lest the translation was not actually what it purported to be, but had suffered alterations.

"An examination was proposed, but either through inability or willful neglect was not attempted; and thus the superstitious humor of the old diocesan was counted among other things which caused delay. The president expressed a hope that on the next organization of the Assembly the proposal would be fully accepted.

"I subsequently saw in a newspaper, that the committee to whom the subject had been referred, or probably its chairman, in direct contravention of his voluntary promise to me, but in obedience to the old bishop's idle fears, had filed in the secretary's office a report unfavorable to the proposal. The proposition was probably never acted upon. To the credit of the province, it certainly was never formally rejected."—Vol. i, pp. 323, 324, 326, 327.

In the province of Rio Grande do Sul is the celebrated iron foundery of Ypanema; the only establishment of the kind in the empire. It is situated in a beautiful valley at the foot of the mountain of Guarassajava. This mountain contains vast quantities of magnetic iron ore. Our author visited this establishment, and amply describes it in his pages.

Our author now proceeded to visit the northern portions of the empire, embarking from Rio in the month of July on board the steam-boat St. Sebastian. Prior to the year 1839 there had not existed any means of regular or rapid communication between the capital and the extreme portions of the empire, particularly the far north. But about this time the Brazilian Steam-packet Company, under the patronage of the imperial government, had established a line of packets, of which the St. Sebastian was one, intended to convey mails and passengers, freight, and, in case of need, munitions of war, between the different ports along the coast, and in fact to establish a bond of connection between Rio de Janeiro and the river Amazon. Mr. Kidder's first destination was Bahia. He passed along the coast of the Espirito Santo, a province which, though early discovered and settled by the first donataries, is described as being yet but thinly inhabited, and lacking the improvements found in

most other parts. Yet its soil is fertile and its waters abound with valuable fish. Bahia and Pernambuco are the cities best known to the commercial world; of the former city, distant from Rio de Janeiro about eight hundred miles, we have in these volumes a graphic description, and an historical sketch from the time of its foundation to the present, which is perhaps as favorable a specimen of the author's perspicuous narration of historical facts as any in the work. It will be found in the second volume, pp. 28–56. Mr. Kidder describes Bahia as a beautiful city, having highly-ornamental suburbs and picturesque scenery. This refers more particularly, if not exclusively, to the upper town—the lower being deficient in neatness, cleanliness, and architectural beauty. Bahia is the seat of the only archbishopric in the empire. The salary of the archbishop is equal to about fifteen hundred dollars. The monastic orders and establishments are numerous. The commerce of Bahia has waned for several years past. The following observations on this subject may not be palateable to our transatlantic brethren, but they are the language of candor and truth. Speaking on this subject, the "trade" of Bahia, Mr. Kidder says:—

"It has never recovered its former vigor since the revolution of 1837. One cause has been the renewed activity of the English cruisers, which began to be manifested in 1838, and has since continued to oppose a formidable obstacle to the slave trade on the African coast, in which Bahia has from early days been deeply interested. The effects of this activity are by no means confined to the number of prizes taken, but are still more obvious in preventing the embarkation of slaves than in capturing them when afloat. It has not been generally known that notwithstanding the opposition of the English nation to the slave trade, and her vigorous efforts to suppress it, yet that the strong bulwark of that traffic *has been the English capital, by aid of which it has been carried on.* Such is the fact. Few slave vessels were fitted out without large credits from English houses based on the anticipated sale of their return cargo. It was not principle that cut off these credits, but the repeated losses of the slave dealers, which left them nothing to pay. Thus English philanthropy and English cupidity came in contact with each other, and it is a happy circumstance that the former, to a great extent, triumphed. Yet the derangement of so vast a business as the slave traffic had become has been severely felt in the commercial affairs of Bahia, not only on account of the number of persons engaged in it, but also on account of the market it had hitherto furnished for two principal products of the province—rum and tobacco."—Vol. ii, pp. 86, 87.

Leaving Bahia, and proceeding northward, our author landed at Maceio, in the province of Alagoas, near the locality of the famous republic of the Palmares. He next touched at Pernambuco, where

he had letters of introduction to several citizens and to an ex-president of the province, late one of the ministers of the empire, and at present baron of Suasuna. This gentleman Mr. Kidder visited at his country-seat, about four leagues distant from Pernambuco.

Here we have another valuable historical epitome of the events transpiring within the province and city up to the time of our author's visit, followed by an equally-interesting description of the customs and employments of the people, the public institutions, and the religious and commercial condition of the city, and its sister city Olinda. Pernambuco seems to have been, until a very late period, the scene of frequent rebellions and disturbances. Notwithstanding this, it has remained tolerably prosperous. Its situation is inviting, and its scenery picturesque. The state of religion is very much like that in other portions of the empire. Not long before Mr. Kidder visited the province a melancholy proof of religious fanaticism occurred. There prevails in Portugal, and to some extent in Brazil, a sect called Sebastianists. Their belief is that Don Sebastian, the king of Portugal, who in 1577 undertook an expedition against the Moors in Africa, and who, having been defeated, never returned, is still alive, and is destined yet to make his reappearance on earth. The Portuguese look for his appearance at Lisbon; but the Brazilians generally think it most likely that he will first revisit his own city, St. Sebastian. The sequel shall be told in the author's own language:—

"It appears, however, that a reckless villain, named João Antonio, fixed upon a remote part of the province of Pernambuco, near Piancó, in the Comarca de Flores, for the appearance of the said D. Sebastian. The place designated was a dense forest, near which were known to be two acroceraunian caverns. This spot the impostor said was an enchanted kingdom, which was about to be disenchanted, whereupon Don Sebastian would immediately appear at the head of a great army, with glory and with power, to confer wealth and happiness upon all who should anticipate his coming by associating themselves with said João Antonio.

"As might be expected, he found followers, who, after awhile, learned that the imaginary kingdom was to be disenchanted by having its soil sprinkled with the blood of one hundred innocent children! In default of a sufficient number of children, men and women were to be immolated, but in a few days they would all rise again, and become possessed of the riches of the world. The prophet appears to have lacked the courage necessary to carry out his bloody scheme, but he delegated power to an accomplice, named João Ferreira, who assumed the title of 'his Holiness,' put a wreath of rushes upon his head, and required the proselytes to kiss his toe, on pain of instant death. After other deeds too horrible to describe, he commenced the slaughter of human

beings. Each parent was required to bring forward one or two of his children to be offered. In vain did the prattling babes shriek and beg that they might not be murdered. The unnatural parents would reply, 'No, my child, there is no remedy,' and forcibly offer them. In the course of two days he had thus in cold blood slain twenty-one adults and twenty children, when a brother of the prophet, becoming jealous of 'his Holiness,' thrust him through, and assumed his power. At this juncture some one ran away, and apprised the civil authorities of the dreadful tragedy.

"Troops were called out who hastened to the spot, but the infatuated Sebastianists had been taught not to fear anything, but that should an attack be made upon them it would be the signal for the restoration of the kingdom, the resurrection of their dead, and the destruction of their enemies. Wherefore on seeing the troops approach they rushed upon them, uttering cries of defiance, attacking those who had come to their rescue, and actually killing five, and wounding others, before they could be restrained. Nor did they submit until twenty-nine of their number, including three women, had actually been killed. Women, seeing their husbands dying at their feet, would not attempt to escape, but shouted, 'The time is come; viva, viva, the time is come!' Of those that survived, a few escaped into the woods, the rest were taken prisoners. It was found that the victims of this horrid delusion had not even buried the bodies of their murdered offspring and kinsmen, so confident were they of their immediate restoration."—Vol. ii, pp. 149, 150.

But we must forbear. We have not room to follow the author in his visits to the remaining provinces, and with unfeigned reluctance we leave full one-third of these remarkably-interesting volumes unexplored. Numerous passages, which we had marked for quotation, must be sought for by the reader in the work itself; and if he read it with but half the pleasure and advantage that we have derived from the perusal, he will find himself more than abundantly repaid for the outlay of time and money. Toward the close of the second volume is a masterly sketch of the political history of Brazil, which especially will repay a careful reading; and we will substitute, in the stead of many things that we wished to say about these "Sketches and Incidents," a few passages from that portion of the work:—

"The favorable position, and the vast extent of the Brazilian empire, must always secure for it a prominent place in the eyes of the world. Indeed, few nations can enter into comparison with it in either of these respects. Brazil stands out upon the eastern shore of South America as the great way-mark of the Southern Atlantic. It commands equal access to Europe and the United States. Africa and the West Indies are its neighbors; while the voyage from its principal ports to Southern Asia and the islands of the Indian Ocean is shorter by ten or twelve thousand miles than from either Liverpool or New-York. At the same

time, Brazil embraces nearly half of all South America, covering an area considerably greater than that of the United States with their territories, and equal to six-sevenths of all Europe.

"The internal resources of the empire are commensurate with its favored position and its wide extent. It is neither the gold of its mines, nor the diamonds that sparkle in the beds of its inland rivers, that constitute the greatest sources of its available wealth. Although nature has bestowed upon Brazil the most precious minerals, yet she has been still more prodigal in the gift of vegetable riches. Embracing the whole latitude of the southern torrid, and ten degrees of the southern temperate zone, and stretching its longitude from Cape St. Agustine, the easternmost point of the continent, across the mountains of its own interior to the very feet of the Andes, its soil and its climate offer an asylum to almost every valuable plant. In addition to numberless varieties of indigenous growth, there is scarcely a production of either India which might not be naturalized in great perfection under or near the equator; while its interior uplands, and its soil in the far south, welcome many of the grains and hardier vegetables of Europe.

"Not only does Brazil embrace whatever is beautiful, whatever is luxuriant, and whatever is magnificent in nature, but it enjoys a pleasant and a salubrious climate. There prevails, throughout its whole extent, a degree of healthfulness unknown in the parallel latitudes of Africa; and, at the same time, an exemption from earthquakes, which the treasures of Chili and Peru, on the opposite coast of South America, can but poorly compensate. Within such limits, and occupying such a position, we find established the only monarchy existing in the new world."—Vol. ii, pp. 386, 387.

Before we lay down these volumes, we must say a word or two about a portion of the book which, in ordinary cases, does not merit separate notice. We allude to the Appendix. There is more historical and statistical information contained in it than in many a ponderous tome. We give but an index to its contents. Mr. Kidder first corrects some important errors on the subject of Brazil in M'Culloch's Universal Gazetteer; and then we have a chronological summary of the principal events that have transpired in the history of Brazil, from the discovery of the country to the present time—a list of all the churches in the city of Rio de Janeiro—correspondence on the object of the author's mission—the offices of the saints, according to popular superstitions in Brazil—monasticism, showing the present uses of all the buildings erected by the Jesuits and other monastic orders—a botanical table, exhibiting the scientific and common names of all the remarkable plants indigenous to Brazil, with their medical qualities and common uses—population of each of the provinces—exports and imports of the empire and of the capital—official documents relating to commerce between Brazil and the United States—finance of the empire, in-

cluding revenues and expenditures in the various departments—diplomacy—army and navy—marriage of the Prince de Joinville to her Imperial Highness Donna Francisca, sister of the emperor—succession of ministers since the abdication of Don Pedro I.—members of the council of state—nobility of the empire, and various corrections of Captain Wilkes's Narrative of the Exploring Expedition. It only remains for us to say that the numerous illustrations, &c., are worthy specimens of art, and that the mechanical part of the work does great credit to the respectable publishers. Altogether, the book is one of those "books that are books," and has our cordial commendation.

ART. VII.—*Brownson's Quarterly Review.* No. V. January, 1845. Boston.

WE have a strong desire to be at peace with our brother reviewers; and so far, with very slight exceptions, have succeeded in this object: but it can scarcely be expected, in these days, that reviewers of different schools, who never truckle, should never come into collision. Great topics are discussed with freedom; the public mind is in a state of activity, and often becomes highly excited. Under such circumstances, it would be strange if reviewers should be either noncommittal or always perfectly cool, cautious, and pacific. Protestant, of the evangelical school, as we are, we can but regard Romanism as a grand corruption of Christianity; and, in view of its internal policy and past history, we are equally convinced that it is a dangerous element in the civil compact. The direct interference of Romanists, as such, with our political and educational interests, has fixed a suspicion in our mind that the agents of this great politico-ecclesiastical institution are playing their old game in this country, and that their changeless policy is a fair subject of criticism and investigation. The pretensions of Romanism, the hopes of its friends, and the fears of its enemies, are in themselves good and sufficient reasons why the people of these United States should thoroughly study and well understand its character and workings. It has been for the purpose of reflecting light upon the subject, and not from any ill will to Romanists, that we have given a portion of our space to the controversy pending between them and the Protestant churches of Christendom. We have no quarrel with them as men or as foreigners. We object to their theology, their ecclesiastical polity,

their literary poilcy, and, we might add, their politics. We use the word *politics* in this connection, not in its ordinary acceptation, but for *the policy of the Jesuits*—the grand object of which is to *subject the state to the church*—a policy which we hope may never meet with favor in this country.

With these views of Romanism, we have exercised our rights as an American reviewer—who ever ought to scorn the idea of truckling to a vaunting foe, or of turning aside from the path of duty for fear of unpleasant consequences—and have taken some notice of the dangerous and injurious policy of the Church of Rome. For our temerity we are likely to smart severely. O. A. Brownson, with whom, on a former occasion, we had a small brush, having recently become a convert to Romanism, and no doubt seeing it necessary to make a strong demonstration of his zeal for his new faith, has taken us in hand. Mr. Brownson, the editor of the Boston Quarterly Review, which closed up in 1842, and the author of several books, now conducts a review which bears his own name, and is devoted almost entirely to a defense of Romanism, and attacks upon the Protestant faith. Mr. Brownson's conversion is to be chronicled in the history of Romanism as an event of more or less importance, according to the term of his adhesion to the cause he has espoused. It is certain that the Romish editors in this country think him a great acquisition. We would make no allusion to his character for the purpose of detracting from the force of his arguments: but that our readers may know how much real importance is to be attached to his conversion, it may be proper just to sketch the leading phases which his theological views have assumed within a few years past. We do this partly from personal knowledge, partly from authentic information from his acquaintances, but mostly from his own publications.

In the first place, we have the pleasure to say, that Mr. Brownson is not, as far as we know, a personal enemy. He has said some very kind things of us, and we have no unkind feelings toward him. Indeed, there are elements in his character that we like. He is a hard student—a considerable thinker—is bold—confident—open-hearted, and, we have ever supposed, honest in his opinions. We consequently have no feelings toward him which would lead us to treat him with undue severity or personal disrespect. We believe it has been his misfortune, or his fault—we assume not to say which—since he came into public notice, to be fundamentally wrong in some things; and, according to all present appearances, not likely very soon to reform his errors. Mr. Brownson was, as he tells us, "brought up with the Methodists;" but how much of a

Methodist he was, we cannot precisely say; we think he once told us that he "belonged to the class," but in this our recollection may not be perfect. He was afterward successively a Presbyterian, a Universalist, an Atheist, a Unitarian Transcendentalist, a Pantheist, and the last time we heard from him he was a Romanist. In a penitential notice of himself in his last number, he tells us that he had been "everything by starts, and nothing long." Of his changes as a politician and as a philosopher we say nothing.

As might be expected, Mr. Brownson now takes high ground, and mouths the dogmas of Popery with all the confidence of a *father*. He has always been entirely confident that he was right, and accustomed to publish his vagaries with the authority of an oracle. His "New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church," he told us in 1842, had with him "the authority due to veritable inspiration;"* and yet that book he now renounces and condemns. You may find in his former heterogeneous publications the wildest vagaries launched in a prophetic and ex-cathedra character that is scarcely equaled by Joe Smith himself. As a specimen, see his "Church of the Future," in the Boston Review, vol. v. It might reasonably have been expected that Mr. B.'s numerous blunders would at least have taught him a little modesty; but no—this would not be Mr. B. He would scarcely act in character, if he could not rush from pole to pole in the twinkling of an eye—if Mr. B. of to-day could not be the antipodes of Mr. B. of yesterday, and yet be as confident to-day that he is right—certainly, infallibly right—as he was yesterday. It must be left for others rightly to estimate his opinions and various changes, for he is wholly incapable of doing this himself. The public generally will suppose that it is, indeed, no great affair for Mr. B. to turn a somerset; and that as he now acknowledges he was wholly wrong, even when he thought himself under the influence of a divine afflatus, time may bring forth another change and another recantation.

Now, we do not say that Mr. B. has not been honest in all his changes, turnings, and shiftings; nor do we find fault with him for them. It seems a characteristic of his mind to change. We do not blame a weathercock for changing with the wind. Poor thing! it cannot make the wind blow always from the same point; and if, when the wind changes, it should remain stationary, it would violate a fundamental principle of its constitution. An unbalanced mind, however active or strong, will not act uniformly.

* See Boston Review, vol. v, p. 4.

It has laws, to be sure; but they are often beyond the penetration of the most far-seeing observer. Like the comet, it moves in an eccentric orbit; but it is still more difficult to trace its track, or to foretell the periods of its return from its devious wanderings. We may learn from this class of minds many useful lessons; but we must not select them as guides, or follow their examples; for we are told not to "meddle with those who are given to change." But we must now hasten to our principal business.

Mr. B. opens his January number with a spirited reply to an article in the Methodist Quarterly Review of July last, upon "The Literary Policy of the Church of Rome." In this article his general course is to *deny* and *assert*, after the manner of a true disciple of Loyola. Some effort he does make to prove, but his evidence is either without authority, or wholly inapplicable, and his reasoning altogether inconclusive. He stoutly contends that the Methodist Quarterly gives no proof of its main positions, and that the Church of Rome has ever been the chief, if not, indeed, the only patron of the press, of literature, and of science.

The proposition which the reviewer attempts to sustain, and which Mr. B. quotes and makes the basis of his article, is as follows:—

"It is proposed in this paper," says the *Review*, "to exhibit the proof that the Church of Rome has ever waged a deadly warfare upon the liberty of the press, and upon literature, and that her expurgatory and prohibitory policy is perpetuated to the present hour, not only against the truth of revelation, but equally against the truth in nature and in science, both learning and religion having been the doomed victims of her perennial despotism."—P. 1.

Analyzing this passage, he makes it to contain

"four distinct charges against the Church of Rome, namely: 1. Hostility to the liberty of the press; 2. Hostility to literature; 3. Hostility to science; 4. Hostility to revelation and religion."—P. 2.

"The first three of these charges" he attempts to meet, and the third he reserves for future consideration. Thus he sets off:—

"The first three of these charges, even if well founded, are urged with an ill grace by a Methodist. If we have been rightly informed, the Methodist press is itself under the strict surveillance of the bishops and elders, and the Methodist people have, we believe, great scruples about purchasing books, even of their own denomination, when not published by their own book society, which monopolizes the principal part of their publishing business. We even remember the time when the Methodist ministers were proverbial for their ignorance, and dis-

tinguished by their contempt for human science and learning. A better feeling is now, we are happy to admit, beginning to obtain among them, and the denomination has succeeded in establishing a few very respectable schools of its own; but we have not yet heard of a Methodist in this country of any remarkable literary attainments, and we are quite sure that no Methodist, clergyman or layman, has as yet made any valuable or permanent contribution either to literature or science. It betrays, then, a great want of modesty, on the part of a Methodist editor, to bring charges of hostility either to literature or science against any portion of the community, however true, in itself, such a charge might be."— P. 2.

This is, in all respects, a curious passage. And though Mr. B. "was in a good measure brought up with the Methodists," the most charitable construction we can put upon a portion of his language is, that he knows very little of their institutions: for we will not yet conclude that he deals in willful slander. Let us look at the several items of this extraordinary paragraph.

Mr. B. says: "If we have been rightly informed, the Methodist press is itself under the strict surveillance of the bishops and elders, and the Methodist people have, we believe, great scruples about purchasing books, even of their own denomination, when not published by their own book society, which monopolizes the principal part of their publishing business." In all this it turns out that Mr. B. has not "been rightly informed." First, "the Methodist press" is so far from being "under a strict surveillance of the bishops and elders," that "the bishops and elders" have no power over it whatever. The editors and agents, aided by the *advice* of a committee, when they judge it necessary to ask it, appointed by three different conferences, conduct "the Methodist press" according to their own views of the wants and interests of the church, perfectly untrammeled by specific instructions. "The bishops" have no more to do with our "press" than the humblest member in the church. The editors are held accountable for their moral conduct, as they should be, to the conferences of which they are members, and for their official fidelity are accountable, in the intervals of the General Conference, to the book committee, who have power, after due forms of trial and conviction, to displace them for mal-practice. This wise and necessary responsibility is the sum total of the "strict surveillance" exercised over them.

As to the "scruples" of our people in relation to "purchasing books" not published at our Concern, Mr. B. is wholly in error. The profits of our publications are applied to the worthy purpose of supporting our superannuated preachers, and the widows and orphans of such as have died in the itinerant field. For this

reason, as well as on account of the inherent excellences of our publications, we urge our people to patronize our publishing establishment, and the better feelings of their nature prompt most of them to do so. But they are required to do so by no law of the church. And that we give a favorable notice of books published at other establishments in all our official periodicals, Mr. B. might know. The fact is, that our people supply themselves with an undue proportion of reading from other presses. But what Methodist ever had his library examined and his books wrested from him by an *inquisitor?* What Methodist preacher ever undertook the business of heresy hunting and book burning? Mr. B.'s "book society" is a creature of his own imagination. There is no such thing in being among the Methodists.

Again: we are accused of "a great want of modesty" for bringing the charges of hostility to literature and science against Romanists, for the reason that Mr. B. "has not yet heard of a Methodist in this country of any remarkable literary attainments," &c. This is, indeed, a most extraordinary position. Must the Protestant churches of this country produce men of "remarkable literary attainments," and make "valuable or permanent contributions to literature or science," before they have a right to advise the public of the inquisitorial and proscriptive policy of the Church of Rome? Truly this is a novel notion, and one every way worthy of its author. We have hitherto supposed that the humblest member of the humblest sect in the country has a perfect right to call public attention to the tendency of the views and measures of any sect or class, however high in their pretensions, and shall most certainly continue to act upon such a supposition, notwithstanding it may expose us to Mr. B.'s most *modest* charge of a "want of modesty."

Mr. B.'s insinuation that the Methodists have produced no literary men, and have made no contributions to the literature and science of the country, is unworthy of a serious reply. It is both false and disingenuous, and is setting up a test of a right to speak which the Church of Rome in this country is as illy prepared to abide as the Methodists. But we shall not descend to a comparison of our distinguished men with those of the Romish Church; but will, however, just hint to our extremely *modest* antagonist that we have a living author who has produced a work which has been republished in England, and has been pronounced by some of the best scholars of the age one of the most learned and conclusive productions in the language. And as this work will be a good bone for such ripe scholars as O. A. Brownson to pick, and

as we suppose he has "not yet heard" of it, we give its title-page* below for his information.

Mr. B. first undertakes to defend the Church of Rome against the charge of hostility to the liberty of the press. And, first, he denies that the reviewer has adduced "a single fact" to prove his allegation touching this point. The reader will do well to recur to the article, and examine for himself. But lest he may not have our July number at hand, we will give a few short passages from the article, from which he will be able to determine how far they go toward sustaining the charge alledged. After having referred to several facts pertinent to the point, the reviewer proceeds:—

"But we have still later testimony in point in the encyclical letter of Pope Gregory XVI., the present reigning pontiff, addressed to all patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops, and bearing date at the Papal see in Rome, August 16th, 1832. It is promulgated in Latin; but with the original before the reader, the following translation of extracts will be found strictly accurate:—

"'*Liberty of conscience* is an absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather mad conceit, and the prevalence of this most pestilent error is owing to that *liberty of opinion* which is spreading far and wide, to the ruin of both church and state; and both these should combine against that trinity of evils, an ungoverned freedom of opinion, public harangues, and a desire of innovation.' Again he fulminates his anathemas against 'that most vile, detestable, and *never-to-be-sufficiently-execrated* liberty of booksellers, who publish writings of whatsoever kind they please, a liberty which some persons dare with such violence of language to demand and promote.' Again:—

"'We are horrified, venerable brethren, when we behold the monstrous doctrines, or rather the portentous errors with which we are overwhelmed, which are disseminated far and wide on every side by the vast multitude of books, and pamphlets, and tracts, small indeed in bulk, but large in mischievous intent.'

"After rebuking the folly of those who hope to vindicate the church from the wounds she is receiving from the unbridled liberty of the press, by publishing some book or other in her defense, his holiness proceeds,—

"'Far different was the discipline of the church in extirpating the infection of bad books even in the days of the apostles, who, we read, publicly burned a vast quantity of books.' And after eulogizing the

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* "A Delineation of Roman Catholicism, drawn from the Authentic and Acknowledged Standards of the Church of Rome, viz: her Creeds, Catechisms, Decisions of Councils, Papal Bulls, Roman Catholic Writers, the Records of History, &c., &c. In which the Peculiar Doctrines, Morals, Government, and Usages of the Church of Rome are stated, treated at large, and confuted. By Charles Elliott, D.D. 2 Vols. 8vo. New-York: Lane and Sandford. 1842."

Council of Trent for compiling an Index Prohibitorius, he repeats the decree of Clement XIII., his predecessor in the Papal chair, and adds,—

"'We must, with all our might, exterminate the deadly mischief of so many books, by *consuming the guilty elements of depravity in the flames!*'

"These citations from the official bull of the present pope may suffice, demonstrating as they do that the Romish Church is prompted at the present hour by the maxim openly avowed more than three centuries ago by the vicar of Croyden, in the time of Henry VIII.:—

"'*We must root out printing, or printing will root us out!*' and under the like policy a Spanish bishop has, within a few years, forbidden the printing of any book in his diocese, except the Prayer-book."—Pp. 356, 357.

Now it may be that Mr. B. would regard a war upon the part of the pope, to the utmost extent of his temporal and ghostly authority, against the "*vile, detestable, and never-to-be-sufficiently-execrated liberty of booksellers*," to be no war at all upon the press. And that when he says, "We must with all our might exterminate the deadly mischief of so many books, *by consuming the guilty elements of depravity in the flames*," the holy father meant to give his most unqualified approbation to "a *free press*." We must confess we have some suspicions upon our minds that Mr. B. made his declaration, that the reviewer "does not adduce a single fact to prove his assertion," under the impression that he was writing for a class of readers who would never take the pains to read the review he criticises. He is very careful not to quote a word of this famous "encyclical letter," as the language, once introduced to his readers, would be likely to beget a suspicion that there was at least a show of proof that Rome is hostile to a free press. With the authority above adduced before his eyes, this brave young convert to Romanism holds the following language:—

"We deny his assertion, and defy him to lay his finger on a single act of the Roman Catholic Church, which indicates the least hostility on her part to a free press."—P. 2.

The learned reader will probably conclude that we may very safely take up this challenge, though it would seem almost useless to attempt to reason with so blinded a devotee of Rome. Mr. B. might about as well challenge us to prove that he had ever advocated atheism, when there are hundreds of living witnesses who heard his atheistic lectures in Boston. We have facts enough at hand, over and above those alledged by the reviewer, in proof that Rome has ever been hostile to "a free press." But if a bull of the pope, issued *ex cathedra*, amounts to nothing with Mr. B., we de-

spair of satisfying him. To add anything upon the subject would be a work of supererogation. Although Mr. B. denies that "a single fact" had been adduced to prove the reviewer's assertion, he finds it necessary to notice the proof which is brought from the "expurgatory indexes." And though, if you believe Mr. B., these "expurgatory indexes," together with the "encyclical letter," do not amount to "a single fact," yet the "indexes" at least must be noticed, and their character and import explained, for fear that the wretched *nonentities*, if left to themselves, may do some mischief.

"The existence of such indexes we of course admit; but so far as they concern merely the pope's own temporal dominions, they come not within the scope of our present argument. The temporal court of Rome is to be judged the same as any other court, and the church is no more responsible for its acts than it is for the acts of the court of France, of Spain, or even of England. The expurgatory indexes concern us, as members of the Roman Catholic Church, only so far as they are designed for the instruction of the faithful throughout the world. But what, after all, are these expurgatory indexes, about which we hear so much, and which are such frightful monsters to our Protestant brethren? They are simply matters of discipline, prepared by the highest pastoral authority in the church,—not to encroach on the liberty of the press, for no book is likely to find a place in the index, if not published,—but to guard the faithful against the destructive effects of the licentiousness of the press. This is all."—Pp. 3, 4.

The expurgatory and prohibitory indexes, then, are not enforced by the civil power out of the Papal state. All this we knew very well before. They are merely "designed for the instruction of the faithful throughout the world—simple matters of discipline prepared by the highest pastoral authority in the church." All this looks very fair. Surely the Romish Church has a right to give "instruction" to "the faithful," and attend to her own "matters of discipline." "Instruction" and "discipline" are very harmless things in some hands, but with the Romanists these are words of terrible import.

Mr. B. does not tell his readers that when the Romish Church has been able to enlist the civil power upon her side, her "discipline" has deprived men of liberty and life. And that, when this is not the case, she enforces her "instructions" by the high penalty of excommunication, which, with a Romanist, implies all the agonies of the second death. Under her ghostly authority, her priesthood, whenever they dare, wrest from the people all books which are prohibited, and often consign them to the flames! Instances of this kind have been too numerous to admit of contradiction. "The instruction of the faithful," and "matters of discipline," are

phrases in Romish nomenclature, which have been employed to whitewash over the most horrid cruelties of the inquisition, and which can now deceive no one at all acquainted with the policy of Rome.

Next, Mr. B. urges the propriety and necessity of watching against bad books, and of guarding the minds of the unwary against them. He says:—

"Nobody, we presume, no matter of what religious persuasion, can recommend to all persons the indiscriminate reading of all manner of books and tractates which may be published."—P. 4.

Very true. All this is perfectly right, so far. But here two inquiries naturally arise. First, what kind of books does the Church of Rome prohibit in her indexes? and, secondly, by what means does she prevent their circulation? If, upon examination, it shall turn out that she only prohibits such books as "Paine's Age of Reason, Volney's Ruins," &c., and that in carrying out the ends of these indexes private rights are not violated, no one would have the least cause to complain. But what are the facts? Is it the corruption of morals, or the propagation of *heresy*, that these indexes are designed to prevent? No one will dare say that all the *corrupt* literature of Italy, or any other Roman Catholic country, has been forbidden, or that "the faithful" are very carefully guarded against this mischievous agency. No, indeed! A licentious book is not to be mentioned the same day with "King James's Bible" by a Romish shepherd of the flock. The literature of Roman Catholic countries is abominably corrupt, while "the Bible in the vulgar tongues," and books calling in question the infallibility of the Roman Catholic Church, and the supremacy of the pope, are proscribed, condemned, and burned with the most relentless zeal. And all this Mr. B. would make out a mere safeguard to the morals and salvation of the "faithful!" Mr. B.'s homily upon the danger of being "corrupted by reading bad books" is very good, to be sure, but wholly irrelevant. But we pass to another subterfuge:—

"The Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists, are as strict in this respect as Catholics themselves. Each denomination has an expurgatory index, as much as the Church of Rome,—only it does not publish it,—and an index equally exclusive, to say the least. What, then, but rank hypocrisy, is this outcry against the Catholic Church? Wherein is her peculiar offense? Is it in the fact, that she *publishes* her index for the guidance of the faithful throughout the world, and does not profess one thing and do another?"—P. 5.

We will not pretend to say how much or how little "rank hy-

pocrisy" there is "in this outcry against the Church of Rome." But we will say, that Mr. B. must know that there is no parallel between the two cases. Perhaps it would be uncharitable to charge our opponent with "rank hypocrisy" for an effort to cover up the deformities of his newly-adopted mother, and to throw dust into the eyes of his readers. We dare not return railing for railing, but we must say in all plainness, this instance of gross sophistry can scarcely be reconciled with plain, straight-ahead honesty. Mr. B. knows that the denominations he mentions never go further than to *recommend* their own peculiar publications, and never make the publication or reading of a book a matter of discipline, unless it is of *irreligious* tendency. No Protestant, as far as we know, is ever forbidden the reading of a book merely because it is not in accordance with the theological views of his denomination. At least we know this to be the case among the Methodists. Protestants publish all the indexes they have, and Mr. B. knows it to be so. But a sad tale, indeed, Mr. B. tells us. The "Catholic Church," it seems, is miserably abused by the "sects," because she "does not profess one thing and do another." Alas, for the times! The true church—"the mistress and mother of all churches"—is scandalized and harassed for her *honesty*—for her *truthfulness—for not saying one thing and doing another!* Now, if this is truth and not fiction, then we see not how Mr. B. can make out that the Romish Church is unchangeable. He thanks the reviewer for proving that Romanists maintain this dogma, and says, "We not only concede, but we contend, that she is now what she always was, and always was what she now is, and always will be to the end of time." P. 3. If this, then, be true, and Mr. B.'s claim for her, that she "does not say one thing and do another," is well founded, why, then, she never did and never will say one thing and do another. What is the fact with regard to the past? At least a thousand years of her history is, to a great extent, made up of frauds and impositions. Her pious frauds, in the way of publications, are almost innumerable; her violation of oaths and plighted faith is recorded in heaven against her; her false-hearted professions, and her violated pledges of personal security, will there be witnessed to by martyred victims of her tyranny. O no! Rome has never said one thing and done another! Mr. B. has discovered that her own historians are liars, the biographers of popes scandalous defamers, and her casuists, who maintain that heretics may *innocently* be *deceived*, and that it is lawful to *break faith* with them, are themselves the greatest deceivers and heretics in the world.

Our opponent makes another false issue, by pretending to a parallel between the proscription of immoral and blasphemous publications and the censorship of the press found in Roman Catholic countries. He says:—

"We, in this country, claim to have a free press; and yet Abner Kneeland, a few years since, was imprisoned in Boston for writing a certain newspaper paragraph; and one Dr. Knowlton was also, a short time before, imprisoned for publishing a certain infamous book."—P. 6.

Mr. B., it seems, can see no difference between inflicting legal penalties upon an author for publishing a book that would injure the morals of community, and tend to subvert the whole social compact, and visiting with such penalties one who had assumed to express some doubts with regard to the divine authority of the seven sacraments, or to call in question the infallibility of an old dotard wearing a triple crown. We now proceed to another position:—

"But the *Review* seeks to establish its proposition by alledging that the Church of Rome wages a deadly war upon liberty of mind and conscience. That the Church of Rome teaches, that conscience needs to be enlightened by the word of God before it can be followed as a safe guide, we freely admit; and that she also teaches, that private judgment in interpreting the word of God or articles of faith should yield to the church, is by no means denied. Every Catholic believes the Holy Catholic Church infallible and authoritative. He feels it his blessed privilege to have an authority which cannot err to decide for him, and set him right, where his own reason might lead him astray. The Catholic Church is divine, it is a supernatural institution, and supernaturally sustained and protected. It teaches all truth, that is, all truth pertaining to religion and morals."—P. 7.

Here we have the leading dogma of Rome unblushingly asserted. Now, we would be glad if Mr. B. would take the trouble to tell us what constitutes the church in which this infallibility resides. This, he knows, is a mooted point among the doctors. And until "the faithful" know whether what the "father confessor" teaches them has been determined by "the church," which is infallible—the pillar and ground of the truth—and until they know where this infallibility is lodged, and that the question has been determined by the church proper, they cannot, with good reason, implicitly receive the instructions of their ghostly guides in relation to it. Mr. B. has hit upon the only theory that can make this infallibility available, though it is one too absurd for any mind not utterly enslaved or totally bewildered. He says:—

"But this promise was made to the church, the *whole* church,—not to any particular portion of the church, nor to any given number of

individuals in the church. Consequently, the Catholic regards no act of the church, even of the highest dignitaries of the church, as infallible, unless the act of the whole church. There are only two ways in which the church is assumed to act as the whole church,—that is, in a universal council, or, what is the same thing, the unanimous, or the morally unanimous, assent of all the bishops or pastors of the church, and through the pope, deciding *ex cathedra*, as the representative of the church; and a man may be a Catholic, without believing that the decision of the pope, unless assented to by the body of the bishops, is to be regarded as infallible. But we, for ourselves, hold the decision of the pope, when he represents, or decides for, the church universal, to be infallible."—P. 21.

Now, Mr. B. is but a novice in Romanism; and though he has made astonishing progress since he adopted his new faith, he is not yet an oracle. We heard Bishop England preach upon the peculiar dogmas of Rome in the cathedral in Baltimore, in 1840, and he asserted that infallibility was lodged in the church collectively. He said a bishop might err, a council might err, and the pope might err; but *the whole church* could not err. But, upon this theory, how can we know the mind of "the whole church" upon a given topic? She has never uttered a response to any one question in dispute between the pope and Protestants. Her *sense* has never been collected and harmonized, and never will be.

Upon Mr. B.'s theory, all we would have to do would be to consult "*the holy father*" *at Rome*, and implicitly submit to his decisions. But when the decisions of one pope contradict those of another, and especially when the same pope decides different ways at different times, it is a little difficult to determine which is right, or to see the signs of infallibility anywhere. But all this Mr. B. can easily surmount; and perhaps we should give him no further annoyance upon the point at present.

After all, Mr. B. will have it that the Church of Rome really allows the utmost liberty of conscience of speech and of the press that can be claimed or desired. He says:—

"You are arrested, then, because the church cannot tolerate your error. You are free to advocate *all* truth, but not free to advocate *all* error. Here is all the restriction placed upon you; and surely this leaves ample room for the freest thought, and the fullest investigation of all subjects."—P. 8.

But who is to tell us what that "truth" is that we may "advocate?" The church teaches authoritatively—and the decisions of the pope are infallible—of course we can teach nothing but what the church, through the pope, teaches us. What a range of liberty is this! "The faithful" have full liberty to hold and teach just what his

holiness the pope says they may! Was there ever conceived such expansive notions of liberty of conscience! The whole of this broad ground Mr. B. has become heir to, in becoming a Romanist. No wonder he chirps and sings like a bird let out of a cage: he has escaped the perils of private judgment, and found the glorious liberty of giving his eyes, and ears, and conscience,—yea, soul and body, to the pope! He has found, after all his devious wanderings, complete personal annihilation,—has merged his personal responsibility for his religious views in those of the bishop of Rome,—lost his moral agency and responsibility together, and now goes on most gloriously, being perfectly "free to advocate all truth," and absolutely secure from "all error!" Who does not envy him his happiness?

Mr. B. closes his argument upon the present point with the *argumentum ad hominem*. "All Protestant sects" are as intolerant as the Romish Church. Though they "professedly recognize the right of private judgment," yet they "all in the same breath deny it. The Methodists excommunicate from their communion the members who lapse into what they call heresy, and so do all the other sects."—P. 8.

So far as the Methodist Episcopal Church is concerned, this is a very unfair and entirely erroneous statement. We "excommunicate" no one for a variation of doctrinal views from our standards, upon doubtful questions, provided they hold them in charity. If they make them matters of bitter controversy and occasions of "dissension," they become subjects of discipline, not otherwise.

But we must now pass to another point upon which Mr. B. controverts the positions of the reviewer. The reviewer asserts that "the Church of Rome has ever waged a deadly war upon literature." This charge fills Mr. B. with pious indignation; and to prove it totally groundless, he proceeds in a strain of great earnestness to sketch the state of literature in the Latin Church, through the "thousand years next preceding the Reformation," and to give us a large catalogue of literary men who sprung up in the Romish Church. All this is meeting an issue which the reviewer does not make. He nowhere says that the Church of Rome has produced no literary men, or that she has no literature. The following are his propositions fully drawn out:—

"All those books, whether religious, literary, or classical, which cannot be expurgated to the necessary extent, are absolutely prohibited; and accordingly we find that the pope and his grand inquisitors include, in the *Prohibitory Index*, Young's Night Thoughts, Milton's Paradise Lost, Cowper's Poems, and the like classical and standard works,

whether in history, literature, or morals, explicitly naming them, and prohibiting them to be read or possessed by any Roman Catholic in any country."

"Thus has the Romish Church ever labored to suppress every species of literature which could not be made tributary to her hierarchy, and this by such desperate measures as excommunicating the authors, burning the books, and prohibiting booksellers, printers, &c., from dealing with them, while the faithful were warned of the spiritual and temporal penalties they incur by reading the works of the prohibited authors, who, indeed, are anathematized not only in reference to the works already written, but equally those which *these authors might write in the future.*"—*Meth. Quart. Rev. for July*, 1844, pp. 354, 355.

Now, will Mr. B. controvert these propositions? Has not the Church of Rome for centuries expurgated scientific and literary productions, and prohibited those which were found too intractable to admit of being made conformable to her dogmas? Has she not "suppressed every species of literature which could not be made tributary to her hierarchy?" Who dare deny this? Mr. B. knows right well that upon the proper issue here made he could not sustain himself for a moment. The principal authority upon which the reviewer relies is the prohibitory and expurgatory indexes, and from these he sketches a few of the many instances which he might have adduced in proof, though Mr. B. asserts that there is "not a proof,—not the shadow of a proof" adduced, and that he does not "even attempt to bring any proof" of the truth of his allegations!

This whole section is crowded with the names of Romish authors —fathers, poets, &c.—in proof that the Church of Rome has ever been the great patron of letters; but Mr. B. neglects to tell his readers how many of these authors have been prohibited, and how many others have been mangled and patched until it is impossible to tell what portions of their works are genuine and what spurious. The reader may judge a little of this man's effrontery, when he hears that he claims Bacon, Shakspeare, Pope, Dryden, and even Milton (!) for Romanists, and that he claims the works of Erasmus, Dante, and others, as splendid specimens of Romish literature; when the whole of the works of Erasmus are in the indexes, and some of those of Dante and others have been expurgated and garbled, and that it was merely the good luck of these two great authors that they died in their own beds. We have before us the index of Sixtus V., in which—under the head of "*Auctores quorum libri, et scripta omnia prohibentur*," *Authors whose books and writings are all prohibited*—is the name of "Erasmus Roterodamus." And as for Dante, the great Italian poet, history tells us that he died just in time to escape the clutches of the holy father;

and that a bishop was sent from Rome to dig up and burn his body, but finding that the execution of his commission would be likely to excite a popular tumult, it was prudently waived. These are unfortunate names for Mr. B.; and it seems a pity that he should have manifested the hardihood to parade them among the Catholic authors who had contributed to the glory and renown of the Romish Church by those productions which have suffered the very proscriptive policy of which we complain.

There are in this section many historical blunders which we cannot occupy space to correct. Any one who can swallow Mr. B.'s glorification of "the dark ages," and his gross libels upon Protestant literature, can know nothing of the matter. He who can believe that "the last thousand years next preceding the Reformation" constituted the millennium of literature, and that the Reformation was a mere outbreak of vandalism, which has resulted in the destruction of all the monuments of genius within its reach, may believe anything, and is scarcely worth converting from his errors.

Next, Mr. B. meets the charge of "hostility to science." Before he proceeds to meet the charge, he gives us a learned homily upon the "infallible authority" of the church, which he says "Protestants do seem never to comprehend:"—and he might have added, that Protestants do not "comprehend" this doctrine of "infallible authority," for the reason that it is incomprehensible, and that Romanists do not comprehend it themselves. Where this infallibility is located is a matter of dispute among Romish doctors, and will remain so notwithstanding Mr. B. has settled the question. All this we pass, and proceed to the question at issue.

The charge contains two specifications. The first is, that Pope Zachary deposed Virgil, bishop of Saltsburg, for teaching the doctrine of the antipodes. This was asserted by Kepler, and has been reaffirmed by many others. A tolerably full examination of authorities has brought us to the conclusion that the assertion is not fully sustained. The facts appear to be these. Virgil, while a mere priest, engaged in a controversy with Boniface, archbishop of Mentz—who was a strong-headed, intolerant, and ignorant ecclesiastic—upon some points of discipline, for which the archbishop thoroughly hated him. On Virgil's broaching the theory of the earth's rotundity, and the consequent fact or possibility of antipodes, the pious high functionary supposed, or affected to suppose, that the consequence of his system was that there must be another earth below this, and another sun and moon, and another race of men who did not proceed from Adam, and were not redeemed by

Christ. Of all these heresies the archbishop accused the priest to the pope: and it was upon the presumption of his guilt that he was ordered to appear at Rome. What the whole amounted to is not known with certainty; but the Romish writers charitably conclude, that as Virgil subsequently returned to his work, and was, indeed, made a bishop, that he made satisfactory explanations to his holiness, and was reconciled to the archbishop. The best way the thing can be fixed, it shows great ignorance and stupidity, or great wickedness, on the part of the archbishop, and does not wholly clear the pope. Here we will leave this specification; and have no regret that we are brought to the conclusion, that the view taken by the reviewer is not fully sustained.

The second specification is founded upon the case of Galileo, of which the following is a faithful sketch.

This famous Italian philosopher was accused, in 1615, by "his eminence the lord cardinal Bellarmine," of holding the damnable heresy that the earth revolved round the sun. In 1616 he was required to renounce that heresy, and not in any way to teach it to others. And in 1623 the philosopher was arraigned before "the Holy Office of the Inquisition," and condemned and imprisoned; and his doctrine, or rather the Copernican doctrine, of the rotundity of the earth and its annual revolution round the sun, declared to be heresy; and he was obliged to abjure it with his hand upon the holy Gospels. This, it is suspected, he was forced to do by *torture;** and it is said, that when he arose from his knees after his forced and false abjuration, he stamped with his feet and whispered to one of his friends, "*E pur si muove*"—*It does move though!* But all this Mr. B. pronounces to be "false, totally false from beginning to end, with not one word of truth in it." Let us now attend to his reasons for this flat denial of a plain, indubitable historical fact.

And first he urges that the doctrine, that "the earth moves and the sun is at rest," had been taught by Cusanus, Copernicus, and other Catholics, previous to the time of Galileo, and had not been condemned by the church; and proceeds to ask:—

"If it was a heresy, why was it so long tolerated? If Rome was opposed to science, why did she protect and honor its cultivators? And how happens it, that in the case of Galileo alone, who broached no novelty, who brought out no new theory, she suddenly became a persecutor?"—Pp. 23, 24.

* The fact that Galileo was put to the torture of the cord is proved by Quinet, in his "L' Ultramontanisme." We cannot here give the reader the facts presented by the learned Frenchman, but may do it hereafter.

In answer to this we would simply say, we are not bound to tell how all this "happens." If Rome is inconsistent with herself, we are not bound to account for it. The force of this reasoning depends entirely upon the presumption that the Church of Rome is always consistent—a presumption that we do not admit, and that is contradicted by innumerable facts. How she asserts and denies, says and unsays, is for her apologists, and not for us, to say. This argument presumes quite too far upon the ignorance of Protestants with respect to the history of the disagreements, self-contradictions, and schisms of Rome. Why some popes should condemn opinions, books, and persons, and others approve them—why, for instance, *Gregory* the Great should condemn *simony*, and excommunicate and anathematize those who practiced it, and yet all the popes, bishops, and clergy of the Romish Church for a thousand years past should have been addicted to it, is not for us to explain; but for those who assert the infallibility of the Church of Rome.

Mr. B. next proceeds to give us the Romish version of the case, condensed from the "Dublin Review." It is as follows:—

"But Galileo was not condemned for teaching this theory, nor was the theory itself condemned, nor was Galileo ever imprisoned, or required to retract his doctrine. What, then, are the real facts in the case? It appears, that Galileo, by the manner in which he proclaimed his theory, his intemperance in advocating it, and his attempt to reconcile it with the Scriptures, created him many enemies, who sought, in 1615, to get him cited before the Inquisition, but without effect. No censure was passed upon him or his doctrine; he was simply required to speak as a mathematician, to confine himself to his discoveries and his scientific proofs, without meddling with the Scriptural question. But with this Galileo was not satisfied. He insisted on two things,—first, that his doctrine was demonstrated, and second, that it was supported by Scripture; and he came of his own accord to Rome, in 1616, to obtain a decision of these two points in his favor. There was no charge against him, he was not *cited* to appear, but he came of his own accord, because he wished to obtain the sanction of Rome to his theories. The court of Rome was unwilling to interfere; but, at length, yielding to the importunities of Galileo and his friends, the pope finally referred the question to the Inquisition, who decided the two points against Galileo; that is, they decided that the doctrine was not demonstrated and not supported by Scripture,—for these were the simple points before them,—and enjoined it upon Galileo not to teach it henceforth as a theory demonstrated, and to observe silence as to the Scriptural question. This would still have left him free to teach it as an hypothesis, and to have adduced every mathematical proof in its favor in his power. But Galileo was not content with this, which left him full liberty as a scientific man, and he was therefore forbidden to teach the doctrine at all. This, as nearly as we can seize it, is the purport of the decision of the

Inquisition in 1616. But there was in this no positive condemnation of the doctrine, and no retraction of it required. Galileo was still honored at Rome; and when his friend, Cardinal Bambarini, became Pope Urban the Eighth, he came to Rome again, was received with the highest honors, and the pope bestowed a pension on him and his son.

"For seventeen years after this decision in 1616, Galileo continued his mathematical pursuits, undisturbed, with the greatest success, receiving everywhere honor and applause, and nowhere more than at Rome. Cardinal Bambarini, who dissented from the decision of the Inquisition, became Pope Urban the Eighth. He was the friend of Galileo, and not opposed to the heliocentric theory. Galileo's friends under this pope were everywhere encouraged and promoted, and it seemed that one needed only to advocate his doctrine to be sure of the pope's favor. Galileo was elated, and published his *Dialogues*, in which he brings out the theory, contrary to the obligation he had taken, and in a manner the most intemperate, and the most satirical and contemptuous to authority. He was accordingly cited in 1633 to appear at Rome, and was condemned,—the question turning on his contempt for authority, and not at all on the truth or falsity of his doctrine. What punishment was imposed upon him we do not know."—Pp. 24, 25.

There is nothing new in all this. It is the false and oft-repeated representation of the Jesuits; a mere repetition of what these arch-deceivers have tried for the two past centuries to palm upon the world for truth. And yet up to this time there have been found those among this order who have regarded the Copernican system of astronomy as under the ban of the church, and consequently as false. Will Mr. B. tell us how this "happened?" But we will now give authority, which Mr. B. will not question, which demolishes his entire superstructure—which refutes and annihilates every material item in this whole congeries of sheer fabrications. And our authority is no less than "*The Sentence of the Inquisition on Galileo.*" We give the whole verbatim. It is as follows:—

"We, the undersigned, by the grace of God, cardinals of the holy Roman Church, inquisitors general throughout the whole Christian republic, special deputies of the holy apostolical chair against heretical depravity,

"Whereas you, Galileo, son of the late Vincenzo Galilei of Florence, aged seventy years, were denounced in 1615 to this holy office, for holding as true a false doctrine taught by many, namely, that the sun is immovable in the centre of the world, and that the earth moves, and also with a diurnal motion; also for having pupils whom you instructed in the same opinions; also, for maintaining a correspondence on the same with some German mathematicians; also, for publishing certain letters on the solar spots, in which you developed the same doctrine as true; also, for answering the objections which were continually

produced from the Holy Scriptures, by glozing the said Scriptures according to your own meaning; and whereas thereupon was produced the copy of a writing, in form of a letter, professedly written by you to a person formerly your pupil, in which, following the hypothesis of Copernicus, you include several propositions contrary to the true sense and authority of the Holy Scripture: therefore this holy tribunal being desirous of providing against the disorder and mischief which was thence proceeding and increasing to the detriment of the holy faith, by the desire of his holiness, and of the most eminent lords cardinals of this supreme and universal Inquisition, the two propositions of the stability of the sun, and motion of the earth, were *qualified* by the *theological qualifiers* as follows:—

"1*st. The proposition that the sun is in the centre of the world and immovable from its place, is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical; because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scripture.*

"2*dly. The proposition that the earth is not the centre of the world, nor immovable, but that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is also absurd, philosophically false, and, theologically considered, at least erroneous in faith.*

"But whereas, being pleased at that time to deal mildly with you, it was decreed in the holy congregation, held before his holiness on the 25th day of February, 1616, that his eminence the lord cardinal Bellarmine should enjoin you to give up altogether the said false doctrine; if you should refuse, that you should be ordered by the commissary of the holy office to relinquish it, not to teach it to others, nor to defend it, nor even mention it, and in default of acquiescence that you should be imprisoned; and in execution of this decree, on the following day at the palace, in presence of his eminence, the said lord cardinal Bellarmine, after you had been mildly admonished by the said lord cardinal, you were commanded by the acting commissary of the holy office, before a notary and witnesses, to relinquish altogether the said false opinion, and in future neither to defend nor teach it in any manner, neither verbally nor in writing, and upon your promising obedience you were dismissed.

"And in order that so pernicious a doctrine might be altogether rooted out, nor insinuate itself farther to the heavy detriment of the Catholic truth, a decree emanated from the holy congregation of the index prohibiting the books which treat of this doctrine; and it was declared false, and altogether contrary to the Holy and Divine Scripture.

"And whereas a book has since appeared, published at Florence last year, the title of which showed that you were the author, which title is: *The Dialogue of Galileo Galilei, on the two Principal Systems of the World, the Ptolemaic and Copernican;* and whereas the holy congregation has heard that, in consequence of the printing of the said book, the false opinion of the earth's motion and stability of the sun is daily gaining ground; the said book has been taken into careful consideration, and in it has been detected a glaring violation of the said order, which had been intimated to you; inasmuch as in this book you have defended the said opinion, already and in your presence condemned; although in the said book you labor with many circumlocutions to in-

duce the belief that it is left by you undecided, and in express terms probable: which is equally a very grave error, since an opinion can in no way be probable which has been already declared and finally determined contrary to the Divine Scripture. Therefore, by our order you have been cited to the holy office, where, on your examination upon oath, you have acknowledged the said book as written and printed by you. You also confessed that you began to write the said book ten or twelve years ago, after the order aforesaid had been given. Also, that you demanded license to publish it, but without signifying to those who granted you this permission that you had been commanded not to hold, defend, or teach the said doctrine in any manner. You also confessed that the style of the said book was, in many places, so composed that the reader might think the arguments adduced on the false side to be so worded as more effectually to entangle the understanding than to be easily solved, alledging in excuse, that you have thus run into an error, foreign (as you say) to your intention, from writing in the form of a dialogue, and in consequence of the natural complacency which every one feels with regard to his own subtilties, and in showing himself more skillful than the generality of mankind in contriving, even in favor of false propositions, ingenious and apparently probable arguments.

"And, upon a convenient time being given to you for making your defense, you produced a certificate in the hand-writing of his eminence the lord cardinal Bellarmine, procured, as you said, by yourself, that you might defend yourself against the calumnies of your enemies, who reported that you had abjured your opinions, and had been punished by the holy office; in which certificate it is declared that you had not abjured, nor had been punished, but merely that the declaration made his holiness, and promulgated by the holy congregation of the index, had been announced to you, which declares that the opinion of the motion of the earth, and stability of the sun, is contrary to the Holy Scriptures, and, therefore, cannot be held or defended. Wherefore, since no mention is there made of two articles of the order, to wit, the order 'not to teach,' and 'in any manner,' you argued that we ought to believe that, in the lapse of fourteen or sixteen years, they had escaped your memory, and that this was also the reason why you were silent as to the order, when you sought permission to publish your book, and that this is said by you not to excuse your error, but that it may be attributed to vain-glorious ambition, rather than to malice. But this very certificate, produced on your behalf, has greatly aggravated your offense, since it is therein declared that the said opinion is contrary to the Holy Scripture, and yet you have dared to treat of it, to defend it, and to argue that it is probable; nor is there any extenuation in the license artfully and cunningly extorted by you, since you did not intimate the command imposed upon you. But whereas it appeared to us that you had not disclosed the whole truth with regard to your intentions, we thought it necessary to proceed to the rigorous examination of you, in which (without any prejudice to what you had confessed, and which is above detailed against you, with regard to your said intention) you answered like a good Catholic.

"Therefore, having seen and maturely considered the merits of your

cause, with your said confessions and excuses, and everything else which ought to be seen and considered, we have come to the underwritten final sentence against you.

"Invoking, therefore, the most holy name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and of his most glorious Virgin Mother Mary, by this our final sentence, which, sitting in council and judgment for the tribunal of the reverend masters of sacred theology, and doctors of both laws, our assessors, we put forth in this writing touching the matters and controversies before us, between the magnificent Charles Sincerus, doctor of both laws, fiscal proctor of this holy office of the one part, and you, Galileo Galilei, an examined and confessed criminal from this present writing now in progress as above of the other part, we pronounce, judge, and declare that you, the said Galileo, by reason of these things which have been detailed in the course of this writing, and which, as above, you have confessed, have rendered yourself vehemently suspected by this holy office of heresy: that is to say, that you believe and hold the false doctrine, and contrary to the Holy and Divine Scriptures, namely, that the sun is the centre of the world, and that it does not move from east to west, and that the earth does move, and is not the centre of the world; also that an opinion can be held and supported as probable after it has been declared and finally decreed contrary to the Holy Scripture, and consequently that you have incurred all the censures and penalties enjoined and promulgated in the sacred canons and other general and particular constitutions against delinquents of this description. From which it is our pleasure that you be absolved, provided that, first, with a sincere heart and unfeigned faith, in our presence, you abjure, curse, and detest the said errors and heresies, and every other error and heresy contrary to the Catholic and Apostolic Church of Rome, in the form now shown to you.

"But, that your grievous and pernicious error and transgression may not go altogether unpunished, and that you may be made more cautious in future, and may be a warning to others to abstain from delinquencies of this sort, we decree that the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be prohibited by a public edict, and we condemn you to the formal prison of this holy office for a period determinable at our pleasure; and, by way of salutary penance, we order you, during the next three years, to recite once a week the seven penitential psalms, reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, commuting, or taking off the whole or part of the said punishment and penance.

"And so we say, pronounce, and by our sentence declare, decree, and reserve, in this and in every other better form and manner, which lawfully we may and can use.

"So we, the subscribing cardinals, pronounce.

FELIX, Cardinal di Ascoli,
GUIDO, Cardinal Bentivoglio,
DESIDERIO, Cardinal di Cremona,
ANTONIO, Cardinal S. Onofrio,
BERLINGERO, Cardinal Gessi,
FABRICIO, Cardinal Verospi,
MARTINO, Cardinal Ginetti."

Now let the reader carefully compare the statements of Mr. B. and this official condemnation of Galileo and his philosophy; and then see how he can avoid the conclusion that Mr. B. has been grossly deceived, or else has knowingly misrepresented the whole case. Let us mark a few points.

1. Mr. B. says, "Galileo was not condemned for teaching this theory, nor was the theory itself condemned." Contrast this with the specific language in which his two propositions are condemned. "The proposition that the sun," &c., "is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical." "The proposition that the earth," &c., "is also absurd, philosophically false, and, theologically considered, at least erroneous in faith."

2. Notice the issue between Galileo and his opponents, as Mr. B. has it: viz., whether the theory was demonstrated, and according to Scripture; and then read the fifth paragraph of the Sentence, beginning, "But whereas." From this part of the Sentence it is perfectly plain that the "holy office" had determined against the *truth* of the doctrine. It is called "false doctrine," and Galileo is commanded "to relinquish altogether the said *false opinion*, and neither to defend nor teach it in any manner." Was this simply asserting "that the doctrine was not demonstrated and not supported by Scripture," and requiring Galileo not to teach the contrary?

3. Mr. B. says, Galileo "would still be left free to teach it as an hypothesis, and to have adduced any mathematical proof in its favor in his power." Whereas the inquisitors plainly deny him this right, "since," as they say, "an opinion can no way be probable which has been already declared and finally determined contrary to the Divine Scripture."

4. Mr. B. says, "For seventeen years after this decision, in 1616, Galileo continued his mathematical pursuits, undisturbed, with the greatest success, receiving everywhere honor and applause, and nowhere more than at Rome."

But it was at the end of these "seventeen years," in 1633, that he was summoned to Rome, and was then and there condemned by the Inquisition, and obliged to retract, under the very reign of "his friend, Cardinal Bambarini," (Barbarini?) who had become "Pope Urban the Eighth." He, indeed, had "success" in "his mathematical pursuits" during these seventeen years, but no thanks to Rome, for his "Dialogues," the principal work he had composed during that period, was condemned and burned by the Inquisition; and the glory of his reception at "Rome" consisted in his being compelled to make his humiliating and false confession, or pay the forfeit with his life.

5. Mr. B. alledges that "the question" in his condemnation turned "upon his contempt of authority, and not at all on the truth or falsity of his doctrine." All the documents contradict this statement. The Sentence is most explicitly based upon the *falsehood* of the *doctrine* he taught, and that alone.

But Mr. B. has a way to elude the conclusion that the church erred in this case, even if all the facts we assert are admitted. "The Inquisition is not an institution supposed by Catholics to be infallible."—P. 26.

This is the old ground of Tiraboschi, who attempts to make a subtil distinction between the bulls of the pope and the inquisitorial decrees which were sanctioned and approved by him. We need not enter into this question. It is wholly immaterial to the argument whether Romanists consider the Inquisition infallible or not. It is sufficient for us to know that the decrees of that court claim to be infallible,* and are enacted with that claim with the pope's knowledge and approbation, and the condemnation of heretical books and persons by the holy office is as much the act of the Church of Rome as any act of the supreme pontiff. And whatever Mr. B. may say, this has been the opinion of abler and better-informed Roman Catholics than he is. A professor of the University of Lauvain—a zealous opponent of Galileo—quotes the bull of Sixtus V., by which the congregation of the index was remodelled, to prove this point. The language is:—"They are to examine and expose the books which are repugnant to the Catholic doctrines and Christian discipline, and after reporting on them to us, they are to condemn them by our authority." And in the preface of the Jesuits' edition of Newton's Principia we have the clearest evidence that the editors supposed his system under the ban of the church. This is the language:—

"Newton in his third book supposes the motion of the earth. We could not explain the author's propositions otherwise than by making the same supposition. We are therefore forced to sustain a character which is not our own; but we profess to pay the obsequious reverence which is due to the decrees pronounced by the supreme pontiffs against the motion of the earth."

"This coy reluctance to admit what nobody any longer doubts, has survived to the present time; for Bailli informs us, that the utmost endeavors of Lalande, when at Rome, to obtain that Galileo's work should be erased from the index, were entirely ineffectual, in consequence of the decree which had been fulminated against him; and in fact both it, and the book of Copernicus, 'Nisi Corrigatur,' are still to be seen on the forbidden list of 1828."—*Life of Galileo*, pp. 64, 65.

* See the language as quoted above, No. 3.

Now if Mr. B. chooses to proceed with his opposition to the opinions and representations of a portion of his brethren, we cannot object; but we shall not allow him to be the only expositor of the transactions in question. We must allow him to be led by a portion of the Jesuits, and dissent from the rest; for he cannot very well agree with them all: but he shall not deceive the public. It is a delicate business for a mere novice in Romanism to attempt to decide peremptorily questions upon which so much has been said, and upon which such discordant opinions have been entertained by Romish writers. He may by this mode of procedure, before he is aware of it, find himself running against a burning mountain, and so be obliged to add to the long list of recantations which he has already made. But it is useless to admonish Mr. B. of approaching danger, for he is not capable of alarm. He must go on and make his experiments, and take the consequences. To these we leave him.

Mr. B. finally takes "the reviewer" to task for asserting that, "except painting and sculpture, no one of the arts and sciences has escaped the anathemas of Rome;" and demands where the Church of Rome has anathematized "music," "architecture," and "logic." We will not attempt to prove that these "arts" or "sciences" have ever been formally anathematized by Rome, and yet we are by no means sure they have not been. Mr. B.'s method of reasoning here, as in former instances, is wholly fallacious; proceeding upon the presumption that what the Church of Rome has favored at one time, she has not condemned at another. But if it will relieve Mr. B. in any manner, we will relinquish the charge so far as "music" and "architecture" are concerned. But as to "logic," unless Jesuitical arts and inquisitorial tortures constitute a part of that science, we cannot concede that Rome has ever been its patron.

We now leave Mr. B. for the present. When he shall see proper to resume the subject, and meet "the charge of hostility to revelation and religion," we may introduce him again to our readers. But when he undertakes a defense of "the Catholic policy in regard to the Bible," we must be permitted to hope that he will meet the question fairly. It is not for "an unwillingness to receive King James' Bible as the pure word of God," that we accuse Rome of hostility to the Scriptures, but for her "unwillingness" that the Scriptures should be given to the people "in the vulgar tongues," and her constant efforts to corrupt the pure word of God, and to elevate above the inspired Scriptures the traditions and commandments of men. This is the great sin we shall prove upon her in spite of the "logic" of our friend, Mr. Brownson.

Art. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Voyages round the World; from the Death of Captain Cook to the Present Time.* New-York: Harper & Brothers.

This little volume forms No. 172 of that excellent and universally popular series, Harper's Family Library: and is in fact a necessary sequel to one of its previous volumes. The progress of discovery, within the period embraced, has been rapid, and its results exceedingly rich. The compiler of this book has not made it simply a narrative, but has added remarks upon the social condition of the inhabitants of recently discovered countries, their progress in the arts, and especially their advance in religious knowledge. It will be found a very interesting and valuable work.

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2. *Principles of Medical Jurisprudence: with so much of Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, and the Practice of Medicine and Surgery, as are essential to be known by Lawyers, Coroners, Magistrates, Officers of the Army and Navy, &c.* By William A. Guy, M. B., Cantab. Professor of Forensic Medicine. Edited by C. A. Lee, M. D. Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-street.

As its title indicates, this is a book of wide and almost universal utility. It sets forth, very clearly and in an admirable manner, all those principles connected with medical jurisprudence for which persons in almost every walk of life find frequent use. It is very justly described by the American editor, as a comprehensive epitome of all that is known in medical jurisprudence: and it is presented in so concise and methodical a manner as greatly to facilitate the task of the student and the convenience of the general reader. It is confined very strictly to the practical and actually useful details of the science, wasting nothing upon mere literary ornaments, and yet being abundantly ample in its facts and illustrations. Dr. Lee has added to the work about two hundred pages of original matter, adapting it more perfectly to the laws and institutions of this country, and has had the valuable assistance, in this labor, of some of our most eminent jurists. The work is one of great value, and is published by the Harpers in a corresponding form. To the profession, and to the public at large, it must be cordially welcome.

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3. *Notes Explanatory and Practical on the Epistles of Paul to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians.* By Albert Barnes. Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-street.

The author of this volume is well-known as a sound and able expositor of the sacred writings; and has hitherto rendered essential service to the cause of Scriptural science by his published writings. In this work he has presented a large body of very valuable comments upon the three Epistles of Paul which are included in the titles.

Giving first an introduction to each Epistle, he presents also an analysis of each chapter: and this is followed by notes explanatory and practical upon the several expressions of each verse. Everything doubtful, or at all difficult, in the meaning of the writer, is very clearly and fully elucidated. The work is eminently calculated to find favor with the religious public.

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4. *Alnwick Castle, and other Poems.* By FITZ GREENE HALLECK. Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-street.

WE are glad to meet Mr. Halleck's too few but very beautiful productions in so elegant a volume as that just issued by the Harpers. No American poet is at once so vigorous and so melodious. His lines are at the same time as strong and nervous as the bow of the far-shooting Apollo, and as musical as the strains of his lute. The poem which gives name to the volume is, perhaps, the most elaborate, and on the whole the best of the collection; though that upon Marco Bozzaris is, perhaps, still more widely known, and evinces more of the author's peculiar ability. Mr. Halleck has carefully excluded everything but his best productions, and has thus issued one of the most creditable volumes of American poetry ever published.

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5. *A System of Latin Versification, in a Series of Progressive Exercises: including Specimens of Translation from English and German Poetry into Latin Verse.* By CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. Harper & Brothers.

NOTHING more need be said of this volume, than that it is well worthy of the excellent series of classical school-books of which it forms a part. It is very well calculated to aid teachers in the greatly neglected labor of teaching Latin versification, an exercise almost unknown in our classical schools, although it forms one of the most prominent features in the English system of education. We are conscious that it is of great service in making students familiar with the structure of the Latin, and that its universal neglect has been among the causes of the extreme depression of classical education in this country. Professor Anthon is certainly entitled to the warmest thanks of the whole community of American scholars, not only for this book, but for the series in which it is published. His classical school-books have been adopted in many of the leading schools of England, and are almost the only ones in use in the colleges and academies of this country. This work is issued in the same admirable style with the rest of the series.

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6. *History of Greece.* By BISHOP THIRLWALL.

THE Harpers have republished this elaborate and very valuable work in two handsome and substantial volumes. We have not been able to examine it very closely, though a very slight inquiry into its merits is sufficient to show that it has manifold and manifest points of superiority

over the Histories by Mitford and Gillies. It is the work of a scholar, who has presented from all authentic sources a very complete and satisfactory history of this ancient and wonderful nation, in a spirit free from all undue bias in favor of any political system, and in a style recommended by its clearness, purity, and great elegance. The readers of Dr. Arnold's excellent Letters will recollect the terms of high admiration in which that great and good man frequently speaks of Thirlwall, and the great work on which he was engaged. The History must take its place, in all libraries, as a standard and indispensable work.

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7. *The Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection stated and defended: with Practical Illustrations and Advices. In a Series of Lectures.* By Rev. GEORGE PECK, D. D. Abridged from the author's larger work. New-York: G. Lane & C. B. Tippett, 200 Mulberry-street. 1845.

THIS *abridgment* of the work upon *Christian Perfection* has been prepared in accordance with the suggestions of several friends in whose judgment we repose great confidence, (among them our highly-esteemed friend *Bishop Hamline*,) for the purpose of meeting the wants of common readers. We have only left out such portions of the original work as are more particularly interesting to scholars and theologians, and would scarcely be read by any other. The present work will be found, as a book upon the great doctrine of *entire sanctification*, complete in all its parts, while it is divested of the scholastic matter which, however important to ministers and students, prevents the general circulation of the original work among the people. Though we have retained some arguments and criticisms which may be beyond the reach of several classes of readers, yet they are so few, it is hoped they will not be deemed objectionable; and as it may be fairly presumed that they may be quite valuable to several other classes, who may not take the pains to read the larger work, they will upon the whole enhance the value of the present volume.

The great object in this publication is that of aiding in the work of "spreading Scriptural holiness over the land." And if our humble efforts shall in any measure contribute to this object, the earnest desire of our heart will be granted, and the great Author of all good shall have the praise.

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8. *Plato against the Atheists; or the Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws: accompanied with Critical Notes, and followed by Extended Dissertations on some of the Main Points of the Platonic Philosophy, especially as compared with the Holy Scriptures.* By TAYLOR LEWIS, LL. D., Professor of Greek in New-York University. Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff-street.

THIS scholar-like work has been elicited by a conviction on the part of Professor LEWIS, that the Atheistic tendencies of modern science could in no way be more successfully met, than by a recurrence

to the vivid ideas and strong common sense of the great Athenian philosopher. It is intended to draw the attention of students in our colleges and theological seminaries to his writings; and thus to prepare the way for a more thorough acquaintance with his philosophy than is common among our theologians. We have rarely seen a work to which we are disposed to yield a more hearty welcome. Its influence upon our system of education cannot but be exceedingly beneficial; nor can it fail to awaken, in the minds of the thinking public, a distrust of that shallow speculation so rife at the present day, and so utterly destructive of all sound principles in religion and in politics. Its publication at the present moment is very timely. The immediate object of this Tenth Book of the Laws is to lay down a preamble containing reasons for the enactment of laws for the punishment of sacrilege and other offenses against religion: and the argument is divided into three parts:—1st, against those who denied the divine existence: 2d, against those who, while they admitted the existence of a God, denied his providence: and 3d, against those who, while they admitted both a God and a providence, maintained that the Deity was easily propitiated, or would not punish sin severely. It will be readily seen that the ground it covers is that upon which it is most fashionable, at the present time, to assail Christianity: and to those who appeal from revelation to the light of nature and of reason, the argument herein presented must have irresistible weight. As we intend hereafter to give a somewhat extended statement of our views with regard to the philosophy of Plato, as set forth in this work, we submit it, for the present, with strong commendations, to the public favor.

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9. *The Pulpit Encyclopedia, and Christian Minister's Companion; containing three hundred and sixty Skeletons and Sketches of Sermons, and eighty-two Essays on Biblical Learning, Theological Studies, and the Composition and Delivery of Sermons.* By the Author of "Sketches and Skeletons of Sermons," "Christian's Daily Portion," and "Sermons for Family Reading." The London edition in four volumes complete in one. 8vo., pp. 616. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

THE full description of this work contained in the above title-page will supersede the necessity of much from us explanatory of its plan. We are happy to say that the work is the best we have seen of the class. The "Sketches" are upon the most approved plan of sermonizing, and the numerous "Essays" are from the great masters—the whole constituting a most excellent "Companion" for "the Christian Minister." "Skeletons," if used as helps to the study of sermons, are useful; but when, as sometimes, they are used as substitutes for original investigation, they are much worse than nothing. We are exceedingly gratified that the Appletons are turning their attention to such works as those we have the pleasure to notice in this number. They are all beautifully executed, and we earnestly hope will meet with adequate encouragement.

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10. *Perils of Popery: especially considered with Reference to the United States of America.* By Rev. JOHN BARTON. 18mo., pp. 256. Cincinnati: H. B. Derby & Co. 1845.

THIS is a spirited performance, and one which should be extensively circulated and read.

11. *A Complete Concordance to the Holy Scriptures.* By ALEXANDER CRUDEN, M. A. A new and condensed edition. Boston: Gould, Randall, & Lincoln. 8vo., pp. 568.

CRUDEN's Concordance has, to the present, remained unrivaled in its particular department. The only difficulty in the way of its universal use has been its size, and consequent high price. The present edition is condensed and abridged by leaving out the Bible Dictionary, now not very valuable to the Biblical student. If it shall be found, as we are persuaded it will be, equally correct and copious in its references with the original, it will supply an important desideratum. The mechanical execution is good; and it can be had in muslin-back for $1 25, of Mark H. Newman, 199 Broadway, New-York.

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12. *An American Dictionary of the English Language.* First edition, in octavo, &c. By NOAH WEBSTER, LL.D. In two volumes. Springfield, Mass.: George and Charles Merriman. 1845.

THIS great work scarcely needs our commendation; though we most cheerfully contribute our mite to the tide of public sentiment which, we doubt not, will continue for many years in its favor. That the work is learned, and contains many improvements in the orthography of the language, none will deny, whatever may be thought of a portion of its peculiarities by some. Its etymological information is unrivaled by any work of the class, and can scarcely be dispensed with. In an effort to embrace all the words of the language, the veteran philologist has, in some instances, incumbered his great work with words which never ought to be used; but excess in such a work is preferable to deficiency. His explanation of scientific terms is exceedingly convenient, and the "Introductory Dissertation" is invaluable. We hope this Dictionary will continue to hold its present high position until a better is produced, and this will not soon be done. The mechanical execution of the present edition is excellent.

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13. *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the Years* 1838–1842. By CHARLES WILKES, U. S. N., Commander of the Expedition. With Illustrations and Maps, in five volumes, 8vo. Phila.: Lea & Blanchard. 1845.

WE have received vols. 1 and 2 of this great work. It gives a detailed account of the first scientific expedition sent out by the government of the United States. Its multifarious details are exceedingly interesting, and will excite much attention both at home and abroad. Perfect accuracy in everything is more than ought to be expected; yet, in the main, we have a basis for confidence in the truthfulness of the statements and representations presented. The style is concise and perspicuous, and the solution and presentation of the facts, so far as we are able to judge by a cursory examination, evincive of sound judgment and good taste. After a more thorough investigation of these interesting volumes, we hope to be able to give the reader a more comprehensive idea of them. The mechanical execution of the work is every way creditable to the enterprising house from which it emanates.

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14. *A History of Germany from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By FREDERICK ROHLRAUZCH. Translated from the last German edition by JAMES D. HAAS. 8vo. pp., 486. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

WE here have a philosophical History of Germany, from the earliest times to the fall of Napoleon. The work is executed with truly German industry and with unusual care and judgment. It belongs to the highest class of Histories. Both for style and matter it is of the highest excellence, and the philosophy of the great events which it records is so wisely drawn out as scarcely to leave room for criticism. The public will, we trust, duly acknowledge the debt of gratitude under which they are brought by the enterprising publishers for this cheap, but beautiful edition of a work which supplies a desideratum in history.

15. *A Manual of Ancient and Modern History, &c.* By W. C. TAYLOR, LL.D., M. R. A. S. Of Trinity College, Dublin. Revised, with a Chapter on the History of the United States, by C. S. HENRY, D. D., Professor of Philosophy and History in the University of New-York. Second edition, 8vo., pp. 797. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

THIS volume is designed as a text-book in history for the use of academies and colleges. It unites "the philosophy with the narrative of history." The defects of the original work are very happily remedied by the editor, Dr. Henry; and, so far as we are able to judge, the present edition constitutes the most perfect work, for the purposes for which it is designed, now extant in this country. The formation of a basis for the study of history, by the student, is certainly an important object. To this Dr. Henry has paid special attention, and we are much mistaken if the American public are not brought under additional obligations to him and the publishers, for a book every way suited to that purpose.

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16. *Meditations and Contemplations.* By JAMES HERVEY, A. M. To which is prefixed the Life of the Author. 12mo., pp. 400. Phila.: Sorin & Ball. 1845.

THE present edition of the celebrated work of Mr. Hervey is tastefully got up, and illustrated with many fine wood-cuts. The style of this author is florid, but chaste. The matter is full of sentiment, and glows with holy fervor. We recommend the present edition of the "Meditations" in preference to any we have seen.

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17. *History of France from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By M. MICHELET. Vol. 1. Translated by G. H. SMITH, F. G. S. 8vo., double columns. Nos. 1 & 2. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

MICHELET is at the head of a new school of historians in France. He is a writer of profound learning and immense research. Of his History of France an English reviewer says:—It "is not only a succession of faithful pictures, but a series of the profoundest deductions." His official position, as "professor of history for France," gives him access to the archives of the nation, of which, his History, so far as he has gone, shows that he knows well how to make the best use. The present edition will be issued in monthly numbers, probably twenty in all, and binding in four volumes.

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18. *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D., late Head Master of Rugby School, and Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford.* By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford. First American, from the third English edition. The two volumes complete in one. 12mo., pp. 516. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

THIS is an exceedingly interesting volume. Dr. Arnold as a school-master, as a politician, as a reformer, as an author, and as a Christian, was no ordinary man. His "school-life at Digby," of fourteen years, was full of interest, especially to one interested in the business of education. The interest he felt in the rising generation, and his ideas of the connection of the right kind of intellectual training with the future destinies of the world, are graphically expressed in a passage which we have this moment opened upon by accident. He says: "The only hope is with the young, if by any means they can be led to think for themselves without following a party, and to love what is good and true, let them find it where they will." An extended review of this volume may be expected hereafter.

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19. *History of the French Revolution, its Causes and Consequences.* By F. MACLEAN ROWAN. Two volumes in one. 18mo., pp. 360. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1845.

A work highly commended in the English Reviews.

Main



Painted by J Pine

Engraved by E Mackenzie

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Lithographed at the Book Room, 200 Mulberry St. N. Y.

[redacted] extensively in this country, but for the last eight years o his life, previously to the publication of the present work, he has visited the continent, and many of the islands of Europe, with a view to aid in the spread of evangelical principles among the churches of the old world. This brought him into contact with all sorts of people, statesmen and Christians, ministers and laymen, with whom he held friendly intercourse on all subjects relating to the government and the state of religion in America. He found

them generally very inquisitive respecting everything which had a bearing on the welfare of the people in this country; and to answer this laudable desire for accurate information, Dr. Baird found it necessary to have recourse to books, that he might not be led astray by depending too much upon his memory. These verbal statements, however, must, from the nature of the case, be confined to comparatively few, were soon forgotten, and from being frequently misunderstood, were liable to be misrepresented, mutilated, or but partially apprehended. To remedy these defects, and to furnish the requisite information to those foreigners who were so eager to obtain it, Dr. Baird, while in Geneva, in Switzerland, composed the work under review, in 1843; and in the following November, having returned to the United States, prepared the present revised American edition, which was published by the Harpers in 1844.

The author, doubtless, had his preferences in regard to the various systems of theological truth and modes of church government; and yet it would be somewhat difficult to guess to which he belongs, such is his impartial regard to truth in the account he has given of the several denominations of evangelical Christians in the United States, while he points out, with a discriminating hand, those peculiarities by which each is distinguished. This is a high, and as rare as it is high, excellence in an author who professes to give a description of the numerous sects which exist in our country. We had, indeed, been so accustomed in reading church history, and particularly the history of theological discussions, to find misstatements of facts, misrepresentations of doctrines, and vile caricatures of usages, that we were almost ready to conclude that it was next to impossible for any writer upon these subjects to free himself from sectarian partialities, and from those asperities which arise out of religious bigotry. Dr. Baird, however, has exhibited that love of truth which rises above bigotry, and that enlarged philanthropy which banishes sectarian littleness, and he richly deserves the laurel of honor awarded to those who achieve a victory over these evils of human nature, by aiming to speak, on all occasions, the language of truth and love. And we cannot but hail this publication as a favorable omen to the church, as indicating the near approach of that day, when the "watchmen shall see eye to eye," and when there shall be nothing left to "hurt or destroy in all the holy mountain."

The author was fully aware that "the well-informed American reader will see many things in this book with which he is already familiar," as he expresses himself in the preface to the American

edition; but this by no means diminishes its value, or detracts from its merits, as the manner in which the author has grouped subjects which are nearly related, the consecutive order in which he has introduced topics which are dependent one on the other, and the perspicuous manner in which he has presented the whole, so as to make it bear on the main object he had in view, namely, "to show the state of religion in America," give to often-repeated facts a new aspect, and make the whole performance at once interesting and instructive.

The range which Dr. Baird has taken gives him a wide scope for the development of the principles he wished, or rather was *bound*, by the force of truth, to establish, and to introduce those numerous facts which form the immovable data of his argumentation. He goes back, indeed, to the foundation of American society, tracing the colonization of this country to its remote causes in the European governments, and shows how these operated, after the discovery of the new world by Christopher Columbus, to force their subjects to expatriate themselves from their homes and kindred, and thus to people the wilderness of North America. Hence the reader of this book will find himself (in some sense unaware, for it did not, at first thought, seem necessary for the illustration of the subject proposed in the first sentence of the title-page) carried back to the days of James I., of England, to Charles I. and II., by which he will see the troubled elements of society working in violent collision, and all tending, by the overrulings of a wise and beneficent, and yet awfully-mysterious Providence, to produce results of a character far more benevolent than any the world ever saw before—with the exception of that grand exhibition of the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God, which was displayed when the Redeemer demonstrated his unparalleled love to man. In thus tracing the causes which led to the colonization of America, together with the means used to accomplish it, Dr. Baird gives a lively description of the state of society generally in Europe, glances at the era of the Reformation, distinguishes with nice discrimination between true and false principles of religion, shows how the one worked to emancipate the human mind from spiritual and civil bondage, while the other tended to keep it enslaved to both the one and the other; but that the principle of freedom burst itself from its bondage, and finally transported itself across the Atlantic, and sought and found an asylum in the new world. This was an achievement of no ordinary character, and could not have been effected without the interposition of divine power and grace.

In this historical sketch of American colonization, our author is

sufficiently minute to give us the particulars which are needful to enable us to form a just perception of the difficulties these bold and intrepid colonists had to encounter; the dangers they shunned, the enemies with whom they had to contend, as well as the mercies which were showered upon them; and yet so succinct as to relieve us from that ennui which a tedious prolixity is so apt to produce. He treats of the settlements of each of the old thirteen colonies separately, and then groups the whole together, and presents them to the reader in one compact body. Even the person who is familiar with the early history of this country will find many stirring facts and incidents related in the volume before us, which he might have overlooked; or, if before observed, he will find them placed in juxtaposition with other facts and incidents in such a manner as to shed additional light upon his mind, and thus render this page of history more luminous, and more especially in its connection with the establishment and diffusion of Christianity in North America.

After giving a short but intelligent description of the American continent, measuring its extent, north and south, east and west, its lakes and rivers, mountains and valleys, the author enters upon the history of its first settlements. In doing this his details, though they must appear much condensed when compared to Bancroft's general History of American Colonization, and others who have written particular narratives of those thrilling events, are nevertheless sufficiently minute to invest them with interest, and to give the reader an accurate perception of the motives by which the colonists were actuated, and the means they selected to accomplish their object. And it is somewhat remarkable that those who first settled the eastern part of the continent, now called New-England, were so different in their habits, religious views, and feelings, from those who emigrated to Virginia and the other southern colonies. While the former were impelled by a strong religious principle, freed from the love of external pomp and splendor, the latter were actuated more by a desire of worldly gain, though still under the influence of that religion which was established by law. The one fled from persecution—the other came under the protection of the king and the church. The one partook more of the hardihood of plebeian virtue than effeminate gentlemen, while the other bore the marks of aristocracy, and assumed the airs of patrician rank. This diversity of character, with all the nice shades of contrast and analogy exhibited by the colonists, enabled Dr. Baird to mark, with a discriminating hand, the different motives by which they were actuated, and to trace their bearings in the future destiny of

the colonies, and more especially upon their civil and religious institutions. But we cannot, in the short space allotted in this article, pursue this subject any further, and we have merely hinted at it here, for the purpose of indicating to the reader the character of the work we are recommending to his attention.

Having completed his account of the colonization of the several original provinces, Dr. Baird enters, in his second book, upon a consideration of the religious character of the colonists, and distinguishes between the founders of the New-England and the southern and middle colonies, with truth and accuracy; showing, that while they all provided for Christianity in some form, and interwove their religious with their civil institutions, a great diversity of opinions prevailed in respect to external rites and ceremonies, while each sect exacted a rigid adherence to its own peculiarities. Thus the Puritan of New-England excluded from his communion the Churchman and the Quaker; the Dutch Reformed of New-York would not tolerate either the Puritan or the Church-of-England man; while, in Virginia and the Carolinas, the Dissenter was treated as a heretic, and forbidden to worship God in the great congregation. In all the colonies, except Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the spirit of proscription for conscience' sake exhibited its hateful character, though none carried the spirit of exclusiveness so far as to inflict death on the innovators upon their established systems, except the colony of Massachusetts. This method of proscription, however, was but an imitation of a practice which almost universally prevailed in all countries, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan, so imperfectly were the principles of religious liberty understood in that age; and hence an apology may be offered for our forefathers in permitting this spirit of intolerance to predominate in their councils. Perhaps among all orders of men, none are naturally so impatient of contradiction as the ministers of religion; and this, doubtless, arises from their habit of dictating continually in the pulpit, without being questioned for what they say; and hence they unconsciously contract a dictatorial spirit, which attaches itself, less or more, to all their intercourse in society. This may have led to that intolerance which has marked the conduct of predominant sects toward others who have dissented from them. And how long was it, even after the spirit of civil liberty had been understood and exemplified in this country, before the bands of sectarian bigotry were broken, and religious freedom allowed to operate without restraint!

They soon found it necessary, however, to lay aside their dis-

putes one with the other, and to unite their counsels and energies against the aggressions of the aborigines of the wilderness, who probably considered that they who did not scruple to persecute each other, might well become objects of vengeance to the murderous tomahawk and scalping-knife. Hence, in the progress of the settlements, these simple natives, thinking their rights were invaded by their European neighbors, commenced a merciless warfare upon the settlements, burning their villages, devastating their fields of grain, driving off their cattle, murdering men, women, and children, and carrying into captivity those that were taken alive. Hence arose an implacable hatred between the two races, which vented itself in wars and bloodshed for a long time, until victory finally perched upon the English standard, and peace was proclaimed on both sides.

But it would take up too much space to enter minutely into these things, and a thousand other difficulties with which the colonists had to contend. During their entire colonial state, though sometimes involved in petty warfare with each other, sometimes more furiously with the aborigines, and at other times with the French, who had possessed themselves of Canada, and some parts of Nova-Scotia, and established trading posts along the river St. Lawrence, the shores of lakes Ontario and Erie, and on the banks of the Mississippi as far as New-Orleans—during this entire period, they maintained the institutions of religion: though often during their protracted and bloody wars it was at a low ebb, it still burned more or less brightly upon their altars: ministers were settled, and generally respected and liberally supported by a tax upon the people in proportion to their property. There were, indeed, some seasons of remarkable revivals of religion, under the ministrations of such men as Edwards, Davies, Rogers, and Tennant, and the country was blessed also with the visitations of the Wesleys and Whitefield; the latter of whom traveled extensively through the provinces, making his powerful voice heard in the pulpits of all who would bid him welcome, whether of the Established Church or of the Dissenter; many were awakened and converted under his searching ministry.

Such was the general state of things at the commencement of the revolutionary struggle. This, which eventuated in severing the colonies from the mother country and establishing the independence of the United States, was a means of destroying all union between church and state, and thus leaving Christianity to win its way unaided by the civil authority, any further than merely to protect it in the free exercise of its functions, and to use its own

appliances according to its sense of right and propriety. According to an estimate made by Dr. Baird, which he assures us is founded on the best authority within his reach, the number of clergymen, of all orders, in 1775, the commencement of the revolution, was 1441; and allowing the population to be 3,000,000 free, and 500,000 slaves, there was one minister for every 2429 souls, "which," he says, "I apprehend is not far from the exact truth." Nor is it at all probable that this ratio was increased while the war of the revolution lasted, during which time the interests of true religion were much neglected, the morals of the people became relaxed, so that the restraints of Christian principle were but feebly felt and but partially exemplified. Yet the principles of civil liberty had taken such firm hold upon the hearts of the people, that they were determined to shake off the trammels of religious, as they had already done of civil, despotism, as it had long existed in several of the states. Though the general government was prohibited, by an article in the constitution, from interfering in religious matters, yet the several states had it in their power, in framing their constitutions, either to interweave regulations for the establishment and support of religion, or simply to leave it to its own resources, the government merely throwing around it the shield of its protection against persecution or coercion. They wisely chose the latter course, though it was brought about by degrees, in some states sooner than in others, until, finally, they have all come into the measure, allowing to each denomination equal rights and privileges. This result, though at first deprecated by some, from an anticipation of its disastrous effects upon the interests of Christianity, is not only acquiesced in as an event that cannot be avoided, but is universally hailed as an auspicious period in the history of the American churches, and that, too, by actually beholding the beneficial influence of the "voluntary principle."

But though the general government does not interfere with religious affairs, any further than to protect each sect alike in the exercise of its peculiar rights and privileges, yet it is manifest that it is founded on Christian principles, recognizing Christianity as the religion of the country, leaving each state to adopt such measures as it might choose for the regulation of the churches within its bounds. That the constitution is not infidel in its character, but acknowledges the authority of divine revelation, is evident from the fact, that all the high officers of government are sworn into office upon the Bible; that the legislature and courts of justice adjourn on the sabbath; and that both houses of congress have their chaplains, who open their daily sessions with prayer to Almighty

God. Those, therefore, who accuse the government of the United States of being a patron of infidelity, merely because the subject of divine revelation is not introduced in the articles of confederation, seem to forget that these articles were framed for political purposes only; that considering the state of the country at that time in regard to the several sects of Christians, no one sect could have been selected as an object of government patronage, without excluding all the rest; that these things being considered, the framers of the constitution wisely concluded that it was best to leave each sect to provide for itself, at the same time acknowledging the authority of divine revelation, by abstaining from all legislative and judicial proceedings on the sabbath, providing for the support of chaplains in its army and navy, as well as in its legislative halls. The same thing is proved, as Dr. Baird has very justly remarked, by several acts of the general government, such as proclamations for days of public fasting and prayer, as well as of thanksgiving and praise, both during the war and since, all which is a plain acknowledgment of its dependence upon divine aid for protection and succor. Whatever of infidelity, therefore, may have mingled itself in the councils of the nation, individuals alone are responsible for it, and not the nation or the national government, as these have ever proceeded upon the presumption that the Christian religion is true; that the Bible contains a record of God's will; and that an oath of fidelity to the constitution derives its sacredness from a firm belief in the being and attributes of Deity.

Having established these things, the author proceeds to examine the influence of the "voluntary principle," as it has been very properly called, upon the interests of true religion. This originated very much from the manner in which the several colonies grew up from small beginnings under the influence chiefly of their own exertions, so that they were early thrown upon their own resources for protection, and for providing for the support of their own institutions, both civil and religious. And when the independence of the country was achieved, and the several states had proclaimed a free toleration to all sects and denominations, without pledging themselves to the support of any one sect to the exclusion of others, each was left free to provide for its own support, for the diffusion of its principles in any way it might see fit, so long as it did not infringe upon the rights of its neighbor, nor violate the constitution of the state in which it had its local habitation, or of the United States, which threw around them all the shield of its protection. This state of things introduced the use of the "voluntary principle," that is to say, the principle which led to the practice now univer-

sally adopted in the United States, of each one's contributing whatever amount he may choose for the building of churches, supporting ministers, and for other expenses incident to divine worship, in opposition to collecting the amount necessary to meet these demands by a legal tax. In fact, the whole machinery of churches—the education, calling, and supporting of ministers, church government, and the entire arrangement of everything relating to the internal regulation of the churches—is left to be managed by the several sects according to their own sense of right and propriety, without any further interference of the civil authorities than to protect them all in the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges.

That this principle has operated most benignly upon the interests of Christianity, Dr. Baird has amply proved from an induction of facts, showing the rapid growth of most of the leading sects in the country. This growth has been owing, under the blessing of God upon the labors of his people, to the care which has been taken in selecting ministers, requiring, generally speaking, as a necessary prerequisite, an experience of regeneration, and the zeal with which these ministers have entered upon their work, together with the strict discipline which has been exercised over the churches, in preventing ungodly persons from becoming members, or if such are found within the sacred inclosure, if they cannot be reformed, of excluding them from the communion. In the elucidation of these facts, the author enters into a minute investigation of the foundation of this principle; traces its operation in building churches in the cities, villages, and in the new settlements; in the support of ministers, founding schools, colleges, (though many of these latter are, in part at least, supported by the state,) and theological seminaries; the forming Bible, tract, Sunday-school, missionary, and temperance societies; all of which are in successful operation in this country. In this minute survey of the development of this voluntary principle, as it exhibits itself in the various Christian denominations, Dr. Baird has evinced not only a diligence of research, but an impartial regard to truth, giving a true statement of the doctrinal peculiarities of each sect, as well as describing the usages of all in regard to the manner in which they call their ministers, the amount of their salaries, and the manner in which they are raised, together with their various missionary establishments. We may, therefore, safely recommend this part of the work as authority upon all these topics.

In describing the general character of "American preaching," our author enters upon a comparative view of the different orders

of clergy, the educated and uneducated, those who read and those who deliver sermons extemporaneously, and thinks that the latter exceed in what is called oratory, but more especially in fervor and efficiency, though they may fall below their brethren in style, in clearness of elucidation and expression. That there are many who enter the Christian ministry, among all denominations, who were never called of God to that sacred work, and are therefore unfit for their office, may well be admitted; and that these, whether they read their sermons, commit them to memory, or, as is too frequently the case, preach other men's sermons, or whether they attempt to extemporize, will not profit the people, must be evident to all who recognize a "call by the Holy Ghost" as essential to constitute a gospel minister; but that such as are called of God, if they "study to show themselves approved unto God," will generally find their hearts so filled and fired with love to God and man, as to be able to speak "as the Spirit giveth utterance," no man acquainted with experimental religion will dispute; and hence that those who move forward under the influence of this love, being conscious of a divine call, will be always ready to deliver themselves not indeed without premeditation, but extemporaneously and with effect, will hardly be denied by any competent to judge on this subject. This is, we believe, generally true. We do not, indeed, deny but that a truly godly minister may be moved to write his sermons, and that an ungodly one may extemporize. But that the latter practice is most in accordance with primitive usage, and is most likely to produce the desired effect, appears to us indisputable, and, therefore, the practice should be assiduously cultivated by all those who are sent to proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ.

On what have been very properly called "revivals of religion" in America, our author dwells at large, tracing their history from an early period of our colonial existence down to the present time, showing the means used to promote them, and the happy influence they have exerted in society. That these revivals have been commenced and carried forward under the influence of the Spirit of God is abundantly proved from the effects which have followed on the hearts and lives of those who were the happy subjects of them. Thousands and tens of thousands of sinners, among all classes of men, both savage and civilized, have been brought from darkness to light, and have given the most substantial evidence of the reality of the change by a subsequent life of piety, by works of justice, truth, and mercy. That abuses have grown out of them, is no more than might have been expected; for what good thing

has not been abused by either the ignorance or perversity of mankind; and, therefore, to condemn a thing because it has been abused, is to condemn every good thing with which God has favored the human race. The fact is, if there be truth in the doctrines of divine revelation, then must sinners be converted from the error of their ways, that they may serve God acceptably here, and be made holy in heart and life, before they can enter the kingdom of glory hereafter; and wherever and whenever this work is carried on, there is a revival of true religion. And, perhaps, there is no country in the universe, since the apostolic age, where these revivals of religion have been more extensive, deep, and genuine, than they have been in these United States. These facts are stated and illustrated in the work before us with great clearness, and the objections which have arisen against them are answered with the most happy effect, neither justifying reprehensible measures which may have been adopted by professed friends, nor allowing the validity of the objections which have been preferred against them by infidels and ungodly men.

In the sixth book the author gives an account of the several evangelical denominations in the United States. In doing this he enters into a succinct history of their origin, gives the doctrines by which the several sects are distinguished, as well as those in which they agree, their different forms of church government, and shows their comparative strength and influence on society, and concludes the chapter with a statement of the number of churches, ministers, communicants, and probable population of each denomination. This chapter, therefore, contains valuable information collected from various authentic sources, and grouped together in such a manner as to give the reader a clear and comprehensive view of the whole subject. In this sketch of the history and present state of the evangelical denominations, while he has aimed to do equal justice to all and to each, he has paid a high compliment to the Methodist Episcopal Church, by giving her credit for an activity and diligence which we can hardly claim for ourselves, though we cannot but be gratified at the honorable mention he has made of our well-meant endeavors to do good, and the more so, as we had been so long accustomed to have our name associated with terms of reproach, and our modes of procedure caricatured as the effect of ignorant fanaticism. Dr. Baird will, therefore, accept of this acknowledgment for his generous remarks, and for the justice he has done us in stating our doctrines and church polity truly, and without disguise.

As it may be a gratification to our readers to see the results

to which the author has arrived, in respect to the numbers gathered into the several churches, termed evangelical, we give the following statistical table, as we find it in the chapter before us :—

	Churches.	Ministers.	Communicants.	Population.
"I. EPISCOPAL.				
Protestant Episcopalians	1,200	1,176	100,000	808,000
Moravians	22	27	3,000	12,000
Total	1,223	1,203	103,000	812,000
II. CONGREGATIONAL.				
Orthodox Churches	1,500	1,350	180,000	1,000,000
III. BAPTIST.				
Regular Baptists	8,482	4,096	637,477	
Free-Will Baptists	1,165	771	61,372	
Seventh Day Baptists	59	46	6,077	4,000,000
Disciples of Christ, or Campbellites				
Winebrannarians				
Total	9,706	4,853	704,926	4,000,000
IV. PRESBYTERIAN.				
Regular Presbyterians—Old and New Schools,	3,564	2,672	279,782	
Cumberland Presbyterians	550	550	75,000	
Dutch Reformed Church	267	259	29,322	
Associate Synod	200	100	15,000	
Associate Reformed	300	165	26,000	4,500,000
Reformed Presbyterians	94	57	10,500	
Lutherans	1,371	423	146,303	
German Reformed	600	180	100,000	
Total	6,966	4,406	681,907	4,500,000

V. METHODIST.	Churches or other places of worship.	Preachers.	Communicants.	Population.
Methodist Episcopal Church	25,109*	3,968 T. M. 7,730 L. M.	1,068,525	4,500,000
Protestant Methodists	2,000	500 T. M. 700 L. M.	60,000	300,000
Welsh Calvinistic Methodists	20	20	2,500	12,500
United Brethren in Christ	2,000	250 T. M. 350 L. M.	80,000	200,000
Evangelical Association	900	112 T. M. 200 L. M.	14,000	40,000
Total	30,029	4,870 T. M. 8,980 L. M.	1,225,025	5,052,500
MENNONISTS	200			
ORTHODOX QUAKERS	300			

"By uniting the Congregationalists with the Presbyterians, which, as they are in all important respects the same, is perfectly proper, we reduce the evangelical denominations in the United States to four great families, and, thus arranged, they present the following summary :—

"* I am indebted for the above estimate of the probable number of places, including churches, schoolhouses, and private houses, in which the Methodist itinerant and local ministers preach, to my friend, President Durbin. It has been made with much care, and, I doubt not, is considerably within the truth. President Durbin has a wide and accurate acquaintance with the country, as well as with the entire economy of the church to which he belongs."

	Churches.	Ministers.	Communs.	Population.
Episcopalians	1,223	1,203	103,000	812,000
Presbyterians	8,466	5,756	861,897	5,500,000
Baptists	9,706	4,853	704,926	4,000,000
Methodists	30,029	4,870*	1,195,025	5,052,500
Total . .	49,424	16,682	2,864,848	15,364,000†"

According to the above enumeration, there were 16,682 ministers of the gospel belonging to these evangelical denominations, independently of the local preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, amounting to 8980, the licentiates belonging to the Baptists and Presbyterians, and those connected with other sects not included in the above list of evangelical ministers. Add all these, and the number would swell, probably, to not less than 25,000; and allowing that there are 18,500,000 inhabitants in the country, as our author supposes there were in 1844, there would be one minister for every 740 souls. If this be correct, as we believe it is not far from the truth, the reason why all are not brought under the influence of the gospel, is not for want of a greater number of ministers, but because so many of them are unfit for their work, or are unfaithful or unskillful in its performance. That this is the case will not be disputed by any competent to judge, though the clergy of the United States will compare favorably with those in any country in the world, more especially those which may be denominated evangelical. Still, among even these there is room for a great improvement in the knowledge of divine things, in that deep and heartfelt experience of the love of God in the heart, and which displays itself in an enlightened and active zeal in the cause of Christ. If all these men were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of their divine Master, and, instead of contending about those minor things which do not affect the vitals of religion, were to bend their whole united force against the world, the flesh, and the devil, "striving together for the faith of the gospel," we should soon see a more rapid spread of Christianity in the world; the strong-holds of sin and Satan would be speedily demolished, and the reign of Jesus Christ would be hastened with a rapidity not hitherto witnessed. We

"* Traveling ministers."

† Why the population of the Methodists should be less than that of the Presbyterians and Congregationalists, when the number of communicants is nearly one-third more, and why it is so nearly equal to the Baptists, while the communicants are more than a third larger, we cannot tell. It is probable, however, for we cannot believe the author designed to misrepresent, that the calculation is correct, founded on the fact that a greater number of non-professors attend the ministry of these denominations in proportion to their membership than do on the Methodist ministry.

rejoice, however, in believing that this spirit is reviving, that ministers of the gospel are awakening more and more to a sense of their high responsibility, and are entering into their work with renewed energy and zeal, and, of course, that the different orders are becoming more and more united in the grand work of evangelizing the world. And we think the book before us will tend much to facilitate this most desirable result, by removing the groundless prejudices which had long existed among the several denominations against each other, as they will here see that all the evangelical sects agree in holding fast the fundamental doctrines of Jesus Christ.

That this spirit of union and active zeal is increasing in the churches designated is further manifest in the several missionary establishments, an account of which is given in the volumes before us. From a hasty glance over this interesting portion of the work, we think we discover the same impartial regard to truth by which we have already noticed other parts of it are distinguished. This is an excellence in a writer, of such a sterling character, that it cannot be too much commended, as it puts the reader at rest while perusing the pages, saving him from that uneasiness arising from a fear of being imposed upon by false statements, or by the distortions of facts in themselves true. The missionary societies in active operation, under the direction of the Presbyterian, Protestant Episcopal, Baptist, and Methodist Episcopal Churches, are all exerting a hallowing influence both at home and abroad, though their appliances are by no means in proportion to the means, pecuniary and others, which are at command. Indeed, unless more energetic plans are devised, and more efficient means are used for the conversion of the world, it will never be converted, for the number of conversions is by no means in a ratio with the increase of the population of mankind. If, therefore, our author has erred in anything, it is in the too charitable construction he has put upon the benign effects which have been produced, and are being produced, by the labors of the several missionaries employed; but even this error, should it prove to be one, exhibits that benevolence of heart, which, in its aberrations, "leans to virtue's side," and leads its possessor to indulge in a too fond anticipation of the speedy triumph of gospel truth and holiness. It is to be hoped that the statement of these facts will tend to awaken the attention of the churches to the high importance of cultivating the missionary spirit, of entering more deeply into the true apostolic zeal in spreading among the nations of the world that gospel which "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth,"

and of arousing and directing their slumbering energies to the emancipation of mankind from their spiritual thraldom. Being thankful to God for what he has done, and to our author for recording it in this permanent form, let us all renew our efforts, and call forth the capabilities of the churches in this holy and evangelical work of bringing "all men to the obedience of faith," and never lay down our weapons until the world is conquered to Jesus Christ.

For the beneficial results which have been thus produced we are indebted, under the blessing of God, to the operation of the "voluntary principle." This the author has shown most conclusively. And for the special information of those foreigners for whose benefit he wrote, he has entered into a full explication of this principle, tracing its rise and progress in this country, showing how it expanded itself over the surface of the Christian community, moving its members to acts of benevolence in establishing churches, in the support of literary institutions, and finally unfolding its energies in carrying on the missionary work for the salvation of the heathen, and the destitute portion of our own continent. Such, indeed, is the intrinsic excellence of Christianity, that whenever it enters the understanding of men, penetrates the conscience, and exerts its transforming influence upon the whole inner man, it prompts its possessor to all those acts of justice, truth, and mercy, by which its holy principles are exemplified, and which are necessary for its permanent establishment and wide diffusion among mankind. It needs not either the civil or military power to enforce its precepts, or to support its institutions. All it asks is fair play. It simply demands from human authority to be protected in the use of its own means of doing good from the rude assaults of its adversaries. It then pledges itself to work its way, by the blessing of its divine Author, subduing, in its onward course, every enemy, removing every "stumbling-block," until it shall captivate all hearts by its inimitable beauties and indescribable excellences. The truth of these remarks has been tested by actual experiment, and never more effectually than in this country, with the exception of the apostolic age of Christianity, during the last half century. Here we have beheld a country rising in population and in wealth, in education and in all the arts of civilized life, under the fostering care of a government founded on the popular will, without any established religion, and yet religion has spread its hallowing influence among all orders and ranks of people, put infidelity to the blush, and established itself in the hearts and affections of tens of thousands of its citizens. In this respect it assimilates itself to its

primitive standard, and claims an intimate relation to apostolic purity, both as to its doctrine and its experimental and practical results.

These facts, no doubt, will seem strange to those foreigners to whom the work before us is dedicated. Accustomed, as they have always been, to view Christianity interwoven with the state, upheld and defended by the arm of civil authority, they must behold, with an incredulous astonishment, this same system of religion gaining proselytes daily to its standard, triumphing over opposition by the power of its own internal energies, and so fixing itself in the affections of its disciples, that they are ready voluntarily to sacrifice their worldly goods for the support of its ministers and all its institutions. Yet such are the facts. And by a comparison of the state of Christianity in this country with what it is in Europe, though it cannot boast of its magnificent cathedrals, nor of its long line of bishops and other high dignitaries, with their pompous rites and ceremonies, it will far outshine them, especially those on the continent, in the purity of its doctrines, in the holiness and evangelical character of its ministers, as well as in the spirituality and godly simplicity of its professed followers. While in Europe, those churches which are supported by the state are generally destitute of the life and power of godliness, and their ministers sunk into carnal security, here a large portion of the clergy give evidence that they know from heartfelt experience the transforming power of divine grace, and exhibit a zealous activity in diffusing to the fullest possible extent the truths which they believe and teach. Is not this a demonstration of the superiority of the effects of the voluntary principle over those coercive measures for the support of Christianity which originate from state patronage and power? This, indeed, is the triumph of truth over error. It is a proof that when the mind is left free to act under the influence of those impulses which are inspired by the Spirit of God, it will achieve more for the cause of truth and righteousness than can be accomplished by any other means whatever. And it is also a proof that a union between church and state is unlawful, that God has "forbidden the bans," and, therefore, his blessing will not accompany the junction. This might be proved from the history of the church from the days of Constantine down to the present hour. Previous to his elevation to the throne of the Cesars, when he took the church under his patronage, Christianity remained comparatively pure, captivating the hearts of men by the excellence and beauty of its own truths; but from that moment its peculiar glories began to disappear; its ministers fondly and foolishly mixed in the coun-

cils of the state, and pride and ambition very soon usurped the place of humility, and a simple desire to promote the glory of God; and from that time to the present, wherever this union has subsisted, pure religion has been at a low ebb, and the church has been considered and used as a creature of state policy. So true is it, that Christianity acknowledges no other king than the Lord Jesus Christ; and hence those churches which say, "Give us a king, that we may be like unto the nations around about us," throw off their allegiance to the "King of kings," and, of course, forfeit his protection and blessing. Those who flee to the state for support, put their "trust in an arm of flesh," while those who look to God alone for aid and direction, trust in an omnipotent arm, and are like "Mount Zion, which cannot be moved."

Dr. Baird closes his work with some general remarks on the "Progress of religious liberty," on the "True source of all the success" of the gospel of Jesus Christ, and of the "Grounds of hope in relation to the churches in America." In these remarks, while he adverts to the means which are used, such as the establishment of sabbath schools, Bible classes, educational, missionary, and Bible societies, and preaching the word of God, he very properly looks to God for his blessing upon the use of all these means for success, and as forming the only solid ground of hope. Nor does he neglect to meet and obviate the objections which have been preferred against the government of the United States, the morals of the people, and the general state of religion. He shows, most conclusively, that the mobs which have at times broken out in America, no more prove that the government is inefficient or unstable, because it is founded upon the popular will, than it does that the monarchies of Europe must totter and fall, because similar disturbances have been witnessed under their sway. Indeed, much more violence has been witnessed in those countries, in times of great excitement, than has been seen in our country; so that the existence of these scenes of turbulence proves nothing either for or against the goodness or strength of a government, but only that mankind are ever prone, under whatever government they may live, to allow their passions to predominate over their judgment, and to impel them on in a mad career of wickedness and rebellion. The strength of a government is demonstrated in curbing those evil passions, in restraining the subjects or the citizens from an improper indulgence in their corrupt appetites, and in enforcing obedience to law and order whenever they manifest a disposition to transgress the bounds of moderation. This has been done here in numerous instances. Nor have the citizens of

this country ever exhibited those turbulent dispositions which have excited them to mob violence to half the amount the subjects of European governments have done on a variety of occasions, and, when thus excited, they have not gone to the same lengths of violence as have those under the despotic rulers of the old world.

And, then, as to the morals of the people, though it be undoubtedly true that deistical principles prevail to a certain extent, and vice shows itself in various forms, yet the moral conduct of the citizens of the United States, as a whole, will rise on a comparison with the people of Great Britain, France, or Germany; and in respect to the observance of the sabbath, there is no country in Europe, except Scotland, where it is kept with such strictness as it is in this country. And in respect to the fulfillment of contracts, regard to the solemnity of oaths, and all those duties which originate from the social relations, they are generally more exemplary than their neighbors. Still, it must be admitted, that there is great room for reformation and improvement; and the only ground for hope in this respect is in the propagation of Christian principles among all orders and ranks of men. That these principles are diffusing wider and wider, is abundantly manifest from the increased zeal of churches in extending their missionary operations, as well as in the numerous revivals of religion which have been witnessed in our happy country.

Some, indeed, who have not been backward in acknowledging the hand of God in the establishment of our national existence, have expressed their fears that he will now forsake us on account of our wickedness. But surely, wickedness is not half so rife now as it was then. Infidelity was then, and for some time thereafter, greatly in vogue; profanity and drunkenness were more generally prevalent than now; and even slavery, which many consider the prime curse of the land, was much more general in the several states than it is at the present time. If God, therefore, aided our fathers in achieving our independence in the midst of these evils, why should he abandon us now when such successful efforts are making to banish them from among us, and to plant in their stead those virtues which adorn and dignify the human character?

But it is time to bring these remarks to a close, although we are aware that we have given but an imperfect view of the contents of the work before us. If, however, these remarks shall excite any to purchase the book, and read it for themselves, one main object of writing will be answered; and we doubt not but that all who do this will thank us for directing their attention to it. They

will here see the manner in which our country was settled—the difficulties with which the colonists had to contend—the hardships they endured—how the Christian religion was at first incorporated with their civil institutions—until, finally, they threw off the yoke of civil bondage, achieved their liberties, and proclaimed their independence—and then trace the manner in which the church and state became separated. They will be led to see, also, how the civil government can throw its broad shield around Christianity, so as to protect each sect in the peaceable possession of all its rights and privileges, without oppressing or proscribing any, while all are left free to adopt whatever mode of worshiping God they may see fit, of selecting and supporting their ministers, and all the institutions they may consider necessary to carry forward the work of God among men.

Nor will they be less delighted in reflecting upon the rapid extension of our territories, the increase of our population, the harmonious action of the state and general governments, protecting alike the life, liberty, property, and character of all, while Christianity has exerted its hallowing influence upon the understandings and consciences of so great a proportion of the people, keeping pace with the enlargement of our settlements by means of missionary establishments and other religious appliances. These are the results which will fill every patriotic heart, much more every pious heart, with sentiments of sincerest gratitude and praise. Depending on God alone for aid, and looking to him through faith in Jesus Christ for success in all their religious enterprises, the Christians of this country have applied themselves to their work with a steady perseverance, and they look forward with a lively anticipation to that day when the "kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of the Lord and of his Christ."

Art. II.—*Review of Rev. T. M. Hopkins's "Examination of Joshua* x, 12–15."

"Ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι τῇ ἅπαξ παραδοθείσῃ τοῖς ἁγίοις πίστει."—Paul.

The Biblical Repository for January, 1845, presents us with a full-grown, and perhaps timely, delivery of a German embryo idea, in the shape of a profound doubt of the genuineness of the passage in Joshua, giving account, that *the sun and moon stood still;* which doubt grows in the mind of the writer into a certainty of disbelief, duly compacted with ligamentous evidence, authority, and criticism; and arrayed withal in the necessary argumental investments. The article is by the Rev. T. M. Hopkins, pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Westfield, N. Y. We wish to unfold the wrappages of this new-born, before its strength shall have become consolidated; to dissect its members, and prove whether there be in it a life which may not die. For to truth, wherever found, we owe unswerving allegiance.

For the reader's convenience, we recite the entire passage which is questioned:—

"Then spake Joshua to the Lord in the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel, and he said in the sight of Israel, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon. And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies. Is not this written in the Book of Joshua? So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day. And there was no day like that before it, or after it, that the Lord hearkened unto the voice of a man: for the Lord fought for Israel. And Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, unto the camp to Gilgal." Joshua x, 12–15.

The writer above named says:—

"In the Biblical Repository, for Oct., 1833, an article will be found 'on the standing still of the sun and moon at the command of Joshua,' supposed by the editor to have come from the pen of Professor Hengstenberg, of Berlin; which takes the ground that the above passage is only a quotation from a book or a volume of poems, therein cited: and that, consequently, the so-called miracle of arresting the sun and moon never took place."—P. 97.

In defending this position, Mr. Hopkins states the question definitively and clearly:—"Is this passage any part of the sacred record? Is it written by him who wrote the Book of Jasher?"

While now we agree that inconsiderate zeal, in defense of that which has been erroneously received as sacred, will in the end prove injurious to the cause of truth, we likewise think that the mighty influence of an alluring philosophy is bearing a large portion of the present age, not merely to the just ground of rigid criticism, but passing that limit, into the domains of skeptical rationalism. Whether the article we have cited be tinctured with this error, it is at least due that its doctrines be fairly questioned: that any arguments which would set aside a portion of our sacred writings should not be received as conclusive without faithful scrutiny. Nay, if in the glorious superstructure of our revelation there be found some spurious materials, introduced whether by chance or unholy design, we should yet proceed with cautious hands to their separation or rejection, lest we thereby injure the genuine parts and the sound. In our haste to remove a false ornament, it were unwise to deface the fair wall, or mar the integrity of the beam that supported it. If the pure gold of a capital, or a curiously wrought triglyph be glossed with a substance that tarnishes, prudence would not, that, to put away the stain, we should bring down with sudden crash the solid frieze, or the beauteous column with all the lofty decorations of its noble entablatures.

The question as stated above, it will be perceived, has nothing to do with the various theories which have been proposed for explaining the passage under consideration. For if the passage is shown to be an interpolation, we have no further need of interpretation; but if genuine, it was for Infinite Wisdom to choose in what way Infinite Power should exert itself to accomplish its end, even though human philosophy should for ever fail to demonstrate the *quo modo* of the miracle.

Though the question seems to propose an investigation, yet the writer becomes rather the advocate of a theory, which he defines in the following terms:—

"It supposes the passage to be a quotation or an extract from a book, known at the time as the Book of Jasher; which was probably a collection of poems descriptive of important events, having truth for their basis, but fiction for their dress."—P. 107.

We will not stop here to scrutinize this definition too closely, which, by supposing the fable in Jasher to have "truth for its basis," *admits the fact of the miracle*, which is the main point controverted in the arguments that follow. He did not intend the admission for this case, and it does not affect the argument. The passage above quoted continues:—

"Inasmuch, however, as all turns on the single question, whether the passage properly belongs to the sacred Scriptures or not, we shall proceed to consider the arguments, which, to our mind, seem obviously opposed to it."—P. 107.

We remark, in passing, that if grammar is a science, "*all*," in the above sentence, must refer to the "theory" proposed to be established. When, therefore, he shall have proved that the passage in question does not "properly belong to the sacred Scriptures," we do not apprehend by what law of logic he conducts his inference. We should call it a *non sequitur*; for the premise gained does not inform us *what* the Book of Jasher is. If, however, it were *intended*, as we suspect, to refer only to the essential part of the question involved, to wit, *the genuineness of the passage*, then the two questions, instead of turning the one upon the other, become identical. For if the passage be genuine, it, of course, properly belongs to the sacred Scriptures; and conversely, if it properly belongs to the sacred Scriptures, it must be genuine. Or negatively, if it is not genuine, it does not properly belong to the sacred Scriptures; and if it does not properly belong to the sacred Scriptures, it is not genuine. But to say, that, if it does not properly belong to the sacred Scriptures, the Book of Jasher is a book of poems of a certain known character—this is not so evident.

These points, however, as not affecting the main question, we should hardly have noticed here, but for the general principle, that by a law of our nature, every argument, in addition to its purely logical value, carries with it to the mind a certain authoritative force of conviction, more or less strong in proportion as we estimate the learning, candor, and reasoning abilities of the author. We proceed then to notice the arguments adduced to support the theory we have cited:—

I. "Joshua x, 12–15, is evidently an interruption of the narrative; and an interruption which, when considered with reference to its own statement at the close, destroys the credibility of the whole passage."—P. 107.

This argument divides itself into two parts: 1st, the interruption; 2d, the fact at the close is not reconcilable with the context.

1. The passage is an evident "interruption of the narrative;"—as what else could it be, if, by *narrative*, be meant the recital of only the *military* events of the campaign? That is, it is the statement of an occurrence distinct in its character from the mere war-deeds of the army, and taking place (if at all) in the midst of these, is inserted where it legitimately belongs, in the midst of the nar-

rative. Or not to make this distinction as to the character of the events, and supposing the miracle actually to have transpired, it then forms a part of the history, and holds its own place in the course of the narration. He adds:—

"The reader has only to turn to the chapter itself, and leaving the passage out, read the remainder. He will then find a well-connected account of a series of events which are in themselves natural, orderly, and perfectly consistent with one another."—P. 107.

Very true: and the same may be said of any paragraph in any narration of events occurring successively, and not necessarily dependent on one another. Thus, if we omit verses 36, 37, of this same chapter, the remaining parts will exhibit "a series of events" equally "well-connected," "natural," and "consistent with one another." The only difference will be, there will be so much less of the history, and instead of seeing Joshua going from Eglon to Hebron, besieging and taking that city, and thence to Debir, we should have him march from Eglon directly to Debir. We might with the same safety, therefore, infer that verses 36, 37, were not a part of the sacred Scriptures.

Our conclusion, then, in regard to this first argument is this:—The fact that any particular paragraph may be dropped from a narrative, and the parts before and after it join so naturally that the omission shall not be perceived unless previously known, does not prove that such passage does not properly belong there. For such a rule would likewise exclude from poetry all episodes, from history all digressions, all parentheses, all explanatory clauses, all ornament. The passage under consideration, if it be a part of the sacred writings, requires of necessity a suspension of the war part of the history, while this miraculous interposition of the Almighty may likewise be told. It would seem, therefore, that before we can argue this passage to be spurious, from the fact that it interrupts the narrative, it were incumbent to show how it would not interrupt the narrative if admitted to be genuine.

2. The incongruity of verse 15 with the subsequent part of the chapter forms the second part of this argument. We are told in this verse, that "Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, unto the camp to Gilgal." To make this return that night, a distance of some thirty-five miles, after having marched all the preceding night to come up from Gilgal, and after the labors of battle and pursuit the whole day, seems physically impossible. Besides, the history shows us Joshua immediately subsequent, at Makkedah, in the vicinity of the recent contest; and after a consecutive and detailed

account of his movements in those and more distant parts, it is said, verse 43, "And Joshua returned," &c., precisely in the words of this fifteenth verse. Here is a difficulty. All commentators have acknowledged it. The two parts seem not reconcilable. Error has even crept into the inspired books, though kept with so much care. Various conjectures have been proffered for its relief. Is this of Mr. Hopkins the best? He seems to think the hand of Dr. Horne rather rash, "to cut the knot," by rejecting the entire verse. When, however, he would send those others with it, perhaps the temerity is ennobled by the dignity of boldness.

What we have to say on this point, is, that if Mr. Hopkins can prove his theory true in respect of this whole passage, we are then happily relieved of the difficulty in this verse: but we do not see that the difficulty in this verse constitutes an argument against the genuineness of the three preceding ones. *They* profess to relate a miracle: *this*, a simple and natural enough movement of the army. If, at least, there be argument here, it certainly resolves itself into this: because the context and the nature of things seem to forbid the supposition that Joshua returned to Gilgal as stated in verse 15; therefore, the Almighty did not put forth his power to arrest the sun and moon, as stated in verses 12, 13.

Thus is the whole of his first argument presented with the full force, we think, of its legitimate bearing. We confess there is very little to weaken our faith in the controverted passage.

II. "The passage under consideration *claims* to be just what we have regarded it,—a quotation or an extract, and nothing more."—P. 109.

Proof of which second position is the question interposed in the middle of the thirteenth verse. As this is a matter of fact, according to each one's understanding of the use of quotations and the meaning of words, we request the reader just to refer to the passage and examine for himself. He will find in verse 12 the invocation of Joshua to the Lord. In the first half of verse 13, the result of that prayer stated historically, as a fact, that "the sun stood still and the moon stayed,"—together with another historic incident. Then comes the question, "Is not this written in the Book of Jasher? So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day;" *repeating* mainly the same fact in language which seems a little more poetic. Verse fourteenth contains a moral reflection of the writer, on the wonderful account related; and verse fifteenth takes up again the history of the army. If now the claim of quotation had been confined to the last clause of the thirteenth verse, we would not have question

its correctness. But the strange assertion that the whole passage, from verse 12 to 15 inclusive, was designed to be pointed out by this interrogatory as a "quotation or an extract, and nothing more," needs, we think, no refutation. To state the case is sufficient.

III. Under the third head we have two particulars:—first, an inquiry concerning the Book of Jasher; and second,—which falls *in mediis*,—he would involve the passage in the following dilemma: on the supposition that the miracle actually occurred, we find the inspired author of the Book of Joshua, who, "*beyond controversy*, made record of it *as soon as* it transpired," referring to a book which must have been written previously, and "was extant at the time of the conquest of Canaan;" in which book, previously written and "uninspired," we have the author "referring to events that did not take place till long after he wrote."—Pp. 109, 110.

1. And first, of his secondly. Remove the postulate, to wit: *That the record must have been made as soon as the event transpired*—which not only is not "beyond controversy," but is both without proof, and contrary both to reason and historic analogy—and the dilemma at once vanishes.

a. It is without proof. The writer has neither offered any, nor can he.

b. It is contrary both to reason and historic analogy. For if the Book of Jasher, as has been supposed, and is taken for granted by the writer of the *Examination*, was a "collection of poems" written on various occasions and by different authors, and kept for general use; and if this important victory of Joshua, and the miracle which is supposed to have accompanied it, was the occasion of an ode for the compilation, we claim it as the more reasonable to suppose that the poetic effusion should have been antecedent to the prose record: that the flight of the winged Pegasus should have outstripped the tardier movements of the pedestrian muse. But if we seek for the analogy throughout the wide scope of human events, we shall find ever, on occasions of great achievements, the triumphal *song* keeping pace with the triumphal march; nay, even the shout of victory and the telegraphic announcement frequently find utterance in poetic numbers; while history, with a graver dignity, enacts the imperishable record, when the tide of excitement shall have given place to the calmer flow of unexaggerated truth. Do the judgments of Heaven strike consternation to the hearts of a people? the swelling burden of wo first finds relief in the soothing symphonies of the softly-cadenced elegy; and after time and gentler influences shall have prepared the public mind, the impartial voice of history rehearses the undeniable facts in a tone which

would have seemed, at the first, rude or insupportably cruel. Indeed, the opinion we have quoted we should have pronounced absurd, had it not been so *gravely* entertained, and so confidently asserted.

But we proceed to remark, that there exists internally abundant and accumulative evidence that the Book of Joshua was not written immediately on the transpiration of the events. But we need not here occupy space to develop the argument. A hint shall suffice. We say, then, that chap. iv, 19, taken in connection with chap. v, 9, can be reconciled to no other hypothesis: that a comparison of Judges, chaps. i, ii, with various parts of Joshua, renders it *probable* that some things recorded in this latter book did not take place till after the death of that leader. When, also, it is said, in distributing the cities of Canaan by lot, that they "could not drive out the inhabitants of those cities, but the Canaanites would dwell in the land;" and "the Canaanites dwell among the Ephraimites unto this day," Josh. xvi, 10; xvii, 12; and the history continues in the next verse, "Yet it came to pass, when the children of Israel were waxen strong, that they put the Canaanites to tribute;" the language necessarily implies a considerable lapse of intervening time. See also to the same purport, chap. xv, 63. The same thing is likewise implied in the phrase so often recurring, "*Unto this day.*"* Or shall these passages also be disposed of by the dangerous process of amputation? We know it has been proposed in regard to some of them, and by eminent names. And if some require it, equally all. But a mode of interpretation which requires so free a use of the knife should be very cautiously admitted. And when no other object is proposed than to support a favorite theory, which theory, if sustained, will not aid, or if it fail, will not weaken, the cause of truth, we do, in the name of Christianity, and in the name of candid criticism, and the name of the sacred regard we have for the integrity of that book containing the principles of our cherished religion, most earnestly and solemnly protest against any such license, unless warranted by testimony clear and irrefutable.†

2. The second inquiry under this head is concerning the Book of Jasher. We do not propose to say who was Jasher, or what the Book of Jasher, but only to examine what has been said to us.

* Josh. iv, 9; xv, 63; xvi, 10; vi, 25.—"Hinc quoque apparet, neque a Josua, neque prope ejus tempora scriptum, aut certe consummatum hunc librum," are the words of the truth-loving Grotius.

† For the authorities on either side, vide Carpzovius, Intro. ad Lib. Histor. Vet. Test., cap. 9, sec. 4, 5.

On a subject so obscure, and opening so wide a field for conjecture, and which has been so fruitful therein, we justly anticipated some learned discussion. Here is the first item:—

"Josephus supposes 'the Book of Jasher' was composed of certain records, and was kept in a safe place *at the time* to which these two notices of it refer; [the other is in 2 Sam. i, 18;] and that it contained an account of what happened to the Jews from year to year. So that the book was not ranked among inspired writings, but only regarded as correct; so much so that its author obtained the name of Jasher, or the Just. Josephus, Antiq. Jud., lib. 5, cap. 2."*—P. 110.

Let us now notice distinctively the several particulars in the quoted opinion. 1. That the Book of Jasher "was composed of certain records." 2. That it "was kept in a safe place." 3. That it was especially so kept, "at the time to which these two notices refer." 4. "That it contained an account of what happened to the Jews from year to year;" that is, *annals*, or something similar to the Roman Fasti. 5. That it "was not ranked among inspired writings." 6. But it was "regarded as correct." 7. And in so high repute was it, that "the author obtained the name of Jasher or Just."

These seven. Very clear and satisfactory; for Josephus shall always have the praise of candor; and what he professes to know or have good reason for *supposing*, we are accustomed to consider as carrying with it no little weight of authority. But to those of our readers whose memories may not be so fresh in this author, what will be their surprise to be told that Josephus, so far from giving an opinion at full length, and specifically as quoted above, concerning the "Book of Jasher," has never once named the name of Jasher throughout the whole of his histories, nor even so much as intimated that he ever heard of such a book.

One has said, and with something of logical wisdom in the remark, that to trace an error to its source is sometimes its best refutation. In order also not to seem, by our flat denial, to lack anything of respect for the opinions of others, we will briefly lay the matter open as it is. The passage from which this supposed

* This bold passage is transferred bodily, and, saving a change of two or three words, *verbatim et referatim*, from Dr. Horne: (see Intro. Stud. S. Scrip., vol. i, part i, c. ii, sec. 3:) and had it also been given *conjunctim et punctuatim*, it would have avoided the nonsense or tautology which it now exhibits. But unfortunately for our expurgator, he has fallen upon a passage containing a tissue of erroneous or altogether groundless inferences, and a dash of singular temerity, such as is seldom chargeable to that most excellent author.

opinion of Josephus depends is this: after rehearsing the battle of Joshua against the five kings, and the miracle that attended it, very much as related in our sacred Scriptures, he adds:—"Now that the day was lengthened at this time, and was longer than ordinary, is expressed *in the books laid up in the temple.*"* The inquiry is, then, what were the "*books* laid up in the temple?" We can easily see that it is not among the wildest of conjectures that have been made, to suppose that the *Book* of Jasher was intended; and that point assumed, the further conjecture, that the other items above named must also have been of Josephus's opinion, gains a strength of probability amounting, perhaps, to inference. But remove this substratum, and the fabric it supports goes with it. And we claim that such a conjecture is entirely independent of the *data* which might have guided it.

In the first place, Josephus tells us himself, that the source of his historic information was the "Hebrew Scriptures."†

2. Nor are we left without his own definition of what these "Hebrew Scriptures" are. The publication of his history provoked the jealousy of the Greeks on a point which touched their national pride; and especially was their vanity offended, that a people so universally contemned as the Jews should bear off from them the palm of greater antiquity, and show themselves as possessing an authentic history from the earliest times. The Egyptian Apion felt a still more lively pique, and seemed willing to avenge the ancient animosity of his nation against that of their some time vassals. These, therefore, wantonly assailed the "Jewish Antiquities," and questioned the veracity of the author; and their attacks called forth Josephus again in defense of his own character and his nation's honor; in which he has produced one of the most admirable essays bequeathed from antiquity, replete with learning of every kind, and especially historic, and abounding in critical censures on the profane writers, with whom he shows himself extensively and accurately acquainted. Then, after giving a detailed account of the very careful manner in which the early records of the Jews were made and preserved, first by prophets, "as they learned them of God himself by inspiration; and others have written what hath happened in their own time, and that in a very distinct manner also;" thus continuing the connection of events down "till the reign of Artaxerxes, king of Persia;" since

* Ant., l. 5, c. 1—not as above cited, cap. 2—at least in our American editions. Had the transcriber verified his references, it were a virtue to be commended.

† Præf. Ant. Jud., sec. 2.

which time there "hath not been an exact succession of prophets;" whereby their history, which hath yet been written since Artaxerxes, "hath not been esteemed of the like authority with the former by their forefathers." Of the former kind, he says:—"We have not ten thousand books among us disagreeing from and contradicting one another, *but only twenty-two books*, which contain the records of all the past times, which are *justly believed to be divine.*"*

3. Inasmuch as Josephus wrote the Antiquities in Rome after the destruction of Jerusalem† and the temple in which these records were preserved, a brief fact, mentioned incidentally in his Life,‡ and without any reference to his historic compositions, assumes in this connection no small degree of importance. At the sack of the city, and in the midst of the universal warfare and the desecration of all things sacred, he tells us that by the clemency of Titus he obtained certain favors for himself and friends, and adds:—"I had also the holy books by Titus's concession."

Provided, therefore, with such materials for his compilation, when we find him saying throughout the body of the work, that he gives such and such facts on the authority of "the books laid up in the temple," or of "that Scripture which is laid up in the temple,"§ who shall persuade us that the reference is to a little volume not reckoned among their sacred Scriptures, which was not—as we have good reason to believe—extant when Josephus wrote, and certainly was never heard of by the Greeks and Romans *for* whom he wrote; and which has remained to the present time of doubtful character to the profoundest antiquaries whose labors have been made known to us? Who shall thus trifle with our own understanding? And shall the *research*, of which this is a specimen, decide at once a question of such magnitude, against the authority of the church and the deep learning of her *scholars* for twenty-five centuries or more?

His own opinion is next brought forward by the writer of the "Examination," in connection with some remarks on the passage in which Jasher is mentioned, (2 Sam. i, 18,) and we think it due that the main argument should be exhibited at length:—

"It was then, as at the present day, the practice to designate a piece set to music, from some one or more of its first words: for example,

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* Jos. versus Ap., b. 1, c. 7, 8. The Jewish enumeration, and the agreement of these "twenty-two books" with our canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament are familiar to all.

† Compan. Life Jos., sec. 75, and Ant., l. 20, c. 11, sec. 3.

‡ Chap. 75. § Ut Supra, and l. 3, c. 1.

'Lord of all power and might.' Books were so designated by the Hebrews. Thus the Book of Genesis was called Bereshith, the beginning; the Book of Numbers, Bemidbar. Sometimes they introduce a poem with this formula: 'az-jasher,' that is, 'then sang;' 'az-jasher Mosheh,' 'then sang Moses,' Exodus xv, 1. The Samaritan Pentateuch reads, 'Jasher vè-jasher Deborah,' 'then sang Deborah.' 'The Book of Jasher,' therefore, was probably a collection of sacred songs, composed on various occasions, and thus named because many of its pieces commenced with the above formula: 've-jasher.' Compare Bishop Lowth, Præl., pp. 306, 307, notes; and Dr. Gregory's translation, vol. ii, pp. 152, 153, notes."—P. 112.

Query. 1. Mr. Hopkins does not mean to say that Bemidbar is the first word of the Book of Numbers? 2. Does he intend, that in Exodus xv, 1, our Hebrew text reads "az-jasher Mosheh," and the Samaritan Pentateuch, "Jasher ve-jasher Deborah?"*

Our purpose in dwelling upon this point so long is now sufficiently obvious. We simply remark further, that light enough has been afforded us to render it quite apparent that the entire subject of the Book of Jasher lies in great obscurity. But even if its character could be determined to be such as has been supposed; if the little volume of miscellaneous forms should be brought forth from the dust of slumbering ages, entire and perfect, to testify to its original inheritance of the quotation in Joshua, it yet has no further

* It were unjust to withhold the following quotation, which serves not only to illustrate the erudition here brought to the difficult, and always delicate, task of Scripture interpretation; but also to clear up some of the strange expressions in the arguments adduced. It is from Horne's Intro. Stud. S. S., v. 4, part 1, c. 2, sec. 2, § 5, note. "The custom of the Hebrews in giving titles to their books from the initial word, is well known: thus Genesis is called Bereshith, &c. They also sometimes named the book *from some remarkable word in the first sentence;* thus the Book of Numbers is sometimes called *Bemidbar*. We also find in their writings canticles produced on important occasions, introduced by some form of this kind: *Az jashar*, (*then sang,*) or *ve-jashar peloni*, &c. Thus *az jashir Mosheh*, 'then sang Moses,' (Exodus xv, 1, the Samaritan Pentateuch reads *jasher;*) *ve-thashar Deborah*, 'and Deborah sang,' Judges v, 1. Thus the Book of Jasher is supposed to have been some collection of sacred songs, composed at different times and on different occasions, and to have had this title, because the book itself and most of the songs began in general with this word, *ve-jashar*.—Lowth's Prælect., pp. 306, 307, *notes;* or Dr. Gregory's translation, vol. ii, pp. 152, 153, *notes*." We would charitably hope that some of the *typographical* inaccuracies of the transcript, at least, are chargeable to the printer; but by what virtue of ingenuity one should contrive to gather such and so many errors into so short a passage, we are at a loss to account.

bearing upon the present argument, than to indicate the probable actuality of the event disputed.*

IV. The fourth argument is, that, "while all the surrounding text is, for the best of reasons, "the gravest prose, *the passage itself is poetry;*" and for the second premise, the improbability that a quotation in poetry would be inserted in historic prose.—P. 113.

To this we reply, that neither Mr. Hopkins nor we know sufficient of Hebrew prosody to affirm that the passage *is* poetry; much less to found a weighty argument on the assumption. This is to our mind a sufficient answer to this point; for the fact of the main premise stands discredited till he proves it: and that, we trust, he has too much prudence to attempt. But that the subject may be equally plain to all, we remark, that all the obvious characteristics by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry, to wit, the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of the syllables in each; in fine, the entire subject of prosody, as it exhibits itself from the ancient Greek hitherward, was wholly unknown to the Hebrew: at least we have no evidence that it was recognized there at all. When, however, the writer was particularly inspired with the beauty or grandeur of his theme, there would naturally arise a corresponding elevation of thought and refinement of diction; impassioned feelings would find expression in impassioned language; and certain rhetorical figures, which, however, belong equally to prose, more frequently recur. These are the only characteristics we can safely predicate of Hebrew poetry.† They had poetic thoughts, poetic diction, we might even say a poetic style; but no verse. Now for the passage under consideration. The latter clause of the thirteenth verse may be said to be in its phraseology poetic. For the rest, let the reader peruse and decide for himself, if he can make of it anything but the gravest prose.

But the minor premise, also, of this argument we consider inadequate to sustain the conclusion: for if all the marks which cha-

* Those who wish to see more on this subject will find a compilation of various opinions in Glassius, Theol. Soc., lib. 5, Tract. 1, cap. 14. It would seem to us that in a discussion of this question, if the fathers were passed unregarded, the notions of the Rabbins at least were worthy of notice, as possessing probably the authority of Jewish tradition. Compare also Carpzovius, Intro. ad Lib. Histor. Vet. Test., c. 9, sec. 4.

† See Nordheimer's Heb. Gram., vol. ii, b. 4, c. 1; where is found, better than in the multitudinous essays that have labored to illustrate and define the limits of Hebrew poetry, the condensed substance of what is *known* on the subject.

racterize poetry in the Hebrew language were obviously found in this passage, what then? Pray what do we find in every historian worthy of the pen, if not, that he modulates the flow of his words to the character of his subject? If the topic is common, his language is simple; if obscure, cautious; if delicate, wise and guarded; if lofty and noble deeds are to be delineated, his language, too, rises with the inspired majesty of the theme. So far from being an objection, therefore, it constitutes one of the *prime virtues* of the historic style, that in such a connection the diction should be somewhat elevated.*

V. "The passage itself contains the elements of its own destruction in respect to several statements which it makes."—P. 113.

The first point presented is the difficulty of the fifteenth verse again. This has already been considered under the first argument, and as no new issues are made here, we pass that part.

The second is in verse 14, which says:—"There was no day like that before it or after it, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man." He here finds two special objections; first, by reading the text constantly as if written, There was no day like that before it, *nor ever will be* after it. And whatever the author "might have averred in respect to every *preceding* day of time," yet, even "upon the supposition that the thing recorded is true," he thinks it "questionable whether he could have assured the world, that there never was to be another like it." But if the thing be true, Mr. Hopkins does not intimate any objection against receiving the passage as inspired. But surely he does not mean to say that the Omniscient and Omnipotent One could not, through the mouth of his servants, announce a truth which should subsist through all time! What did the Lord say in reference to the flood? What in reference to the affliction of Jerusalem? But the language (which, if it were, forms no objection) is not the text. 2. He secondly finds the point of contrast between this day and all other days to be *in the fact that on this day the Lord heard prayer;* whereby the passage is made to affirm, that the Lord had never before, *nor ever* will again, hear and answer the prayer of a mortal! Certainly to state these points is to answer them. And surely he who would lift the *sword* of criticism, should know, that if our English version will suffer the interpretation given to this last particular, the Hebrew will not. The only sense it admits is that very obvious one in which the verse has been generally understood: to wit, that never before nor

* "*Primum*—facta dictis sunt exequanda," are the words of him to whom pertains the prescriptive honor to be written, "Father of Philosophic History."

since (down to the time of the writer,—*not*, never will) has the Almighty displayed his power in such a manner in answer to the prayer of a man. And that our most excellent translators thought they were employing a phraseology in accordance with that sense, seems evident from the fact that they have been almost universally thus understood.*

VI. The absence of traditions, in other nations, commemorating such an event.

"Why do we not find some notice of it in the traditions of other nations? Would not the world be likely to remember it, if such an event had occurred? . . . . Why do we not find some scrap of history, some vague tradition, to say the least, of such a day and such a night? . . . . We find, however, nothing of the kind, not a shred of a record; not the faintest traces of a tradition of such an event: a silence for which we find it difficult to account, except upon the above ground, that no such event ever occurred."—Pp. 117–119.

This is both strong assertion and strong inference. If we had preserved to us traditions unequivocally pointing to this great miracle, it would be powerful confirmation of the Scripture record. But we cannot argue, that conversely their absence or our ignorance of them invalidates the authority of Scripture. But what is the probability that we should have inherited the knowledge of such a tradition, in case it had ever existed? By our commonly received chronology, the date of this event is fixed at about 1450 B. C. The earliest compiler of profane traditions whose works have come down to us lived about 450 B. C., leaving us the broad intervening space of ten unrecorded centuries.† Easily, therefore, might the knowledge of an event so inexplicable to the heathen world, and of which no natural monuments, as of the flood, would be left remaining, become distorted beyond the power of recognition, or wholly lost in the vicissitudes and skepticism of so many revolving ages.

But does he who pronounces with so much assurance that no traces of such a tradition is anywhere to be found, profess to have compassed the knowledge of *all* traditions of *all* nations?—for its existence, however marred or corrupted, in one tribe however obscure, would outweigh its absence in all others. Has he critically analyzed them all, and traced accurately to their source all which

* Hereto accords also the most ancient Latin version: "Non fuit antea nec postea *tam longa dies, obediente Domino* voci hominis, et pugnanti pro Israel."

† The fables of the poets prior to Herodotus seldom aspire to the rank of historic tradition.

might be suspected to refer to this event? Till then we may safely affirm, only—"*We* do not find;" and neither he nor another may assert that none such exists or has existed.

We agree with Mr. Hopkins that the passage in Herodotus supposed by Homer to refer to this event is too remote, and apparently quite distinct from this. But we do not agree that there is the point at which to dismiss an investigation of this subject: for surely he could not have been unacquainted with another certain myth, the strongest, and if without any basis of fact, the most unaccountable of all that adorns the legendary lore of heathen antiquity, and which does, in some of its prominent features, bear a striking resemblance to the phenomena of the miracle related in Joshua.

In order to form a correct judgment of the points of resemblance or coincidence, we note, first, that to those who had no just notion of a Supreme Being who could wield the power implied in this miracle, and who could therefore know nothing of the cause, and would not be likely to apprehend the real nature of the occurrence; whatever account they may have had of it would relate, not to the act itself—which is the principal and almost the only thing stated in Joshua—but to the effects of which they would be witnesses. 2. We note, second, that as the motion of the heavenly bodies is not sensible, the sun might remain fixed for many hours without the idea ever occurring to their minds, that it was actually stopped in its course. The prolongation of the time, however, which it continued above the horizon would be apparent; and to account for the manifest irregularity, wild conjecture and frighted imagination would bring their ready theories. 3. One of the most obvious effects would be the necessary increase of heat. This would cause the sensation, and might produce the ocular illusion, that the sun was nearer than usual to the earth. And if the miracle occurred—which is probable—when the sun was declined toward the western horizon, and the moon was at the time near the meridian—which is also probable, as we shall presently see—this relative position of the two orbs would strongly tend to confirm such a notion. 4. An unusual disturbance of the equilibrium of the atmosphere, producing violent storms accompanied with copious discharges of the electric fluid from the region of the clouds.* These

* The storm of hail as mentioned in Joshua, science would teach us, without the aid of skepticism, to regard as the natural result of the *sudden* increase of heat; and the divine interference was, in shielding the Israelites from its strokes, and directing it to the discomfiture of their enemies.

are the principal phenomena that would attend such a miracle as is here supposed.

Now, what says tradition? or rather, what, of the many utterings of the hoary chronicler, escaping the wide mælstrom of confusion and forgetfulness, and surviving the shocks of counter currents and dizzying eddies, of dashing cataracts and stagnant pools, in the long time-stream they have had to traverse, have, at length, surmounting every obstacle, floated out into the quieter sea of more certain knowledge, and approached the shore of this later world? And of these wrecks and fragments of a former world, now strewed along this extensive line of coast, what, within the limited compass of our survey, have we been able to disentangle from the rubbish, to determine its nature, and to re-integrate the fractured and time-worn parts, so as to affirm of this or that with proper assurance, We find, or, It cannot be found? Little wonder were it, if many things had been, of which there were now to us no discoverable whole, or even any distinguishable relic; and little, therefore, would it avail to our minds as argument against the truthfulness of Scripture history, that profane tradition could not, out of its deep gulf of uncertainties, and against so many improbabilities, furnish a confirmation. But what *do* "we find?" It was fabled, that in the far time the chariot of Phœbus was committed for a day to the guidance of his youthful son. The fiery coursers mount the skies with their wonted ardor. Soon aware of the absence of their rightful master, and spurning the authority of puerile ambition, they became more than ever impatient of control. Lifted to so dizzy a height, the untried charioteer becomes weak and at length stiff with fear. The reins slacken upon the backs of the celestial steeds, now full heated by the arduous labor of the morning. At the touch, they dash wildly away from the accustomed track and wander at large ("*exspatiuntur equi*") over the wide scope of heaven ("*per auras ignotæ regionis.*") After coursing through all the region of the fixed stars, thawing from the torpidity of his eternal winter the serpent that surrounds the pole; frightening the solemn Boötes, with the lumber of his huge wagon, to an undignified attempt to run; and spreading consternation through all the upper air, they at length come plunging precipitously earthward ("*per decliva viasque precipites spatio terræ propriore feruntur;*") and the moon sees with astonishment the horses of her brother taking their diurnal course beneath her own ("*inferiusque suis fraternos currere luna admiratur equos.*") Earth now becomes sensible to the disorder of heaven. Her clouds first are dissolved in vapor; the mountain tops begin to burn; the surface everywhere

is dry and cracked; the herbage is withered and parched; the forests, instead of a protecting shade, afford material to the conflagration; cities and nations seem devoted with the general ruin; the fountains are slaked; the rivers decrease; old ocean is contracted in his bed beyond the power of the sea-god to resist, and through the yawning caverns the upper light surprises the gloomy sovereign of the shades and his dusky mate in the abodes of Tartarus. The omnipotent Jupiter now from his lofty throne "consulting the sum of things," sends forth the winged thunderbolt, and strikes the hapless youth "at the same time from the chariot and from life."*

Here, then, is a tradition, in which, when we have made due allowance for the exaggerations of licensed antiquity, for the factitious ornaments of poetic imaginings, and the errors that would of necessity attach to any explanation of such an event which failed to apprehend its real nature, we shall recognize all the principal features which a tradition of this miracle could be expected to contain:—the protraction of the day, (evidently implied;) the increase of heat, (most conspicuously stated;) the apparent proximity of the sun to the earth, and finally the storm with thunder and lightning. Even for the deluge, a retributive judgment of heaven so stupendous and awful; of which the real nature, the author, the ultimate cause of the agency, were clearly understood by all the surviving inhabitants of the earth; and of which, its own monumental evidence is everywhere imprinted on the surface of the earth to the present day: in all which particulars it differs from the miracle under consideration, and gains a probabilty of remembrance a thousand fold stronger—yet even for this, we challenge the production of traditional testimony more clear and satisfactory.

VII. The next difficulty is found in the geographical position of Joshua relatively to Gibeon. The battle had gained a point to the westward of Gibeon, the distance of, perhaps, "eighteen or twenty miles." The time must have been late in the afternoon. How, then, could the sun stand "over Gibeon?—The sun could have been over Gibeon only in the morning."—Pp. 122, 123.

Very true; and if the text had said *over* Gibeon, it were quite a different thing. But take the facts as above stated, in which we agree with Mr. Hopkins, Joshua then sees the day well-nigh gone and much of the appointed labor unaccomplished. The mountains to the west and the north of him are beginning to throw their dark

* Vide Ov. Met., lib. 2. The localities specified in this tradition range from Asia Minor to Gaul,—places so far west, the sun would be considerably higher than in Judea.

shadows across the valley in which the battle was raging. Eastward, the mountain of Gibeon lifts itself full and clear into the blaze of setting day. He turns his eye southward, and the moon, higher up in the heavens, is looking down into the valley of Ajalon. In his zeal and in the might of faith he cries "to the Lord,"—"Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon;" that is, let thy light continue to rest *upon Gibeon*.—"And thou moon *in the valley* of Ajalon. And the sun *stood still*, and the moon *stayed*." If we knew nothing of the geography of the country, the language would require us to suppose the very relative position that is now given. We have read that this preposition, *upon*, once gave rise to an elaborate discussion by all the learned jurists that attend on the two highest courts in the British empire, to determine whether it meant *before*, or *after;* and it gained a different decision from each of the august benches. It was not argued at that time, whether it might also signify *over*.

VIII. That "it is not once referred to in all the subsequent Scriptures. . . . . Why is it nowhere noticed? Why is it not once alluded to by those who so often and faithfully reminded Israel of the great and mighty works which God had wrought for their deliverance and for their defense?"—Pp. 123, 124.

And when he comes to the third chapter of Habakkuk, in which the prophet is celebrating the majesty of the Almighty, and reads in verse 11, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation," this modern Daniel finds a key to the whole problem. This "should *not* be thought to have had a reference to an event which actually took place," but the prophet having made the expression, then afterward "the author of the Book of Jasher finds the glowing description in Habakkuk of the conquest of Canaan, and selecting the startling declaration in verse 11, *clothes it in his own language*, and makes it the theme of a *short* poem. Afterward, a transcriber of the sacred volume, or of the Book of Joshua, when he arrives at the place in the narrative *where we find the extract*, took the liberty to introduce the whole passage from the Book of Jasher." If the name were not so unpardonable, we would say, this quite out-Strausses Strauss.

It were gratuitous to attempt a refutation of this pleasant fancy. But a word further of verse 11. "No one," the writer asserts, "supposes for a moment, that a single one of the remaining declarations (of this chapter) ever referred to a transaction which at any time literally occurred." We confess we do not understand that part of the hermeneutic science which would teach, that a prophet of the Most High could occupy a whole chapter in extolling

the majesty and glory of His acts on the earth, and not employ a *single expression which could for a moment be supposed to have reference to any act that ever transpired!* We boldly affirm, that could such a chapter be found in the Bible, it could convey no possible instruction to the mind of man. It were unmeaning jargon.

We take the whole of the chapter to be not literal historic description, but full of allusion, in the native style of the Oriental hyperbole, to *facts* which had "literally occurred." Nay, the writer himself, forgetting the ground he had taken, immediately after, as we have already quoted, supposes the chapter to contain a "description of the conquest of Canaan." And who, indeed, can read, "Thou didst walk through the sea with thy horses, through the heap of great waters," without remembering that under the symbol of a pillar of fire He led the Israelitish host "into the midst of the sea on the dry ground; and the waters were a wall to them on the right hand, and on the left?" ("He made the waters to stand *as a heap*," Psa. lxxviii, 13.) Or, "The mountains saw thee and they trembled," and it should not recall the imposing scene of Sinai? We claim the allusions in these passages to be clear beyond a rational dispute. Others are equally evident. Let us now inquire for our author's own canon of interpretation, which he propounds with the following emphasis: "*We shall insist on stretching one and the same line of interpretation on the passage under present consideration* (verse 11) *that we use for the rest of the chapter.*" By this law, verse 11 must also be an allusion to fact. Or will he apply the expunging process again? And if so, what becomes of the Book of Jasher? 'Twere too dear to sacrifice so beautiful a theory.*

IX. Chapter ninth returns upon the difficulties connected with verse 15; but as no new points of argument are presented, we shall not dwell upon it.

We have now fully, we believe, and fairly presented the list of arguments arrayed against this passage in all the essential parts in detail. It will be observed that most of them are negative, and if admitted, prove nothing against the genuineness of the passage. Two points, only, have a *positive* bearing against it. The one is No. VII, respecting the position of Joshua relatively to Gibeon; the other, which is several times recurred to, is the difficulty, verse 15, which has no connection with the miracle at all. This difficulty remains, nor is it any part of our task, on the present occa-

* Isaiah xxviii, 21, is by some supposed to allude to this miracle; but this is not so clear. The undoubted allusion in the Apocrypha (Ecclus. xlvi, 4) is, to us Protestants, only evidence of its existence in the text before the date of that writing.

sion, to remove it. A conjecture, however, is present to our mind which will add to the much that has been said on the subject. It is evident that the army frequently encamped elsewhere than at Gilgal. In verse 21, it is said: "And all the people returned to the camp to Joshua, at Mannedah, *in peace*;" that is, unmolested by the enemy. Might not the original word, in verse 15, have been בְּשָׁלֹם (beshalom) instead of הַגִּלְגָּלָה (hagilgalah?) Should a transcriber find this word obscured, he might, from the identity of verse 43 in all the rest, have innocently introduced this latter word. The original sense of the verse would then be, simply, that they were left for the night in undisputed possession of the field. Or, and to which our mind inclines the rather, taking הַגִּלְגָּלָה (hagilgalah) to signify, as Josephus interprets it, (Ant. Jud. 5, 1, 11,) *liberty*, read it as a common noun. The sense is then very much as before. We only propose these as *conjectures*, and claim for them nothing more than plausibility. The more common opinion is, that a copy of verse 43 has been erroneously transferred to this place. This is not improbable; but whatever the truth may be, the difficulty in this sense yet remains, while the three preceding verses, distinct from this in every way, rest, for aught we have yet seen, on the same basis as formerly.

As to the Book of Jasher, we think that neither Mr. Hopkins nor we know much about it. We incline to another opinion than that given above; one which has been supported by great names, and is favored by the interpretations of the Rabbins; but it cannot be demonstrated.

It is worth our while to bear in mind the origin of this doubt; that it forms a consistent part of a system of philosophy, which, setting forth from the abstractional intellectualities of Kant, and traversing the wide desert of rationalism, is now arriving in the very heart of a novel and unacknowledged skepticism: so the nineteenth century exhibits the strange phenomenon of a professed believer in Christianity writing a "Life of Christ," without once admitting the idea of a *miracle* being wrought by the Son of God. What cannot be explained away as natural, is found inconsistent, and rejected. May Heaven protect the American Churches from the infection of such philosophies!

The article of Professor Hengstenberg, which seems to have been the germ of the one we are considering, we have not had the fortune to meet with; but we take it for granted that his disciple has not only presented the virtue of his arguments, but has strengthened and illustrated them with ten additional years of doubtful study.

ART. III.—1. *The History of the Popes, from the Foundation of the See of Rome to the Present Time.* By ARCHIBALD BOWER, Esq., formerly Professor of Rhetoric, History, and Philosophy, at Rome. London. 1750.

2. *A Compendious History of the Popes.* By C. W. F. WALCH, D. D., Professor of Divinity and Philosophy at Gottingen. London. 1759.

3. *The History of Popedom.* Written in High Dutch, by SAMUEL PUFFENDORF. London. 1691.

4. *Critica Historico-Cronilogica in Universos Annales Ecclesiasticos Eminentissimi et Reverendissimi Cæsaris Cardinalis Baronii, auctore* R. P. ANTONIO PAGI, Doct. Theol. Ordinis Minorem Convent. S. Francisci Antverpiæ. 1727.

5. *Biblia Gregoriana seu Commentaria Textuum Scripturæ Sacræ, S. Gregorii, Papæ I., Augustæ Vindelicorum et, Grecii, Sumptibus.* P. M. & J. HAEREDUM. 1731.

6. *Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.* By GEORGE CAMPBELL, D. D., Principal of Marischal College, &c., &c. London. 1834.

7. *Ecclesiastical Histories of Mosheim, Haweis, &c., &c.*

ROME was the birth-place of Gregory the Great, but not the Rome of the Augustan age. The place was indeed the same, and the walls which then inclosed millions of the proud hearts of the glorious empire yet remained; but what availed this, when the indomitable courage was gone? Cities, nations, and ages are individualized and distinguished by the genius of their people, far more than by splendid edifices, or creations of art; and when the spirit of the masses has changed, we may truly say, They are not the same.

Italy was mostly subject to a Lombard king, and Rome, although yet under the rule of the emperor of the East, was the wretched victim of many miseries. The noble families of the empire had survived the chaos of civilized and barbarian life of the fifth century, only to be subject to insult and poverty in the sixth. Poverty indeed! not alone as to worldly goods, but in respect to the more enduring riches of the intellect and heart. Disorder reigned—wickedness triumphed—love expired!

The religion of Christ, which had long been the state religion, was by this time much corrupted, though it retained something of its original power. The bishops, who were scattered here and

there in the churches, had assumed the power exercised by secular rulers, and, by becoming swallowed up in the affairs of this world, too often neglected those of the next. Of the principal sees, those of Rome and Constantinople stood highest, and next in order came those of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. The bishops of these sees were elected by the joint votes of the clergy and the people, and held their offices for life, or until they were deprived of their high privileges by reason of some misdemeanor of their own, or personal feelings of others. Over the humbler centres of religious influence, both Rome and Constantinople looked with paternal and ambitious eyes, each longing to become the great centre of the ecclesiastical system of the age.

Such were the obvious relations of things; but, when viewed in connection with the national powers, the phase, it must be confessed, was darker still. Barbarism advanced rapidly. The Lombards, little better than the rude Goths, spread their ravages, and burned and slaughtered at the very gates of Rome. The emperors of the East attempted in vain to resist them, for they themselves were weak and fast dying away. A sort of government was instituted over the part of Italy still in their power, through an officer called the exarch, whose residence was at Ravenna; but it was nearly nominal, since that functionary could boast little money and less power. When, however, we speak of the Lombards and the Romans, we mean not that there was really a very great difference between them in point of refinement, for truly the successors of the civilized and patriotic citizens of the empire were like them but in name. Romans and Lombards were nearly the same: not utterly uncivilized, nor without hope. The conquerors had melted down into the same mass with the conquered, and had adopted their religion, or rather made a religious compromise, for there was little difference between the Christianity and the heathenism of that age. Wonderful conversions of whole nations happened then, and miracles multiplied on every hand. Ignorance, too, failed not to be present, with all the evils which swell her train. St. Jerome, 'tis said, was whipped in a dream by the devil because he read Cicero; the Council of Carthage prohibited the bishops from reading any heathen book; and as few applied themselves to study except the clergy, who themselves knew little or nothing, the amount of available learning was small indeed. On this point we refer the reader to the following extract from a book on "Popedom," written by Samuel Puffendorf, in 1690, who thus quaintly elucidates the matter:—

"This ignorance, accompanied afterward with so insupportable a pedantry, was promoted by different causes; one of the chiefest whereof was the invasion of a no less warlike than ignorant people, in the western provinces of the Roman empire, which for some ages, during an unsettled and inconstant government, felt nothing but cruel wars, terrible disorders, spoiling, ravaging, and laying waste of whole countries; and in a word, all the miseries that are the necessary consequences of a barbarous government. Whereas the Muses and Liberal Sciences are the daughters of peace and prosperity; but in the hurly-burlies and tumults of war, books are a dead ware, and shall lie long enough on the hands of those that have 'em. Schools and academies are then like wildernesses, either quite empty, or haunted by none but wild beasts; and the gentlemen of the long robe will rather choose to shoulder a musquet than trudge to Westminster Hall with a green bag under their arms: so that, in such times, the poor professors, schoolmasters, &c., have nothing to do but to shut up their shops, pack up their goods, and be gone, especially when the victorious enemy has no knowledge of letters, and as little esteem or kindness for them."

About, or a little before, this time, men began to separate themselves from the rest of the world by retiring into monasteries; thus commencing that mode of life which plays so conspicuous a part in succeeding histories, and which has continued to exist even to the present. In these convents, the little knowledge of the age was collected together; but covered as it was with bigotry and superstition, it did hurt, rather than good, to those who tried its shallow depths. The writings of the fathers were held in high esteem, and carefully copied, though with more than commendable zeal, for often were the precious relics of earlier ages erased to give place to them.*

Such was the state of things when Gregory first opened his eyes upon this world, in the year of our Lord 544 or '5. He was descended from one of the most illustrious families in Rome, being the great grandson of Pope Felix II., who was of a senatorian family. He was educated as much as might be, in that age, being well versed in grammar, rhetoric, and logic, as also no stranger to the principles of honor, morality, and religion. From his connection with the state, he found it necessary also to study Roman jurisprudence, in which he became well versed. Coming into public life at the proper age, his abilities and prudence, being far above those of his companions, caused him to rise rapidly in the esteem of all, until his integrity and name becoming known to the emperor Justin, he was appointed governor of his native city. Rome at this time was surrounded by a victorious and implacable

* Hawein's Eccles. Hist.

enemy, against whom Gregory had to exert all his abilities, both natural and acquired.* At one time we find him making good use of his skill in jurisprudence to gain his ends; at another he moves the people by eloquence which was simple and unaffected, but yet possessing in no small degree the power of exciting the feelings. By these endeavors he many times saved the city from the enemy without, and from famine within, for want of food was no uncommon affliction in that time of apprehension and turmoil. Gregory's exertions to remedy these evils, being great and efficient, gave universal satisfaction, not only to the emperor, but to the senate and people of Rome. At this time,† his father dying, left to him an immense property, with which, in his zeal for religion, he founded seven monasteries, six in Sicily, and one in his own city, dedicated to St. Andrew. Into this latter he himself retired, after a time, having found that power, and grandeur, worldly business, and the praise of men, had an influence to efface the religious sentiments imbibed from his cradle. Under St. Valentius, who was appointed abbot of St. Andrew's by himself, he began the life of a monk; in which capacity his native powers gained him many admirers; for, banishing from his mind all thoughts of the world and its cares, he sought spirituality through meditation and prayer. He was truly a monk, living only upon legumes, and even eating sparingly of these, until his abstinence proved too much for his constitution, and his health failed rapidly. His friends now came to his aid, and persuaded him to remit many of his fasts, and preserve his life for the good of all.

We must allow that the monk Gregory was deeply religious, desirous of serving God in spirit and in truth. The life of a governor was not suited to his disposition; for, on account of his naturally-excellent heart and lively temperament, the spirit of the socialities of the world had undue power over him. As to his tendency to fall into those enterprises which were not in themselves sinful, but which lead to error, his after life will furnish examples. Suffice it to say, that he possessed stern determination and good judgment, but they had to do battle with the superstitions and misdirected religious sentiments of the age—which conflicts too often injured rather than nourished the real goodness of the man. Still he was far above his cotemporaries as it respects the kindlier feelings of the soul; and on account of these, he will always merit the praise of the true philanthropist. To say that all his honors came in virtue of his zeal for the public good is not too

* Bower's Hist. Popes, vol. ii, p. 463. † About A. D. 578.

much; in this he will bear comparison with the great of any age, not excepting our own glorious times.

As might be expected, the convent walls could not long contain him, for Pope Pelagius having need of a trusty person to act as nuncio and advocate at the court of the emperor at Constantinople, called Gregory from his obscurity, and committed to him the business of announcing his election, and gaining, if possible, some aid against the fury of the Lombards. In order to this he was ordained deacon, and, with his responsibilities thus increased, he appeared at Constantinople. The emperor Tiberius and his favorites soon detected the rare qualities of the new comer, who rose rapidly in their esteem through his courtly conduct and modest behavior. The bishops even, who always looked upon the nuncios of the pope with jealousy, could not but love him, and evidenced their affection by outward acts. Still he did not escape every difficulty, for a dispute arose between him and Eutychius, of Constantinople, on the question whether the resurrection body was palpable. Eutychius sustained the negative, whom Gregory vigorously opposed; and the question being discussed before Tiberius, the decision was in favor of Gregory, the book written by his opponent upon the question being at the same time condemned to the flames.

Gregory remained at Constantinople about five years, that is, from A. D. 579 to 584, when Pope Pelagius, needing the services of his eminent nuncio in another business, recalled him, and sent another in his place. Among the many things which Gregory brought away from the imperial city was an arm of the apostle St. Andrew, and the head of St. Luke. These relics are now exposed to adoration in Rome, the arm being in the monastery of St. Andrew, and the head in the church of St. Peter.*

Immediately upon his return, Gregory requests permission to retire again to his monastery, which is reluctantly granted by the pope, who, however, made use of him as private secretary after his retirement. Soon he is chosen abbot, and in this new station he exacts from the monks all that strictness in observance of rules which had characterized himself. Never, perhaps, were the laws of monastic life better enforced; and if fasting, flagellation, and seclusion from the world, could make saints, then there were saints in St. Andrew's. Thus time rolled on, without the occurrence of any matter to disturb the peace or excite the interest of the people, except it may have been the incursions of the Lombards, or the pressing necessity for food among the masses in the city, until the

* Bower's Hist. Popes, vol. ii, p. 467.

report was spread that Pope Pelagius was no more. Perhaps we are mistaken, but the probabilities are vastly in favor of the idea that the people rejoiced in the event; for there was one to whom they looked with great expectations, whom they hoped to see in the chair of St. Peter. That one was Gregory; and in consonance with their wishes, he received the votes of the senate, the clergy, and the people. This happened in the year of our Lord 590.* The newly-elected pope was looked upon by the people "as an angel in the form of a man, sent down from heaven to comfort, assist, and relieve the city, then miserably distressed without by a barbarous enemy, and visited within by a dreadful famine, and a more dreadful plague." Gregory was, however, very backward in accepting the great honor which his admirers so unanimously bestowed. He felt, or affected to feel, that he could not perform the weighty duties of the station; and therefore without loss of time wrote to the emperor Mauricius, who had succeeded Tiberius, earnestly entreating to be released from the obligation. The letter, however, never reached Constantinople, having been intercepted by the governor of Rome, who took upon himself the business of writing to the emperor, and making known the wishes of the people. Gregory, thinking all would turn out as he desired, remained in his monastery until the epistle of Mauricius, confirming the election, arrived. Thus far matters had gone against him; but, determining to free himself if possible, he fled to the forests, and remained concealed for some time in a cave. Some authorities say that he was carried past the guards of the city gate in a basket, which is quite probable, as a strict watch was kept to prevent his escape. His flight, however, did not avail him, for he was shortly discovered, carried in triumph back to the city, and, without stopping, to St. Peter's, where he was ordained, and Gregory, the abbot, became Gregory I., the pope.

Having now followed this celebrated personage from his youth up to the high office of supreme pontiff, or, in the language of Rome, *vicegerent of Christ*, we will turn to the real object of our article, which was to investigate certain acts of Gregory as it respects their bearing upon the Roman Catholic Church and doctrines. Gregory, it is well known, is received as one among the many saints of that proud and wicked system of pseudo-religion; and if we can show that their acts have been, and are, in direct contradiction to the doings and faith of their much-honored father of the sixth century, and also that he was often inconsistent with

* An. Pagi, Crit. in Annal. Baronii, tom. ii, p. 669.

his declared belief, we shall have accomplished our object. Far be it from us to pick flaws where none appear; but the sins in the present case are too apparent to be passed by. We must remember, however, that in spite of his errors, Gregory had at heart a store of good feelings, which are sufficient to redeem *him* from the just odium attached to many of his followers. No sooner was the ordination completed, than, according to custom, the new pope drew up his confession of faith, and sent it to the other patriarchs, viz., to the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. In this confession, he professed to receive the four Gospels, the first four councils, to reverence the fifth, and to condemn the three chapters. He adds, "Whoever presumes to loosen the persons whom the councils have bound, or to bind those whom the councils have loosened, destroys himself and not them." Thus is it apparent that even in the sixth century the authority of councils was equal to that of the Holy Scriptures. We shall find Gregory acting up to this belief. The three chapters which he professed to condemn were the writings of three prelates, Theodore of Mopsuetia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Ibas of Edessa, which had been pronounced orthodox by the fourth general or œcumenical council, that convened at Chalcedon; but by reason of their favoring the Nestorian doctrines, they gave offense to Theodore, bishop of Cesarea, who was a Monophysite, and attached to Origen; who, therefore, persuaded the emperor to condemn and efface that part of the acts of the council which related to these writings. This act of the emperor was vigorously opposed by the bishop of Rome, and other sees, but in vain; for power effected what reasoning could not do, and Vigilius, who was then bishop of Rome, having consented to condemn, his successors afterward followed his example.* Several bishops in Italy, and some in Spain and Gaul, united also in the condemnation; but those of Istria could not be persuaded to act with the others. To reconcile them to this measure was therefore the first business of Gregory. To accomplish it, he summoned a council to be held at Rome, and persuaded the emperor Mauricius to furnish him with an order to oblige the Istrian bishops to attend. Having obtained the wished-for order, he dispatched it immediately to Serverus, the metropolitan of Istria, and by it summoned him, and those under him, to assemble in council at Rome.† The bishops assembled, but not at Rome; for seeing clearly their way of escape, they drew up memorials to the emperor, in which they declared they still held

* Mosheim, vol. i, p. 426. † Pagi, in Annales Baronii, tom. ii, pp. 690, 691.

the faith taught them by Vigilius—that an order from himself had been surreptitiously obtained by their enemies for their attendance—and that if they should condemn the three chapters the people would decline their communion. The emperor, understanding the matter, and fearing lest the churches should desert him for the Lombards, dispatched a letter to Pope Gregory, which contained the following:—

"As your holiness is well acquainted with the present state and confusion of affairs in Italy, and sensible that we must in prudence comply with the times, *we command your holiness* to give no further trouble to the Istrian bishops, but allow them to live undisturbed till it shall please God to settle these parts in peace and tranquillity."

How different this from the conduct of later rulers, who have "cringed before" and "servilely adored" the pope of Rome! Romish writers, in commenting upon this matter, do not fail to abhor the tyranny of Mauricius, who so grievously insulted the vicegerent of Christ as to *command* him to cease unnecessary persecution. Yet Gregory himself did not seem to think that the emperor had transcended his powers, for he talks of writing again to his "*most serene lords*" on the same subject. Whether he did or not, we cannot tell; but certain we are that the Istrian bishops gained their cause. Having failed in this, Gregory looked toward certain heretics in Africa, called Donatists, whom he succeeded in persecuting, causing their aged and revered primate to be deposed. He even advises force to be used in compelling the heretics to receive the true faith. With the Jews, however, he acts very differently, so much did he depend upon intrigue and policy; for while he prescribes force for the former class, he wins the latter by rewards—neither of which methods could make true converts. This he seemed to know, for he said that "conversions owing to force are never sincere."

We next find him striving to correct the many abuses which had crept into the church, and the want of discipline among the monks. Many who had once retired from the world, had again returned to its pleasures, had left their monasteries, and married. This, in the eyes of the pope, was a grievous sin not to be endured; so he requested, importuned, and commanded the erring ones to return again within the walls from which they had escaped. Rules, also, were made and applied, which effectually remedied the evil. But the clergy, too, were all gone astray, for incontinency and simony were vices of every day. Against these rapidly-increasing abuses, Gregory brought forth all his forces, and finally con-

quered; but, in so doing, he riveted firmer and faster the duty of celibacy upon the Roman priesthood. We know indeed, by good authority, that it was his opinion that the custom should never have been begun; but because councils had commanded and popes concurred, he must not swerve from the established rule. How plainly do we see in this the elements of the bigotry and obstinate ignorance of later times! The earthly greatness of the Papacy is certainly owing, in a great degree, to a rigid adherence to certain principles; but when the principles are wrong, it follows necessarily that the fruit will be bad, and in such case, adherence gives but deformity. The "mystery of iniquity," which had begun to work even in the apostolic age, had now spread far and wide, and, like poison introduced into some blood-vessel of the human system, it had run from vein to vein of the great Christian body, until disease, deformity, and death were the consequences. Still its action was insidious and slow, deceiving even the righteous, until in the course of centuries its power became exceedingly great—its results "sensual and devilish."

About this time the Lombards were converted through the influence of their queen, who was already a Catholic. This necessarily added to the influence and power of the pope. The see of Rome had now the direct oversight of the religious interests of all Italy, Sicily, and indirectly of France, and other parts; but the East looked to Constantinople for aid, while Ireland, which contained flourishing churches, relied upon neither. This was the relation of things while Gregory lived; but with him commenced the supremacy of Rome, for he labored incessantly for the increase of the power of his see. St. Peter was to be honored by the subjection of all men to himself, and no means were left untried to succeed in this particular. We must not expect, however, in Gregory, great crimes for the accomplishment of this. It was too early in history, and he had too little power. What he did was done secretly, and without pretension. Still he maintained that he had the right of re-examining the causes that had been decided by the metropolitans, and of reversing their decisions by the authority of St. Peter.

In attempting to exercise this assumed right upon one Maximus, bishop of Salona, he met with much opposition. Maximus had been duly elected bishop, but Gregory, for reasons of his own, declared the election null, and signified to the clergy of Salona, that they could not choose a bishop without his permission. Unexpectedly, the emperor gave permission to Maximus to accept the office, so that the pope was brought in direct opposition to Mauricius,

his *most serene lord.* Had this happened in later days, the pope would have triumphed; but, as it was, Gregory gave in, and all seemed settled. But this would not do: Maximus was summoned to appear at Rome to be tried for simony, sacrilege, and other crimes laid to his charge. To this, however, he paid no regard; and as a consequence was excommunicated. This, too, did not avail, for Maximus was bishop still; and moreover he contrived to accuse Gregory of being accessory to the death of one Malcus, a bishop. This coming before Mauricius, he refused to have anything to do with the matter, and turned it all over to the exarch Callinicus. He having chosen Marinianus, bishop of Ravenna, as arbitrator, Maximus repaired thither, and having asked the pardon of the pope, as was adjudged, they parted in peace. We wonder whether Gregory VII. would have settled the matter in this way?

About this time two ecclesiastics were tried at Constantinople for heresy, and having been found guilty, one of them, Anastasius by name, was cruelly beaten with cudgels. This coming to the ears of the pope, he wrote to the patriarch of the imperial city, and complained against the introduction of such a new and barbarous kind of punishment. John the patriarch, not liking this intermeddling with his affairs, resented it by neglecting to return an answer in any way to the epistle. Nothing disconcerted, Gregory wrote another letter upon the same subject, which was answered, but in no very graceful manner. Indeed, it is supposed that the patriarch committed the business to some layman, who tried his skill in satisfying the pope of Rome. Gregory, however, persevering, wrote again, and in his letter we find the following: "Your fraternity knows what is said in the canons, of bishops who cause themselves to be feared by blows: we are pastors, and not executioners. You cannot be a stranger to what an excellent preacher said: Preach the word, &c., reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine.* But to recur to blows, and with blows require men to believe, is a new and unheard-of method of preaching." It seems not very plain how Romanists can reconcile this doctrine with the actual practice of later popes.

The two presbyters who were condemned at Constantinople, having repaired to Rome, were there absolved, so well did the creed of the two churches agree. Indeed, what was heresy at Rome was the Catholic faith at Constantinople, and vice versa.

The emperor Mauricius, finding that the soldiers began to desert his army, and become monks, issued an order forbidding any to do

* Second Epistle to Timothy iv, 2.

so until their time of service was fully expired. Gregory, as he was commanded, made known this edict to all in his region, and then, having performed that part of his duty, immediately sent to Constantinople a letter, from which we make extracts for present and future use:—

"Your late constitution has given me, I ingenuously own it to my lords, (Mauricius and his son Theodocius,) the greatest uneasiness, seeing the way to heaven is thereby shut up to many, and what has been hitherto lawful, is thereby made henceforth unlawful.—But what am I who thus address my lords? I am but dust—I am but a worm. But nevertheless, as I apprehend the law to be displeasing to God, the author of all things, I cannot conceal from my lords what I think. Power was given to my lords over all men, that such as desire to live well might be helped and encouraged; that the way to heaven might be widened, and the earthly kingdom might be made subservient to the kingdom of heaven.—It is indeed a matter of grief and sorrow, that men should be withheld from leaving the world when the end of the world is at hand.* I indeed, who am subject to command, ego equidem jussioni subjectus, have caused the said law to be transmitted into different parts of the world; but as I apprehend it to be displeasing to God, I could not help acquainting therewith my most serene lords. And now I have on both sides discharged my duty: on the one I have yielded obedience to the emperor, and on the other, spoken my mind with openness and freedom."—*Greg.*, l. 2, Ep. 62.

This letter was not sent directly to Mauricius, but was delivered to the emperor through his favorite physician, to whom the pope writes in the following manner: "My tongue cannot well express the many benefits which I have received of the Almighty, and of my most serene lord the emperor, and in what other manner can I acknowledge them, but by loving the very ground he treads!"

Does not Gregory here acknowledge that he as pope had no secular power, but could only use persuasion and plain declaration of duty to gain a cause? It is very evident that he knew no power above that of the emperor, nor had the thought of the emperor's being obliged to bow to his see ever entered his mind. Should the reader not think the above to be sufficient authority for this conclusion, he may refer to the second, thirtieth, and sixty-third of Gregory's Epistles for further confirmation. These Epistles are largely quoted by Dr. George Campbell in his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.†

* It was an opinion then in vogue that the world would come to an end when the empire did; and as that seemed sinking fast, the time of the end seemed near.

† See Lecture xv, p. 279.

It was early seen that there was a strange inconsistency between the doctrines and actions of Gregory and those of later popes, and to remedy the deficiency, two forged bulls were produced, which were distinctly in favor of the Papal supremacy. The forgers, however, did the business in a bungling manner, for one of the bulls was signed by bishops who never existed, as also by those who had died before the bull purported to have been drawn up. The style and manner of both would, without any other aid, settle the question that they were not from Gregory; for in one he is made to say that Christ has entailed upon his see "power over all things and persons," and in the other we find the following, far too profane and antichristian for the character of Gregory;—

"If any king, bishop, or judge shall presume to infringe the decrees of our apostolic authority, or transgress this our command, let him be deprived of his honor and dignity; let him be cut off from the communion of the church; let him be loaded with all the anathemas and curses that have been thundered against infidels and heretics since the creation of the world to the present time; let him for ever be damned in the bottom of hell, *in inferno inferiori*, with Judas, the betrayer of our Lord."—*Bower's Hist. of Popes*, p. 501.

We have no hesitation in declaring that these words never were written by Gregory, and should have had none had we not known that they have been clearly proven to be forgeries by two eminent divines, viz.: Launois, in Diff. de Prince St. Medard, and Du Pin, de Antiq. Eccl. Discep. Dissert.

About this time the bishop of Constantinople assumed the title of œcumenical or universal patriarch; and Gregory, fearing lest he should make his power equal to his name, with policy, determined to object to the title. He instantly, therefore, dispatched a messenger to Constantinople with letters to his nuncio, charging him, "as he tendered the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free," to use his utmost exertions with the court and the bishop to procure the abolishment of so *proud*, *profane*, and *antichristian* title. All these commands his nuncio obeyed so far as was in his power, but without effect; for the patriarch could not be made to understand how his title could give umbrage to his brother in Christ, the pope of Rome. He asserted, moreover, that as the honor was conferred upon himself and his successors by a council, if he should lay it aside, his successors would not. The emperor and empress, with their court, in addition, asserted that they would have nothing to do with the affair; so that the nuncio had little good news for Gregory when he wrote. The emperor also sent an epistle to the

pope, requesting him not to meddle with the matter, lest there might arise a misunderstanding between the East and West.

Gregory could not give up at this stage, but writing to his nuncio, commanded him to attempt again to procure the removal of the title, and enjoined it upon him, that if he should fail, he must immediately separate himself from the communion of the patriarch. He declares that he desired to live in peace with all men, but he could not agree to fall in with this impious affair, since it would deprive him of his faith. From all which he wrote, it was, and still continues to be evident, that the title of universal bishop was in his opinion heretical in itself, and that no one could assume it without departing from the faith. At this time he had no better success than before, and his nuncio renounced the communion of the patriarch. The pope determined, however, to try once again, and therefore sent a letter directly to the bishop, in which he loads the title with the most opprobrious epithets. "Whom do you imitate," says he, "in assuming that arrogant title? Whom but him who, swelled with pride, exalted himself above so many legions of angels, his equals, that he might be subject to none, and all might be subject to him?" Gregory here plainly compares him to Satan who should assume such a title.

Let us place by the side of this the words of Boniface VIII. They are these: "We declare, say, define, and pronounce it to be necessary to salvation, for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff." Now if popes are to be considered infallible, which shall we believe? To make the contrast greater, and directly condemn the Roman Church from the mouth of one of its own saints and infallible pontiffs, we refer again to the letter of Gregory. He says in another place, "If none of the apostles would be called universal, what will you answer on the last day to Christ, the head of the church universal? You who, by arrogating that name, strive to subject all his members to yourself?" He adds: "But this is the time which Christ himself foretold; the earth is now laid waste and destroyed with the plague and the sword; all things that have been predicted have been accomplished; the king of pride (antichrist) is at hand." If John was worthy to be called *forerunner* of antichrist, should not the Papacy itself be called antichrist, since it afterward usurped the power which John could not have? Letters were also written to the emperor and empress upon this subject, as well as to the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, but it was all in vain; for John still continued to assume the title, until death put an end to his mortal career, which happened even while these matters were pending.

After a little delay, Cyriacus was elected in his place, who, as was customary, sent his confession of faith to the other bishops, and of course to Gregory. With his letter to Gregory came others from the bishops and the emperor, filled with commendations of the new patriarch. The messengers who bore these letters were received with all kindness by the pope; the confession of faith was approved, and Cyriacus was received into the communion of the successors of St. Peter. These letters contained no allusions to the title which had been assumed by his predecessor, and excited hope in the mind of Gregory that it had been laid aside; nevertheless, he sent as before his commands to his nuncio, intimating to him that should Cyriacus assume that "proud and impious" designation, he must immediately decline his communion. Cyriacus, discovering this, attempted to appease Gregory, without giving up his honors, by sending to him a nuncio, who was impowered to settle the matter. It was, however, all in vain; for Gregory assured his officer that the title was "scandalous, profane, and blasphemous," and that he would not connive at it. He wrote also to the patriarch, and declared to him that "whoever calls himself universal bishop, or desires to be so called, in the pride of his heart, is the forerunner of antichrist. Ego fidenter dico, quod quisquis se universalem sacerdotem vocat, vel vocari desiderat, in elatione sua, antichristum præcurrit."—*Greg.*, l. 6, Ep. 30.

In all this matter we see plainly the jealousy of Gregory, who feared lest the see of Constantinople should attain to universal power, and his own be degraded. Not being able to obtain the honorable designation, which was really the bone of contention, he could not see it given to another without a murmur. St. Peter was in his eyes deeply injured and contemned by this act; therefore it was that he labored to obtain the removal of so "impious" a name. Unable to gain his point, he took to himself the title of "servant of servants," by which he intended to signify his detestation of the course pursued by his cotemporary, and the humility which should be characteristic of every Christian. This title, which has been assumed by all of Gregory's successors, it is needless to say, is as full of pride as that which was condemned in the patriarch, and is far beyond it in hypocrisy.

In the year 596, Agilulph, the king of the Lombards, being desirous of tranquillity, and not being able to bring the emperor, who treated with him through his exarch, to terms, was enraged, and accordingly laid waste the Roman dukedom, burned the villages, reduced Cortona, and carried into captivity very many of the in-

habitants. The pope, always kind, tried all means in his power to relieve the sufferers and redeem the captives, both by expending all the money in his hands, and by writing to other bishops, advising them to be as charitable as possible in this extremity. In Rome the number of poor was very great, so that Gregory himself in his letters informs us that there were no less than three thousand virgins in the city, who were compelled to sell even their clothes and the coverings of their beds for support. Nothing is better ascertained than that thousands were kept in being during that trying time by the compassion and generosity of Gregory. He wrote to the great men of the East for supplies, and they readily assisted; he freely devoted his own money and time to the work, so that he was as a guardian angel to the city. How different this from the conduct of many of his successors, who boasted that they were the vicars of Christ, but were, if we may judge by their fruits, the servants of Satan!

In this same year Gregory undertook the conversion of the Saxons in England. Authorities differ somewhat upon the time when he first formed this design, and the cause; but the most probable account is that which makes him to have thought of the Saxons from having seen some English children exposed for sale at Rome. William Mavor, in his Universal History, has the following account of the origin of his prepossessions in their favor:—

"That prelate, while yet in a private station, had observed in the market-place of Rome some Saxon youth exposed for sale, whom the Roman merchants, in their trading voyages to Britain, had bought of their parents. Struck with their fair complexions and blooming countenances, he asked to what country they belonged. Being told they were Angles, he replied they ought rather to be denominated Angels, and lamented that the prince of darkness should enjoy so fair a prey. Inquiring the name of their province, he was informed it was Deira, a district of Northumberland; 'Deira,' exclaimed he, 'that is good; they are called to the mercy of God, from his anger, *de ira*. But what is the name of the king of that province?' He was told it was Ælla, or Alla; 'Alleluia,' cried he, 'we must endeavor that the praises of God be sung in that country.'"

Moved by this event, he sent a company of missionaries, with Austin at their head, into Britain. This monk Austin, who is also called Augustine, was, however, governed somewhat by love of self; for after having arrived in France, he deserted his company, and returned to Rome, declaring that the undertaking was impracticable, and begged to be excused. Gregory, more sanguine and daring than he, was nothing daunted; but having encouraged

his timid servant, and furnished him with letters of introduction, sent him back again. Having joined his company, they crossed over to Britain, were favorably received by King Ethelbert, and allowed to preach their religion in his kingdom. They labored well and perseveringly; and, as a reward, were permitted to baptize about ten thousand converts. Nevertheless, the fact that the queen was a Catholic, was, perhaps, a great cause of their success; for, by her endeavors, the king himself was persuaded to accept the new doctrine, which conversion of royalty became an example for all the people. That we have stated a truth, is evident, from the fact that when Eadbald, his successor, who was a pagan, ascended the throne, there was a great apostasy.

The next year a new colony of monks was sent into Britain; and at the same time, a letter to Queen Bertha, commending her zeal in the cause of Christ. Suitable advice was also given to Austin, (who is said to have been a vain man, much puffed-up by his success;) and joined to this, were instructions which required him to permit the Britains to continue their pagan ceremonies, —but with the difference, that instead of their gods they must worship the Lord of heaven. We may well wonder why this was permitted by Gregory, for he could not but have known that to separate them from their false worship, he must abolish their heathenish ceremonies, and that as long as they continued the ancient services their minds would cling to their idols. Thus was established for a time in England a sort of mixed, mongrel religion; or rather, no religion, for it was much nearer paganism than Christianity. This will not fail to remind us of his mode of winning the Jews by rewards; which, with the present, must have been two as feeble ways of making spiritual Christians as could be imagined. These methods of conversion, and admittance into the mystic body of Christ, were much practiced in those times, and even long after. Michelet, in his History of France, speaking of a certain portion of the Saxons, then dwelling about the river Lippe, says,—

"All of them who abided in their settlements suffered themselves to be baptized without difficulty; and, indeed, this ceremony, of which undoubtedly they hardly understood the meaning, never seems to have inspired the barbarians with any particular repugnance. In the days of Louis the Debonnaire, (the Meek,) the Northmen flocked in crowds to be baptized; the only difficulty being to find white dresses enough for the proselytes, some of whom would be baptized three times, in order to gain three dresses."

Monachus relates that on one occasion, some Northmen being

baptized, there was a deficiency of linen dresses, and an indifferently made shirt was given to one of them. Looking at it for some time with great indignation, he said to the emperor, "I have been washed here twenty times, and have always had given me fine linen, white as snow. Is a sack like this fit for a warrior, or a swineherd?" Antonius Pagus, in "Critica in Annales Baronii," says that the Avars, Charlemagne's allies, perceiving that he feasted their Christian countrymen in the hall, while the rest eat at the door, received baptism in great numbers, in order to have a seat at the imperial table.

We have given these instances for the purpose of showing the nature of the celebrated conversions of those times. Religion had become a mere outside show, plenteous in ceremonies, but dreadfully rotten within. An event happened in the south of Gaul which also illustrates the deplorable state of religion. Images of Christ, the Virgin Mary, &c., were frequent in the churches, and the common people had ignorantly fallen into the custom of worshiping the images themselves. This coming under the observation of Serenus, one of the bishops of Gaul, he ordered the images to be removed from the churches, and destroyed, in order that none might be guilty of this idolatry. Pope Gregory was, however, offended at this, and wrote to Serenus, telling him that worship of images was without the least doubt wrong, but that they were of importance to fix the attention of the people, and serve as books to instruct them. He declared, in addition, that though idolatry ought always to be prevented, yet his conduct was reprehensible, since he had destroyed the images when he should have discoursed to the congregations, and given them to understand that the images were not to be worshiped, but to be as representatives only, for their instruction. Serenus was justly astonished that such ideas should be advanced by one of such rare judgment as Gregory. The reason for such conduct will appear, if we reflect that the people were attracted by everything which bore a resemblance to the paganism which they had left, which popular affection the pope wished to turn to the advantage of his see.

As to the existence of images in churches, it is allowed by Romanists that none were permitted to be used in the first three centuries, though they *now* had become quite necessary to keep up the customs. Romanism was corrupted, deeply corrupted, even in the sixth century; and it needed but power, to show to the world its heart of blackness. Gregory, too, was drawn into its ambitious projects; and, as we have seen, his actions gave evidence that it had influenced him to what was inexpedient, if not really evil.

Now, however, we must relate that which more than anything else tends to cast obloquy upon Gregory the Great. In the year 601, toward its close, there happened an event which changed *in toto* the affairs of the state, and caused no little misery and sorrow. We relate the affair as concisely as possible. The army of Mauricius, over which was the centurion Phocas, revolted, declared that officer emperor, marched with rapidity toward Constantinople, and seized the city. The emperor was delivered up to Phocas; who, in the refinement of cruelty, caused five of his children to be murdered before his eyes. It is related that the nurse had artfully saved one, the youngest of them, and substituted her own child in its place; but when the unhappy father observed the change, he immediately gave information of the same, and his own suffered. After the completion of this bloody scene, Mauricius himself was slain upon the altar made by the bodies of his children. His eldest son, whom he had dispatched to Persia, was taken at Nice, and beheaded; and many of his relations and friends shared the same fate. His wife, Constantina, and three daughters, were also most cruelly treated; for having fled for refuge to one of the churches of Constantinople, orders were given that they should be taken away, and executed; but these commands were without avail, because Cyriacus the patriarch would suffer no violence to be offered them in their asylum. Phocas therefore determined to try other means, and applying directly to Constantina, he persuaded her with fair and well-dissembled words, and oaths, to quit her asylum, and trust to him for safety. No sooner, however, was she in his power, than he confined her, and the three daughters, in a monastery, from which they were soon taken to Chalcedon, and there cruelly executed, upon the same spot where the father and five children fell.

"In fine," says Maimbourg,* "there never was so much innocent blood shed, nor so many miseries and misfortunes, as under this reign. And indeed there never was a more infamous tyrant than this wicked man, who had neither virtue, birth, honor, nor merit; was very ill-shaped, frightfully ugly, having a hideous aspect, seeming always in a fury whenever he spoke; a drunkard, lascivious, brutal, and sanguinary; devoid of the least sensation of humanity, being wholly a savage beast in his countenance and temper, and having nothing of a man about him, but his shape, which was horridly deformed; in a word, having all the ill qualities that may be contrasted with those which historians have so greatly applauded in Mauricius."

* Hist. du Pont. de St. Greg., pp. 179, 181.

Such were the crimes, the character of Phocas; such the state of the empire. Can the reader doubt as to what will be the course pursued by Gregory? Will he not thunder from the chair of St. Peter against so great sins, so great iniquity? Will he not excommunicate all those who have borne parts in the work of blood? Alas! the truth in the case was far different. Let the reader judge for himself: we give extracts from Gregory's own letters.*

"Various are the changes, and many the vicissitudes, of human life; the Almighty giving sometime in his justice princes to afflict his people, and sending sometimes in his mercy princes to comfort and relieve them. We have been hitherto most grievously afflicted; but the Almighty has chosen you, and placed you on the imperial throne, to banish by your *merciful disposition* all our afflictions and sorrows. Let the heavens rejoice, let the earth leap for joy, let the whole people return thanks for so happy a change. Lactentur cœli et exaltet terra, et de vestris benignis actibus, universæ reipublicæ populus nunc usque vehementer afflictus hilarescat."

"May the republic long enjoy these happy times! May God with his grace direct your heart in every good thought, in every good deed! May the Holy Ghost, that dwells in your heart, ever guide and assist you, that you may, after a long course of years, pass from an earthly and temporal to an everlasting and heavenly kingdom."

"But we hope the Almighty, who has begun to relieve us, will complete what he has so happily begun; and that he who has given us such *pious* lords, will deliver us from our cruel enemies. May the Holy Trinity, therefore, grant you long life, that the later we have received the blessings that flow from your piety, the longer we may enjoy them!" "What tongue can utter, what mind conceive, the thanks we owe to God, who has placed you on the throne to ease us of the yoke with which we have been hitherto so cruelly galled? Let the angels give glory to God in heaven, let men return thanks to God upon earth, for the republic is relieved, and our sorrows are all banished."

After all this flattery and wickedness, we find, as we have all along suspected, that the interest of the see of St. Peter is at the bottom; for Gregory writes as follows:—

"I should, perhaps, have entreated you to take under your particular protection the hitherto most greviously-afflicted church of the apostle St. Peter; but as I know you love God, I need not ask you to do what I am sure you are ready to do of your own accord. For the more you fear God, the more you must love his apostle, to whom it

* We make use of the translations of these epistles which are given by Bower, because they are sufficiently faithful, and not very inelegant. The reader who may not have access to Gregory's works, may find the Latin of the letters in Campbell's Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.

was said, Thou art Peter, &c. To thee I will give, &c. May he therefore be the guardian of your empire; may he be your protector on earth, may he be your advocate in heaven, that after a long course of years you may enjoy in the kingdom of heaven the reward that is due to you there, for relieving your subjects from the burdens they groaned under, and rendering them happy upon earth."

Now let him who reads this article, turn back and review the extracts we gave from the letter of Gregory to Mauricius; and then if he will not allow that this last act casts a stain upon the fame of Gregory that never can be erased, we despair of convincing him upon any subject, however plain. Even the Papist historians cannot but look upon the matter in this light, for they attempt to give reasons for the conduct of Gregory; but, neglecting those which are the true, as might be expected, their explanation only renders the matter worse. Maimbourg, whose account of Phocas we have transcribed, says, "I own that all I have here related may give some uneasiness to those who shall afterward read the three epistles which the holy pontiff wrote to Phocas, and to Leontia, his consort, when advice was brought to Rome of what had been transacted at Constantinople, at his being crowned emperor there."

Afterward he attempts to explain these inconsistencies, but fails, as all may conceive. The real reason must be found in the fact, that Mauricius had declared in favor of the patriarch of Constantinople, in certain disputes which Gregory had with that religious functionary. When John had assumed the title of universal patriarch, Gregory was offended, and took upon himself the title of servant of servants, as if in humility, but really in pride; and now, carried beyond all proper bounds by his ambition for the supremacy of St. Peter, he forgets entirely the enormous crimes of the tyrant whom he so warmly commends. Well does Bayle say that "there are but few examples of a virtue so pure and exalted as to have been proof against the jealousy of authority or party interest." Of Gregory he says, "How great a fall! What a blindness and base condescension was this! A pope who exerts himself with so much severity against a poor fornicating ecclesiastic, and pronounces such dreadful sentences on this occasion; and at the same time does not express the least sorrow that Mauricius and his children had been put to death."

Gregory now draws near to the close of his eventful life. Sickness, pain, and agony, are his constant attendants. The business of his see can be no longer performed by him. In short, he lingers awhile; the invisible world opens upon his view, and the fleshly

part is stiff and motionless. They buried it in one of the porches of St. Peter, under the altar of the apostle St. Andrew. This was done in March, A. D. 604.

Gregory certainly possessed great abilities; but there were also great inconsistencies in his character. In the character of a monk he was perfect; as a pastor he was vigilant, and untiring in the prosecution of his duty: in short, as a man he possessed many virtues, and many failings. Naturally he had a most tender and benevolent heart; but policy and worldly spirit did much toward corrupting his better feelings. While he filled the Papal chair, no one can declare that he neglected its interests; for if any one desire of his was greater than another, it was that he might do somewhat toward causing the apostle Peter to be honored among men. Most of the evils of which he was the cause we have mentioned, of the good acts which he performed we know less, but that little is sufficient to assure us that thousands could call him blessed. He was mild, compassionate, disinterested, as it regarded himself, an enemy to pomp and grandeur, a zealous laborer for the good of his people. That the superstitions and ignorance of the times had much influence over him, all historians allow; the wonder is that they did not lead him into greater errors.

His writings were numerous, but not of high excellence. We will mention the most prominent. He wrote the "Morals," or commentaries upon the book of Job, undertaken at the request of Leander, bishop of Seville, and of the monks of St. Andrew, divided into thirty-five books. In this work he commends Job, reproves his friends, gives good advice, and moralizes spiritually and allegorically. Following this, he wrote also Homilies on Ezekiel and the Gospels, which are common-place. His best work was called the "Pastoral," in which he considers the qualifications and duties of bishops and pastors in general, in four parts. Part one treats of their duties with reference to the ambition which pastors too often allow to excite them, and advises all to trust in God; part two tells us that a pastor should be pure, just, holy, merciful, &c.; part three shows how the pastor must adapt his teachings to his people; and part four administers an antidote to pride, and enjoins humility. This book bears with itself its own recommendation—it is excellent for what it was intended, and might do much good even in this age.

The next work of importance was called the "Dialogues," said to have taken place between Gregory and his deacon Peter. It is full of remarkable events, which require a great share of credulity in the reader in order to be received. "The abbot of Fundi

hesitated to eat meat at a feast, where there was nothing else, and a fish miraculously came into the water a servant had drawn." "The oil failing in a church, the holy attendant poured water into the lamps, and the wicks burned well and brightly." (Where's the wonder?) "The abbot of Mount Soracte removed a rock by his prayers, to make way for a garden for his monks."* We read also that St. Bernard, by a miracle, mended a broken seive; that he broke a glass of poison by making the sign of the cross; that his sister raised a tempest to oblige him to remain at her house over night. Also that Pope John's horse would not carry a woman; that Sabinius stopped an inundation of the Po, by sending a letter to that river, containing his commands, &c.

There are various other writings attributed to Gregory, but they are of little importance. His letters, which amounted to eight hundred and forty, were collected in twelve books. Editions of his works have been published at Rome, Paris, London, and Oxford. That of Paris, in 1705, is perhaps the best. We have now before us the "Biblia Gregoriana, seu Commentaria Textuum Scripturæ Sacræ, S. Gregorii, Papæ I. cognomento magni, collectaer omnibus ejusdem operibus." From this we had intended to furnish the reader with a few specimens of Gregory's style, but our space will not permit. C.

ART. IV.—*Fourierism.* 1. *Theory of Universal Unity.* By CHARLES FOURIER.

2. *A Concise Exposition of the Doctrine of Association.* By A. BRISBANE.

3. *A Popular View of the Doctrine of Charles Fourier.* By PARK GODWIN, Esq.

4. *Constructive and Pacific Democracy.* By PARK GODWIN, Esq.

5. *The Phalanx, or Journal of Social Science: Organ of the Doctrine of Association.*

CHARLES FOURIER was a man of singular fortunes, as well as singular views. He was from childhood trained to business in the shop of his father, who was a woolen-draper, and at the age of eighteen entered as a clerk in a commercial house at Lyons. Three years after, his father died, leaving him sixteen thousand dollars; but before the close of the year he lost the whole of it,

* See "The Succession of Sacred Literature," by J. B. B. Clarke, vol. ii, p. 360.

having engaged it in commercial speculations. After the ravaging of Lyons by the forces of the National Convention, in 1793, Fourier, with other citizens, was condemned to the scaffold, but fortunately made his escape, and fled to his native place, Besançon. He reached this place in a state of complete destitution, and also worn down with sickness and fatigue: here he was again thrown into prison, and saved his life only by engaging in the national service. After serving two years in the army of the Rhine, he procured a discharge, and again entered a commercial house, in the capacity of a clerk. In business, however, he seems to have met with no marked success, such as sometimes indicates superior abilities. In 1799 he turned his attention to the organization of society; and before the close of that year it is announced that he "discovered the laws of universal unity, and the essential destiny of humanity upon earth."

From that time Fourier bent all his energies to the development and perfection of his new theory. In order to facilitate his studies, he returned to Lyons, and became a *courtier marron*, or unlicensed commercial agent. Here he published, in 1808, his "*Theorie des quatre Mouvemens.*" After having devoted the best part of eight years to the preparation of this, his first volume, which was designed merely as a prospectus of his work, he issued it from the press; but it failed to attract attention. He had hoped by this volume to acquire means for publishing the remainder of his work; but being disappointed in this, and discovering that his theory in itself was incomplete, he withdrew the work from circulation, and devoted seven years more to its elaboration, at the same time continuing his petty business at Lyons. His fated volume he was about committing to the press again, when Napoleon returned from Elba, in 1815. Napoleon having made Count Fourier prefect of the department of the Rhone, Charles was placed at the head of the statistical department. On the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, and the return of the Bourbons, Fourier found an asylum with his widowed sister, in a country village, near Belley. With this sister, and another living in Belley, he resided from 1816 to 1821, spending most of his time in poring over his manuscripts, and elaborating the works he designed for publication. These works were published in 1822, in two volumes, under the title "A Treatise on Domestic and Agricultural Association." Notwithstanding five years were spent in Paris by Fourier in efforts to bring this work into notice, it seemed destined, as did also the abridgment published in 1829, to the fate of its predecessor.

The year 1832 dawned with brighter auspices upon the project

of Fourier. He had as early as 1830 turned his attention to the St. Simonians, who were making quite a stir in Paris. At first the proffered services of Fourier were rejected with disdain; but before the lapse of two years several of the leaders, and among them Transon, Le Chevalier, Paget, and Leymoyne, deserted the St. Simonian cause, and came over to that of Fourier. A weekly journal, "*La Reforme Industrielle*," was established; and a joint-stock company formed to give a practical realization of the principles of Fourier. This company purchased an estate for $100,000; but unforeseen difficulties paralyzed its operations. In 1835 Fourier published the first part of a new volume, entitled "False Industry." The second part of this volume was nearly completed when its author was cut off from its prosecution by death. The subsequent history of the Fourier movement—especially in our own country, where it seems to be taking deep root, at least in a certain class of mind—is too familiar with the public to require rehearsal here.

Fourier, we know, possessed uncommon perseverance of character; and, if we may credit his panegyrists, rigid integrity and virtue. His biographer says of him, that "he was remarkable for the tenacity with which he maintained his opinions, when he conceived himself to be in the right." His genius seems to have been of the imaginative and fanciful kind. His master passion, even when young, was the cultivation of flowers and music. "His sister relates that when a boy he had his room so lumbered with plants that a narrow passage from the door to the windows was the only space left unoccupied." He was kind and generous in his habits, especially in the earlier part of his life; and had an utter abhorrence of all kinds of falsehood and dissimulation. But he seems to have had little relish for society. In fact, he lived almost entirely alone, "as great a stranger to his own family as to the rest of society." "His taciturnity increased as he advanced in years;" and as he lived and died a bachelor, it is not to be wondered that "he acquired the habits and manners of a hermit." In his diet, as well as in his habits, he seems to have had all the whims and oddities of an old bachelor. "He had no confidence in medical science," and when he met with a severe accident, in 1837, a violent contusion of the head, by falling down stairs, he refused all medical aid. Among his friends were two physicians, but he obstinately neglected their prescriptions. His habitual taciturnity seemed to acquire increased asperity during his last illness. "He had a particular dislike to being surrounded by servants and friends;" nor would he permit any one to attend him but the old

woman who was in the habit of serving him on ordinary occasions. And when his friends offered to sit up with him, "he refused peremptorily," not even allowing them to "remain in the adjoining room." On the night of his death, he sent the servant to bed about twelve o'clock, requesting her to be up at five the next morning. When she went to see how he was, at the appointed hour, she found him out of bed. He had had the energy to get up, and go to the night table; and as he was making an effort to return, his spirit fled, and the dead body was left kneeling at the bed-side.* Whether he professed any religious faith, aside from the indefinite and absurd rationalism imbodied in his theory, we have no means of determining.

Such is a brief outline of the life and character of Charles Fourier. Whether they were the best adapted to give him rational and consistent views of society as it is, or to prepare him for the development of a truer and better scheme, we leave the candid reader to judge. Having shown himself incompetent to the management of the wealth bequeathed to him by his ancestors, he devises a plan by which "the capital of capitalists may be perfectly secure." With no ability to increase his own stock, he proposes to show how capital may be made "tenfold more productive." With no practical disposition to labor, he would discover to us the principles on which labor should be organized and made attractive. Himself a recluse, he would develop a new social system: a bachelor, he would disclose a system that is to enhance the bliss of the domestic relation: resting down upon the foolish mummeries of the Catholic Church, or upon a cold, speculative rationalism, he would discover the springs of a new and better faith to the Christian world. Such were the auspices under which this new scheme of socialism has been brought before the public, to bewilder and lead astray thousands of ardent yet unreflecting minds.

The rapidity with which one popular delusion succeeds another is not less astonishing to the mind than painful to the heart; but it is especially astonishing to observe the strong hold which the reigning humbug takes upon the public mind, and the multitudes that are entangled in the meshes of its net. Indeed, the number is not small that seem to be struggling most of their lives amidst the eddies and whirlpools of some delusion or other. Their heads rise above the waves of one just in season to dive under another, so that their locks are never free from the spray. There are some, indeed, that never more rise to the surface: the mists may all

* Godwin's Popular View, p. 25.

clear away from the public mind, but no light comes to them. They pursue the *ignis fatuus*, even after a thousand defeats, with the same ardor of enterprise, and the same confidence of hope, that inspired them when first it presented its delusive phase to their imagination. We could weep over these victims of popular delusion. Their all of earthly, often (sad as it may be!) their all of heavenly hope, is chained to the car of some vagary, baseless and ruinous, as it is fascinating and delusive. To rob them of this delusion would be to dry up the only fountain of their bliss, to blot out the only sun in their heavens, and to render the earth an arid and howling waste, whose barren desolation would be enlivened by no verdant oasis, and whose solitude broken by the song of no bird, and enlivened by the murmur of no stream. The heart that sorrows over their delusion is almost inclined—sympathizing as did the poet with the illusive but sorrow-beguiling fancies of his "wild maniac"—to exclaim,

> "Chide not his peace, proud reason; nor destroy
> The shadowy forms of uncreated joy."

And yet it is sad to see noble minds and rich talents—minds wearing the impress of God, the stamp of immortality; talents which, consecrated to truth and righteousness, might have been a noble sacrifice laid upon the altar of their country's or their race's good—alike borne down and overwhelmed by the strong tide of mental delusion. Democritus may laugh, and Heraclitus weep, over the follies and delusions of the world; but shall not a brighter day, a day in which *truth* shall be the radiant centre of thought, feeling, and action, ere long dawn upon our race? A day when the dull mists that gather along the horizon, and roll up their dark clouds to the zenith, shall be dissipated, to obscure our mental sky no more? Is there nowhere to be found a channel in which mind may roll its stream along, without stagnating amidst bogs and marshes, or plunging amidst eddies and cataracts? Truth, reason, religion, God, all unite in an affirmative response; but to their voice, since passion usurped reason's throne, and sin nestled itself under the very shrine of divinity, man has lent but an inconstant and uncertain ear. It is not once only that the serpent has beguiled Eve; but for nearly six thousand years man has been the willing dupe and victim of the same hellish arts, till reason has become almost unstrung, and faith almost a stranger to the soul.

Our mental history is a sphinx's riddle, which the sphinx only can unravel. The planets, held in equilibrium by the centripetal and centrifugal forces acting upon them, revolve with unvarying

constancy around their common centre of light and heat; but since the harmony of man's nature, and especially its unity with God, was disruptured in Eden, the equilibrium of mind seems to have been completely destroyed. Now, with lightning velocity, it shoots along the centripetal line; again, with startling suddenness, it darts away on its erratic centrifugal flight; and anon we are astonished with circumvolutions, of which the *Cartesian Vortices* would furnish no faint resemblances. It is not, however, only in the sphere of religion that fancy runs riot, and superstition without eyes, and fanaticism without either heart or eyes, take possession of the soul. Society was not more deeply moved to conquer the Saracen and Turk, than to discover the hidden Alkahest, so long the absorbing object of pursuit to the alchemist. The visions of Swedenborg, and those of St. Simon, mark oscillations equally remote from the centre, but in opposite directions. Millerism and Fourierism mark also extreme points of oscillation: the one claiming to be the very centre of religious truth; the other the centre and imbodiment of *all truth*, the "universal unity." He who has watched the signs of the times, and noted the gathering of the elements for the few past years, will not need the gift of prophecy to enable him to discover in the latter the legitimate successor of the former. The mind, cloyed with spiritual delusions, turns to earth, to cull the flowers that spring up in the new Eden of its fancy; spiritual shadows having disappeared, it grasps after the equally unsubstantial shadows of earthly lure; disappointed in not being summoned up on high to spiritual bliss, it forthwith essays to elude the flaming sword and watchful cherubim that guard the way of the tree of life, and make at once its entrance upon an Elysium formed and decorated with its own hand.

Now let there be no ominous starting among either of these two classes, at being thus unceremoniously jostled together. The traits of resemblance are such as to render the family relation indubitable. They are both agreed as to the wickedness and evil influence of our present societary organization. Fourier calls it, "the social limbus, in which human passions are in constant conflict."* Godwin calls it, "the social hell."† The disciple of "Father Miller" gravely announces, "that the earth has reached the days of Sodom and of Noah, when all flesh had corrupted their way, and the earth was filled with violence."‡ Neither of them seems to possess words sufficiently strong to express their utter faithlessness in all existing institutions to bring about the needed

* See Phalanx, p. 51.

† Pacific and Constructive Democracy, p. 21. ‡ Gospel Standard.

reform. Science, the disciple of Fourier will tell us, must for ever fail, because it overlooks the sublime "theory of passional attractions," and is destitute of the "law of the series:" the disciple of Miller proclaims, "that crime, oppression, pride, aristocracy, poverty, and human suffering have kept pace with the discoveries and labors of science." The systems of legislation and government are equally obnoxious. "If," says one, "we were in the first stages of civilization, making our first trials at social organization, we should perhaps be excusable for entertaining some hope of social good from our legislative wisdom; but long experience has sufficiently deceived us. We have evidently nothing to hope from our philosophical and political sciences. Twenty-five centuries of trials of them have proved that they are so many causes of error; and instead of fulfilling their promises, they bring upon nations new calamities."* How perfectly responsive of this is the wail of the despairing devotee of Millerism! "The best forms of government furnish no hope of relief to the miseries of the race." The Christian church also share equally in the denunciations of these pseudo reformers. One tells us that "they ["nominal Christians"] have substituted selfish policy for divine order, and expediency for justice;"† that the four beasts, in the sixth chapter of Revelation, represent the four states of the Christian church; "and at the Reformation began the fourth condition‡ of Christendom—the condition in which *we now are*—a state of death and hell—death on the pale horse, and hell followed with him."§ The other, that "the nominal church is a great practical lie; professing to benefit and save men, its tendency is to crush and destroy." Again, both are on the tip-toe of expectation that some event of tremendous magnitude and consequence is about to take place. "Old things," says the Phalansterian, "are now to pass away, and all things are to become new. Puseyism, and the hundreds of other questions of the day, are nothing but the sea and the waves roaring, under the portentous and secret influence of the terrible storm that is coming to shake the nations of the earth, for a great judgment is most surely at hand."‖ The whole generation of his cousins have, for two or three years past, resounded "the world's crisis," by both land and sea; and as often, to make the matter doubly sure, fixed the period of this catastrophe;

* Phalanx, p. 91. † Ibid., p. 105.

‡ First condition, the apostolic, "robed in the whiteness of the true faith;" second, "the red or blood-stained condition," the union of the church and Pagan Romanism, &c.; third, "the black condition, Papal Rome during the dark ages." See H. H. Van Amringe, Nature and Revelation.

§ Phalanx, No. 4, p. 55. ‖ Ibid.

but the earth has as yet obstinately held on in her way, as though she were even now in the blithe season of youth.

We might multiply these parallelisms to almost any extent; but these are sufficient to establish the cousinship of the parties.

"Facies non omnibus una,
Non diversa tamen, qualem debet esse sororum."

"The sciences," says a very reputable authority, "are of a sociable disposition, and flourish best in the neighborhood of each other." And so it may be said of the various humbugs that have afflicted our age. There is a relationship existing between them; and we mistrust that not a few individuals could be found, who, from Matthias downward, through "saw-dust," phrenology, clairvoyance, Mormonism, and Millerism, have steadily wended their way. Of this class not a few might be found who are beginning to turn their steps toward the divine order of Charles Fourier. It is but common justice, however, to remark, that the two branches of the humbug family we have been comparing have a striking disagreement, (a thing that will sometimes happen in families still more nearly related,) about the expected "crisis:" the one expecting nothing less than the entire destruction of this mundane system; the other limiting the destruction to the old systems of social organization, government, science, and religion. Time, it is to be hoped, will terminate this controversy; and then it will undoubtedly be discovered, as is usually the case in family jars, that there was not a little fault on both sides.

Here we must premise, that we have no "*instinct* against all schemes of association;" and furthermore, that we do not possess a nature "so sublimated that we can discover truth by instinct;" but still with the "larger part of our fellow-mortals prefer the old-fashioned faculty called reason, when we have to decide upon grave and important matters."* And it is for this very reason that we prefer to jog along in the "old-fashioned" track, rather than to mount the railroad car of some modern humbug, to be sublimated into the shadow of universal unity by the speed of travel; or, if our lump of humanity be too dull for that, to be plunged at last amid the bogs of an interminable and bottomless morass, which forms at once the *terminus* and the *depot* of the greater portion of these modern high-pressure "improvements." Again we protest that we do not stand in opposition to the improvement of the social condition of mankind. Nothing that concerns our race is devoid of interest to us. Effort to improve our social condition, even

* Godwin's Popular View: see preface.

though it should fail, if it has been dictated by benevolence, and guided by reason, deserves the approval and gratitude of all men. The erection of a lighthouse near a difficult and dangerous strait may be a work of mercy; but mercy and justice both demand that we put down in our chart such distances and bearings as will enable the mariner to escape the shoals and rocks that lie along the passage. But, to launch out upon a great *practical* question, to propose it as the concentration of every possible good, to say, *Hic est aut nusquam quod quærimus*,—while yet we have never brought that question to its only proper and true test; to build our lighthouse, and then prescribe our bearings and distances, while as yet we have only viewed the channel in the distance, is requiring an individual to trust himself to an inexperienced and unsafe guide. It is a foul tampering with human credulity and human interest. And the man who on such insufficient grounds for determining final results seeks to overturn the established usages and order of society, is a wild and visionary fanatic—moon-struck with a theory, or an arrogant and designing knave.

The pecuniary reverses that have been experienced in this country for several years past, and the consequent suffering and deprivation, have predisposed the public mind to give a favorable ear to anything that promises greater permanency to the hitherto fluctuating tides of business. Fourierism not only makes its direct appeal to our cupidity, promising larger and surer profits to both capital and labor, and boldly pledging itself to render the term "loss" obsolete in the technics of trade; but it slyly glides up to our weak part, insinuating that the reverses and calamities we have suffered are to be set down, not against ourselves, but to the account of our defective social organization. Or do we, with some doubt still lingering on our minds, make mention of the improvidence, the extravagant expenditures, the ill-advised schemes of commercial enterprise, the hot haste to be rich, and the preposterous reliance of men of business upon *credit* rather than *capital*, all of which was highly characteristic of several years prior to the eventful 1837 and '38, we are again assured that all these, and numberless other evils, are the inevitable result of the great fact that in our social organization there is "an antagonism to itself."

Such is the scheme that demands nothing less than the entire remodeling of our social organization. The elements of this grand farce are already being accumulated in formidable array. Bright but eccentric minds, splendid but erratic talents, are already enlisted in the enterprise. Associations are formed, or being formed, in distant parts of the Union; and an age will probably

elapse before the bubble bursts, and society returns to its accustomed channels.

Let us glance at the social order of Fourier as a system. Let us assume the question which is dropped from a thousand tongues, and whose solution is labored by a thousand minds—

What is Association?

This we at first took to be a practical question, unincumbered with abstrusities *physique* or *metaphysique*, and admitting of a direct and plain answer. But it was only the darkness of the labyrinth that led us to suppose, from an exterior view, its passages to be short and strait. We have read with some patience, and with a perseverance which we flattered ourselves was quite commendable, the productions of the master spirits in the Fourier movement in this country, and made some little effort to comprehend the system of which they profess to be the expounders; and yet we are not certain that we have mastered the "law of the series," that mysterious *seseme* which was all potent in the hand of Fourier to open the storehouse of eternal truth, hid from the foundation of the world. But even here we stand on the same footing with some of these redoubtable Phalansterians, who have been forced to the confession, "We are imperfectly acquainted with the 'law of the series.'" We therefore take courage to plod our way onward through the high-piled mass of sounding phrase, to see if we can reduce its meaning to vulgar comprehension.

Association, in its simple and practical aspect, is a body of from three hundred to eighteen hundred individuals united together, not in a community of property like the Shakers, nor in a community of wives like the St. Simonians, but on the joint-stock principle, each individual being entitled to an equitable compensation for the capital so invested by him. After meeting the current expenses of the association—including a competent support for every man, woman, and child—the proceeds are to be distributed in proportion to the capital, labor, and talent of which the association has had the use. The laborers are to be distributed in groups and series of groups, according to their capabilities and tastes. A large mansion is to accommodate this entire family; and though each particular family has its private apartments, in the storage of provisions, and in the various household duties, they are considered as one—the whole association dining together, and mingling, under suitable restrictions, in their various avocations just as the several members of a family unite with and assist each other.

This is association "on foot;" but then it has stilts; it has philosophy; it expands its wings, flashes its eye, and refuses to be tethered to plain common sense. Then you have "law of the series," or "universal unity"—"man and nature adapted to each other, that is, constructed in harmony." Do not do such deep injustice as to suppose association to be a mere practical common-place matter; spurning all such limitations, it luxuriates amidst the "harmonies of the universe." Then it is that it becomes difficult to follow it in its erratic and trackless flight. Indeed, we are informed, "the principles of this harmony constitute the gist of Fourier's wonderful discoveries." *First*, he has ascertained all the original instincts, passions, and tendencies of human nature, and, by the rule of permutations and combinations, ascertained the various changes they may produce. *Second*, he has passed from man to nature, and entered into the same discoveries there. *Third*, by recombining these permutations and combinations, he has discovered all the phases of man and nature combined, and blended them in his "theory of universal unity," or of industrial association. But then this forms only one, and the lowest of the three formulas in the "theory of universal unity," viz.: "the unity of man with nature." We have indicated the process by which this problem was solved and this formulas obtained; what then must have been the prodigious labor and supernatural power employed in the solution of the two higher formulas, "the unity of man with man," and "the unity of man with God?"

Were it not for its philosophy, Fourierism would be but a common-place affair—altogether too much so to wake up the marvelousness of this marvelous-loving age. Let us glance once more at its phase *philosophique*.

"Fourier, among other discoveries, has announced that he has found the TRUE AND NATURAL METHOD of investigation, or, in other words, the LAW OF THE SERIES, or the law by which God has distributed the harmonies of the universe—the general formula of creation—the mold of universal order, by which variety is harmonized in unity, and which is the source of spiritual liberty and love. He holds that all natural objects, that all the functions of vegetables and animals, that the passions of the human soul, that the developments of history, are all regulated by Providence according to this law."—*Phalanx.*

Amazing discovery! The mold of universal order! Spirits of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, how is your lustre dimmed and your glory obscured! A brighter light has appeared in the galaxy of the heavens. Henceforth must *ye* stand as stars

of secondary magnitude! The "law of the series," embracing, in one mighty sweep, matter, mind, God, and all things—let it be written in all our works on mathematics, that childhood and youth may learn to lisp with reverence the name of the great discoverer; let it be inscribed on all the indestructible monuments of art, that future generations may solve for themselves the grand problem of their being. But, ye disciples of the "Great Neglected," raise high the monumental marble, and on its very apex let this profound "law" be inscribed, that nations now living may behold it, and generations yet unborn may see and believe!

But, let us glance at another phase of this "universal unity"—"*passional attractions and repulsions.*"

"The science of the passions is the MASTER SCIENCE, and is the key to universal truth. They unfold the mysteries of nature and revelation, of God and the universe, and thus open the book of knowledge, so far as the mind of man, in this mundane world, is capable of comprehending. There is no divine truth out of the passions, that is, that the LAW OF THE PASSIONS does not include and explain."—*Phalanx.*

Here then, we may presume, we have the key that unlocked the "law of the series" to the mind of the "great discoverer." But let us not underrate the importance of so profound and important a discovery. This is the very arcanum of the universe, into whose vestibule, only, Newton was permitted to enter when he revealed to man the laws which regulate the *material* world.* Jesus Christ, even, was only the *prophet* and *forerunner* of this discovery! Is it thought that we exaggerate? Let us then turn to the language of Fourier, in which he modestly† turns this difficult point in his philosophy:—

"There have been two instruments of divine Providence with whom I could not disagree without denying my own principles, and these were *Jesus Christ* and *Newton*. Jesus Christ foretold‡ the

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* "The present state of philosophy contains at least one hundred thousand different and contradictory systems, none of which will bear the light of a comparison with that science of social mechanism and attractive industry it has been my lot to discover; and which consists in harmonizing all our instincts and desires by means of an industrial and domestic combination."—*Translation from Fourier.* See *Phalanx*, p. 207.

† "The opposition to Columbus of the age in which he lived, the fifteenth century, is quite analogous to my position in the nineteenth. The subject of discovery then was a new material world; and now it is a new industrial and social world."—*Translation from Fourier's Works.* See *Phalanx*, p. 122.

‡ Brisbane, in his "Concise Exposition," calls Jesus Christ "the Prophet of Nazareth."—P. 2.

discovery and the practical application of the principles of peace and social harmony, and he forcibly enjoined his followers to seek the kingdom of heaven and its justice; but they have hitherto failed in practicing his precepts. Sixteen hundred years, however, after the birth of Christ, Newton discovered the principles of attraction which regulate the material harmony of the world; but he neglected the mechanism of moral harmony, the principles of which it has fallen to my lot to discover, in obedience to the will of Christ."—*Fourier's Reply to the Gazette de France.* See *Phalanx*, pp. 185, 186.

As John the Baptist was the forerunner of Christ, so Newton appears to have been designed as the *avant coureur* of Charles Fourier; but, unfortunately for science, he seems to have obstructed rather than have cleared the way for his august successor.

"In drawing man's attention to the laws of gravitation, or the mere natural branch of general attraction, Newton has commenced the study of the universal movement at its lowest extremity—the seat of honor, if you please, but still the lowest basis, the tail-end of the subject; and this inadvertence has passed unnoticed by our men of science, who would easily have seen the fact, if a complete method of exploration, similar to that which I have here exposed, had been constructed previous to the time of Newton."—*Ibid.*

How lamentable that nature should have so far deviated from its own code of order as to have produced Newton before Fourier! Then had philosophy not been doomed to the ungracious development of "tail-end" first.

But perhaps these specimens, with those that will be incidentally given in connection with other parts of our subject, will suffice to give the reader some glimpses of the transcendental nature of Fourier's speculations when he enters the sphere of philosophy and metaphysics. The following Dialism seems to have been perpetrated by one familiar with all the mysteries of *passional attraction:* "The stream flows between its banks according to love. The planets sustain and restrain themselves, in their courses, by this same principle. All nature governs itself by love."* In love nature freezes up her rivers and pools, and wraps herself in her mantle of snow. Anon, a new freak comes over her, the fleecy locks and mountain glaciers of winter have all disappeared, and the earth parches and vegetation dies beneath the burning loves of a September sun. In love the stagnant lake sends up its miasma, and the winds bear on their wings contagion and death. Does nature, from her laboring bowels, send forth her liquid fires to overwhelm cities and desolate the plains, covered though they be with her choicest productions and decorated with her highest skill;

* Dial for October, 1840.

or does she, rent with internal discord, ingulf islands and men in the horrid chasm disclosed? It is all a fit of love. Truly this is no faint development of that philosophy that represents "all partial evil as universal good, and all seeming discord harmony not understood." We cannot give a more apt definition of Fourierism, than *an attempt at the practical realization of transcendentalism.*

When Mr. Brownson brings against Fourierism the charge of "miserable eclecticism," it is indignantly repelled. "The charge of 'miserable eclecticism' cannot be brought against us; for, with the 'law of the series,' we have the NATURAL METHOD of investigating whatever of truth or error there may be in prevailing faiths."* Here again we have another application of that mysterious "law of the series," which "constitutes the gist of Fourier's discoveries." It is a perfect miner's wand, revealing with unerring certainty the very spot where the golden treasures are entombed. How astonishing that Victor Cousin, born in the same age and nation, should not, in developing the nature and giving consistence to the character of the eclectical philosophy, have availed himself of this amazing discovery of Charles Fourier; and still more wonderful that Fourier, with this "law" at his command, should have left the little truth which his system contains so deeply buried among the accumulations of error as to render it difficult to be exhumed and disentangled. As the religion of Mohammed betrays its Arabian paternity, so does the social order of Charles Fourier, and especially that part of it which relates to the sexes, betray its origin among a people where the "love of alternation" is prominently developed. How, with the law of the series, that infallible *wand* of discovery, before him, Fourier could have been led into views of the sexual relation directly at variance with the gospel, and deemed even by a most frantic devotee on this side of the water "objectionable," it is difficult to explain; unless, indeed, it be a sort of "Book of Mormon," with readings suited to the views and purposes of its author. We cannot now, however, enter upon this delectable item in the Fourier philosophy.

As to the special claim of Charles Fourier to inspiration and revelation, it seems to be about as well founded as that of our good Millerites; but in point of originality, they evidently have the advantage of our French savan. The most that can be claimed for his system is a reproduction of earlier and exploded systems, with such modifications as the age or other circumstances suggested. For instance, the "Republic" of Plato seems to be a rough draft of the same idea. Plato would abolish entirely the relation of

* Phalanx.

family, extinguish all individual title to property, and yet preserve a rigid distinction of castes. More's Utopia, while it does not reiterate the precept of Plato, "Let the women be held in common," still retains the community of property, and, in its admission of slavery, the virtual perpetuation of *castes*; but then neither "priests, lawyers, book-worms," nor any other sort of "idlers," were to be endured. The agrarian division of property was also preserved in Harrington's Oceana. These visionary theorists have not failed to find equally visionary *practicalists*, who have sought the practical realization of their theories. St. Simon, the soldier, the merchant, the polytechnic, the debauchee, the reduced and forsaken, and, at last, "evangelist and prophet," prepared by ample experience in the school of variety, at length commenced the great work of giving a practical realization of Republic, Utopia, and Oceana—all three united. St. Simon evidently had the advantage of Fourier in the disciplinary school through which he passed preparatory to his grand denouement. He quitted the "labor" of killing that he might "perfect civilization," and then became the victim of licentiousness and vice; he amassed a fortune of a hundred and forty-four thousand livres, that "he might found schools of science," and then spent it in dissipation and profligacy, till he was reduced to abject poverty. But then all this was done to prepare himself for the great work of "evangelist and prophet." Now, let no squeamish religionist query whether Israel's evangelists or prophets went through a similar training. His mission was of a higher character than theirs—his was the *reality*, theirs the shadow; his was the veritable "New Christianity," theirs the type, the forerunner. The certificate of his follower must be perfectly satisfactory on this point. Says Reybaud:—

"A gourmand, a debauchee, and a profligate, from principle more than inclination, [?] by system rather than by instinct, St. Simon lived five years in one; he acquired the experience of an old man even while a youth; he used and abused all things that he might prepare the elements of his future calculations; he inoculated himself with diseases that he might better understand the methods of their cure. His life was an experiment, and therefore not to be judged by the rules of ordinary morality."—*Godwin's Popular View*, p. 14.

Who now can doubt the competency of the *sainted* St. Simon to organize society on a new, and eminently Christian basis? Who can doubt his capability of exhibiting "in a new and vivid light the moral precepts originally advanced by Jesus?"*

* Godwin's Popular View, p. 15.

It would perhaps be difficult to comprehend how great must have been the sufferings voluntarily undergone to amass "the elements of his future calculations"—to throw his own moral nature upon the rack—to "abuse all things"—to "inoculate himself with diseases," in order to prepare himself for the great work of a reformer! It is true, the Saviour of man, afflicted as he was, endured no such conflict as this. He was abused by the world, but he abused it not; he came to heal its moral diseases, not to "inoculate himself with" them; and *having become perfect*—not through debaucheries, but *through suffering—he became the author of eternal salvation to all that believe on his name.*

"The long process of starvation finally brought St. Simon to his end,"* without realizing even the *experimental* fulfillment of his mission. His doctrines, however, receiving a more precise and comprehensive development from his disciples, rapidly spread, and in a few years "New Christianity" was put to its practical test in the family collected at Menilmontant. "This," says Godwin, "was also a new church." "Its motto was, To each according to its capacity, and to each capacity according to its work." Here evidently was a recognition of the principles of "universal unity," and also of "passional attraction;" and yet this "new church," based on "New Christianity," so ardently eulogized by Mr. Godwin, soon exploded, like a torpedo, scattering its fragments to the four winds of heaven. The coolness with which Mr. Godwin contemplates this explosion, and the desolation of this "new church," are very interesting items.

"It was evident that a society so constituted [that is, on the principles of "New Christianity," as digested by the "evangelist and prophet," who "abused all things" to familiarize himself with its elements, and "inoculated himself with diseases," in order to devise methods of cure] could not long be held together. Made up of enthusiasts, without definite principles of organization—trusting to feeling, not to science—its members soon began to quarrel, and the latter days of its existence were stained by disgusting license. St. Simon was one of the noblest spirits, but an unfit leader of any enterprise. He saw all things, says a friendly critic, through his heart. In this was his weakness; he wanted head; he wanted precise notions; he vainly hoped to reconstruct society by a sentiment; he laid the foundation of his house on sand."—*Godwin's Popular View*, p. 15.

We doubt not that the Fourierists in this country will ere long be found wrecked upon the same rock.

We pass over *Robert Owen* in our notice of socialists. It is

* Godwin's Popular View, p. 15.

unnecessary to rake up a rotting memory from its ashes. His "New Harmony" was perhaps as "beautiful a conception" as the "New Christianity" of St. Simon, or the "Universal Unity" of Charles Fourier. Godwin says of him that "he had errors"—"few, but fundamental;" these are summed up in "the denial of personal responsibility, and the doctrine of common property; which we hold to be utterly untenable in argument, radically defective in morals, and of course extremely pernicious in society."* These are the "moral and religious delusions" of Mr. Owen, over which Mr. Godwin so eloquently laments. We had thought there were *others;* the Christian world have long thought so: but it seems that from the hand of American associationists, Christianity has received such a development that it can nearly leap over the chasm which separates it and the vile system of unrestrained socialism put to the practical test in New Harmony. But all these "social architects," though they were discordant among themselves, contributed something to the vast mass of heterogeneous materials out of which the sublime system of Fourier has been erected. They were the alchemists, he the Lavoisier, who from these materials has constructed a "true social science."

This "true social science" is developed, as we have already indicated, in the formula of "universal unity," embracing the three formulas—

1. Unity of man with nature.
2. Unity of man with man.
3. Unity of man with God.

This sounds well for the primary indication of a new system. It is an imposing programm, and we are incited to look for the development of a theory studded so thickly with unities. What then are we to understand by the "unity of man with nature?" "It is the activity of the five elementary passions, manifested through taste, smell, feeling, sight, and hearing, in true development." So then the "unity of man with nature" consists in having a good palate, sensibility of feeling, acuteness of smell, and proper organs of sight and hearing, with capabilities of using them. Verily, it would not seem that the discovery of this mystical unity was anything more than what every one blessed with such organs would be compelled to make from the very necessities of his being. The "unity of man with man," we are told, consists "in a full development of the spiritual passions;" and "these passions are *four* in number, and may be denominated, 1. Friend-

* Godwin's Popular View, p. 17.

ship; 2. Love, consisting of mildness, and increasing, disinterested devotion to the good of the object; 3. Paternity, or family affection; 4. Corporate, or general sympathy." Old John Locke or Dr. Reid might question both the precision and completeness of this classification of the "spiritual passions;" but they are antiquated souls, honest enough, but destitute of the "true system of philosophy," having begun, as did Newton, at the "lower basis, the tail-end of the subject."

Let us, therefore, pass on to the higher order of "unity;" for it was there that the genius of Fourier was principally displayed. "The heavenly passions, which form the unity of man with God, are, 1. Love of the marvelous; 2. Love of alternation, or change from one pursuit or subject to another; 3. Love of order and progress." Here, then, we have a Frenchman's idea of religion; for, let it be understood, this is the "unity of man with God in true religion." Such a religion, we should suppose, would be quite congenial to the predominant tastes of the French; but whether it would well comport with the higher requisitions of Christianity is more questionable. We infer that the rejection of Fourierism by his own nation could not result from any especial difficulty of a religious nature. Nor can we conceive of any serious difficulty in the development of these three "loves" the world over; and then would be everywhere manifested the "unity of man with God in true religion." We question whether the "love of the marvelous" be not already sufficiently developed. Upon the "love of alternation" emphatic stress seems to be laid by Fourier. "It would be fatal," he says, "to the blessedness of either man or angel, if he were too long detained in one state of mind. The most exalted joys would soon become monotonous, and lose all their powers to charm, if they were not varied and alternated from one thing to another; and hence the love of alternation is a source of perpetual delight." It was perhaps in view of this devout, religious love, that Fourier deemed an *alternation* in the sexual relations, not only consistent with his divine social order, but highly proper and necessary in the higher stages of association. Whether such *alternation* would be attended with the very satisfactory result of bringing man into "unity with God in true religion," may, we think, be fairly questioned; unless, indeed, the Deity be such as the lascivious wine-loving mythologians have described him.

Organic and Practical Aspects.

The economies proposed to be secured by industrial association may be comprised under a threefold order—economy of labor, economy of trade, and economy of living.

Economy of Labor.—Under the organic regimen proposed by Fourier, and advocated by his followers in this country, our principle of *sociality*, or love of society, is to be consulted. No one is to labor alone or separately in a perfectly-organized association. The laborers are to be distributed in *groups* and *series of groups*; each group to embrace from three to twenty individuals, according to the nature and amount of work to be done. By this arrangement a greater amount of labor will be accomplished than the same individuals would do working separately. The emulation between individuals of the same group, between the different groups in the same series, and between the different series, would contribute not a little to this result; and then each is paid according to his ability and will to labor. Also, the tastes and adaptations of each are to be consulted, both in the selection of their *kind* of labor, and in their classification into groups. Thus all the evils that result from injudicious selection of trades and professions, and the vexations that result from disagreeable companions, will be avoided—while "each one moving in the sphere or group of his choice, will take unspeakable delight in his avocations." No force or constraint whatever is to be exercised in the adjustment of series and the filling up of groups.

"The members of association will choose freely the groups which they wish to join; they will consult their own tastes, and no dictation or control will be exercised by the association. The members of a group will be equal, associated partners, united from taste for the occupation in which they engage, and prosecuting it for their joint account and advantage."—*Brisbane's Concise Exposition*, p. 44.

This mode of organizing society, and perpetuating its organization, reminds us most forcibly of the old atomical method of forming, not the social, but the physical world.* While they would have us believe that the world was self-made, they do not pretend to say that the atoms of which it is composed, at the "first jump," organized the universe; but that "in length of time," after "innumerable other freaks," atom was joined to its fellow-atom in one sublime harmonic order. But whether, self-moved, the social "atoms"

* Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe, vol. ii, p. 80.

will, without "*innumerable* other freaks and discongruous forms produced," organize themselves into one harmonic social order, is at least a question. There may be men "suited to every necessary work," and enough of them too; but whether *inclination* would not sometimes run counter to *adaptation*, and that too with a current too strong to be resisted without any "force or constraint whatever," may admit of a doubt. This is one of the weakest points in the whole scheme. The "uncleanly and repulsive works," necessary to be performed in an association, will be committed to the "sacred legion," a group that will, from choice, assume these necessary functions. This series is to "rank first in public estimation," "and admission to it to be made difficult, and considered a signal favor." Thus their individual degradation is to be offset by their elevation in public esteem. This is a chimera, light as air; just as if public esteem would be governed by a rule, and not by circumstances. We doubt whether honors so light and so questionable would long operate as a stimulus to the performance of the more arduous and difficult duties of the domain, to say nothing of the "uncleanly and repulsive works" peculiar to the sacred legion. But suppose all this machinery were put together in as perfect order as the conception burst upon the imagination of Fourier; we can hardly conceive how, without a *pin* here and there, it could be made to hold together; and especially how those shocks which complicated and extensive machinery will sometimes suffer could be overcome. The novelty of the thing, and the presence and influence of "the leaders" in such an enterprise, might wake up a sort of enthusiasm, and make it work with something like order for a time; but these would soon fail to exert much influence, and then being "without constraint," but each one permitted to do what might seem right in his own eyes, the whole organization must fall into confusion, and its termination be like that of the St. Simon "church" at Menilmontant.

Another item in this economical phase is that it will engage every class of "*non-producers*" in productive industry. This is not an unimportant item, especially when "non-producers" are estimated to comprise two-thirds of the entire population of the globe. In this class are enumerated three-quarters of the women in cities, and half of those in the country—three-fourths of the children and servants—one-half of the manufacturers—nine-tenths of the merchants—two-thirds of the agents of transportation by sea and land—all fiscal agents, armies, and navies—all legal, accidental, and secret idlers—controversialists—idle rich—outcasts, including pub-

lic women, vagrants, beggars, rogues, brigands, &c.* A tolerably formidable list of "dry bones" is this; all of which are to be resuscitated and clothed with life. Then will our earth, no longer burdened with its mighty load of "non-producers," be converted into a veritable bee-hive without the incumbrance of a single drone! But who is to regulate these idlers and outcasts, and, "without force or constraint," make them draw in the Fourier traces? "Ay, there's the rub."

Economy of Living.—This economy results from the organization of the members of the association, composed of from three hundred to eighteen hundred individuals, *into one family.* For the accommodation of this household, one large public domain is to be erected, having all its appurtenances of out-buildings on a corresponding scale of magnitude. Each family is to have its private apartments; but one suite of granaries, cellars, wood-houses, wash-rooms, kitchens, and dining halls, are to serve this vast family. This phase *economique* is thus described by Brisbane:—

"Three hundred families require at present three hundred separate houses, three hundred kitchens, three hundred kitchen fires, three hundred sets of cooking utensils, three hundred women to do the cooking, and, if they be farming families, three hundred little farms, three hundred barns and sheds, three hundred teams, innumerable walls and fences, and everything else equally as complicated and uselessly wasteful. All the cares and labors attendant upon providing for the wants of a family, such as cooking, washing, marketing, and keeping up fires, must be gone through with three hundred times daily by the three hundred families, and with the same detail as for an assemblage of eighteen hundred persons, except the difference of scale. Association will avoid this monstrous complication and waste; instead of three hundred little kitchens, and three hundred fires, it will have four or five large and convenient kitchens, with as many fires, by means of which not only the cooking can be done, but the entire edifice warmed; instead of three hundred little fire-places, and cooking-stoves, and as many sets of cooking utensils, it will have its extensive kitchen-ranges, its large boilers and ovens, and machinery on the largest scale and the best that can be invented, for facilitating the culinary operations; instead of three hundred women to do the cooking, it will have a few experienced cooks, engaged by turns every other day; instead of three hundred poor teams, half the time idle, it will have merely the requisite number, and of the best quality; instead of the immense number of walls and fences now required, it will have a few extensive hedges; and instead of making all its sales and purchases at retail, paying in

* Brisbane's Concise Exposition, pp. 13, 14.

profits to traders one-half of the product of its labor, it will make them at wholesale, and in the most economical manner."—*Concise Exposition*, p. 17.

The same system is to be detailed through every other department and branch of household labor. It will be seen that this is the same system of household economy, that is, in the main, adopted in public houses and large boarding establishments; only we are not aware that rigid economy is carried so far as to warm parlors and sitting-rooms with the fumes of a kitchen furnace. Of its utility, considered merely in an economical point of view, there can be no question. The experiment is going on in ten thousand places over the whole civilized world. But that an aggregation of three hundred families can be thrown together—each, "without constraint," to move in the sphere that might seem good in its own eyes—without the sacrifice of family comforts and family enjoyments, cannot be expected. Only the intervention of a miracle could save such a concern from exploding into ten thousand fragments. The very wealth heaped together by these economies would become boiling lava, rocking and heaving the crust of the earth above it.

Economy of Trade.—The economy of trade to be effected by association may be presented under the following aspects: 1. Competition will be avoided. Upon the evils that arise from competition in trade, Mr. Godwin has some very forcible, and, for the most part, pertinent remarks.

"On one side, we see competition among laborers reducing the wages on which they and their dependent families must subsist; on the other, we see competition among employers forcing them, how great soever may be their generosity, to yield only the lowest rates of pay, (since no employer, without running the risk of certain ruin, could afford to pay his workmen higher wages than what was paid by his competitors,) and thus the detestable laws of modern economy break all the laws of justice and humanity. Free trade, by which we mean competition without organization, is distinguished by the execrable mark, that it always and everywhere tends to the reduction of wages. After plunging the toiling masses into the gulf of misery, it grinds them with a weight that is for ever growing heavier. In Ireland, in England, in Belgium, in Italy, in France, and in our own country, wherever competition reigns, where nothing arrests the action of a disorganized and incoherent industrialism, the working classes are inevitably becoming more miserable and more abject. They not only work against each other, but against machines, which cost nothing, yet dispense with the labor of a hundred men."—*Constructive and Pacific Democracy*, p. 14.

This is but too true a picture of the condition of many classes of common laborers everywhere. But then we are to remember, that the necessaries of life cheapen nearly in the same ratio as human labor; and the machinery that "dispenses with the labor of a hundred men" tends both to multiply and cheapen its products, so that, though labor is carried into other channels, it need be only a temporary loss it sustains. That there is a festering evil in the very core of society, no one can doubt; and its existence must be deplored by every *friend of man*. And if the world would practically adopt the motto of the noble earl Talbot, *Humani nihil alienum*, or that higher and more definite precept of inspiration, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*, the evil, result from whatever cause it may, would be checked, if not healed. Competition, virulent and self-seeking as it is, is undoubtedly *one* of the causes of the miseries that afflict the laboring classes; but it is only one in a series of causes whose *primum mobile* is more deeply seated. It is only one of the outward manifestations of a depravity within, which the gospel only can heal. But how is competition to be destroyed? When the entire progeny of Adam shall have been parceled off into associations, where is the guaranty that it shall not spring up between rival associations? Each association will, of course, have a direct interest to swell its dividends beyond that of its neighbor. This must lead to competition in trade; and as the most skillful men will be selected to conduct the trade of the association, it will be *Greek vs. Greek*, the real "*tug of war*." The results, after sufficient time has elapsed to permit things to take their natural course, must be correspondingly oppressive. This evil will be oppressive, not only to the association as a corporate body, but to all the individuals of which it is composed. The plaster is not broad enough to cover the wound. Change human nature so that its incongruous forms might match together, and its discordant interests harmonize, *then* the system might work; but then, also, it would not be needed.

2. Uniformity in prices will be secured, and all fraud in trade will be avoided in association. Mr. Brisbane thus discourses upon this topic:—

"In association there will be, as a general rule, no buying and selling between individuals—the fruitful source, at present, of so much fraud, enmity, discord, slander, and violence. The members will deal directly with the association. If a person desires, for instance, to purchase a suit of clothes, he goes to the group of persons who have charge of the clothing department, and has them made, but does not

pay the group; they are charged to him on the books of the association, with which he settles. Just prices will be established for everything by the council of internal arrangements, and when an individual wishes an article for private use—a watch or a book—he would not have to bargain for it, or be subject to the imposition and extortion of the seller, but would take it at the fixed price, sure of being dealt with on fair and equitable terms."—*Concise Exposition*, p. 57.

Let us glance at this system of home-trade, and its restrictions. We can readily conceive that it could be made for the interest of individuals to trade with the association generally; but suppose an individual or a family, not over thrifty in labor, should be disposed to patronize the company's store beyond their income—furnishing their apartments sumptuously, and clothing themselves in costly apparel; who is to check and limit this propensity, in an association where "constraint" is not to be used? Or, again, suppose an individual purchase of the company "a watch," who shall prevent his selling or bartering it to his neighbor for twice its value? And then the door is open for slander and quarrel, as in our "present disorganized state of society." The observer cannot but have observed, in tracing along the system of Fourier, the vast disproportion between the evils to be remedied and the remedies he proposes. They not unfrequently remind one of the quack who attempted the extraction of a tooth with his "tweezers."

3. Gain of time in marketing is another economy in trade that is to be gained. Instead of each individual carrying his products to market, all that is produced is the property of the association, and marketing is done by the quantity. These economies are thus illustrated in an example given by M. Considerant:—

"In the mountains of Jura, where the climate interdicts the cultivation of the vine and grain, and where milk cannot be sold in its pure state, owing to the distance from the cities, it is converted into cheese. It was the custom, not long since, in every village of this region, where there were some twenty or thirty families, owning some two hundred cows, for each family to make cheese for itself, and to send to market for itself—thus every day making use of some twenty or thirty utensils, and of the labor of some twenty or thirty men, both in producing the article, and conveying it to market. And in most cases, to say nothing of the waste, the cheese produced was of an inferior quality; while each family coming into competition when they entered the market, was obliged to sell at the lowest possible price, so that none gained by the sales, while the majority were losers. What did these brave mountaineers do under these circumstances? Why, they fell upon the very rational principle that it was not wise in them to be picking each

other's pockets, and would be much better if they could assist each other as friends and neighbors. So they hired a small house in the centre of the village, composed of two rooms, one of which they converted into a shop, and the other into a dairy. In the shop they erected a hugh brass kettle, large enough to receive the daily milk produced by the two hundred cows, which milk was made into cheese by the labor of a single man called the fruiterer, without further trouble on the part of its owners. The quantity of milk deposited each day by any family was notched upon two pieces of wood, one of which was kept by the fruiterer, and the other by the family; by which simple method the strictest account was kept. When these cheese were sold, they were sold by wholesale, without losses through competition, and with comparatively slight charge for conveyance to market. From the general sum received for them was subtracted the rent of the house, the price of the fuel, instruments, carriage, and of the work of the fruiterer; after which, the remainder was divided among the families of the village, in proportion to the amount of milk contributed to the dairy. Thus, with one-thirtieth part of the labor, and a thirtieth part of the expense, they were enabled to receive a threefold return for their product. This practice, which began in the hamlet of Salines, is now the common custom through all the higher provinces of the Alps. It is a simple, but most significant illustration of a great truth." —*Godwin's Constructive and Pacific Democracy*, pp. 30, 31.

It is, as Mr. Godwin remarks, "a significant illustration of *a* great truth;" but not necessarily of *the* great truth. It shows very clearly to how much more advantage a common avocation may be prosecuted by a simple combination of individuals engaged in it; but it should be noted that these mountaineers still retained their family distinctions, and this circumstance perhaps had as much agency in their success as their simple combination had.

We have here given something of an outline of the economical aspects of that system which promises to increase production tenfold, and human happiness and social order incalculably. Fourier modestly promised to France, as the result of the adoption of his system by her, the payment of her national debt in twelve years, we believe; and afterward the ability to increase her riches *ad libitum*. We have only one additional remark to make here, and that is, could the masses become as pliable to the requisitions of this system, and as completely subject to its laws, visionary as they are, as the machinery of a manufactory is to the will of the machinist, the system would contribute greatly to the *mere production of property*. But this we hold to be impossible; and if it were possible, it could be accomplished only at the expense of higher interests than the mere acquisition of property.

There is one more physical result that must not be overlooked

in this connection, viz.: *the increase of population, and the subjugation of the cold, sterile, and waste portions of the earth for its accommodation.* If the doctrine of some of our political economists, that the increase of population will keep pace with production, be true, what a prodigious increase may be expected when Fourierism has succeeded in increasing the actual producers threefold, and the actual individual production tenfold! The *habitable* globe, it would seem, would soon become too strait for their accommodation. This circumstance has not been overlooked. The "curse" is to be taken off the earth, as well as from the race that inhabit it, and the portion now inhabitable is not only to be rendered infinitely more productive, but every desert is to become fertile, every marsh and bog is to be converted into a plain, every forest, now the abode of venomous reptiles and savage beasts, is to become a scene of bustling activity. These physical renovations are to triple the productive energy of old earth. Mr. Brisbane draws the following vivid picture of the earth's surface:—

"The surface of the earth is in as miserable condition as the race upon it: vast deserts and marshes, which generate pestilential winds and miasmatic exhalations—the source of the most frightful diseases, such as the plague, the cholera, the yellow fever, etc.—and wild forests and plains, inhabited by noxious reptiles and savage beasts—cover at least three-fourths of it. The portion which has been brought under cultivation is but miserably cultivated, and parts are devoted to the worst of purposes; here we see regions exhausted in the production of noxious plants, like the poppy and tobacco, which are grown to furnish mental vacuity and idleness with the means of momentary occupation and excitement; their districts planted with grain, not to sustain life, but to be converted into a poisonous liquid, which may afford to the degraded masses a brutal exhilaration, with its attendants, folly, disease, and death. Besides, whole regions have been devastated by fire and sword, and remain in a neglected state—monuments of the folly and madness of nations."—*Brisbane's Concise Exposition*, p. 5.

After giving this picture, in which he entirely overlooks earth's smiling landscapes and sunny plains, the abodes of purity and of peace, he inquires whether the condition of the earth does not "call for some great reforms?" So, then, not only human society, the social order, is to be reformed, but the physical order also. This reform is not only to extend to the "irrigation of deserts," "fertilizing swamps," plugging up volcanoes, and supplanting the savage and venomous population of forests with true Phalansterians; but the vast regions that circumscribe the poles of the

mundane sphere, though now girt with ice, indurated with frosts, and covered with snow, are to become mild in climate, and fertile in production, so as to rival the fairest portions of the present "cursed earth." This is no fiction of the reviewer. The great champion of association in this country is our voucher for its genuine Fourier paternity:—

"How did Fourier come to believe that the new equilibrium would result in breaking the ices of the poles, in removing the obstructions from the seas and straits of those latitudes, and in extending the domain of man over so many countries now deserted, and about which man has disquieted himself so many years, with so much fatigue and danger, and so little success? This is the next question.

"In studying the arrangement of the earth's continents, it has often been remarked that they both present a point elongated toward the south, and that, in that direction, the land terminates at a great distance from the polar circle. To the north, on the contrary, the continents approach the poles, widening as they penetrate the icy zone, so that the Arctic Ocean, if it were practicable, could soon be made, like the Mediterranean, a centre of activity, and a place of intercourse for all nations.

"But these lands and seas, so favorably situated for the general interests of man, are useless to him in consequence of the ice and frosts, which forbid all access.

"Fourier did not believe in chance; he believed in a Great First Cause governing all creation by beneficent laws; and he boldly concluded, from the disposition of the land, that the globe having been providentially prepared for man, man must have been endowed with forces sufficient to remove every obstacle to the complete subjection of his domain. And since the obstacle here is the temperature of the poles, he thought it was given to man to moderate that temperature.

"Man, we have said, may, by his action upon the surface of the earth, render the circulation of both winds and electro-magnetic currents more regular.

"The irregularity of the electro-magnetic currents is manifested in many ways; among others, by irregularities in the emission of fluid during the appearance of the aurora borealis. If, by unitary circulation, the electro-magnetic movements should be regulated, the aurora borealis would appear regularly, and not by fits and starts, as they now do. Fourier predicts that they would augment in duration in such a manner as to become permanent, and in intensity, so as by their caloric action to rescue the circum-polar regions from their graves of ice, and warm them into life and vegetation.

"Fourier does not doubt this result, because only in this way is it possible to understand why the continents have received a form, which, without this new source of light and heat, without BOREAL CROWN, would be useless, and unworthy of the wisdom and goodness of Deity."—*Godwin's Popular View of the Doctrines of Charles Fourier*, page 81.

A mind that could beget so monstrous a conception may certainly be excused for being struck with wonder at its vast proportions: which wonder, no doubt, was somewhat increased by the excessive pains of parturition. It will not be surprising that such a mind should confound physical and moral causes and results; but that others should take up the subject, and gravely undertake to lead a community into a "will-o'-the-wisp" chase after such a phantom, cannot but excite the indignation and contempt of sensible minds.

A twin sister of this "boreal crown" conception of Fourier is that of his "material duplicity," upon which also association will put its extinguisher.

"Duplicity reigns everywhere in lieu of unity, and this duplicity is what is termed the 'curse of God' in Scripture. Material duplicity is threefold—planetary, hominal, and mixed. First, the physical duplicity of the planet consists in the congelation of the poles, the bituminous inflection of the sea, etc., etc. Second, the physical duplicity of the human body consists in the blackness of the skin of one-half the race, and the darkness of the skin of the other half when exposed to the direct rays of the sun. Third, the mixed degree of duplicity in the creation consists in the fact of the great majority of things created being out of unity with man. In the animal creation not one-twentieth part of the quadrupeds are directly useful to him, or in any way associated with him in his labors; among the feathered tribe not one-hundredth part are directly useful to him; and among the insects there is hardly one-thousandth part which do not injure and annoy him."—*Translation from Fourier's Works.* See *Phalanx*, No. 4, p. 54.

The infinite advantages of association, we think, will no longer be questioned, when it shall not only prevent the congelation of the poles, purify the ocean, bleach white the sable African, and supersede the use of sun-shades; but "the lion and the young lion," the fierce tiger and the "laughing hyena," be "associated with man in his labors." Birds shall become his letter-carriers, and his mail-routes be through the air. Even the musquitoe shall forget the use of his sting, and annoy man no more.

But let us once more briefly glance at the organic structure of an association modeled upon the principles of Charles Fourier. An association, comprising say about four hundred persons, would be distributed into about fifty or sixty groups, or sub-series; and these groups or series, according to Brisbane, the Fourier oracle of this country, may be occupied as follows:—*

* Concise Exposition, pp. 52, 53.

Eight series devoted to the care of animals, and distributed as follows:—One to the care of horses, one to horned cattle, one to hogs, two to poultry, one to doves, one to fish in streams, ponds, and reservoirs, and one to singing-birds and birds of beautiful plumage.

Twenty-two series devoted to agriculture; the four principal features of which are "works of irrigation," "care of forests," "cultivation of grains," and "cultivation of flowers and vegetables."

Ten series devoted to manufactures; four of which are occupied with its "attractive branches," viz., one to confectionery, one to the manufacture of musical instruments, one to dairy, one to cabinet-making: the remaining six series will be devoted to the "necessary branches of manufacture," viz., one series of workers in wood, as carpenters, wagon-makers, turners, etc.; one of workers in leather, as saddlers, shoe-makers, glove-makers, etc.; one of workers in metals, as blacksmiths, locksmiths, tinsmiths, etc.; one of workers in cloths and other stuffs, as tailors, milliners, hatters, etc.; one of printers and bookbinders; one of goldsmiths and jewelers. Four series of art, science, and education; one of doctors, dentists, and nurses; one of teachers; and two devoted to music.

Six series devoted to household and domestic labor. Two of cooks; one of laundresses; one of housekeepers; one supervising building at night, care of fires, baths, etc.; and one of pages or waiters.

Four or more isolated groups or sub-series. For example: one of book-keepers; one of commission merchants, having charge of the sales and purchases of the association; one having charge of library, reading-rooms, gallery of art, and the scientific collections; one of self-denial, termed the "sacred legion," which group is, "from choice," to perform the uncleanly and repulsive works connected with the association.

Here then we have the outline, the skeleton of the organic structure of an association modeled upon the plan of Charles Fourier; the vast machine by which labor is not only to be made "attractive," but "tenfold more productive than in the present disorganized state of society." This structure, as a whole, and every part of it individually, it should be recollected, is to be self-moved, and no "force or constraint" is to be used to secure or preserve organization, to produce or continue action. No arrangement is made to prevent friction in the parts, because Fourier did not dream it possible that friction could obstruct the "divine order." The "music

box," as Mr. Brownson facetiously terms it, is not only to wind itself up, but to keep wound up, and yet play, for ever.

We had advanced thus far, and were picking our nails, and scratching our head, to start some new ideas at this crisis of our discourse, when, being already overcome with fatigue, we dropped into an irregular slumber, during which we were favored with the following interesting and instructive

DREAM.

The atmosphere around me seemed exceedingly misty, notwithstanding my great elevation above the surface of the earth; and was rendered still more obscure by the infinite number of larger and lesser circles that were incessantly forming and then bursting, like bubbles, all around me. With great difficulty I made my way down to earth; and no sooner had I touched my foot to the soil than a most beautiful and attractive spectacle spread itself out before me. I seemed to stand upon a beautiful elevation: the ground gradually sloping away gave a complete view of about six thousand acres of meadow and tillage land, in the highest state of cultivation; with here and there orchards loaded with the choicest species of every variety of fruit, gardens abounding with every variety of vegetable, and bordered with the most fragrant and beautiful flowers. Just in the rear of where we stood, and on the most elevated part of the ground, reposed a splendid edifice, beautiful in its proportions and architecture, and capacious enough to accommodate a legion; while, still further in the rear, capacious out-houses and barns were flanked by graceful lawns and beautiful woodlands.

As yet, no living being had appeared; but while I gazed with rapturous astonishment upon the scene before me, and wondering whether this was not the very Eden from which our fallen progenitors were expelled, a deep, enchanting sound filled the air. It proceeded from no particular spot, but from all around it commenced the deep and thrilling chaunt of universal unity. As the tones of music ceased, a form stood before me: there was a peculiar phrensy in its eye, and an overwhelming energy in its gesticulation, as it gave utterance to these words, "O most fortunate among mortals! Great leader in that movement that is destined to demonstrate the perfectibility of human happiness upon earth! Was Fourier blessed to discover the great principles of universal unity? Behold it is for you to test their applicability! This enchanting spot has been purchased for the purpose; you are the selected leader in the enterprise; and, behold, yonder come a happy

multitude, fleeing, as Lot fled from Sodom, up out of the 'social hell,' to realize their earthly paradise under your direction." The spectre vanished. After recovering from my momentary astonishment, I looked, according to the direction of its hand, and saw the whole plain covered with an approaching multitude of not less than five or six hundred, consisting of men, women, and children, with carts in their train, loaded with every imaginable species of furniture, and herds and flocks innumerable. On they came, till in long line they were ranged before me. Assisted by some dozen accountants, I soon completed an inventory of such of their effects as were to go for the use of the association, and in lieu thereof gave them "association scrip." The different family groups now began the selection of their private apartments. Here we were obstructed with innumerable difficulties: some claimed the most eligible rooms; others disputed about the price of their apartments; and some absolutely refused theirs because of disagreeable neighbors that had chosen to nestle by their side.

Next came on the division of this heterogeneous mass into groups and series. I had confidently looked for the harmonious play of our whole system, and expected to see the entire body falling into groups and series, and assuming their proper places with a precision and a harmony not inferior to that observed in our solar system. First came the "eight series devoted to the care of animals." Here the requisite number readily volunteered; indeed, quite a surplus thought they possessed a very peculiar faculty for the "care of poultry," "doves," "fish in ponds, streams, and reservoirs;" and even some athletic, able-bodied men insisted upon having the care of the "singing-birds, and birds of beautiful plumage," to the exclusion of the boys and girls, who were ambitious of the same task. The "series with horses," and that "with horned cattle," were easily supplied; but when I called out, "Who will take care of the hogs?" a general titter ran through the audience, and no one responded; and at length, when, after a deal of urging and reasoning, a fat, dirty, pug-nosed Irishman stepped forward, the titter deepened into a laugh from some parts of the audience. This I gravely rebuked, telling them that "all occupations were to be held in equal honor," and "industry to be rendered attractive." This speech had the desired effect, and the group was, with a little address, finally filled up. Next came the "twenty-two series devoted to agriculture." Here also the candidates for cultivating the "pears," "apples," "flowers," etc., were quite numerous: very few, however, seemed to have any "passional attraction" for the potato field; and for a long time it seemed questionable whether the mur-

phy-growing group would not be minus. But bethinking myself of the Irishman's "natural affection for the 'pratie,'" I made an eloquent and not ineffectual appeal to it. The "ten series devoted to manufactures and mechanics" were next called for: here there seemed to be an unconquerable emulation to enter the groups "occupied with confectionery," and some very suspicious-looking ones, who seemed to me to have more capacity for eating than for making "confectionery," most lustily and vehemently protested that they had a most violent "passional attraction" for the "manufacture of confectionery," and the deadliest "passional repulsion" to the more vulgar arts of the "dairy" and the "kitchen."

But, to omit the perplexing details of a whole week spent in organizing and perfecting our arrangements, let it suffice to say that our organization was at length completed, and the whole set in motion. But when we were looking on with wonder to see their harmonious play, we found our difficulties were just commencing. Pugnacious individuals were incessantly quarreling; group became jealous of its neighbor group, that their labors were lighter and their profits more; and individuals of the same group claimed a pre-eminence over their fellows, which they were unwilling to grant. Gumps had been "attracted" into the cabinet shop, and bunglers were engaged in the "manufacture of musical instruments." The "attractive branches of manufactures" were thronged, while the *repulsive* branches were but half supplied; and, notwithstanding our sublime theory about "attractive industry," we were forced to the necessity of "overcoming this repugnance" to the shoe-maker's bench, the tanner's vats, and the blacksmith's shop by "giving higher compensation." Blockheads proposed themselves as "teachers," and insisted that "neither force nor constraint" should be used to keep them out of the department for which they had a "passional predilection." "Steam-doctors," that could not tell the difference between the gall-bladder and the heart, walked into the medical department, hung up their hats by the wall, and deposited their "lobelia" in the most eligible cases with which the room was provided. The "series devoted to music" did not seem to promise much toward "that great desideratum for an association, a fine orchestra." Some of them seemed to have *tone* without *time*, and others an "attraction" without "an ear" for music. And then, again, not a few in the association denounced the whole race of "musicasters," "poetasters," book-makers, etc., as *drones*, living upon the labors of "honest men;" and declared that they ought not to be tolerated in an "industrial association."

Then again, the cooks and washerwomen not only kept up an incessant warfare among themselves, but they united against the lighter burden of the matrons, whose business was to keep the private rooms in order; and it must be confessed that some of this class were none too neat, and not over scrupulous in "righting up" the rooms of their neighbors. Mothers complained of the partiality of the series "devoted to the care of children;" matrons that their clothes were not washed as they ought to be; and washerwomen that their victuals were badly cooked. Children quarreled on the "vast corridors stretching around the interior of the domain;" and that set mothers by the ears. Again, some persons, who had formerly enjoyed a degree of elevation in society, still retained too much of their aristocratic feelings to associate with the "common herd;" and this was an incessant cause of jealousy and strife. They required their "food served up in their private apartments," or in the "private dining rooms," and this was the cause of great complaint on the part of the "waiters." Others were so overbearing and authoritative in their tones of command to the "series of pages," or waiters, that had it not been for their sense of self-respect and of the dignity becoming "officers of the institution," they would undoubtedly have given vent to their resentment. Then again, some wag was ever and anon putting his finger significantly on his nose as some member of the "sacred legion" passed by; and not unfrequently were noses found to be bleeding soon after such incidents. This is certainly not to be wondered at, when we remember that this series, devoted to the "performance of uncleanly and repulsive works and functions," was "composed principally of boys of an *ardent* temperament, from the age of nine to sixteen." But, after all, who could but admire the exalted "social charity and religious philanthropy" which enabled these heroic boys to not only do the filthy work of the association, but to endure the ridicule of the wags, and the giggle of the girls!

Thus were things moving on with us, when a new and more serious difficulty began to develop itself. This difficulty undoubtedly had its origin in the irregularities of the "passional attraction," (the magnetic needle you know will vary,) and consisted in the frequent changes of individuals from one group to another. Some seemed kindly inclined to form an acquaintance with every group in the phalanx. He that was to work in the potato field yesterday, would be found in the perfumery office, or making a piano to-day; and he that was taking care of horses—in the nursery, taking care of babies; and especially did the young gentlemen and ladies give the most striking developments of "passional attraction,"

clearly demonstrating the profound discovery of Fourier in this department of science. On a cold, rainy day the out-door groups would be almost annihilated, so that the cattle were often untended and unfed.

Finally, the question of a church and a religion came up for discussion and settlement. Some were of the opinion that the association was of itself a church, and quoted Fourier, St. Simon, and Godwin in proof; others, that a group of religious teachers was indispensable; while others were unwilling that such a group should be tolerated. Some claimed, that the daily schools should be opened and closed with prayer; others, that the necessity of prayer had been done away by the discoveries of Charles Fourier. Some thought that work should be done on the sabbath. They reasoned thus: "'The great type of association is the physical universe;' then, as worlds do not stand still, or cease to revolve, neither should association." This discussion elicited not a little warm and angry debate; and while engaged in a controversy that promised to be interminable, unless, indeed, it should blow the whole concern into ten thousand fragments, one of the "sacred legion" rushed into the assembly, with the startling cry, "The domain is all on fire!"

The suddenness of the alarm awoke me, and I found that a lock of my hair having got into an unfortunately close proximity to the lamp, was just kindling up into a blaze; but for a long time the distant and commingling sounds of angry and prolonged discussion about "church" and "no church" seemed to be ringing in my ears.

Having somewhat recovered from my sudden alarm, I concluded to give my readers the benefit of my dream.

Moral and Social Aspects.

The moral and social aspects of association next claim from us a passing attention. While on the one hand our earth is to be converted into a new and more glorious Eden; on the other, our race (that is, all that will become Fourierists) are to be morally and socially prepared to enjoy this new Eden—a social and moral Elysium is to be realized on earth. We acknowledge and lament the great social and moral evils that afflict our race, and most sincerely should we rejoice in any scheme of benevolence that could give promise of redemption from these evils; but we approach this division of our subject with fearful apprehension that moral and social Fourierism will prove as visionary and baseless as we have already found it to be in its physical aspects. We

might, indeed, question whether there were not more of wild and frenzied declamation than of just and proper description in the portraiture of the "social hell," as drawn by Godwin and other socialists—whether, indeed, our earth is such a veritable hell as these philanthropists would have us believe: but we pass over these things. Having admitted the existence of evils—evils of enormous magnitude—let us proceed at once to their *cause* and *remedy*. These are the two great questions in which all real philanthropists are deeply interested, and on both are we compelled to join issue with our modern socialists.

As to the first question, that which concerns the *cause* of our social and moral evils, the Phalansterian cannot discover that they lie any deeper than in the organic structure of society. With them the wickedness of the mass does not grow out of the corruption of the individual, but out of the false relation in which society has placed him to his neighbor.

"Society, as at present constituted, is based upon principles which in their operation misemploy, misdirect, and pervert the faculties and passions of man, and defeat all the ends and hopes of life. It is based upon the principle of isolation, of separation of man from his fellow-man; upon individual effort, and envious strife, and anarchical competition; upon selfishness, distrust, antagonism, over-reaching, fraud, and injustice; upon the conflict of all interests; and upon universal duplicity of action. There is no combination or unity; no harmony of action, of interests, or of feeling; no connection or association. Every family has, for example, a separate house, a separate interest, separate hopes, and a separate welfare to attain; it is in conflict with most of the families around it, eager to detract from their prosperity to add to its own, instead of seeking to unite with them to advance by their combined efforts their mutual welfare and happiness."—*Brisbane's Concise Exposition*, p. 2.

Here we have a Fourierite's idea of the cause of the numerous "ills that flesh is heir to." Society, not the individual, "perverts and misdirects" his faculties, defeating "all the ends and hopes of life." But let us look at the "example" to illustrate that society is "based" "upon fraud and injustice, a conflict of interests, and universal duplicity." It is that "each family has a separate house, separate interests," etc. But in association will not the principle "of isolation" and of "separate interests" still be preserved? Will not each family have its private apartments, and its exclusive interests? If living in separate *houses* is of so "anarchical" a character, living in "*separate apartments*," and retaining "exclusive family interests," must mar the beauty and perfection of the

social order; and, indeed, nothing could completely annihilate this offensive "principle of isolation" but the most unrestrained *promiscuity*.

We will not question that much in the very frame-work of society is defective; but this is a result of evils that lie further back, that are more deeply seated in man's moral nature. We will not argue these points, they are too clear and palpable to require argument for their support; but we will simply remark, that having mistaken the nature of the disease, the seat of the evil, it is not so much to be wondered that Fourier should have been equally unfortunate in his prescription of a remedy.

But this leads us to the consideration of the second question, To what shall we look for a remedy of these evils? Here again must we join issue with our Phalansterians. They tell us that the remedy is to be sought in the establishment of the "divine social order discovered by Charles Fourier:" we claim that the disease is not merely social and external, but also individual and internal; and therefore external and general applications will not heal the wound. Godwin tells us that "a better and truer mechanism, a nobler organic liberty, to which these awful evils do not adhere, can be found. The wisdom of man is able to discover, if it has not already discovered, an outlet to this labyrinth of suffering, a pathway upward from this dark, disordered, and howling abyss."* That association is destined to accomplish all this we do not readily concede. The rich will still have their vantage ground of the poor, so long as individual right to capital is recognized. Indeed, all the principles of "antagonism" that now exist in society will be preserved in association, in the distinct and conflicting interests of capital, labor, and talent. The very thing denounced is retained in principle, and will undoubtedly be developed in practice should ever an opportunity occur. Fourierists declaim much about the aristocracy of capital, and yet they lay a broad foundation for the permanent establishment of such an aristocracy. They would convert every "drone" into a "laborer;" and yet they talk about the "domain" affording, in its "more eligible apartments," a "beautiful summer retreat for its wealthy stockholders." But men of genius, and great reformers, will sometimes be inconsistent.

But suppose an association, through misfortune, improvidence, want of industry, or misapplication of funds, should fail to yield a competent support to its members, and a proper dividend on the capital invested; who is to keep the members from suffering, and

* Pacific and Constructive Democracy, p. 26.

the capitalists from complaining? Suppose the members of an association should become immoral, intemperate, and licentious; where is the redeeming power to work a reformation? Fourier, with the characteristic confidence of visionary speculatists, seems never to have dreamed of the possibility of failure. The fate of Menilmontant, and of Godwin's "new church," seems not to have imparted the least misgiving to his faith in the "universal unity." In his new ship he launches out upon the ocean of experiment: he makes no provision for a storm, for he never dreams that one can overtake him: he takes no precautions against shipwreck, for in his fancy neither shoals nor quicksands obstruct the ocean he navigates.

But what is most singular and striking in this system is, that all these moral and social harmonies are to be based upon no deep, broad, and permanent moral principle. Interest is to be the talismanic influence by which all these harmonies are to be produced; it is to bind and cement the great Fourierite brotherhood together. The passions are not to be checked and restrained, but gratified and indulged. The great superstructure of *virtue* and *social order* may rest upon the foundations of a worldly interest; and even the "love of money" is to be productive of social harmony, and tend to the development of our moral nature. Nay, in his transports at his amazing discovery, Fourier could not stop even here, but goes on to declare that even religion will "allow a superstructure of religious happiness to be constructed on the basis of industrial pleasure and security."*

"It is commonly affirmed that 'we should love and practice virtue;' which aphorism is thus translated in associative theory, 'We should desire the good things of this world, and seek them constantly.' This is a monstrous inversion of truth in the eyes of philosophers, but in associative unity it will be found immensely preferable to their visionary dogma; for combinative equilibrium rests entirely upon wealth and truth united practically, and the only road to wealth and affluence, in association, is practical morality and truth; and as they mutually serve each other in a righteous community, it is proper that the most attractive (to an age of materiality) should be set forth most prominently, that the practice of the one may lead speedily to the possession of the other, and *vice versa*. The stronger the desire of wealth in such a state of things the better, because a greater degree of activity and true morality must be developed to acquire it; whereas, at the present, the love of wealth is not a source of true morality."—*Translated from Fourier.* See *Phalanx*, vol. i, p. 66.

* Translation from Fourier's Works. See Phalanx, vol. i, p. 37.

The monstrous inversion of all the principles of sound morality is here too apparent to need further exposure. Our Saviour says, *Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth, but in heaven; for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.* Matthew vi, 19–21. This aphorism would be "thus translated in associative theory:" "Lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, for the more you get on earth, the more will you have in heaven also." The above quotation from Fourier, translated and indorsed by our American Phalansterians, discovers to us that they mean by "virtue" and "morality" something very distinct from the generally-received notions of them; that the goddess "virtue," which they worship with so much pomp and declamation, is something very different from the virtue and practical morality enjoined by the word of God. Let no one be deceived, then, at the enthusiastic eulogies pronounced upon "virtue" and "religion" by these modern socialists. It is not the self-denying virtue and religion enjoined by the Bible that they applaud; but a figment of their own imagination, as vague and airy as a dream. It is high time that this fact should be exposed, and the delusive veil behind which they "conceal their march" be rent asunder.

As we have already intimated, another basis of moral and social order, as well as of religious faith, in the scheme of Charles Fourier, is the universal gratification of the passions, which is promised within the pale of this "new church." At the outset, he claims that "there must exist a divine social order, composed by God, and revealed to us by attraction."* And then he enters into a long argument to establish the fact; when, in fact, nobody doubts the existence of such a code; though perhaps he who was not willing to exalt the visionary theories of French speculatists above the Bible, might find it difficult to admit that that code consisted mainly in self-gratification, or indeed that it was revealed to us by "attraction," and not by God himself. Indeed, such old-fashioned disciples of the Bible might go so far as to claim that our social evils result not from want of a social and moral code, but from not obeying the one which we have. Fourier intended, unquestionably, that if men would give themselves up to their passional impulses, those impulses would guide them into the calm haven of social order and virtue. What else could he mean? He could not certainly mean that the *passions* could investigate and unfold the theory of this social order. That would be to substitute passion for intellect—an absurdity into which he could hardly fall. It only

* See Phalanx, p. 93.

remains, then, that these passions—"passional attraction."—were to lead man on to the practical realization of this "divine social code." The intellect might not have discovered its harmony and beauty, not a single principle of its great unity may have been understood, but the swollen tide of "passional attraction," like the gushing torrent in a freshet, would bear the whole human family along into the very midst of this earthly Elysium. But what are we to understand by the passions?

"Fourier adopted the word passion to denote the innate and essential faculties of the soul."* Again: "By the passions are to be understood those spiritual motive powers, those springs of action, those primitive tendencies implanted by God in man, which in the works of philosophers, and in popular speech, are variously denominated sentiments, emotions, feelings, affections, loves, desires, dispositions, instincts. *Attraction* is a word which we shall often use as synonymous with and equivalent to passion."† This passage will be sufficient to show that we have not misinterpreted that passional attraction which is to be the great guide of the human race to its social destiny. The resistance which has been offered to these passions has not only "given birth to a false state of society," but absolutely "placed men at enmity with God."

"The subversion of the passions, and the war of man's innate attractions with themselves and with society, have given birth to a false state of society and morals, which regards duplicity of action as the final destiny of man, and teaches him to war against his own affections, to resist his natural attractions and desires; which principle of war against his unborn passions, places man at enmity with God; for all our instincts and desires, affections and antipathies, were planted in our souls by God, to animate and guide us to our final destiny."—*Translation from Fourier's Works.* See *Phalanx*, vol. i, p. 51.

The antagonism of the principles of morality here recognized to those of the Bible is most obvious and flagrant. There we learn that "the carnal mind is enmity against God;" here we are taught that to resist the "carnal mind" "places man at enmity with God."

But again: this "passional attraction" is not only the guide, but the supreme guide, of man. It is subordinate to neither reason nor conscience; but in itself is the only authoritative indication of the will of God, imbodying the true revelation.

"The assertion that reason has been given us as the guide and regulator of the passions and attractions," (which assertion has before been

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* See Phalanx, p. 89. † Ibid., p. 88.

ascribed to "the philosophers,") "leads to the following conclusions—first, that God has subjected man to the control of two contradictory and irreconcilable guides, *passion* and *reason*; this would be *organic duplicity*. Second, that the Creator is unjust toward the ninety-nine hundredths of men, to whom he has not given sufficient powers of reason to cope with the passions; for in all countries, civilized or uncivilized, the mass possess but a moderate share of reason in the philosophical acceptation of that word; this would be *distributive duplicity*."—*Phalanx*, vol. i, No. 7, p. 94.

It would be well to inquire why reason in so large a proportion is "too weak to cope with the passions," and why the two are "contradictory and irreconcilable." This would open to us a chapter in the moral history of our race which it is but too evident that Fourier has never read. He seems never to have dreamed that his "music-box" was out of order, but only that a bungler had wound it up.

In this new order of society, which is to be realized when Fourier has wound up the "music-box," and which is to be "essential and permanent," the accomplishment of every possible virtue is to be realized, and that too "in entire accordance with the gratification of all our essential desires."* As "constraint does not enter into the plans of the Creator," neither does it into the plans of Charles Fourier.† But in our present "incoherent, exceptional, and temporary" state of society, "under the '*curse*,' constraint, repulsion, and self-denial are absolutely necessary;" but these shall give way under "the redemption" or Fourierean state of society, and "this martyrdom of unsatisfied attraction, reigning everywhere, even among the most obscure classes," shall cease. "Here a peasant chokes with spite for having missed a farm which another has obtained;" but it shall no longer be so when the "reign of passional attraction" begins; for then nobody will own a farm—the odious distinction of *meum* and *teum*, in landed estates, shall cease—all shall be swallowed up in the "universal unity," the association shall own all. "Here, a young girl sinks into a decline, and dies from disappointed love;" but under the reign of "passional attraction," such an evil, so repugnant to "attraction," so destructive to "social order," shall no longer exist. The villainous swain shall choke, and the love-sick maid pine no more. Every "passional attraction" shall be fully satisfied. But as to the *modus*

* Phalanx, vol. i, No. 7, p. 200.

† Are not the planets constrained to their orbits, as well as impelled onward in their courses?

operandi by which these effects shall be consummated with such unerring certainty, our readers must excuse us from attempting to explain, as we frankly confess ourselves to be ignorant of the peculiar application of the "law of the series" to this sublime topic, having never yet "choked" for a farm, nor "died" for love. But this great Phalansterian system, this profound science of universal unity and passional attraction, will develop every term of the series with mathematical precision, and when once its reign is fully established, every desire of the heart shall be satisfied, and contentment rest on every brow.

Another distinctive feature of this moral and social code, and one that is undoubtedly to contribute to its "unity," is the "alternation" that is to be admitted in the marriage relation. Brisbane, indeed, asserts, that "association will maintain the family and marriage ties."* But this he asserts in opposition to his master; and whether *the disciple is above his lord* in the mastery of the "law of the series," is yet to be learned. Fourier is of opinion that "love is too sacred a passion to be held under artificial restraints." Then, also, he believed that "while a part of mankind were formed for constancy in love, others were formed for change:" while a majority of men and women would probably stop in the "corporation of constancy," others would "pass into other corporations not so strict in their requirements," "as may be agreeable to their inclinations and temperaments." Under this economy, the marriage tie could not rest heavily, as the only "bill" required would be the development of the "love of alternation," under the influence of whose "passional attraction," both men and women might change their domestic relations "agreeably to their inclinations and temperaments." Whether this specific arrangement would serve to develop social order and promote moral purity, we may seriously question, if the result of Robert Owen's "new church" at New Harmony, or Parke Godwin's at Menilmontant, afford us any criterion of judgment in the case.

The "Bacchantes and Bayaderes" are all to be provided for according to their "passional attractions," and are all to "co-operate in the production of harmonic results." Godwin, in speaking of Fourier's detailed description of the arrangements of these various "corporations of love," says that by this "he has brought the greatest discredit upon his system, and that many good persons have been led to believe that he favored *promiscuity*."† We should not infer that he favored corporations of inconstancy; but that he

* Concise Exposition, p. 9. † Popular View, p. 88.

admitted them, no one capable of discerning the import of language can question. Fourier would not at once, indeed, leave each couple to the unrestrained liberty of choice in the dissolution of marriage relations, but seemed to look forward to a period when the "preparatory discipline and progressive refinement" of some "three hundred years" should have removed the last excuse for "constraint." "As to the details," says Godwin, "which he has given, in conjecturing the peculiar customs of the higher degrees of harmonic life, we must say that many of them strike us as fanciful, and others as highly repugnant and erroneous."*

We might further extend our remarks upon the social and moral aspects of Fourierism; but this brief development of its principles must suffice. There seems to be a singular misapprehension of the nature and wants of man running through the whole system, and in no part is this radical defect more pernicious and glaring than in the system of education to be adopted in associations. Infants are to be taken from their mothers, and committed to the care of nurses. Where did Fourier get this item of his system? Not, we may safely venture to say, from nature or from revelation. They teach no such lesson. We will not question the workings of such a plan in the foundling institutions of France; but we should deeply deplore its introduction into society. To the infant and child the mother's care and sympathy are indispensable. Why has the God of nature implanted such beautiful sympathies in a parent's breast, if it be not to find expression in the exercise of a parent's care? We are at a loss whether Fourier borrowed this feature of his system from the iron code of Lycurgus, or from the system adopted in the foundling hospitals of France.

We might offer similar strictures upon the arrangements for children of a larger growth; but think we have already sifted enough out of the heterogeneous mass to give a tolerably-comprehensive view of the moral and social aspects of the system presented to the world by Charles Fourier.

Religious Aspects.

We cannot close our sketch of this subject without glancing briefly at the religious aspects of Fourierism: for it claims to be not only a complete system of economical and industrial organization, but also to imbody the great elements of religious faith; so that every association will also be a "new church," founded upon

* Popular View, p. 80.

the essential harmonies of nature, as well as the revelation from God. We must not, however, be deceived by its professions of religious faith; perhaps—we throw it out as a caution—something may be intended quite distinct from the religion of the Bible; and the faith it professes may be a faith different from that begotten by the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. Since the days of Spinoza, infidelity has often and mainly assumed a new and more dangerous form. It is no longer negative, but positive. It no longer denies, but affirms.* It is full of sublime expressions setting forth the fullness of its faith in God; but then its God is the great energy of nature, and not a personality. It possesses a faith and charity capacious enough to receive and patronize the creeds of all churches and all sects, however diverse and contradictory. It has faith in the Bible, and also in the Koran of Mohammed and the Shasters of India. It has faith in every tradition and every creed. Nothing can be more capacious and accommodating than this overflowing faith. But then it is to be understood that all these faiths and creeds are recognized as only a single *phase* of truth, and often presented in such relations as to leave a false impression; so that this universal and very complaisant faith is rather equivocal after all.†

"Fourier has neither added to the book of revelation, nor taken away from it, by forming a new religious creed of faith and doctrine. He refers us constantly to the word of God as a true standard of truth, and reconciles all partial creeds and doctrines based upon the word, without preferring any one exclusively. Partial creeds or sects

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* "If, then, it be asked, what particular form of doctrine we propose to teach, we reply, that we have no mission to teach any one religious creed in preference to others. Individually, we admit all creeds in their particular spheres, inasmuch as they are all respectively partial aspects of the one eternal truth of revelation, in its infinite variety of aspects. We admit all views of truth, without denying any, and subscribe to every creed, but not exclusively; what is affirmative in each is, for the most part, true, while the error in each is its negation and exclusivism."—*Godwin's Popular View*, p. 115.

† "His [Fourier's] policy of peace and reconciliation is, to conform to the established church in every Christian country, whatever be the special creed or articles of faith put forth authoritatively in particular branches of the universal church of Christ respectively. His creed, and that of his particular partisans, being that of the whole word of God, they can consistently conform to any partial creed, but not exclusively; for catholicity is the universal creed, embracing all, rejecting none, receiving all, and purifying all as partial streams are purified by entering the sea. This is the creed of Fourier and his followers in Christ."—*Note to Popular View*, by Hugh Doherty, of London.

he looks upon as fragmentary; a 'taking away from the whole word' certain parts to form a creed distinct from other partial creeds, derived from the fragments of the word; which breaking of the word and of the body of Christ, he looks upon as an exceptional law of progress in false unity, to be restored to true unity again when all are gathered under Christ, the Prince of Peace."—*Phalanx*, p. 97. Also *Godwin's Popular View*, p. 119.

But we should not be lavish of the charge of infidelity; nor will we make it against this system of modern socialism, till we have scrutinized the elements of its religious faith, and ascertained whether they are reconcilable with that Word to which Fourier is said "ever to have appealed." Fourierism does not indeed reject Christianity, but it exalts itself above it. It claims to be the *genus*, but admits Christianity to the lower dignity of *species*, in common with Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Paganism. It does not doubt the truth of revelation and religion, but then it is only the *partial truth*, "the parsley-bed," whose films are to be dissipated by the clear light of mental puberty—socialism. Christianity, then, is a subordinate feature of "universal unity." And the creeds, also, defective as they are, Fourier cannot find it in his heart to put under the ban of his interdiction.

"Let us not, however, be understood to say, that any of the various 'confessions of faith' in Christendom are absolutely false or unscriptural; we do not mean to say so; but we deem them incomplete in affirmation, and delusive in negation; sickly, and sickening in professions of exclusivism; subversive in duplicity, and not organic in variety."—*Phalanx*, p. 203.

"We say, then, that the one Holy Catholic Church of Christ has always existed *prothetically*—but that it has never existed *synthetically*. As a fundamental principle in potentiality, not as a synthem of subject and object—that is, as an actuality, has it been established."—*Phalanx*, p. 204.

So, then, it would seem that Jesus Christ did not sufficiently comprehend the "subject and object" of his ministry to blend them together in the church he formed; and that down to the present time, in consequence of this blunder, the "Holy Catholic Church of Christ" has existed only "*prothetically*;" but is now, under the auspices of the disciples of Charles Fourier, to be *synthetically* organized. We will submit to their consideration, whether this "new church" should not be titled the "Holy Catholic Church of Charles Fourier."

But, perhaps, our readers will be solicitous to learn what new ingredients have been mingled in to give "actuality" and a *syn-*

thetical existence to this old *prothetical* church. One of these ingredients, undoubtedly, is the intermingling of worldly interest, not merely into the frame-work, but the very foundations of this "new church." We have already seen that Fourier would "allow a superstructure of religious happiness to be constructed on a basis of industrial pleasure and security." This was evidently an advance from the old *prothetical* church. It would seem that our Saviour, having never made discovery of the "theory of universal unity," could discover no way to harmonize the indulgence of "worldly affections and lusts" with the spiritual good of his creatures, and taught his disciples that these lusts should be slain. But in "associative unity," worldly interests are indispensable to the development of true religion.

"Religious truth is the *principle* of unity and harmony, but it cannot be realized in *practice* universally, without a correspondent unity of action in the sphere of worldy interests. Association is the true form for the practical imbodiment of religious truth and love; and while attractive industry and unitary combination are not themselves religious unity, they are the body or collective form in which alone the ordinances of Christianity, the spirit of religion, the universal church, can be incorporated practically and incessantly; for without the body the spirit cannot be fully manifested on earth."—*Address of American Associationists to the People of the United States.* See *Phalanx.*

What these "ordinances of Christianity," that are to be "incorporated practically" in association, are, and who shall be the priests to administer them, we have not been able to discover.

One would think that it was a great error in our Saviour that he formed no industrial associations, *a la mode* Fourier; but relied upon the virtue of the Holy Spirit, the great Comforter promised to his disciples, to work individual redemption even in the midst of the most corrupt society. But our associationists would begin externally, and work in. They would reform society outwardly *first*, and leave the rest to follow as a necessary result. "There are large classes in existing society, who cannot be reformed inwardly until a change takes place in their outward circumstances, for the reason that they cannot be reached by religious influences, while all the actual influences about them are corrupting."* And again,—"Mere reform of an individual is not all that is necessary; (he must be reformed from his present disfigurements, but all his faculties and susceptibilities must be perfected;) but to perfect him, if it were possible, and still leave his outward circumstances the same, would only be to render his life more miserable."†

* Phalanx, p. 200. † Ibid.

We were not aware that virtue and piety were so dependent upon external circumstances! Noah, we cannot believe, "was more miserable" on account of his piety, though he lived in a generation that had *corrupted its way upon the earth*, and when *the earth was filled with violence*. Nor can we imagine that the piety of Lot rendered him "more miserable," though *his righteous soul was vexed daily with the filthy conversation* of the Sodomites, among whom he sojourned. The highest attainments of an apostle did not render him "more miserable," even while under bonds, and with the abiding testimony that *bonds and afflictions awaited him*. The precept of the divine Redeemer is, *Cleanse first that which is within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be clean also;* but these Phalansterians have discovered this precept to be a monstrous inversion in the theory of universal unity; and, therefore, require it to be revoked. It must not be thought strange that *old things should pass away and all things be modeled anew;* for in this "New Christianity" variety is indispensable, and its disciples shall not only be fed with the sincere milk of human reason, but the dish is to be fitted up with new and ever-varying flavor. And the unrestricted ingenuity of individuals will be put in requisition to produce this unending variety.

"But, then, authority which does not foster private judgment as an element of progress, and assimilate the truths elaborated periodically in the sphere of individual investigation with regard to doctrine, acts insanely and must die eventually of sheer inanition, as an individual who refuses to take nourishment of modern growth, believing there is nothing wholesome in the world, but what has actually been grown within the latitude of one small country. But orthodoxy is still more insane, for it expects the people to feed constantly upon the same food prepared a thousand years ago, and hashed and stewed repeatedly in Protestant amalgamation without any new addition of importance to give flavor to it. . . . . When orthodoxy, which has long ago passed through the system of digestion, is served up again repeatedly for food, it causes spiritual pestilence or infidelity, and many refuse to feed upon it. In disgust they lose their rationality, denying that there is a God, or that such spiritual food can be from heaven."—*Translation from Fourier.* See *Phalanx.*

Fourier has commenced the work of giving variety and flavor to this dish; and his followers in this country bid fair to rival their master in this respect. We should think there must here be an "adding to," or "a taking away," of the old gospel of Jesus Christ. But is it true that change of food, and that food of exotic growth, is indispensable to the development and perfection of our physical nature? Or will the stomach nauseate

over and refuse food, simply because our forefathers for a thousand years have lived upon the same diet? For our part, we shall be satisfied to partake of the same "spiritual food" as that which imparted life to the disciples of our Lord nearly two thousand years ago. But let us turn to the science of mind. Are those truths, demonstrated by Euclid more than two thousand years ago, any the less interesting to the successive generations of men that rise up to pursue them, because of their age and immutability? They have been "hashed and stewed repeatedly," and digested by a hundred generations; but yet we question whether they do not burst upon the mind of every succeeding generation with as rich and inviting a flavor as in the first century of their discovery. The simple reason is, that they are indestructible and eternal truths,—changeless as the throne of God. And when the discoveries of modern science shall have revealed the fact, that God's "eternal purpose," in the great scheme of redemption and in the plan of salvation by the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, is not "eternal," but has lost its saving power; then will the soul, hungering after righteousness, nauseate over this spiritual food prepared more than a "thousand years ago," and Christianity "die of sheer inanition;" unless, indeed, some Fourier disciple should discover some new and more healthy spiritual food.

Again, Christianity is a system of self-denial: the religion it enjoins is one of self-denial, a sacrifice of worldly lusts and pride, a crucifixion unto the world. Fourierism is a system of self-indulgence; it enjoins the gratification of all our desires, and bids us "seek the good things of this life and eagerly pursue them." Christianity would restore to man the moral image of his Maker by the renewal of his moral nature; Fourierism *promises* the same by "unitary combination in the sphere of worldly interests." There is to be no sacrifice, no self-denial, no constraint of the passions, for the acquisition of moral purity and religious faith. This, however, may not seem so strange when we enumerate the principles to be developed, in order to constitute the "unity of man with God in true religion. They are, 1. Love of the marvelous; 2. Love of alternation, or change; 3. Love of order, or progress."* But upon this point we have sufficiently enlarged elsewhere.

Again, the Bible teaches us that man is a fallen being; that his very nature is tainted with moral defilement and perversion: Fourierism plants itself as a fundamental principle upon the absolute perfection of man's nature. Man's passions, Fourier indeed admits,

* Phalanx, p. 240.

have been misdirected and perverted by the "false state of society" in which he lives; but the same faculties, if rightly directed, as they shall be under the reign of harmony, would lead only to good. Here, then, is the antagonism of Fourierism to Christianity; the latter teaches that evil comes from within; the former, that man's nature, his instincts, his passions, his tendencies, are essentially holy, and that evil proceeds from causes extraneous; from causes which restrain, repress his natural instincts and impulses, and prevent their full, and free, and harmonious development. Fourierism proposes to take off these "causes," which now "restrain and repress our natural instincts;" and then will be ushered in the reign of universal unity. "If the soul, or spiritual part of man, be trained, educated, or developed according to the law of divine order, or the 'series,' then he will obey and act in harmony with the laws of God; and perfect spiritual or internal unity will exist."*

By this system, the great and fundamental doctrine of atonement and redemption are necessarily set aside. No redemption, indeed, is necessary. Man's faculties were only misdirected, and it but needed a divine teacher to give them a new direction. This divine teacher has at length appeared in the person of Charles Fourier. And, even the great doctrine of the immortality of the soul, in the creed of association, is not directly asserted, but presented only as an "analogical conjecture," lest materialists and atheists should object to membership in this "new church." When Fourier comes to treat upon this subject, he says, that for fear of "displeasing materialists and atheists," and, "in order to avoid all pretext for discussion on these abstract questions, I have given them as *analogical conjectures*, so that unbelievers are at liberty to class them with romantic fictions, if they like; and I have purposely omitted the application of Kepler's laws to corroborate these views, that I may not appear to give them much importance."† We hardly know what a Phalansterian would call this;—"organic variety," or "duplicity." Such is the system that is to supplant Christianity, remove the "curse" from earth, and work the redemption of man. Its gates must be kept open to "materialists and atheists," and not "much importance" is to be attached to the doctrine of the soul's immortality. This weakness and vascillation, we opine, will tend more to "reconcile the partial creeds and doctrines" of his followers, than to the establishment of a permanent and pure Christian faith. This feature of this

* Phalanx, No. 7, p. 96.

† Translation from Fourier's Works. Phalanx, No. 4, p. 57.

"new church" will account, perhaps, for the sympathy between our American Fourierists and the Communitists at Skaneateles, with John A. Collins at their head. After giving a very full report of the ranting of Collins and Mrs. Rose against religion, law, and order, in the Boston convention of socialists, held in May, 1844, the Phalanx remarks:—"Still the main object in view was right; it was to do away with evil and misery, and bring happiness and good will upon the earth; and thus far, we heartily sympathize with the Communitists, and think them far in advance of any other class of reformers or religionists."* One of two things may be inferred from this encomium, namely; either that the Communitists of Skaneateles are in "advance of any other class of religionists;" or, that there is a pretty strong leaning among American Fourierists to the no-religion of John A. Collins and Mrs. Rose.

Let us not be deceived with this enthusiastic devotion to God and love to man; this declamation about "universal providence," and "unity of man with God in true religion." Let us analyze its elements and sift out the gold from the alloy. If God means only the aggregate of universal nature, then loving him is nothing more than admiring the beauty, grandeur, and harmony of nature; and "universal providence" is significant of nothing more than the law by which water is congealed. The vilest infidel that ever walked the earth, or turned his pie-bald face in mockery to the heavens, has had his God whom he adored, his providence of which he could speak with raptures, and his religion of which he could boast! Was it not so with the atheists of France? Did not the blaspheming Voltaire and the licentious Rousseau, both in elevated terms, speak of God and of providence? With impiety on their tongues, and atheism—dark and revolting atheism—in their hearts, they were accustomed to speak of the higher duties of religion as if they were very saints. Brisbane has an item in his Concise Exposition, which, to our apprehension, is almost worthy of the pantheism of Spinoza, or the transcendental infidelity of Parker: "We believe that the time is fast coming when man, the universal soul, that which is God upon earth and the only thing which is God and is divine, who now hates the earth as a prison-house, because it is full of discords, and who curses it as he toils over it in repugnant labor, will love it, and bless it, and embellish it, and fill it with material and social harmonies."† What kind of God is here intended we find it difficult to ascertain; but feel assured that it is not He that is *high over all and blessed for ever.*

* Phalanx, No. 13, p. 183.

† See second page, cover to first edition.

We must here dismiss the subject. We had prepared extracts on many topics upon which we have been unable to touch, and those we have discussed we have been obliged to dispatch often with a brief notice. The principles which we have sketched out as pertaining to association are not to be understood as the principles of all who may become members of an association; but rather of the leaders in the Fourier movement. These principles cannot be embraced without weakening all faith in revelation and religion; they connot be carried out in practice without undermining the very frame-work of society, and giving it a rapid tendency back to its original elements. Many honest men and well-meaning Christians will undoubtedly be led astray, as is the case with every popular delusion; but the bubble will ere long burst, and then the whole concern pass to the records of the world's history as one of the humbugs *that were.*

ART. V.—*Theopneusty; or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By S. R. L. GAUSSEN, Professor of Theology in Geneva, Switzerland. Translated by EDWARD NORRIS KIRK. Second American, from the second French edition, enlarged and improved by the author. New-York: John S. Taylor and Co. 1844.

OUR author is a colleague of D'Aubigné in the Theological School at Geneva. He is evidently an evangelical Christian, a profound scholar, an able writer. His style is pleasing, lacking neither vivacity nor precision; and happily for his reputation, his work has fallen into the hands of a translator who entered fully into his spirit, and who has presented his volume in just such an English dress as the author himself would have selected had he possessed an equal acquaintance with our vernacular wardrobe. The new-coined Greek title which he has given to his book—harsh though it sounds, from its novelty—is expressive, and indicates with sufficient clearness the subject upon which he writes. That subject is the inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, (Πᾶσα γραφὴ ΘΕΟΠΝΕΥΣΤΟΣ, 2 Tim. iii, 16.)

What do we mean by the inspiration of the Scriptures? One class of writers—including, perhaps, the greater number of the German neologists—understand by this inspiration nothing more than a divine afflatus; by which they mean, if they have any meaning, that the sacred writers were inspired much in the same

way as the poet who invokes the aid of the celestial nine, in suggesting suitable dactyls and spondees for the euphony of his hexameters; or, if they eschew heathenism, the afflatus of which they speak may mean that kind of inspiration which, in the composition of his great poem, Milton sought and found.

Others go further. They admit that the sacred writers were under the guidance of the Holy Spirit so far as that they had suggestions at times from him,* and that they were kept from running into any egregious blunders on matters connected with the salvation of the soul; but that, being men, and, for the most part, not philosophers, they have been permitted to mingle errors in science with truths in theology, and absurdities in narrative with profound didactics. Of course, men of this persuasion claim the right—it is theirs, doubtless, seeing they have the ability—to rectify errors, to suggest amendments; in short, to exercise an editorial supervision, by explanatory parentheses, by erasures, by interlineations.

Another class, at the head of whom stands the learned Michaelis, fully admit the inspiration under which *parts* of the sacred canon were written. Matthew and John wrote their Gospels as moved by the Holy Ghost; but it is doubtful if Luke were thus inspired; and almost, if not quite, certain that Mark was not. So with the writings attributed to Moses, to David, to Isaiah; and so with the Epistles of the New Testament. A part—they profess to know which part—is given to us in the words of the Holy Ghost; but other portions are in this respect doubtful; and yet others are of human origin, and consequently of nothing higher than patristic authority.

Whitby, with whom Adam Clarke seems to agree, as he quotes him with approbation in his Introduction to the Gospels, contends for such an inspiration as has reference to the *matter* written, and not to the *manner;* to the facts, and not to the phraseology: that although in some instances the words and phrases used by the sacred writers were dictated by the Holy Spirit, yet that this is far from being the case universally, or even generally.

In opposition to all these theories, our author maintains that the

* Thus *Bishop Wilson:* "Men cannot say where this inspiration begins, and where it ends."—*Lectures*, &c. Thus *Dick:* "We should recognize three degrees of inspiration. In the first place, there are many things which the writers could know by the mere exercise of their natural faculties; in the second place, there were other things for which their understandings and their faculties needed to be divinely *strengthened;* finally, there are many others still which contain subjects that made a direct inspiration indispensable."—*Essay on Inspiration of Holy Scriptures.*

Scriptures were divinely and miraculously inspired; that the whole, and every part, was equally and entirely inspired: that this inspiration extends to, and includes, not only the facts and the sentiments which are left on record, but the words in which these facts and sentiments are expressed. He affirms, (to quote his own language,)

"this kind and degree of inspiration of all the Scriptures: the historical books, as well as the prophecies; the Epistles, as well as the Psalms; the Gospels of Mark and Luke, as well as those of John and Matthew; the history of Paul's shipwreck in the Adriatic Sea, as well as that of the destruction of the ancient world; the scenes of Mamre, under Abraham's tent, as those of the days of Christ in the eternal tent; the prophetic prayers, in which the Messiah, a thousand years before his advent, exclaimed in the Psalms, 'My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me? They pierced my hands and my feet; they cast lots upon my vesture;' as well as the narrative of the same events by the evangelists. In other words, we aim to establish, by the word of God, that the Scriptures are from God,—that all the Scriptures are from God,—and that every part of the Scriptures is from God."—Pp. 38, 39.

It will, of course, be understood that our author does not mean to say that God did not use men as instruments in furnishing his revelation to their fellow-men. They spake, but spake only, spake always in the sacred canon *as*—only *as*—they were moved by the Holy Ghost; and, as Paul has it, in the *words* which the Holy Ghost teacheth. They were amanuenses; the Bible is His. Just as we may say, for illustration, the Paradise Lost is Milton's—Milton's in conception, in diction, in everything—although this part were written from his lips by his friend Philips, and that by a visitor who chanced to be present.

We agree with our author. We believe his position is the only one from which error, in her protean shapes, can be successfully assailed; the only one upon which it is safe to stand, or that, as a foundation, is worthy of God to give. Without following precisely our author's method, or confining ourselves to his arguments or illustrations, at the same time making this general acknowledgment of our indebtedness, we purpose to notice some of the more prominent objections to "theopneusty," or the plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures; and then to present a few arguments by which it is sustained.

An objection that is not formally noticed by the author, for the simple reason that he wrote not for the skeptic but for the inquirer, is glanced at by the American editor in his Introduction, and is drawn from the fallibility of man and the impotence of human lan-

guage. It may be thus stated:—How can that be a perfect revelation of the mind of an infinite being which is couched in the feeble language of a finite creature? This objection is specious; but it will be seen that with its pretended reverence for the Creator, it in fact aims a blow at his supreme omnipotence, and arrogantly attempts to decide what he can and what he cannot do. Is it the imperfection of human language, or the inability of the great Supreme, that lies at the foundation of this objection? Could not God, were he so disposed, speak to you in your own language intelligibly? Doubtless. Where then is the difficulty in believing that he has spoken intelligibly to others? And where the impossibility of his enabling them to record faithfully and exactly every syllable thus spoken? Is there any reason, from the necessity of the case, that because his communications have been made to finite and fallible creatures, that these communications when transmitted to us must be mingled and mixed up with their fallible or erroneous conceptions? But again, admitting the objection in its full force, what does it amount to? Simply to this, that by so imperfect a medium as human language a perfect revelation of an infinitely perfect being cannot be made. We admit it. The Bible pretends to nothing of the kind. Neither in heaven nor on earth, by angels or by men, will the Almighty be found out to perfection. It is contended only that God has, by revelation, in language intelligible to men, revealed so much of himself as it is essential to man's well-being to know; that in so doing he has chosen confessedly an imperfect medium, human language; and that he has done so because they for whom the revelation is intended are incapable of receiving it by any other. What is the testimony of the Scriptures themselves to this point? With those who believe them to have emanated in any way from God, their decision is final. "The words of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "are pure words." "As for God, his way is perfect: the word of the Lord is tried," or, as the margin has it, "refined." So, too, the great Teacher himself: "I have given them thy word: thy word is *truth*." And, referring to the Old Testament Scriptures, he declares that not even a jot nor a tittle—the most minute and insignificant particle—shall fail of its complete fulfillment. Are declarations like these, and they abound in the sacred record, reconcilable with the idea that the imperfection of the medium through which His will is communicated at all vitiates the perfection of the revelation itself? Do they not rather teach that even the jots and tittles, though marked down by human agency, were placed just where He designed them to be placed—that they too are His?

But we are asked, *Cui bono?* Where the necessity of inspiring men to write that which they already knew? Is not a large portion of the Scriptures a mere narrative of facts, well known without inspiration to those who wrote, and to others also? Does not the Bible abound in self-evident propositions; in genealogical tables, equally accessible to all at the time of their transcription; in songs; in catalogues; in palpable truisms? Is it not absurd on its very face to suppose that the all-wise Being wrought miracles—for the gift of inspiration is miraculous—unnecessarily?

This objection has truly a formidable appearance. It is this which has driven divines, theologians, commentators, to the pitiful subterfuge of classifying, according to their own judgment, the revelations of His book. This sentence is wholly inspired; that was written under a kind of partial inspiration, one-half, or three-fourths, as the case may be; while with this evidently God had nothing to do. It is the sentiment of Moses, or of Paul, or of the unlettered son of Zebedee! We have called this a pitiful subterfuge, and shall verify the charge before we close. In the mean time we say, in answer to the objection:—

First. It has its foundation in a total misapprehension of the question. That question is not, Did the sacred writers obtain all their knowledge by a direct inspiration from Heaven? but, Were they led by the Holy Ghost to write what they have written? We ask not, Were they indebted for all the statements made by them to a direct supernatural communication? but, Did they record such things as God directed? Did they speak as they were moved by the Holy Ghost?

Secondly. To make this answer still clearer, let us refer again to Milton's great poem. He employed more than one to transcribe his verse. Beyond a doubt it contains a great many things which were as well known to his amanuenses as to himself. There are truisms, and "old saws," and catalogues: there is evidence not only of profound research and deep investigation, but there are what we deem fanciful speculations, common-place sentiments, school-boy logic. What then? Is not the work Milton's? Is it not all his? Apply this reasoning to the Bible, and the difficulty vanishes. Let it be borne in mind further that the inspiration of which we speak, and for which we contend, is not the inspiration of the writer, but of the matter written. The internal state of him who wields the pen is never presented as an object of faith. The statements made by the agent selected for this purpose may have been perfectly familiar to him before he began to write; he may have been an eye-witness or an ear-witness; he may have received

them by tradition; or, on the contrary, he may have been utterly ignorant of the meaning of what he had written, as doubtless was the case with a part of the prophecies; but all this is wide of the mark; it has nothing to do with the question at issue. "GOD spake unto the fathers by the prophets," Heb. i, 1; and "CHRIST speaks in me," says Paul. 2 Cor. xiii, 3.

Thus, too, very readily, may we dispose of the objection, that the Scriptures contain many things in themselves so simple, so level to the comprehension of a child, that it is not to be supposed that they came from Him whose thoughts are not as man's thoughts, but higher, even as the heavens are higher than the earth. It is too simple, too plain. Say you so? We turn you over to him who makes precisely the opposite objection; who professes to doubt the inspiration of those parts of the record which he cannot fully understand. This, says he, is dark, obscure, mysterious. Now God is light, and in him is no darkness at all; and can that be a revelation which does not reveal? Verily, between you we shall have nothing left. For whom was the Bible written? For the child and the philosopher; for the wise and the simple; for all. It is just then in this respect what might have been expected. Were not the truths essential to the salvation of "these little ones" brought down to the level of their comprehension, of what use would it be to them? And did it contain nothing but what a finite mind might readily comprehend, that fact would render more than questionable the divinity of its origin. "It is the glory of God to conceal." Man is directed to "*search* the Scriptures;" and he who, by education and early training, is best qualified for the task, who has "searched" longest, most diligently, most perseveringly, has been rewarded most amply. He returns again and again to his task. At each perusal new beauties flash upon him. A long life is thus spent. At its close his language is the same as at the beginning, "Thy thoughts, O Lord, are *very deep*;" and, with the humblest follower of the Lamb, he exclaims, "*Now* we see through a glass darkly." Is it enough? It is; for Jesus hath said unto him also, "Thou shalt know hereafter."

A want of uniformity in the style of the sacred writers is urged as a fatal objection to the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. How is it, says the objector, if God be the author of the entire Bible, that we discover such a variety in the style in which it is written? David differs from Moses; Isaiah soars beyond his associates in the grandeur of his diction; and Luke, and Peter, and Paul has each his own peculiarity, by which, without a prompter, his style may be readily distinguished.

We admit the fact, but deny the correctness of the inference. On the contrary, this variety of style is just what we have a right to look for in everything emanating from the great Supreme. Perpetual diversity and endless variation characterize all his works. One star differeth from another star in glory; so does one countenance, one intellect, one blade of grass, from every other. There is everywhere, in the kingdom of nature, of providence, of grace, uniformity sufficient to establish the unity of the Godhead; variety abounding to attest his infinite wisdom and limitless power. So with the Bible: running through all its pages, from Genesis to Revelation, there is uniformity of doctrine, concord of sentiment, agreement in facts; while there are also peculiarities in phraseology, varieties of illustration, and diversities of argument. It is sometimes—slightly to modify the language of our author—it is sometimes the sublime simplicity of John; sometimes the excited, elliptical, startling, argumentative energy of Paul; sometimes the fervor and solemnity of Peter; it is the majestic poetry of Isaiah, or the lyrical verse of David; it is the simple narrative of Moses, or the sententious wisdom of Solomon: yes, it is all this; it is Peter; it is Isaiah; it is Matthew; it is John; it is Moses; but it is—God. Will the objector confine the infinite to one peculiar style? Will he arrogate to himself the power of judging of the greater propriety of this or that method of elucidating an argument or narrating a fact? Does he mean, when he refers this passage to a peculiarity in the early education of Saul of Tarsus, and that to the absurdities of the Mishna and the Talmud, from which he gravely tells us James borrowed arguments and illustrations,* does he mean that *he* can recognize the true and only idiom in which it was proper for the Holy Ghost to convey instruction?

Again: the argument is a fallacy. It proves too much. If it be admitted that the diversity of the style of the sacred writers precludes the supposition that the entire Bible came from God, it will prove, when pressed a little, that no part of it is from God. The most rapturous flight of the evangelical prophet, the most glorious outburst of the sweet singer of Israel, the sublimest rhetoric of the apostle to the Gentiles, bears as legibly the stamp and signet of Isaiah, of David, or of Paul, as does the narrative of the simplest event recorded by either in their individual history. Our author's illustration of this point is striking and to the purpose:—

* See A. Clarke on this Epistle.

"If God himself, in order to save the French nation from a frightful explosion, by introducing the gospel among them, should deign to send some prophets, by whose mouth he would make himself heard, they would certainly preach in the French language. But then, what would be their style, and what would you require as characteristic of the style of God? He might choose that one of these prophets should speak like Fenelon, and the other like Bonaparte. Then it would be in a certain sense the pithy, barking, jerking style of the great general; it would be again, in the same sense, the flowing style, the sustained and wire-drawn period of the priest of Cambray; but, in another sense, more elevated and more true, it would be, in the one and in the other of these two mouths, the style of God, the periods of God, the manner of God, the word of God. . . . . If, then, in speaking to men on the earth, He must adopt the words and the construction of the Hebrews and the Greeks, instead of the syntax of the heavens and the vocabulary of archangels, why should he not also equally have borrowed their gait, their style, and their personality?"—Pp. 62, 63.

Let us now turn our attention to what is in reality the main reason for the adoption of a sentiment adverse to the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. It is this: Errors are found there—errors in doctrine, in logic, in facts. Evidently these never could have been dictated by the God of truth. The only alternative then is, that while other parts of the record, doubtless, came from him, the authorship of these must be attributed to men uninspired and fallible, like ourselves. Let us look at this. And first as to doctrinal errors. By what standard are we to try them, and to pass judgment? Unless we profess to have received, ourselves, a direct revelation from God, evidently we have no test to which to bring them, but the Scriptures themselves. By those to whom our argument is mainly addressed, this is admitted; and while they are ready to receive the teachings of inspiration so far as they admit that inspiration, they beg to be excused from receiving manifest contradictions as the words of an unchangeable God. So do we. But where are these contradictions? Here is one. It is clearly revealed that Jesus Christ will be the sole judge of an assembled universe at that day; that men, and angels who kept not their first estate, will then receive from him their final and irrevocable doom. By what authority then does Paul say, *We* shall judge angels? By what authority? By precisely the same, the ready answer is, as that whereon the same Paul assured the Athenians that "God has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained." But is there not a contradiction here? First settle conclusively the meaning of the apostle in both places; and then we may be prepared to an-

swer that question. As it is, while scarcely any two of your learned commentators agree; while one concludes the apostle's meaning to be that the saints shall be assessors with Christ, in the final judgment, and another that he refers not to the final judgment at all; while one assures us that the apostle is merely referring to the predictions of Daniel, and another that he means that the saints, in the future world, shall be raised to a rank more elevated than even that of the angels in heaven;—while these contradictory explanations are found on the learned pages, even of those who deny or doubt the theopneusty of the Scriptures, we hold ourselves not bound to answer your question. You do not surely insist upon our solving a contradiction until you tell us plainly what that contradiction is.

A similar objection is sometimes urged with reference to the doctrinal teaching of the apostles on that momentous event, the second coming of Christ and the destruction of our world. "The coming of the Lord draweth nigh," says James; "the end of all things," says Peter, "is at hand;" and says Paul to the Hebrews, "Ye see the day approaching." Evidently, says the objector, such opinions could not have come from God, for they were contradicted by the event. Thus the skeptic reasons; and the professing disciple yields the point, and accounts for it by supposing that such passages were not inspired, and were the mere opinions of the apostles. But how absurd is this! You first assume that in these and similar passages the apostles meant to teach that the day of judgment and the destruction of our world were close at hand; and by this supposition you strip the sacred writers not only of inspiration but of common sense. Inspired or uninspired, they could not mean on one page to assert one thing, and something directly opposite on the next: they could not beseech those to whom they wrote in one Epistle (2 Thess. ii, 1–3) not to be troubled or shaken in mind as that the day of Christ is at hand; and then, in the very teeth of that declaration, assure others that that day *is* at hand. Deny them plenary inspiration if you will, but allow them common sense.

Indeed, objections of this kind, once deemed insuperable without giving up the theopneusty of the Scriptures, are gradually vanishing, as closer investigation and more thorough research reveal the meaning of the sacred record.

From the days of Jerome it has been common to attribute to the writers of the New Testament the use of inconclusive arguments, defective reasoning, bad logic. Even St. Paul, we are told, "does not know how to develop a hyperbaton, nor to conclude a sentence; and having to do with rude people, he has employed the concep-

tions which, if at the outset he had not taken care to announce as spoken after the manner of men, would have shocked men of good sense." Hence the conclusion, that inspiration cannot extend to the style and the phraseology of the apostles, is irresistible. Truly it is: that is, *if* what Jerome did not understand is therefore unintelligible; *if* the mind of the objector is to be, for all men, of all ages, the unalterable standard of reason, and logic, and common sense. Stripped of its pompous phraseology, the objection amounts to this:—I do not see the bearing of this reasoning, the pertinency of that argument, the connection between these premises and that conclusion; therefore—therefore what?—therefore it is not inspired, it came not from God! Nay, rather let me therefore look into this matter more closely; let me study it with more patience, with more humility; and look up with more earnestness and more faith to Him who hath declared that if any man lack wisdom, and will ask of him, he will give liberally and upbraid him not. But says our author,—

"We have something yet more serious to add. We ask, Where will you stop when you have once entered on this path? And by what reasons will you, in your turn, stop those who wish to go still beyond you? You dare to correct one part of the word of God; by what right then will you blame those who may wish to correct the rest? Beings of yesterday, while they are traversing this earth as a shadow, with the eternal book of God in their hands, they dare to say, This, Lord, is worthy of thee, this is unworthy of thee! They pretend to select for themselves in the oracles of God, to ascribe one part of them to the folly of man, to separate the mistakes of Isaiah or Moses, the prejudices of Peter or of Jude, the paralogisms of Paul, the superstitions of John, from the thought of God! Lamentable rashness! We repeat it, where will they stop in this fatal work? for they place themselves at the very table on the one side of which are seated the Socinuses, the Grimaldis, the Priestleys; and on the other, the Rousseaus, the Volneys, the Dupuis. Between them and Eichorn, between them and William Cobbett, between them and Strauss, where is the difference? It is in the species, not in the genus. It is in the quantity of the imputations of errors, and of irreverent remarks; it is not in the quality. There is some difference in their boldness, none in their profaneness. The one and the other have found errors in the word of God: they have both pretended to rectify them. But we ask, is it less absurd on the part of a creature to wish to improve in God's creation the hyssop that cometh out of the wall, than that of the cedar of Lebanon; to pretend to rectify the organization of a glow-worm, than to wish to increase the light of the sun? By what right will ministers who say that they see nothing but the language of Jewish prejudices in the accounts given by the evangelists of the demoniacs, and the miracles of Jesus Christ driving out the im-

pure spirits; by what right will they pronounce it strange that another sees in the miracles of Saul's conversion, of the resurrection, of the multiplication of bread, or of the day of Pentecost, nothing but a discreet and useful compliance with the ignorance of a people fond of the marvelous? By what authority would a professor who denies the inspiration of Paul's arguments blame Mr. De Wette for rejecting that of the prophecies of the Old Testament, or of Mr. Wirgmann making his *separation of the New Testament*, or Mr. Strauss changing into fable the miracles and the very person of Jesus Christ?"—Pp. 121–123.

With reference to what have been deemed errors in the narrations of the inspired writers, in their dates, their quotations, their allusions to the events of contemporaneous history, it is unnecessary for us to dwell at any length. One after another, difficulties in this respect which seemed insurmountable have been solved by patient investigation and research. From the time of Porphyry the Syrian, who, in the reign of Diocletian, collected these apparent discrepancies into a volume, his legitimate successors have been hurling darts stolen from his armory, and presenting difficulties that have been solved, and objections that have been again and again triumphantly refuted. We do not object to this. The enemies of inspiration will continue to write, and its friends must expect to contend against them. Not until they put off the harness and enter into rest will this warfare be accomplished. But we do object to the folly, the disloyalty, of the professed believers in revelation, of those set for the defense of the gospel, of such men as Pye Smith,* and the bishop of Calcutta,† and Twesten,‡ who, because of these attacks of the aliens, take the indefensible, and unsafe, and false position, in the language of the latter, "that *all* is not equally inspired in the Bible; and that if we admit no errors in the details of the evangelical narrations we shall be thrown into inextricable difficulties to explain them."

And what are these fancied errors which throw doubts upon the inspiration of the sacred writers, and are deemed sufficient to drive the leaders of the sacramental host from their impregnable position? They are such as these:—Luke tells us of the census ordered by the Roman emperor, that "this taxing was first made when Cyrenius (Publius Sirius Quirinius) was governor of Syria." Luke ii, 2. History tells us that this Cyrenius was not governor of Syria until twelve or fifteen years after the birth of Jesus. Hence

* Defense of Haffner's Preface to the Bible.

† Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity.

‡ Rector of the Berlin University. The translation is by the American editor of the work under review.

the difficulty. Luke is mistaken: consequently, *pro tanto*, Luke could not have written under inspiration. We will not burden our page with the solutions that have been given to this difficulty. The reader may find them in Lardner, Newcome, Campbell, A. Clarke, and other commentators; but we will ask, if it be not almost miraculous that Luke, certainly the best educated of the evangelists, should fall into so palpable a blunder? Leaving inspiration out of the question, it is very strange that he who knew so well about another taxing under the same Cyrenius (Acts v, 37) should be so ignorant of the first as this objection seeks to make him. After all, the blunder is about the same, when the original is correctly translated, as it would be in a writer of our own day to assert that Braddock's army was saved by the skill of General Washington. True, Washington was not a general at the time, nor was Cyrenius a governor at the date of the enrollment; but in either case the statement is correct, and perfectly intelligible.

Again: Matthew tells us (xxvii, 5) that Judas hanged himself, while Peter declares (Acts i, 18) that "falling headlong, he burst asunder in the midst, and all his bowels gushed out." We are told, here is a contradiction, consequently no inspiration. But there is no contradiction. Both events were equally true, as in the case of the man referred to by our author, who, seated in a window of the fourth story, shot himself with a pistol, and falling thence was dashed to pieces. One writer relating the circumstance attributes his death to the ball; and another may say, with equal truth, "falling headlong, all his bowels gushed out."

With what facility we may be led into error on points of this nature, and thus attribute our own error to the sacred writers, is illustrated by the two miracles wrought by Christ in the multiplication of the loaves and fishes. If it had so happened that Matthew and Mark had related but the one in which he fed the five thousand with five loaves, and Luke and John had given an account only of the other, in which seven loaves were broken among four thousand, how very readily would the skeptic have jumped to the conclusion that they were all referring to the same event, that they manifestly contradict each other, and that, consequently, their histories are worthy of no credit? The professed believer in a partial inspiration of the Scriptures would not have gone so far. He would have attributed the blunder to human infirmity, and have joined with the skeptic in using it as an argument to disprove the declaration that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God. Thus is it also with the numerical statements made by the writers of the Old and the New Testaments:—

"As, for instance, that of the talents of gold brought from Ophir to King Solomon, (1 Kings ix, 28; 2 Chron. viii, 18;) that of the numbering of the Israelites in the time of David, (2 Sam. xxiv, 9; 1 Chron. xxi, 5;) that of the children of the patriarch Jacob, transported into Egypt, (Gen. xlvi, 26, 27; Deut. x, 22; Acts vii, 14;) &c. One single circumstance, in addition to these rapid recitals, will at once place them in accord before us. King Solomon might, in the one case, have reckoned the gross amount of his revenue, and in the other have deducted thirty talents therefrom for the expenses of the navy. The numbering of David might exhibit two results, according as it included, or was exclusive of, the ordinary military force (militia) already numbered throughout the kingdom, (288,000 men with their officers of every rank.) Finally, there might be sixty-six, seventy, or seventy-five persons, for the family of the patriarch, according as we reckon, on the one hand, Jacob with Joseph, and his two sons; on the other, Ifer, Onda, and Dinah; and to these latter may be added the wives of the eleven patriarchs."—Pp. 137, 138.

It is unnecessary, however, nor can we afford space, to enter into the minute details of these, and similar apparent discrepancies. We say apparent discrepancies. We simply ask, is it not more rational to conclude, more easy to believe, that in every one of them there may have been circumstances which, from the brevity of the narrative, have been omitted, and which, were they known to us—as in the case of the miracle above referred to—all would have been equally plain, easy, and intelligible. If, with the skeptic, you take ground against the inspiration of the Bible, *in toto*, we may not here stop to argue with you; but if you contend for a partial inspiration, an inspiration that extends to the great and fundamental truths it reveals, but deny that inspiration to its minor details, then should we be glad to see with what adroitness you will extricate yourself from this dilemma: the men whom infinite wisdom selected for the purpose of making known this revelation had the ability of giving these details with minute accuracy, or they had not that ability. If they had the ability, then have they, voluntarily, and of set purpose, blundered and mixed God's truth with error. If they had not the ability, that fact must have been known to Him who selected them for this purpose; and, consequently, it was his will that mistakes should mar his pages, and that a futile attempt should be made for the concord of truth with falsehood, light with darkness. Does such an opinion square with your conceptions of God's immutable veracity—with your idea of him who is THE TRUTH?

It is contended again that the sacred writers do not speak with philosophical accuracy on the phenomena of nature; and that fact

is adduced against the idea of a plenary inspiration. To see this objection in a clear light, let us suppose a profound philosopher attempting to explain to his children the wonders of the planetary system, and inquire, How is it to be done? Most evidently, while he cautiously avoids stating anything palpably false, he must, of necessity, bring down his language to the level of their comprehension. He will talk of the rising and setting of the sun: will it follow that he is ignorant of the revolution of the earth which causes that appearance? He may discourse of the firmament above us, and of the stars and planets over our heads: is that evidence that he knows nothing of the globular sphere on which we dwell; or that he is ignorant, because to them he does not, cannot make plain all that is known to himself? In the language of our author:—

"When Sir John Herschell asks his servants to send some one to wake him exactly at midnight, for the observation of the passage of some star over his meridian lens, does he think himself obliged to speak to them of the earth, of her rotation, and of the moment when she shall have brought their nadir into the plane of her orbit? I think not. And if you should ever hear him converse, in the observatory of Greenwich, with the learned Ayrie, you would see that even in this sanctuary of science, the habitual language of these astronomers is still just like that of the Scriptures. For them, the stars rise, the equinoxes recede, the planets advance and are accelerated, stop and retrograde. Would you then have Moses speak to all the generations of men in a language more scientific than that of La Place, of Arago, and of Newton?"—P. 178.

We go further. We contend that not only was it necessary that the sacred writers, on all philosophical subjects, should come down to the level of the comprehension of those for whom they wrote, but that, if they had spoken of these things as they really are, that is, as they are seen by the infinite God, their revelation had been unintelligible even to the philosopher who has studied most patiently, and reasoned most profoundly. For what does the wise man know? Has he by searching found out God? Has he found out the Almighty to perfection? He cannot make his child comprehend those great truths which are established in his own mind by the force of acute reasoning; while in intelligence, in everything the child is infinitely nearer his level than he to Him who is unsearchable. And it will be always thus. We cannot set limits to man's scientific attainments. It is very possible that discoveries may yet be made which will cast all that have preceded them into the shade; and that language which will be perfectly

plain to some Newton, a thousand years hence, would be a dark enigma to us who live in the present age. Hence, while it is denied that any erroneous statement on philosophical subjects is to be found on the pages of the Bible, we see, in the simplicity of its narratives, and the popular style of its language, the wisdom of God condescending to the weakness of man; the benignity of the great Father of the universe speaking intelligibly to his "little ones."

More than this: the sacred record, when studied with attention, is perpetually throwing out hints, and affording glimpses of science and philosophy, which it is not its direct object to teach. We find, often, in the language and expressions of the sacred writers, a precision, an exactness, the like of which, in former ages, was nowhere seen. Nay, there are allusions to truths which have remained undiscovered from generation to generation, and with which, beyond a doubt, in many instances, the writers themselves were unacquainted. Was he who wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes, for instance, aware of *the circulation of the blood?* Or is it God himself who is alluding to it where he speaks of "the bowl," and "the pitcher," and "the fountain?"* It is but little more than two hundred years since the discovery of the fact, that the blood does circulate; and until that time, of course, much of the beauty and force of the passage was unappreciated, because unseen. Down to the days of Galileo, the *gravity of the atmosphere* was an unknown fact, yet it is written: "He looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven, *to make the weight for the winds;*" or, more properly, to give to THE AIR ITS WEIGHT. Job xxviii, 24, 25. Until the invention of the telescope, but a limited idea was conveyed by the promise made to Abraham, that his seed should be as *the stars of heaven.* Ptolemy fixed their number at a little more than a thousand: Herschell confirms the comparison of the sacred writers, who speak of them as innumerable, even like the sands upon the seashore. Moses, with what has appeared for ages unaccountable, if not a blunder, speaks of *light* as existing anterior to the creation of the sun. Newton finds it necessary to suppose, and some future philosopher will, in all probability, demonstrate the fact, that the universe is pervaded by a subtil and elastic *ether;* to which all the phenomena of *light,* and even of gravitation, may be attributed. What is this earth upon which we dwell? It is a plane surface, said the ancient philosophers; flat, and triangular, says the Shaster; the mountains were made to hold

* Eccles. xii, 6. See Adam Clarke's admirable notes upon the passage.

it fast to its moorings, says the Koran; and the divine Plato considered it an intelligent animal. What do the sacred writers, the penmen of the great Creator say? "He set a compass (or, as the margin has it, a *circle*) upon the face of the depth," Prov. viii, 27; and, "He sitteth upon the circle (or, as it might have been rendered, the SPHERE) of the earth." Isa. xl, 22. And what are its foundations? How is it upheld? Job declared, thousands of years before human science had rendered it *safe* to understand him literally: "He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and *hangeth the earth upon nothing*." Job xxvi, 7. In that most remarkable passage in the Epistle of St. James, (i, 17,) is an allusion, and that merely incidental, to the subtil doctrine of the *parallactic angle*;* the importance of a knowledge of which, in measuring the planetary orbs, was unknown at the time in which he wrote, and for ages afterward. It is beyond a doubt the language, the *ipsissima verba*, of God himself; and there, as in other instances which we stay not to point out, and yet others now "dark from excessive brightness," but which the researches of future philosophers will render visible, we see and hear the great "Father of lights," the fountain of all knowledge, communicating with his children; and, at the same time, giving glimpses that his knowledge is too wonderful for us, and that his ways are past finding out.

It comes in place here to advert to the objections which have been urged against the miracle wrought in the days of Joshua; when it is said, "the sun stood still upon Gibeon, and the moon in the valley of Ajalon." Perhaps no single passage of the Bible has been more frequently branded as a palpable and manifest absurdity. It could only have been recorded, we are told, by one utterly unacquainted with the planetary system; and received as fact by none but the most credulous. True, such objections have been, again and again, refuted; but they reappear, as often, in the borrowed rags of witticism, the garb of ingenuous inquiry, or the solemn drapery of profound investigation. So far as they are urged by the scoffer and the skeptic, for the purpose of invalidating the divine inspiration of the entire Bible, they claim from us, at present, no attention. In *their* vocabulary the epithets, absurd, impossible, imply simply, that the acts thus characterized are out of the ordinary course of nature; that is, miraculous. Now, it is not only conceded that the event under consideration was a miracle, but

* "The Father of lights, with whom is no *parallax, nor tropical shadow*."—*Wakefield's Translation.*

that is the character given to it by the sacred writer: "The LORD hearkened to the voice of a man: for the LORD fought for Israel." While, however, we waste no words with the avowed disbeliever in the revelation which God has given us, we must protest against the readiness with which well-meaning Christians unite with the scoffer in throwing doubts upon the narrative of the sacred writers. "It was not an enemy, for then I could have borne it." . . . "I was wounded in the house of my friends." It is they who profess to believe that nothing is too hard for the Lord, and that the Bible is HIS book, who seek to render that book palatable to those who deny the divinity of its claims, and question the omnipotence of its Author. Alas for them! where will they find a stopping-place? Admit that in the sacred volume are to be found unauthorized quotations from uninspired poets, fanciful narratives from the Book of Jasher, and absurd stories, calculated only for the astonishment of a half-civilized people; and the enemy will not fail to take advantage of your admission, and assume the right to denounce as absurdities everything which his perverted reason cannot fathom, and which comes in collision with the corrupt propensities of his nature. We choose to enter into no explanations as to *how* this thing was done. HE, who has all power in heaven and on earth, could counteract, for the time being, all the laws of matter; and most assuredly had the ability to prevent any of those consequences which man, in the plenitude of his self-sufficiency, declares must have ensued when the sun stood still in mid-heaven. We are no more concerned about the *modus operandi* in this matter, than we are about the precise nature of the efficacy of the clay ointment used by Christ in opening the eyes of the blind man; or the *bulk* of the fragments remaining after the thousands had been fed with the loaves and fishes. "I was dumb, I opened not my mouth; because THOU didst it."*

* In answer to the objection, that if the sun had stood still for one single instant, or if the movement of the globe had been retarded, universal destruction would have been the result, our author says:—"It is this very objection which is itself an error. In fact, if the miracle, in place of arresting suddenly, in an indivisible instant, the rotation of our globe, took only the short space of a few seconds to accomplish it by a gentle and continuous action, then you have enough in this simple circumstance to assure you that such a phenomenon could not have, mechanically, any other sensible effect than to raise, from west to east, the waters spread over the surface of the earth. A child might tell you, that a coach in rapid motion, rushing against an impediment, may be dashed to pieces, because the impediment is immovable; and all the travelers, thrown out forward, will be hurled to the ground. But let it be stopped by a continuous resistance, which is applied gradually, for three or four seconds; then the smallest children seated

The objection arising from the variations which have been found in different manuscripts, it will be seen, does not lie against the plenary inspiration of *the original Scriptures*. Errors may, or may not, have crept into the copies subsequently made. Transcribers may have blundered, and translators may have failed to give the precise meaning of the original. None of these things affect the question:—Did the whole Bible come from God? The integrity, the accuracy, the faithfulness, of any copy or version, is a matter totally different from the divinity of the original. It is not to be concealed, however, that just here, with many, the difficulty presses with the greatest force. Admitting that the original came from God, of what advantage is it, when we are assured that errors abound in the copies we now have, that the versions differ from one another; that various readings, to the number of thirty thou-

in the vehicle will remain unshaken from their seats: they will not even be aware of the impulse, which three seconds before they were receiving from the impetuous movement of the horses, and which, without this precaution, must have been sufficient to throw them to a great distance. The rotation of the earth is, at the equator, at the rate of fourteen hundred and twenty-six feet a second; at Jerusalem, twelve hundred and twelve feet. This is the speed of a ball at the moment of leaving a cannon, projected by one-fifth its own weight of powder; which is capable (deducting the effect of atmospheric resistance) of elevating this projectile to the height of twenty-four thousand feet; and yet a child of six years, in two-thirds of a minute, could, without danger, destroy all this force, by the elastic and continued action of its fingers. Commit to its little hands an eight pound cannon-ball for forty seconds; and during the same time, let another of the same weight fall freely through the air, and from the height of Mount Himalaya. At the end of only forty seconds, the weight, after having acted by the same impulse upon the one and the other of these projectiles, shall merely, in regard to the first, have wearied the feeble fingers which held it; while it shall have imparted to the other a rapidity of motion, equal to that of the rotation of the earth impressed on the hill of Beth-horon in the latitude of Jerusalem. The child does not imagine that he has been able, in two-thirds of a minute, to destroy, by the continued action of his little hand, a force capable of projecting a ball eight thousand feet higher than Mount Blanc, and of cutting down, at an immense distance, squadrons and ramparts in the day of battle! Thus, then, if God should have employed no more than forty seconds, in the days of Joshua, to arrest, by a supple and successive resistance, the movement of our globe, the projecting impulse from west to east, which a mass of iron of eight pounds would have felt in the plain of Beth-horon, would have been no stronger than the pressure felt to-day by the hand upon which you lay such a weight. And if the mass instead of having the form of a bullet, had had that of a quoit or of a cube, there would not have been enough of that impulse to make it overcome the resistance of friction, and change its place upon the surface of the ground."—Pp. 172–174.

sand, have been detected by those who have critically examined the various manuscripts that have come down to our day? Truly, this looks formidable. Thirty thousand variations! But what are they? Years of the most patient and persevering toil have been spent in comparing, and collating, in weighing, in dissecting, in scanning with microscopic eye, the chapters, the verses, the letters, yea, and the very punctuation, of every version and manuscript known to be in existence. Kennicott, Michaelis, and Houbigant, upon the Old Testament; and Griesbach, Bengel, Wetstein, upon the New; with a host of others, and they, men of profound learning, and the most astonishing patience, have pored, for years, over the versions in the Arabic, Syriac, Armenian; have explored the convents of Mount Athos, of Asiatic Turkey, and of Egypt, rejoicing at the discovery of a new manuscript, "as one that findeth great spoil," and, adding it to those already under examination, have published to the world the result of this protracted, and laborious, and oft-repeated investigation. And what is that result? We have said,—variations amounting to thirty thousand. But what are they? Differences in the shade of expression; the omission or addition of an article; the repetition of a noun or a pronoun; an article in place of a pronoun; and vice versa: a difference in the order of a sentence, a variety in the spelling, the position of an adjective before or after a substantive; in short, variations, many of them so minute as to escape observation, save by those who search for them; so trivial as to be utterly imperceptible in a translation; and so unimportant, altogether, as to justify the opinion of a learned man of our own day when he says:—"In truth, if we except these brilliant negative conclusions to which they have come, the direct result obtained by so many lives of men consumed in these immense researches, appears to be a nullity; and we might say, that time, talent, and science, have been foolishly spent in arriving there."*

Even so. If we except those brilliant negative conclusions! But by their establishment, the church and the world have gained more than they could have done, had the labors of these men taken any other direction whatever. The battery which had been erected against the sacred volume has been turned, successfully, against its assailants. What was once urged as an argument to disprove the integrity of the Scriptures, is now seen to be testimony, direct and conclusive, to the fact, that the God who gave has taken care to preserve, in all its brightness, "a lamp unto our feet and a light unto our path." In this respect the dying words of Moses have

* Wiseman, as quoted by our author.

been fulfilled; and we may exclaim, "Happy art thou, O Israel: thine enemies have been found liars unto thee, and thou hast trodden upon their high places." The learned Bengel, who, at first tormented, and in grief with reference to the integrity of the sacred text, resolved to devote his life to a thorough examination of the subject, for which he was admirably fitted by genius and by education, thus writes to his pupil, at the close of his labors:—

"Eat simply the bread of the Scriptures, such as you find it; and be not disturbed, if perchance you find here and there a little fragment of the millstone which has fallen into it. You may now dismiss all the doubts which once so horribly tormented me. If the Holy Scriptures, which have been copied so often, and which have so often passed through the imperfect hands of fallible men, were absolutely without variations, the miracle would be so great that faith in it would be no more faith. I am astonished, on the contrary, that there has resulted from all the transcribings a no greater number of different readings."

But some ask—and the acute Coleridge* is of the number—Are the inconclusive reasonings, the unmeaning truisms, the malignant effusions found in the book of God—in the mouth of Job's friends, for instance, and in the lips of Satan—are they to be accounted the dictates of infinite wisdom? And are we to be classed with the revilers of His book because we will not, cannot thus receive them? To this the answer is easy. We shudder, with you, at the blasphemy which would charge upon the God of the Bible the absurdities, the follies, the falsehoods declared therein to have been uttered and perpetrated. We are very far from advocating or believing the dogma that "all that is in the Bible is religion." On the contrary, our position is, that whatever is stated there to have been said or done, *was* said or done; that it was said or done by those to whom it is there attributed, exactly as stated; and that it is all thus recorded by the Holy One precisely as it would have been, had he written it all,—as he did the decalogue, with his own fingers. There is a vast difference between a perfect saying, and the perfect record of a saying; between the dictates of infallible wisdom, and the sayings and doings of fallible creatures, infallibly recorded. The objection, sanctioned though it be by great names, is a man of straw which we are ready, if it be necessary, to assist in knocking down.

There remains for consideration yet one other objection to the inspiration of the Scriptures. It is derived from their own state-

* See his "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit."

ments. The apostle Paul, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, apparently makes a distinction between what he says on his own authority, and what, he tells us, is an express revelation from the Lord. Thus in the 25th verse of the seventh chapter he says:—"Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; yet I give my judgment, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord." In the 10th verse of the same chapter he says:—"Unto the married, I command, yet not I, but the Lord:" and in verse 12:—"But to the rest speak I, not the Lord." The general opinion of commentators on these passages seems to be, that Paul was here making a distinction between what he says as an inspired apostle, and what he says as a private Christian: and hence, the argument is, that all Scripture is not given by inspiration of God, but is a mixture of inspired and uninspired directions to the church.*

If the argument be sound, it will follow, with reference to the direction given in verse 12: "If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away:" that a brother thus situated may, if it please him, put away his unbelieving wife, without transgressing any commandment of the Lord. He will, indeed, thereby act contrary to the *advice* given by the apostle, but his advice, apart from his inspiration, may be rejected, certainly without sin. True, "the brother," by so doing, will violate the express command of Jesus Christ; (Matt. v, 32, &c.;) but still he may plead, that the apostle, who had the mind of the Spirit, does, by the language under consideration, teach that he may thus act even toward a wife who is "pleased to dwell with him," without incurring any greater guilt than that of simply rejecting uninspired advice; for the apostle's language is, "To the rest speak I, NOT the Lord."

So, again, in the 25th verse, where the apostle says: "I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment:" if he means to be understood as speaking merely his own sentiments, in contradistinction to the directions which he gives under the inspiration of God, it will follow, most conclusively, that his direction in verse 27 teaches that he who is bound to a wife *may*, or may not, "seek to be loosed," with no greater blame in the one case, or credit in the other, than that of rejecting, or following the advice of an uninspired Christian; or, at any rate, of one who does not give this advice under the inspiration of God. It is most manifest, however, that these and similar absurdities could not have

* Dr. Adam Clarke, for instance, in his Commentary; especially in his note on 1 Cor. vii, 6. Barnes, on the same passage, in his Notes, Explanatory and Practical, &c.

been intended by the apostle; and, consequently, such interpretations must be based upon a misapprehension of his meaning. Our author's sentiments on this subject are clear, and happily expressed:—

"When the passages are more closely examined, it will be found that they cannot be adduced as a proof against the doctrine of a full inspiration. Far from limiting the divinity of apostolic language, these verses, on the contrary, speak as only the fullest and most sovereign inspiration could authorize. St. Paul could speak thus, only by placing his epistles, if I may so say, as St. Peter has done, (2 Peter iii, 16,) ON THE LEVEL WITH THE OTHER sacred writings: nay, we must say, ABOVE THEM, (inasmuch as we there hear a more recent expression of the will of our Lord.) Let us examine this point. What does the apostle of Jesus Christ seek in this chapter? He treats of three cases of conscience; concerning one of them, God has commanded nothing and interdicted nothing. 'So, then, he that giveth her in marriage, doth well.' I speak this by PERMISSION, and *not of commandment*, but as an apostle, I give from the Lord, merely *counsel;* and he is careful to add in the fortieth verse: 'I think also that I have the spirit of the Lord.' The Lord would leave you free herein, says the apostle: he will place no snare in your path; and if you care not to follow the general advice that is given you, you violate no commandment, and commit no sin; only, he that marrieth, doeth well; he that marrieth not, doeth better. In regard to the other case, however, be careful; FOR HERE IS A COMMANDMENT OF THE LORD. He has already made known his will, (Matt. v, 31, 32; Mal. ii, 14,) and I have nothing new to declare unto you. Both the Old Testament and Jesus Christ have spoken. It is NOT, therefore, I, the apostle of Jesus Christ, it is the LORD, who has already made known his will unto you.

"For the third case, that of the brother who finds himself bound to an unbelieving wife, you had a commandment from the Lord in the Old Testament. *I revoke it,—for I have the spirit of the Lord.* I abolish, then, the former commandment, and am charged to replace it by a contrary order. It is not the Lord (verse 12) who forbids you (by any previous precept) to put away an unbelieving wife; it is *I*, Paul, an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father who raised him from the dead. We see, then, with the clearness of noon-day:—the apostle, instead of appealing to the ancient word of the Lord, revokes it, to replace it by a contrary order; so that this passage, very far from weakening the inspiration, confirms it strongly; since it would have been nothing less than an outrageous blasphemy, if the apostle had not felt, that in using this language, he was the mouth of God; and if he had dared to say by his own authority, It is not the Lord, *it is I.* *I* myself tell you:—if any man have an unbelieving wife, let him not send her away. The Lord had given (under the old dispensation) a contrary commandment. Deut. xxiv, 2; 1 Kings xi, 2. These verses of St. Paul, then, far from authorizing the supposition of any mingling of human wisdom in the

Scriptures of the New Testament, are there to attest that, in their epistles, and in the most familiar details of their epistles, the apostles were the mouth of God; and ranked themselves, not only as successors of Moses and the ancient prophets, but even above them; as a second message from God must supersede that which was before it, and as the New Testament must surpass the Old, if not in excellence, at least in authority."—Pp. 200–202.

It is gratifying to be enabled to add, in corroboration of these sentiments, the opinion of Dr. Adam Clarke, who, as we have already intimated, is not an advocate for the plenary inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, in the sense in which we use that phrase. In his note on one of the verses under consideration (com. on 1 Cor. vii, 12) this learned expositor says:—

"As if he (the apostle) had said, For what I have already spoken, I have the testimony of the Lord by Moses; and of my own Lord and Master, Christ. But for the directions which I am now about to give, there is no *written testimony;* and *I deliver them now for the first time.* These words do *not* intimate that the apostle *was not now under the influences of the divine Spirit;* but, that there was nothing in the sacred writings which bore directly on this point."

Wesley, in his notes on verse 25 of the same chapter, is still more explicit:—"The apostles wrote *nothing which was not divinely inspired.* But with this difference: sometimes they had a particular revelation, and a special commandment: at other times they wrote from the divine light which abode with them, the standing treasure of the Spirit of God. And this also *was not their private opinion,* but a divine rule of faith and practice. As one whom God hath made faithful in my apostolic office; who, therefore, *faithfully deliver what I receive from him.*"

We have dwelt the longer upon this objection, not only because many, who have written for the purpose of enlightening the world on the mysteries of God's revelation, have conceded the point, and have based arguments upon it; but, because we readily admit, that if such be the fact,—if the sacred writers, themselves, declare that sometimes they were left to the utterance of their own thoughts, and permitted to incorporate *them* with the thoughts of God,—then is our plea for the full and complete inspiration of the sacred record totally annihilated; and every argument that can be advanced on this side of the question stripped of its power.

We inquire, then, what do the sacred writers, themselves, say upon the subject of the inspiration under which they wrote? Will it be reasoning in a circle to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures

by the Scriptures themselves? It might be so considered, were our argument with the atheist, or the deist; but that is not the case. Our starting point is the authenticity of the Old and New Testaments. It is admitted that the writers were men of truth, that they knew what they say they knew: what, then, do they say on the subject under consideration?

We have already, more than once, adverted to the declaration of Paul in his Second Epistle to Timothy, (iii, 16:)—"All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Of course, he refers to the Old Testament; of which he says, in the preceding verse, Timothy had known from his childhood. It is a matter of no consequence to the argument, whether we adopt our authorized translation, or read the passage with the transposition of the verb:—"All Scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable," &c. In either case, he is speaking, be it observed, of the *Scripture;* that is, not of the thoughts, nor the facts, but of *what is written*, (γραφη,) and the writing, yea the letters which compose that writing, (ταειραγράμματα, as he has it in the preceding verse,) were given by inspiration of God. It is the *writings*, too, of which the apostle predicates the epithet *holy*, in alluding to the early studies of his son in the gospel.

Of the same import is the testimony of St. Peter. Of the prophetical writers of the Old Testament, he says, in his First Epistle, (i, 11,) "The Spirit of Christ *was in them;*" and in his Second Epistle (i, 20) he declares that "no prophecy of the Scriptures is of any private interpretation; for the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man;" (proceeded not, says Adam Clarke, from the prophet's own knowledge or invention,) "but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Here let it be noted, the apostle is speaking of the *written* word, the prophecy of the *Scripture*. No particle of this is of any private interpretation; but in the whole of it the Holy Ghost speaks by men chosen by himself for the purpose. This language cannot be confined simply to the *predictions;* for, as is well known, the word prophecy, both in the Old Testament and in the New, is applied to any religious teaching or exhortation. Thus, "Eldad and Medad *prophesied* in the camp;" and Moses, when requested to forbid them, replied, "Would God that all the Lord's people were *prophets*." Num. xi, 26, 29. In 1 Chron. xxv, 1, we read of those who "should *prophesy* with harps, with psalteries, and with cymbals;" and "he that *prophesieth*," says Paul, (1 Cor. xiv, 3,) "speaketh unto men to edification, to exhortation, and comfort." Now, then, if no prophecy of the Scriptures, nothing written therein for edification, or

exhortation, or comfort, came by the will of man; and if, in them all, holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, we see not with what propriety it can be contended, that any part or portion of the Old Testament is the mere private uninspired opinion or assertion of those who wrote.

In further corroboration of our position, it is declared, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that "God spake unto the fathers by the prophets," chap. i, 1. Had there been anything less in the apostle's mind than a plenary inspiration, he would not have used this language. If God *speaks*, the words spoken must be God's. So, also, he "who walked in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord, blameless," the holy Zacharias, "filled," at the time, "with the Holy Ghost," and "*prophesying*," declares that "God *spake* by the mouth of his holy prophets." Luke i, 70.

On that memorable occasion, when the apostle to the Gentiles had reached Rome, after a perilous journey, and had there labored with little success to "persuade" his kinsmen after the flesh "concerning Jesus; both out of the law of Moses, and out of the prophets, from morning until evening;" he dismissed them with a bitter quotation from Isaiah; the language of which he attributes to God himself:—"Well SPAKE the *Holy Ghost*, by Esaias the prophet, unto our fathers," &c. Acts xxviii, 25. Peter declares to the assembled disciples, previous to the election of a successor to the traitor Judas, that "this scripture must needs have been fulfilled, *which the Holy Ghost*, by the mouth of David, SPAKE." Acts i, 16. And "the company" of the disciples, on the liberation of Peter and John, lift up their voice, and, in their thanksgiving, assert that the "God who made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all that in them is, *had said*," by the mouth of his servant David, "Why did the heathen rage, and the people imagine vain things?" Acts iv, 24.

It is unnecessary to multiply quotations from the writers of the Old Testament on this point. Moses declares that the Lord said unto him, "Go, and I will be with thy mouth, and teach thee what thou shalt say." Exod. iv, 12. And hence we hear him repeatedly exclaim, "Thus SAITH the Lord." Jeremiah tells us, that he declined to go with a message to the people, until "the Lord put forth his hand and touched my mouth, and said unto me, Behold I have put *my words* in thy mouth." Jer. i, 9. So, the commission of Ezekiel: "Get thee unto the house of Israel, and speak *with my words* unto them." Ezek. iii, 4. David, the anointed of the God of Jacob, and the sweet psalmist of Israel, said, "The Spirit of the Lord *spake by me*, and HIS word was in my tongue,"

2 Sam. xxiii, 1, 2; a declaration attested by Jesus Christ himself, who assures us that "David spake by the Holy Ghost." Mark xii, 36.

The argument from these passages we suppose to be sufficiently clear. It is briefly this. Did not the inspiration of the sacred writers extend to the *manner*, as well as the matter, to *words*, as well as things, there would be a manifest impropriety in the quotations referred to; an impropriety which, we hesitate not to say, would very materially impair our confidence in the accuracy of their authors. Such an impropriety cannot, of course, be admitted by any who take the Bible for their rule of faith: and hence, our conclusion is irresistible. That conclusion is strengthened, moreover, by the fact, that nowhere do the sacred writers intimate anything to the contrary; and, in the only passages of the New Testament, on which the opponents of a plenary inspiration rely, we have seen that a very good sense, to say the least, may be given to the apostle's language, without involving him in the absurdity of self-contradiction.

Our attention has as yet been confined to the writings of the former dispensation. The evidence, that the authors of the New Testament wrote also under the plenary inspiration of the Holy Ghost, is equally satisfactory. Paul, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, claims this inspiration for the *manner*, no less than the matter: "We spake not *in the words* which man's wisdom teacheth, but" (in the words) "which the Holy Ghost teacheth," chap. ii, 13. He expressly declares the teaching of himself and his colleagues to be the *word* of God: "Ye received it not as the word of men, but (as it is in truth) the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe." 1 Thess. ii, 13. The promise of the great Head of the church to his apostles was, that the Holy Spirit should *guide them into all truth*. That he would do this, not by partially enlightening them, or by the suggestion of ideas which they might clothe in their own language, is evident from his directions with reference to the persecutions they would be called to endure for his "name's sake:"—"Take ye no thought how, or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say; for it is *not ye that speak*, but the *Spirit* of your Father *which speaketh* in you." It is not probable that He who furnished *words* that were to be uttered in the hearing of a few persecuting rulers and magistrates, and which would be forgotten almost as soon as spoken, would have left them to themselves in the preparation of instructions and exhortations, destined for his church, and for the world, until the consummation of all things.

The Scripture argument might be extended; but we hasten to submit a few additional considerations, which will commend themselves to the attention of all who desire to come to a correct conclusion on the question at issue.

And first, on the supposition that a part of the Bible was given by the direct and plenary inspiration of the Holy One; and that a part was not thus given, it will devolve upon the advocates of that opinion to mark out for us the dividing line; to tell us what God says, and what are merely the unauthorized dicta of Moses, or of David, or of Paul. It would be a convenient thing—would'nt it?—if they who have the ability would prepare, for the benefit of those who seek to know God's will, a copy of the Bible, wherein those parts which were written by His inspiration should be printed in a dfferent type,—say a larger letter. We are serious when we claim the right to demand this service at their hands; and, perhaps, nothing but the absurdity of the undertaking will open their eyes to the lamentable consequences that must ensue, were their professed opinion carried out in practice. We will not ask, what kind of a Bible would be the result of the combined wisdom of those who deny that the whole of it came from God; as the supposition that they will ever agree among themselves is an absurdity: but we will ask, What kind of a Bible have they now? What is their rule of faith and practice? The sacred Scriptures? No, verily; but those parts of them which *they* believe to have been written by inspiration of God; which have been summoned before the tribunal of *their* judgment, and have stood the test of *their* investigation. Does the Unitarian, the Universalist, the Papist, ask anything more? And can you, in the common courtesy of life, to say nothing of the charity of the gospel, grant him anything less? You question the inspiration by which Luke inserted in his Gospel the genealogy of Jesus: your neighbor, quite as good a scholar as yourself, denies the divinity of Christ, and tells you *he* doubts the inspiration of John, when he wrote the introduction to his Gospel. Again, you are pleased to find rabbinical superstitions in the Epistle of St. James; if, perchance, you will not venture, with the father of the Reformation, to brand the whole of it as chaffy—*epistola straminea.* Is it wonderful that the Universalist finds a solution to passages, which speak of a future punishment, in those same rabbinisms; and prefers to apply Luther's epithet to declarations like that of the Baptist, when he says, "He that cometh after me . . . will burn up the *chaff* with unquenchable fire?" Once more. With what consistency do you condemn the Romanist who tells us, that he believes as the church believes, and that he leaves

it to her to settle what portions of the Bible are the word of God, and what are merely the traditions of uninspired men; when you claim for yourself the authority which he, with quite as much faith and more humility, yields up to those who ought to know more about it than himself? Look into this matter more closely; and tell us, if you can, what is the precise difference between taking for the rule of faith the Bible *and* tradition on the one side; and making that rule to consist *partly* of the words of God, and *partly* of mere human sentiments, on the other.

In the next place, we remark, that the hypothesis which denies that the style, the language, the words, of the sacred writers were dictated by the Holy Spirit, and confines inspiration to the subject matter, while it perplexes the reason with doubts, does not relieve the supposed difficulty for which it was invented. It is perplexing. Human language may, or may not, convey the precise shade of meaning which the Holy Spirit intended. If He did not control the entire phraseology of the writers, what assurance have we that they may not, in one place, have spoken a little too strongly; and have varied from the precise idea suggested to them, in another? It is well known, that even when they intend to express the same sentiments, writers differ in their choice of expression, and in their style; and this difference, although it might be of little importance in a fictitious narrative, or even in the relation of historic facts, becomes momentous when man's eternal interests are at stake. We want a clear and steady light, not only upon the beginning, but all through the pathway to the skies. We want positive certainty as to what God says, and it is scarcely possible to conceive of anything more bewildering and perplexing to a sincere inquirer, than the flickering *ignis fatuus* which increases just in proportion to our uncertainty on the question, Who speaks? and, Is it spoken just as He would have it?

But the hypothesis does not relieve the difficulty which good men have found, or fancied, in the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. That difficulty arises from two sources: first, there are matters of trivial moment which, it is said, might have been as well recorded without, as with, this inspiration; and secondly, it is inconceivable how God should dictate the very words used by the sacred writers. In reply to the former, while it is admitted that much of what is found in the Bible, particularly in the historical parts of the Old Testament, might have been written without inspiration *elsewhere*, the question is, How came those things *there?* and being there, they lose that trivial character which might otherwise belong to them. Then, again, it is, we think, rather more difficult to suppose an

inspiration which does not, than one which does, extend to the phraseology. How are ideas communicated without words? Is not the connection between thought and language inseparable? Perhaps not. But it is easier, speaking after the manner of men, to communicate words than ideas; and hence, the supposition that the Almighty suggested the thoughts, and not the phraseology, instead of lessening, absolutely increases the difficulty, and increases it unnecessarily. It is inexplicable, say you, how God communicated the words of the Scriptures. Granted. It is none the less, if it be not more, difficult to explain how he furnished ideas without words.

It is undeniable, moreover, and this is an argument of much force, that the sacred writers, so far from clothing the ideas they received in language of their own, did not, in many instances, understand the full import of what they wrote. Daniel records what he hears, and says, "I heard, but I understood not," chap. xii, 8. Numerous passages might be cited from the other prophets—from the Psalmist especially—the purport of which was evidently not perceived by themselves or by any one else, until He of whom they wrote made the application to himself. It is written, twice, for instance, in the historical books of Moses, that a bone of the passover shall not be broken. Exod. xii, 46; Num. ix, 12. Not until Christ's death was it known that these apparently trivial and unimportant directions were prophetic of an event which, so far as human agency was concerned, might or might not have taken place. When did "they part his (David's) garments among them, and cast lots upon his vesture?" What burial-place, and what man of wealth, were in the mind of the evangelical prophet when he wrote:—"He made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich, in his death?" Did the writer of the Book of Exodus, or Asaph, to whom is attributed the eighty-second psalm, know the use which Christ would afterward make of their apparently casual remark relative to the gods of the people? John x, 34; Exod. xxii, 28; Psalm lxxxii, 6. But it is needless to multiply questions of this kind. We have the testimony of an apostle himself to the fact under consideration. "The prophets, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you," are represented, by St. Peter, as "*searching what the Spirit of Christ, which was in them, did signify,* when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow." The prophets themselves searched into the meaning of their own writings! Why? Because God gave ideas which they clothed in their own language? Absurd. In the very nature of the case, ideas must be fully comprehended, before it is

possible to transfer them from the mind to paper; whereas, an amanuensis may, or may not, understand what is dictated by his employer. To him who put this essay in type, some parts of it may have been perfectly plain, and others strangely mysterious; his business was to follow copy: so, to compare small things with great, on no other principle can the anxiety of the prophets to search out the hidden meaning of what themselves had written be explained and accounted for.

Again, to illustrate the gratuitous supposition that while parts of any prophecy, or narrative, or epistle, were written from the lips of God, other portions originated wholly with man; let us suppose, for a moment, that the printer had interspersed throughout these pages sentiments of his own; here, an explanatory sentence, and there, clauses and expletives ornamental or exegetical;—to whom would the authorship belong?* In these additions there need be nothing false or absurd; and then you have a case precisely parallel with the hypothesis that a part of the Bible came from God, and a part was written without his dictation, by men, who were, nevertheless, "kept from any gross absurdity, or fundamental error." We say the cases are parallel. In the former, you could not know whose sentiments you were perusing: in the latter, you are equally ignorant; and, in fact, have no Bible, no book of God. What you are pleased to call such, is, by the supposition, converted into a volume of doubtful authorship, containing, with "the Word of God," more or less "Apocrypha," according to the reader's judgment; that is, in many instances, his fancy or imagination.

Did Jesus Christ, by precept or example, give any countenance to this kind of eclecticism? Did the great Teacher, when he had occasion to refer to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, ever intimate that any part or any sentence lacked the divine impress; and might be considered as the sentiment merely of him who wrote? Far from it. Throughout his whole history, he treats all that is written in the book of the law, in the prophets, and in the psalms, with equal respect; exemplifying the meaning of his own declaration, on an occasion already referred to:—"THE SCRIPTURE CANNOT BE BROKEN." Previous to his entrance upon his public ministry, he

* "We recollect an insane man," says our author, "a pensioner of our hospitals, whose hand-writing was so good, that a minister of Geneva employed him to transcribe his sermons. Conceive the confusion of the minister, when, in receiving his manuscripts, he found that this unfortunate man had imagined he could enrich every page by adding his own thoughts. Yet the distance between a lunatic and a minister, be he holy as Daniel, and sublime as Isaiah, is less than between Daniel or Isaiah and Eternal Wisdom!"—P. 255.

foils the tempter and drives him back to his own hell; not, as he might have done, by a withering glance of his eye, nor by an express command from his lips alone; nor yet, by a burning sentence, revealing a new truth; but, by a simple statement, thrice repeated, in which he refers to the words and the letters of the sacred volume: "It is WRITTEN." And where is it written? Truly, in that book which, as its name implies, contains a *repetition* of what had been already revealed; and which, of the entire Pentateuch, the advocates of a partial inspiration might otherwise have adduced as not having required the dictation of the Holy Spirit. So, when the Pharisees complained of his "doing that which it is not lawful to do on the sabbath-day," he referred them to that *which is written;* and quoted from the minor prophets. He charges ignorance of the *Scriptures* upon the Sadducees, as the reason of their doubting the resurrection of the dead: and, instead of proving by a new argument, or even authoritatively declaring, the immortality of the soul, he refers them to what Moses had *written*. It is so all through his ministry. Upon the cross, he yields not up his spirit until the prophetic declaration of the Psalmist is fulfilled to the very letter: and, after his resurrection from the dead, in that last personal interview with his disciples, their hearts burn within them, not as they receive new views of doctrinal truth, or listen to vivid descriptions of the eternal world; but, as he "explains to them the Scriptures;" as he says unto them, "Thus it is *written;*" and shows the necessity that "*all things* concerning himself must be fulfilled, which *were written* in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms."

With these facts before him, the reader may ask himself the question, Did Jesus Christ believe in the plenary inspiration of the Old Testament Scriptures? Does his language, or his conduct, anywhere intimate anything like a belief in a partial inspiration? Or, on the contrary, do they not infallibly lead to the conclusion, that in His opinion the author of the Bible is the author of every verse, and word, and letter; just as He, who made the world, made every leaf, every blade of grass, every little grain of sand upon the sea-shore?

It has been no part of our design to discuss the question:—Which are the writings that deserve the epithet, sacred? Or, What constitutes the Book of God? We agree with those who have no doubts on that subject; who receive all the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, and are satisfied, from internal evidence, as well as from the voice of the church, that the Bible is God's book. It matters not, then, that within the compass of that volume

are, confessedly, "many things hard to be understood;" many, for the insertion of which we see not the propriety; and more, that appear perfectly unnecessary. It is just so in his other great volume—the book of nature. We see, around us, venomous reptiles, insignificant insects, repulsive zoophytes. It becomes us as little to question the handiwork of the Almighty, in the one case, as in the other; but, in both, equally to bow in reverence to that Almighty Being who is unsearchable, and whose ways are past finding out. F.

ART. VI.—*Appeal to the American Churches, with a Plan for Catholic Union.* By S. S. SCHMUCKER, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Lutheran Church, Gettysburg, Pa.

SUCH is the title of a small duodecimo volume, now before the American churches. Though first published some six or seven years since, it is matter of deep regret that its interesting contents should be so little known by those for whose especial benefit it was designed. The "Appeal" has undoubtedly been heeded in certain quarters, and, where heeded, has had a most happy effect. This would seem evident from the array of indorsers and recommendations appended to the second edition. Still, for some cause, the book must have had a very limited circulation; especially as compared with its intrinsic merits, and obvious adaptedness to do good.

The perusal of this excellent little volume awakens the tenderest and sweetest emotions; emotions, it may reasonably be supposed, kindred to those which swell the bosoms of rapt spirits before the throne of light. It would be hardly accurate to say, the author throws his whole soul into his subject: his subject seems rather to absorb him; to take him captive; to carry him forward in a current of thought and feeling as beautiful and lovely as it is, at times, grand and overwhelming. To the catholic ear, the "Appeal" seems like an echo from the God of love. It is the voice of him who reclined on the bosom of Jesus, again saying, "Little children, love one another."

The divisions, and bickerings, and sectarian prejudices of the Protestant churches, with respect to each other, can never be viewed by the sincere friend of a pure and spiritual Christianity

with any other feelings than those of unmingled sorrow and painful regret. What a pity that the body of Christ should be thus divided; that his seamless garment should be so needlessly rent asunder; that he should be thus cruelly wounded in the house of his own friends! Nothing has, perhaps, done so much to strengthen the hands of the skeptic, to render religion inefficient, and to array prejudice against it, as that want of Christian union which our author so pointedly and so eloquently condemns. It has been the bohon upas of our American churches; blasting, by its dreadfully malign effluvia, the fruits of righteousness; and spreading mildew and death over the heritage of the Lord! Thanks to the benevolent Schmucker that he has come out against it with a power of argument, an eloquence of expression, and a blandness of spirit, as rare as they are at once commendable and captivating.

In the first chapter the author urges the obligation of Christian union—from Scripture injunctions, the example of the apostles and primitive Christians; and from the baneful consequences of sectarian divisions. He maintains that such divisions tend to destroy community of interest and sympathy of feeling among Christians; that they impede the impartial study of the sacred volume; that they retard the progress of religion among the people of the world; that they obstruct the operations of the missionary cause; and that they favor the spread of Popery among ourselves.

In the second chapter he inquires into the nature of the primitive Christian union; showing that it did not consist in the subjection of the church in a whole nation under one supreme judicatory; nor in the subjection of the whole visible church on earth under one head or pope; nor in an absolute unanimity of religious sentiment; but in a union of name and fundamental doctrine, in mutual acknowledgment of each other's acts of discipline, and in the occasional interchange of epistolary communications.

In the third chapter the author proceeds to remark on the origin of the Protestant churches, and on the causes of sectarian strife. Among these causes he enumerates:—the absence of all connection between neighboring churches, and the connection of each with other churches abroad; separate organizations on the ground of doctrinal diversity; influence of transfundamental creeds; sectarian training of the rising generation; sectarian idolatry; ecclesiastical pride; and the conflict of pecuniary interest.

These topics disposed of, Dr. Schmucker brings forward in the fourth chapter his plan for the restoration of catholic union. This we regard as decidedly the most interesting and important part of the whole volume. For if the union descanted upon be not fea-

sible, if it involve a practical impossibility, then the author's whole "Appeal" is to be regarded only in the light of a most lovely piece of declamation; a sort of paradisiacal landscape, the counterpart to which is not to be found in any portion of our sin-stricken orb. We may feel a kind of abstract pleasure in contemplating the picture, but must not venture to hope that the thing represented will ever be realized. It is a mere fancy sketch—the pencilings of a truant imagination. Well, if it be only a vision of the fancy, it is a most beautiful one: the hallucination itself must be credited to something like an ethereal nature: there is somewhat of heaven in it.

We do not mean to say, that the doctor's plan is faultless. In some of its unimportant details it may, doubtless, be improved. But that the union contemplated is practicable, and that our author has stated, in substance, what is necessary in order to the consummation of such a union, it seems to us no candid and intelligent mind can doubt, after a careful perusal of the volume before us.

As a further preliminary remark, and that the reader may not look upon our author's plan of union, in advance, as the chimerical scheme of the mere theorist, it may be suggested that the feasibility of this plan is strikingly exemplified in the federal union of these United States. Each party to the compact, that is to say, each state, is sovereign in itself. Within certain constitutional limits, it knows no superior. While it acknowledges certain confederative obligations, it has reserved to itself full right to do its own work in its own way. But, at the same time, for the attainment of greater security, as well as for the accomplishment of objects supposed to be of common interest, all of the different states are united under one confederation.. Such we take to be, at least in its substantial outlines, the plan of union proposed by Dr. Schmucker.

It will be seen, then, that it differs widely from the plan advocated by certain ultraists of the present day. The latter, if we understand it, is a plan of consolidation, and not of union. It is a scheme for the amalgamation of the different sects, and not for their harmonious association. In the formation of a homogeneous whole it seeks the destruction of the elementary parts. Its efforts correspond to its aims. It cries, not "havoc," but *union;* and yet "lets slip its dogs of war." Now, if this be union at all, it must be union with a vengeance. While we question no man's motives, we are compelled by a sense of duty to the Christian public to say, that, in our opinion, a more mischievous sort of ecclesiastical polity, if polity it can be called, was never advocated by the most visionary theorist. And this opinion is strongly sup-

ported by facts. The kind of union upon which we here animadvert has been productive of the most disastrous consequences. Many of the churches in central New-York, particularly the Presbyterian, have felt its dreadfully malign influence. They have been distracted, and torn, and cut up by it into factious parties. It has passed over them like the Italian sirocco, or the Arabian simoon, withering the olive-branch of peace, and blasting by its pestiferous breath all the fruits of brotherly love. Pastors have been driven from their flocks, and the flocks themselves, scattered and peeled, have fallen an easy prey to the prowling wolf. Some of the agents in this work of destruction have even boasted of their success, and challenged the admiration of their deluded votaries that they had been so skillful and mighty in tearing down churches!

The plan of union we approve, and the one which the "Appeal" advocates, is as distant from the one just alluded to as heaven is from hell. It seeks the destruction of no one, but the union of all. It allows each to retain his livery, but throws around the whole the mantle of a common Christianity. It does not confound and consolidate, but harmonizes and assimilates. Like that of our national insignia, its motto is, *E pluribus unum.* On this point our author is very explicit. He says:—

"Some few advocates of union have proposed that all others should abandon their systems and peculiarities, and unite with them by conforming in all things to their views and practices. As this method violates the unalienable rights and obligations of Christians, by requiring the abandonment of what they believe truth, and the practice of what they consider error, it cannot be regarded as judicious, or as promising any success. It would, moreover, betray extreme weakness for any one Christian sect, at this late day, to calculate on the universal adoption of its peculiarities by all others!"—Pp. 89, 90.

Such a scheme, were the thing at all practicable, would defeat its own professed object. For illustration, what would be the effect if all the division fences between our different premises were thrown down? Would it be likely to promote the ends of good neighborhood? So far from it, that it would be the likeliest way imaginable to produce social ruptures. If we would preserve peace, every man should see that he does not trench upon the rights of his neighbor. While all use the public highway, and meet there as on common ground, each should cultivate his own land and appropriate the fruits of his own labor. Thus the rights of all are respected and the peace of society secured.

We do not, then, regard it as a misfortune that there are different sects and denominations of professing Christians. If there were

but just one, the strong presumption is, there would be nearly or quite as much diversity of religious sentiment as there now is. This would give rise to intestine broils, which would be likely to destroy the whole church. As it now is, every rational Christian can find some ecclesiastical body with which he can cordially unite.

On this point, however, we would not be misunderstood. We do regard it as a most serious misfortune that such diversity of religious opinion should exist among the followers of Christ; and we cannot but look upon it as furnishing most conclusive proof that man is a fallen being. For had man remained as he was when he first came forth from the hand of the Creator, all would have reasoned alike —all would have reached the same conclusions. Such, however, is not his present intellectual character; and when we say we regard the existence of different sects and denominations of professing Christians as no misfortune, we mean that, *in view of this diversity of religious opinion*, we consider it no misfortune. Indeed, this very diversity of association, growing out of diversity of religious opinion, if kept within proper bounds, and modified by the proper amount of Christian charity, may be turned to good account. For though the differences among fierce and fiery controvertists appeal in vain for sanction to the will and word of God, yet the differences that exist among pious and moderate men, honest in their inquiry after truth, may be considered as the powers that balance and regulate the religious world in this state of infirmity, just as the different attractions of the solar system preserve every planet in its proper orbit, and regulate the due measure of its heat and cold.

But then the whole system should have a common centre. All of the different parts of it should converge to a single point. The various members of the Protestant family should recognize their divine relationship, and should bind themselves together in a divine covenant. In all that is essential to catholic union, THEY SHOULD BE ONE. And in order to this harmony among the churches, there need be neither speculative nor practical latitudinarianism. Doubtless, there should be a sound and discriminating regard to what is fundamental in doctrine and discipline. But fatal error carefully guarded against, each denomination may maintain its own peculiar sentiments, and scrupulously adhere to its own distinctive usages. We ask not for the surrender of these. Christian fellowship does not demand it. It is bigotry—cold, heartless, repulsive bigotry—that exacts such a sacrifice.

And here it seems proper that we allow the author of the "Appeal" to develop his plan of union a little more specifically and

in detail. Any plan deserving the attention of the different Christian denominations he thinks should possess the following attributes:—

"1. It must require of no one the renunciation of any doctrine or opinion believed by him to be Scriptural or true.

"2. It must concede to each denomination, or branch of the church of Christ, the right to retain its own organization, or to alter or amend it at option; leaving everything relative to government, discipline, and worship to be managed by each denomination according to its own views for the time being. The principle of ecclesiastical association is Scriptural; the mode of its application, and extent of its use, are not decided by the sacred volume, and therefore are just matter for private judgment and progressive experience.

"3. It must dissuade no one from discussing fundamentals and non-fundamentals in the spirit of Christian love, and amicably showing why he believes some non-fundamental opinions held by any of his brethren to be incorrect."

"4. The plan must be applicable to all the orthodox Christian denominations, to all that are regarded as portions of Christ's visible church on earth. It must embrace all whom the apostles and primitive Christians would have admitted to the one catholic or universal church; all whom God has owned by the influence of his Spirit and grace."—Pp. 88, 89.

These things premised, our author proceeds to furnish a more distinct portraiture of the several "features" of his plan:—

"*First feature.* The several Christian denominations shall retain each its own present ecclesiastical organization, government, discipline, and mode of worship. It is conceded by the great body of Christians, that the Scriptures do not determine all the particulars of any system of church government, but leave the matter, excepting some important outlines, to the conscientious judgment and experience of the church in every age, and under every form of civil government; and the few who think they find their entire system of government in Scripture, do not regard it as so essential as to lead them to deny the Christian character of others. Hence every church has an equal right deliberately to test her forms of ecclesiastical organization by experience; and diversity of practice on this point ought neither to preclude ecclesiastical communion, nor to impede substantial union among the parties."—Pp. 91, 92.

This is the view taken of church government by most Protestant denominations. It exactly accords with the seventh article in the Augsburg Confession, and is fully sustained by the twenty-second article of our own confession. Variety of usage, then, can form no barrier to the union of the Protestant churches. Provided the "unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace" be scrupulously maintained,

this very diversity may be made to contribute to the perfection of the church, just as the several functions in our physical systems contribute to the perfection of the one whole man. Besides, as our author justly observes:—

"The attempt to promote union by the immediate abandonment of existing organizations would seem to be inexpedient for another reason. Experience proves it dangerous suddenly to unsettle the long-established habits of the community; lest being released from the old, they fail generally to settle down on anything new that is better. An attempt to break up existing organizations would, moreover, cast into uncertainty and confusion the various interests of churches and pastors, and might open the door for encroachment of the strong upon the weak, of the more talented on the less, of the rich upon the poor. It is a dictate of wisdom not to place ourselves at the mercy of even professed Christians, when we can avoid it. Accordingly the first feature of our plan, by stipulating that each denomination shall retain its organization as long as it shall see fit, provides against this danger, and leaves each denomination as an independent community to watch the effects of the other features proposed, and decide for itself how far to accede to the terms of union, and how long to adhere to them. It also provides for the indulgence of existing diversities and preferences so long as they shall exist; while the other features will gradually tend to diminish them; thus inviting external uniformity no faster than unity of spirit and of views has fully prepared the way. And, finally, this feature would leave untouched the relations, government, and charters of the various religious, theological, and benevolent institutions; while the general plan of union would promote unity of spirit and efficient co-operation among them all, thus accelerating the grand enterprise of the Christian church—the preaching of the gospel to every rational creature."—Pp. 93, 94.

"*Second feature.* Let each one of the confederated denominations formally resolve for itself, not to discipline any member or minister, for holding a doctrine believed by any other denomination whose Christian character they acknowledge; provided his deportment be unexceptionable, and he conform to the rules of government, discipline, and worship adopted by said denomination. This would be actually retaining in good standing all whom the apostles would have retained."—P. 94.

In delineating and defending this "feature" of his plan, the author evinces great candor, profound research, critical acumen, and argumentative talent of a high order. If we correctly understand him, he takes precisely the same ground occupied by Mr. Wesley, so far as private members are concerned. The latter, speaking of the United Societies, says, "There is only one condition previously required of those who desire admission into these societies, namely, a desire to flee from the wrath to come, and to be saved

from their sins." The Methodist Episcopal Church governs herself by the same principle. No other test of membership is thought of than that which consists in a recognition of fundamental doctrine, correct religious experience, and a holy life. We are, however, in doubt whether this principle would not be a little too loose to govern the *ministry* of any particular denomination. Great diversity of doctrinal views here might lead to serious inconvenience. For instance, an Arminian and an ultra Calvinist ministry, in the same branch of the church, so far from promoting her unity, would tend to distraction. It is true, such a conjuncture might not be very likely to occur. The principle of elective affinity, unobstructed in its operation, would, in general, lead to a different result. Those of kindred views and opinions would be apt to fall into the same ecclesiastical association. But as the thing might possibly occur, and as the occurrence of it might lead to unpleasant collisions, the articles of confederation or plan of union should, in our opinion, provide for the contingency. It might be stipulated by the contracting parties, that each branch of the confederative body should be allowed, in a mild and Christian way, to maintain substantial doctrinal uniformity, so far as its ministry might be concerned, without any offense to the church catholic.

"*Third feature.* Let a creed be adopted including only the doctrines held in common by all the orthodox Christian denominations, to be denominated, *The Apostolic Protestant Confession;* and let this same creed be used by all denominations as the term of sacramental, ecclesiastical, and ministerial communion. To this each denomination would add its present formularies for government, discipline, and mode of worship, which it might also change or amend from time to time, at its own option, and in its own way. Each denomination might also use its own former creed as a book of instruction to whatever extent it saw proper."—Pp. 106, 107.

It is proposed that the confession of this associated body of Protestant churches consist of two parts. First the "Apostles' Creed." This little formulary has already been adopted by a large majority of the Protestant churches, and the formal recognition of it would establish the doctrinal identity of the confederated churches with that of the apostolic age: a point, this, of no little moment, at least in the popular mind.

"The second should be styled, 'The United Protestant Confession,' embracing a selection of those articles from the creeds of the prominent Protestant churches, in which *all* can agree, taking but one article on each subject. As each of these churches acknowledges the Christian character of the others, they all virtually admit that the creed of each contains everything essential on the doctrine of which any

given article treats; while each one believes the creed of the other to contain minor errors on some points. Now, if a selection can be made from all the creeds, which will contain an article on every topic necessary to be introduced, and yet not include any peculiar aspects of doctrines on which the parties differ, all denominations can adopt it; for they fully believe it, and have already acknowledged its Christian character, by acknowledging as brethren those who profess it. And if, in order to complete such a creed, it would be necessary to strike out some minor specifications from any article of the existing creeds, in order to make it unexceptionable to all parties, it is evident that, *if nothing be added*, all can adopt it; because the thing erased must be non-essential, as it is one on which the confederated denominations differ."—Pp. 107, 108.

The position is briefly this: what *all* Protestant denominations agree that they find in the Bible, is most incontestably contained in it: what *some* of them believe the Bible does not teach, very possibly is not supported by it. The former should be embraced in the associated confession; the latter should be left out; though for denominational purposes it may be retained in the primary creed. But is it possible to construct such a confession; one in which all orthodox Christians can agree, and one, too, embracing all that is essential in the Christian faith? This is, at least in our estimation, placed beyond a doubt in the volume under review. The fifth chapter of the Appeal actually contains such a confession. It is composed entirely of articles now found in the confession of some one or all of the orthodox Protestant denominations; and contains nothing to which any evangelical Christian can object. It is of course more ample than the Apostles' Creed,—presenting many more points against the common foe. Possibly it might be very advantageously modified a little, but is every way sufficient to show that the thing attempted is practicable. And such a creed, when once agreed upon, would serve as a bond of union among all true Christians on the face of the whole earth.

It is, perhaps, matter of reasonable doubt whether the time has come for calling an œcumenical council, or authorizing a general convention with a view to the formation of such a confession. Probably it has not. There is yet too much of sectarianism in the Protestant churches to allow the hope that such a meeting would be productive of any very beneficial results. Our author doubts whether one is at all necessary. He thinks the testimony of experience is by no means favorable to the probable consequences of such a convention.

"The whole field of theological topics would have to be passed over, and the discussions entered on anew which were passed through in

the original formation of the several creeds. In this process, the facts and acknowledged doctrines of Christianity would probably be again commingled with the disputed relations and philosophical explanations of them, and no harmonious result be achieved. The ambition, passion, or overbearing disposition of some of the disputants, might disturb the harmony of the assembly, and wound the brethren of more pacific spirit."—P. 108.

All of this might happen, very possibly would happen, if such a congress were held before a more catholic spirit were infused into the Protestant churches. But then such an issue should be regarded as a mere incident, by no means necessarily connected with a meeting of that kind. Under a more favorable concurrence of circumstances, a general convention might be held with the happiest effect. The delegates might be limited by their constituents to such a range of topics as would preclude the possibility of angry discussion, and, at the same time, be abundantly sufficient to furnish the elements for a bond of union. Indeed, we see not how the contemplated union can be *fully* consummated without the calling of such a meeting. In the mean time, the friends of catholic unity should do their utmost to bring the Protestant churches together, both in feeling and action.

"*Fourth feature.* There should be sacramental, ecclesiastical, and ministerial communion among the confederated churches."—P. 117.

Though we regard the principle involved in this feature as all but an indispensable element in the proposed confederation, yet we frankly confess that we see great difficulties in its practical application. A large and respectable body of Protestants, it is well known, look upon "*sacramental* communion" with those who have not been immersed by a minister of their own faith and order, as peremptorily prohibited by the terms of the gospel covenant. With them, of course, communion is out of the question till they are brought to view the subject in a different light. Whether there be any prospect of this, we are not sufficiently advised to give an opinion. What a pity that the views of that most accomplished and eloquent divine, the late Rev. Robert Hall, should not be embraced by the Baptist churches generally! Till this is done we hardly see how they can become parties to the contemplated union.

The same difficulty would exist in the Episcopal churches in regard to "*ministerial* communion." We restrict the remark, however, to that portion of those churches which holds the doctrine of apostolic succession, so called. It is maintained by those of that

school, that those who are not episcopally ordained, and ordained, too, by a bishop descended in an unbroken line from the apostles, are not ministers—are mere laymen. Of course, those who have only a Presbyterian or Congregational ordination cannot look for ministerial communion with them. And though, at present, that party seems to be on the increase, yet it may be hoped that the accumulating light of the nineteenth century will bring back to the Episcopal churches, generally, the more liberal and Scriptural views of Archbishops Whitgift, Usher, and Tillotson; of Bishops Bilson, Morton, Jewell, Croft, Burnet, White, and others; of Doctors Willet, Whitaker, Stillingfleet, Haweis, and Sir Peter King.

It may, perhaps, be proper in this place to correct an error into which Dr. Schmucker has fallen respecting the Methodist Episcopal Church. He seems to take it for granted that she holds to and practices "diocesan episcopacy."—P. 90. This is not the case. While she repudiates the doctrine of three orders in the ministry, her bishops are itinerant general superintendents. She holds as fully to the validity of Presbyterian ordination as any other Protestant denomination. The supposed difficulties, then, in the way of union with her do not exist.

"*Fifth feature.* In all matters relating to the government, discipline, and forms of worship in individual churches, but pertaining to the common cause of Christianity, let the principle of co-operation regardless of sect be adopted, so far as the nature of the case will admit, and as fast as the views of the parties will allow."—P. 121.

The American Bible Society and the Protestant Association in the city of New-York are specimens of what might be done in this way, were our churches sufficiently imbued with the spirit of a *common* Christianity.

"*Sixth feature.* The Bible should as much as possible be made the text-book in all our religious and theological instruction."—P. 124.

To this, certainly, no Protestant can object.

"*The seventh and last feature* of this union is, that missionaries, going into foreign lands, ought to use and profess no other creed than the Bible and the Apostolic Protestant Confession, and connect with it whatever form of government and mode of worship they prefer."—P. 127.

On this point we should be glad to quote at large from Doctor Schmucker, but have already been too ample for our limits. We must, therefore, refer the reader to the "Appeal," and bring our remarks to a close.

And now we would ask the reader what objection he can urge against the plan of union here proposed? Is it not feasible? And if union can be effected, is it not infinitely desirable? How delightful would it be to hear Christians habitually employing language indicative of their unity,—to hear them speak of the APOSTOLIC PROTESTANT CHURCH, meaning the whole associated body of the Protestant churches,—and then to hear them speak of the Methodist Episcopal *Branch* of that church, of the Presbyterian *Branch* of it, of the Lutheran *Branch*, of the German Reformed *Branch*, of the Congregational *Branch*, and so of all our evangelical churches! Thus should we literally verify the declaration of the Lord's prophet: "And the Lord shall be king over all the earth; in that day there will be one Lord, and his name one." And thus, also, would the Saviour's prayer be answered: "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me." The thing, so beautiful and lovely in itself, would indeed have a most powerful effect on the "world." Nothing could more directly tend to stop the mouths of gainsayers, to silence the clamor of infidelity. Again, it would be said, as in the days of the persecuting Nero, when the blood of martyred Christians ran down the streets and colored the surrounding streams with a crimson hue, "BEHOLD HOW THESE CHRISTIANS LOVE ONE ANOTHER!" Happy day! When will it dawn upon our sin-stricken and distracted world? When will the friends of Christ again be, as in apostolic times, "of one heart and of one mind?" Then will the Lord again add to his church daily such as shall be saved. Thus united, and thus reflecting the glory of the heavenly world, she will become "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners." Nothing can stand before her.

Sir Walter Scott tells us, in his Life of the late emperor of France, that it was ascertained, in the progress of scientific war, "that that commander will be victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides." It was the practical application of this principle that crowned the arms of Buonaparte with such astonishing success. The principle is equally applicable in Christian tactics. Here, if anywhere within the whole range of social being, union is strength. To be successfully aggressive upon the powers of darkness, the forces of the Christian world must act as a unit. They may have their separate and appropriate banners, but must all follow the *one* standard—the standard of the cross.

Why is it that after the lapse of more than three centuries the principles of the Reformation have gained a no more extensive currency? Why is it that so large a portion of our own Protestant America is still unevangelized, and that more than four-fifths of the human race have never heard of the sinner's Friend? Is there any defect in the system of instrumentality appointed by God? No, indeed. That system admits of extension to an indefinite degree; of extension adequate to the wants of the world. All of the means, and appliances, and instrumentalities, requisite in order to the universal diffusion of evangelical truth, are now at the command of the church. The desideratum is, concentrated and persevering effort. We want union. The Protestant churches need bringing together, so that they may act in concert. And when brought together in spirit, their union wants imbodiment, form, visibility. Protestants are now infinitely more harmonious in their feelings and views than Romanists; and, when confederated in the manner proposed in the book of which we are now about to take our leave, they will even present an outward aspect of far greater unity: for it will be a union of love, and not of external force.

Cazenovia, N. Y., March 22d, 1845.

Art. VII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Explanatory Notes on the New Testament.* By Rev. John Wesley, A. M. A New Edition, with the Manuscript Corrections of the Author. Large 18mo., pp. 416. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

For a brief exposition of the sacred text, we have long considered the Notes of Mr. Wesley the best extant. Early in our ministry, in connection with the text, we read them through by course, and were charmed with their beautiful simplicity. The plan of the work is, in connection with a literal translation, to give the sense in as few words as possible. There is little of elaborate criticism, but the result is generally highly satisfactory. We see that the commentator is a profound Biblical scholar, and that he gives us the results of the best efforts of both ancient and modern times for the illustration of the inspired writings of the New Testament, though he spares us the trouble of tracing the processes by which they are secured. We have long wished Wesley's Notes more generally diffused among our people, and particularly that our young preachers might always have them at hand. We hope the present small and cheap edition will secure this desirable object. We think all will admit that the work is beautifully got up. The type, though necessarily small, is exceedingly clear and readable. We earnestly recommend this edition of Wesley's Notes to our people, especially to the young of both sexes. But no *young preacher* should be without it.

2. *The Pilgrim's Progress from this World to that which is to come. Delivered under the Similitude of a Dream.* By JOHN BUNYAN. The Text divided into Chapters: with an Introduction; Index; Notes, chiefly selected from Bunyan's own Writings; and a Sketch of the Author's Life. By Stephen B. Wickens. Illustrated with a fine Portrait of Bunyan, and numerous Engravings on Wood. Large 18mo., pp. 478. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

No uninspired book has passed through so many editions, been so universally read and admired, and done so much good, as the "Pilgrim's Progress." Editions of this work, "with notes," have generally been least acceptable and useful, because the notes are too often dry hobbling commentaries upon what is already sufficiently plain, or mere sectarian cant, offensive to the more liberal and purely orthodox reader. We confess we could never be induced to turn aside from the text of Bunyan to read the prosing annotations of Scott, or the sectarian dogmatizing of Mason and others. The notes of the present edition are mostly made up of passages from Bunyan's other works: when they are original they are short, judicious, and evangelical. The preface contains a better account of the bibliography of the work than we have ever before seen. We cannot occupy space to sketch all the peculiarities of the edition. The whole will be found suited to the wants of our people, and the diligent editor and annotator will receive the gratitude of the church for the able and faithful manner in which he has executed his task. We hope no Methodist family will hereafter be without "Pilgrim's Progress."

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3. *The Superannuate: or Anecdotes, Incidents, and Sketches of the Life and Experience of* WILLIAM RYDER, a "Worn-out" Preacher of the Troy Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Related by himself. 18mo., pp. 160. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

THIS little work is made up of interesting and amusing anecdotes in relation to a most singular character, still living, though wholly deprived of the powers of locomotion. The beautifully told story of his being lost in the woods is worth more than the price of the work. If any one who has the use of his limbs can read the story of the extraordinary sufferings of "the superannuate," without thanking God that he is not a cripple, we are much mistaken. The book is a mixture of the sublime and the ludicrous, the great and the little, the something and the nothing, which a man of an eccentric cast of mind, who can do nothing in the world but *think* and *talk*, might relate concerning himself. And by the way, traces of genius and scholarship mark the work, much to the credit of the writer of the story.

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4. *Sketches and Incidents; or a Budget from the Saddle-bags of a Superannuated Itinerant.* Vol. 2. 18mo., pp. 197. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

OUR "superannuated itinerant" has taken another "budget" from his "saddle-bags;" and we doubt not that many will desire to learn something of its character. So far as we are able to judge, the second volume is equal in interest to the first. The writer relates his anecdotes in an easy and pleasing style, and never fails to add pious reflections. Such efforts to snatch from oblivion the stirring facts of the early history of Methodism in this country, and the more private events, and the truly apostolic achievements which marked the career of *our old preachers*, will always be received with favor. We hope this volume will follow the former, wherever it has found its way; and that both will have a wide circulation, and be the means of imparting a lasting blessing to the church.

5. *One Talent Improved; or, the Life and Labors of Miss Susan G. Bowler, a successful Sunday-School Teacher.* By B. K. Peirce. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

This biography has only to be read to be useful. Few memoirs of departed Christians are so well adapted to the wants of the times. Plain, practical, and simple, it will address itself to every one's comprehension and sympathies. Free from the tedium of didactic works, it inculcates the best of precepts, all illustrated by a lovely and consistent example. The teacher, and we might say any Christian, who does not find this a deeply-interesting and profitable book, will have reason for close heart-searchings, and for inquiring whether indeed he is aware of the nature and responsibilities of the work in which he professes to be engaged. We rejoice to believe that there are thousands who will delight in the perusal of these pages, and will draw from them instruction, encouragement, and consolations of the most valuable kind.

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6. *The Infant Teacher's Manual; for the Use of Sunday Schools and Families: containing fifty-two Scripture Lessons for Infants, with Hymns.* By Rev. Daniel Wise. 18mo., pp. 179. New-York: Lane & Tippett. 1845.

For a long time past, the want of a work like that now before us has been generally, and in many instances painfully, felt throughout our connection. In the progress of the great sabbath-school enterprise, one of the happiest characteristics of the present age, it has been found that very young children may be profitably instructed in the most important doctrines of the word of God, even before they learn to read. Hence, an infant department is now considered an almost essential branch of every well-organized Sunday school. The Manual before us has been prepared with express reference to this state of things, and is designed to furnish every teacher of such a school with a body of practical divinity, adapted to the comprehension of very young children. It is drawn up in catechetical form, and interspersed with hymns, inasmuch as singing forms a very important part of the exercises of an infant Sunday school. There should be no delay in placing this work in the hands of every infant Sunday-school teacher throughout the entire church. Many who have hitherto been unable to establish such a department in their Sunday schools will have their greatest difficulties removed by the use of this work. Nor should it be sought for by teachers alone. Parents universally ought to procure it for use in their families, either as a help to the instruction of the infant Sunday school, or as a substitute for it, if they have not the opportunity of sending their children to such an institution.

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7. *The History of Romanism: from the Earliest Corruptions of Christianity to the Present Time. With a full Chronological Table, Analytical and Alphabetical Indexes, and Glossary. Illustrated by numerous accurate and highly-finished Engravings of its Ceremonies, Superstitions, Persecutions, and Historical Incidents.* By Rev. John Dowling, A. M., Pastor of the Berean Church, N. Y. 8vo., pp. 672. New-York: Edward Walker, 114 Fulton-street. 1845.

We have not been able to examine this work so fully as we could have desired. But from a particular examination of portions which relate to the most important points of the general subject, we are persuaded that it is a work of great interest, and is calculated to do much good. The author exhibits a commendable diligence in the collection of materials, and judgment in their selection and arrangement.

Popery is at present an exciting topic, and too much information as to its character and history cannot be obtained. The people of this country know too little of the real character of *the great abomination*. We hail with gladness all proper and judicious efforts to set the subject in its true light before the American people, and most heartily commend the present work to the notice of our readers.

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8. *Chemistry, as exemplifying the Wisdom and Beneficence of God.* By GEORGE FOWNES, Ph. D. Chemical Lecturer in the Middlesex Hospital Medical School. 12mo., pp. 158. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. Philadelphia: J. W. Moore. 1844.

THE various departments of science are made to contribute to the enlargement of our views of the wisdom and goodness of God. The present work is a "prize essay" upon the demonstrations furnished by "chemistry," of the great and glorious truth, that the Author of nature is wise and beneficent. The facts are perspicuously stated, and the deductions natural and conclusive. The argument from the atmosphere is a beautiful specimen. The different gases of which atmospheric air is composed are not chemically combined, but only mixed. Their proportions could not be varied without the most destructive results upon animal and vegetable life. And then if it were not for a principle of "diffusiveness," by which an equilibrium is preserved, the denser gases would settle and the more rare rise, and this would blast the earth in the twinkling of an eye. Surely "the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord." In general we commend this volume to our readers: there are, however, just at the close of the work, some expressions which seem to squint toward latitudinarian views of the *divine benevolence*. The supposition, too, that the race of men may "wither away and disappear, like the ichthyosaurus and the iguanodon of old," is rather *ultra geological* for us.

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9. *An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE. 12mo., pp. 234. Philadelphia: H. Hooker. 1845.

SEVERAL strong efforts have been made within a few years past to show up the absurdities and inconsistencies of President Edwards' book on the Will: a book which, as a Presbyterian clergyman, in conversation with us upon the subject, once said, resolves itself into these three nonsensical truisms, viz.: What has been, has been: What is, is: and what is to be, will be. This same book has been pronounced "unanswerable," perhaps as many times as there are lines, or even words, in the volume. The works which have lately appeared in the form of answers to this great work are those of Professor Tappan, President Mahan, and Mr. Bledsoe. Of the first we have spoken heretofore; of the second we may speak hereafter; of the last we now say, that it is a decisively clear, strong, and conclusive production. The deeply laid trains of sophistry by which the great fatalist bewilders and deceives his unsuspecting disciples are, by our author, laid bare. We have not space to say all we wish to say of this book. It is a masterly effort, and the friends of the great New-England necessitarian will have to try again or give up their idol. We heartily thank the author for his book, and most cordially recommend it to our readers, bating somewhat for the *new divinity* of the *fifteenth section*.